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This thesis -- originally entitled “Reckoning the Unnamed Fabric”, 
both a cultural study of the poetics of ecological consciousness and 
the ecology of poetic consciousness -- investigates the post-Romantic 
legacy informing John Burnside’s (b. 1955) poetry from The hoop 
(1988) to The Light Trap (2002) as a case study.  The thesis argues 
that a developing aesthetic form and movement in subject derive from 
Burnside’s increasing involvement with ecological thought and 
practice.  This move to the poetry of the oikos begins with an 
investigation of the self through the reconciliation of subject with 
object (or human with nature), and latterly has moved into a 
sustained reflection upon the idea of dwelling.  This thesis relates 
the chronological development across Burnside’s nature poetry to an 
aesthetic infused with religious iconography and language, which via 
an evolving motif-poem of ‘world-soul’ or ‘communal fabric’ increases 
in its secular and empirical inflection.  I read Burnside’s elevation 
of historical materialism s a progression in Wordsworthian craft and 
as a result of the poet’s pragmatic reflection on dwelling; I argue 
that the poetic consolidation of the intrinsic value of nature as an 
active and guiding spirit promotes nature less as a place for 
inhabitants than as the site and point of relation. 
 
The argument responds to Burnside’s transatlantic perspective from 
which he questions what it means to live as a spirit, and what a 
poetics of ecology can achieve in respect to the human subjective 
lyric and the need to transcend the human into the collective.  To 
address these questions, which are implicit in Burnside's oeuvre, I 
draw upon Heideggerian poetics and American post-Transcendentalist 
Romanticism.  I locate Burnside’s poetics within philosophical, 
aesthetic, and ecological frameworks.  First, Burnside’s poetry is 
primarily a poetics of ontology that understands the ‘I’ within the 
midst of things yet underpinned by epistemology/hermeneutics; second, 
Burnside exhibits neo-Romantic poetry that has engaged with Modern 
American poetry -- it is this fusion that I call post-Romantic; 
third, the ecological constitutes both Burnside’s political stance 
and his aesthetic-poetic stance.  I read the latter as a reflection 
of Jonathan Bate’s notion of the ecopoem as the “post-
phenomenological inflection of high Romantic poetics”, an idea which 
is most apposite when read in relationship with Burnside’s path 
towards the metaphysical inscribed in the historical. 
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MOT   The Myth of the Twin, 1994 
 
SIF   Swimming in the Flood, 1997 
 
ANS   A Normal Skin, 1998 
 
TAD   The Asylum Dance, 2000 
 
TLT   The Light Trap, 2002 
 
TGN   The Good Neighbour, 2005 
 
AL   A Lie About My Father, 2006 
 




Full publication details are to be accessed in the bibliography.  I 
reserve the formulations ‘ch.’, ‘p.’, ‘pp.’, ‘pt.’ and ‘sec.’ for 










Every great poet creates his poetry out of one single poetic 
statement only.  The measure of his greatness is the extent to which 
he becomes so committed to that singleness that he is able to keep 
his poetic Saying wholly within it. 
 
The poet’s statement remains unspoken.  None of his individual poems, 
nor their totality, says it all.  Nonetheless, every poem speaks from 
the whole of the one single statement, and in each instance says that 
statement.  From the site of the statement there rises a wave that in 
each instance moves his Saying as poetic saying.  But that wave, far 
from leaving the site behind, in its rise causes all the movement of 
Saying to flow back to its ever more hidden source.  The site of the 
poetic statement, source of the movement-giving wave, holds within it 
the hidden nature of what, from a metaphysical-aesthetic point of 
view, may at first appear to be rhythm. 
 




I. Initial Outline 
 
This thesis forwards an overarching framework to access the poetic 
output by John Burnside (b. 1955) from 1988 to 2002 as a progression 
toward the metaphysical and the ecological as a single move.  As a 
study into the contemporary poetics of ecological consciousness 
Burnside’s anti-dualist position to reconcile mind and matter, and 
being and world is read as an attempt to reconcile the material and 
the spiritual.  This disposition is illuminated by his belief in a 
contingent self and a non-contingent soul (“Iona: A Quest for the 
Pagan” 22)1 -- the evident gap bridged by an ecology of mind.  It is 
imperative that the reader keeps this duality within the context of 
its extension: this mind achieves a gathering of the self as a form 
of (dis)possession, where “[you] suddenly [see] yourself from 
outside” (25) –- an historical perspective and modality that offers 
consciousness as the site of interrelations and not the ordering of 
relations.  This is a prerequisite to understanding the 
interdependent exchange between mental ecology and physical ecology, 
and it underpins the politics of representation (both of ‘I’ and of 
other) within the poetic site Burnside constructs.   
I read the poetry without recourse to Burnside’s short stories or 
novels for they do not share the same conceptual premise of inquiry 
into the limits of the lyrical.  Burnside stipulates that his oeuvre 
is concerned with “healing” (Dosa interview 22), and that his prose 
works operate within the process of discovery and journey toward 
this, while his poems are works of attention (as a means); these are, 
he conceives, “different branching paths off that [one] road” (21).  
Burnside’s first novel, The Dumb House (1997) replays the experiment 
                         
1
 Hereafter referred to as “Iona”. 
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of the Egyptian king, Psammetichus I to discover the first spoken 
language.  Burnside’s prose develops from here to explore human-to-
human relationships within specific landscapes and under certain 
historic conditions; the poetry remains interested in the idea of 
ursprache but evolves into an interest in written language.  In 
chapter two I review Burnside’s interest in the formation of circuits 
of the brain in my exposition of the poems “Chain Work” and “Source 
Code” (CK) and their associative lexis in information technology, 
reflecting upon the capacity to forge new links and reorganize 
self/object to adapt to new environments/learn new skills (‘willed’ 
dwelling).  Each language places its own stamp upon the brain 
creating highly distinct neuronal connections, self-sufficient brain 
networks (Wolf).  This encourages Burnside to forward the experience 
of the lyrical ‘I’ replicated in the reading process; a process that 
highlights the disposition beyond information processing and 
discovering solutions: it is thought-in-action.  I read Burnside’s 
phenomenological aspect with this in mind.  It is generative energy 
that carries the sense that truth is created by the self but also 
that the poetics of self-to-world (both nature and text, exaggerated 
by the associative dimension of the intertext in Burnside’s oeuvre) 
creates inferentially, analytically, and critically cogent subjects 
receptive to world-to-self dynamics.  This undermines anthropocentric 
comportment. 
What is primarily of interest to a reader of the poetry is that it 
is a scientific premise that informs the spiritual.  For Heidegger 
scientific principles banished the traditional value of things and 
enabled a view upon material and world that reduced them to mere 
resource abstracting them from the context of life and work, the free 
play of letting be.  Burnside follows Heidegger but injects 
ecological principles back into the mix.  The resulting aims of this 
project are to posit reader and text into a creative semiosphere i.e. 
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to participate as agents in the larger play of the poems across 
collections and the oeuvre and to collocate poems within the textual 
referencing offered by the poet, finding each poem as a nexus of 
meaning simultaneously critiquing and foregrounding a 
phenomenological pulse that centres the ‘I’ and the reader.  This 
raises distinct problems, especially in TLT: 
 
Who is that reader who knows a lot about Lucretius, but who also 
knows a lot about the notion of ‘home’ in Heidegger, and who 
reads a lot of Wallace Stevens, and who reads Walter Benjamin 
and Heraclitus in the original German and Greek respectively, 
but who also reads Latin passably and is also well-versed in the 
botany of the British Isles?  Burnside’s ideal reader would have 
to be better read than Coleridge. (Richardson 143) 
 
I do not disagree completely, but I do see the use-value in following 
up references and creatively making connections across the Frankfurt 
School and earlier German thought out into a post-Puritan 
sensibility.  Measuring the advantages and disadvantages posed to the 
general reader by this approach is not an emphasis of my qualitative 
analysis but I do address intertextuality throughout the thesis in 
terms of aleatory poetics offering illumination upon sources, and 
specifically in terms of peritext in chapter five within a thesis on 
the poetics of structure.  However, to return to my position above, 
the interest value for the reader of Burnside’s poetry listening in 
on Burnside’s science is sustained in that Burnside’s disposition is 
one fully aware of the level of materiality in late twentieth century 
culture that can no longer retreat to the pastoral or indicate the 
pre-linguistic.  This does not marry or sit neatly within a paradox 
beside the letting be of things, nor do the two terms offer a simple 
contradiction, but they are terms resident within every collection 
under analysis in this thesis.  As a means to indicate the possible 
bridging of the pre-linguistic and the voicing of world, or to see 
them in relation, Burnside’s canon is posited as an ecological and 
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phenomenological reconciliation of nature poetry within British 
Romanticism and American post-Transcendentalist post-Romanticism.  By 
this, I indicate that a post-religious view of the sacred is offered 
to a reading of the traditionally conceived sublime, ephemeral, 
transcendental and other-worldly, brokered by terms of ecology, self 
co-extensive with world, and a view of the imagination drawn from the 
influences of New England and its hinterland, and the wider arc of 
twentieth and twenty-first century Americana.  These offer relation, 
I argue, not non-relation. 
 
To propose Burnside’s oeuvre as a suitable candidate for ecocriticism 
to enlarge upon, this thesis extends Jonathan Bate’s ecological 
tradition outlined in Romantic Ecology: Wordsworth and the 
Environmental Tradition (1991) and The Song of the Earth (2000) by 
positing traditional criticism alongside phenomenological analysis 
across poems to view their incorporation into an emergent oeuvre 
embodied by post-Romantic ‘metaphysical-ecological’ poetry.  I arrive 
at this position after reviewing the literary and environmental 
stress in Catherine Rigby’s response to Bate.  Moreover, my 
understanding of their debate and my reading of post-Romanticism 
suggests that the compound is an attempt to understand home in a 
material and spiritual sense always locatable by an ‘I’ in the life-
world to emphasize that one is never exempted from the field of 
inquiry, one is embodied within it.  This consideration of the degree 
that sense impressions and intentional consciousness constitute world 
promotes the lyrical device drawn from an ecologically sensitive 
model of encounter, which could be termed ‘enworldment’. 
This project to understand home within a scientific and rational 
account of nature is gaining kudos inside and outside the humanities 
in this new century, however the larger issues this brings into 
relief -- how we critically examine home and how human epistemologies 
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offer narrow conceptions of home in terms of exile, nation, or 
belonging -- are those that Burnside’s poetry has encouraged this 
critical examination to address.  I am concerned with Burnside’s 
progression from the Romantic problem of ‘I’ and mind/other not the 
politics of self and nation state, nor self determination.  
Furthermore, it is very interesting that as a centre of perception 
Burnside’s lyrics attempt to posit creativity within historical 
materialism.  This subjective control is bound further by the 
empirical grounding often expressed by Burnside’s attentiveness to 
qualia: “the specific textures of our experience of the world” (Bate 
“Eco laurels”), in itself promoting legitimacy to exploring the 
universe through human consciousness while also supporting a view of 
experience as a tool for direct awareness of the universe.2  This 
qualifies the paradox between transcendent/metaphysical thinking and 
historical materialism and negates the view on the British poetic 
which does not offer lyrical enlightenment of the circumstantial and 
the profoundly mysterious in the manner that Burnside’s enchantment 
forwards. 
To see how these concerns are deposited in the early poetry is to 
afford a view of an accumulative lyric that evolves into a vessel of 
diluted egotism in TLT; here it reaches Martin Heidegger’s meaning of 
Being as relational in terms of pure forces that hold the world 
together: the intentional stance of the phenomenological overridden 
by extensionality.  Here the fabric of world, biosphere/ecosphere, 
takes on greater significance as it increases in its material 
inflection and is reflected in the poetic device (the poem) itself.  
This approach to reading Burnside’s lyrics begins to uncover a device 
synthesizing two terms of a dialectic, foregrounding and 
                         
2 A unique engagement for Bate; the poet featured neither in Song nor 
in “‘The Green Line’ of Contemporary Poetry’,” The Line of 
Contemporary Poetry, The British and Irish Contemporary Poetry 
Conference, St Anne's College, Oxford University, 22 Sept. 2006. 
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contextualizing phenomenological reconciliations of the immanent and 
transcendental.  Why the need to marry these terms is still a 
preoccupation in the twenty-first century remains a point of interest 
to readers in so far as the displacement of God -- however far from 
memory -- is rekindled within the metaphysical aspect of nature (or 
the world’s worlding and human Being i.e. how things are) as strong 
elements within Burnside’s secular, redemptive ethos.  Readers 
sensitive to the failed projects of modernity or the rise of 
insecurity, global capital, and depleting resources, may find this of 
value without the need to regain a religious disposition.  While 
Stephen Priest argues that existentialism is still available for the 
purpose to restore metaphysics (224-238) Burnside’s main argument is 
not one of faith or salvation but one of reconnection, which he views 
through relationships (dynamically between and across people, place, 
and history), healing, and the lack of selfhood. 
The coalescence of immanent and (traditionally conceived) 
transcendence in Burnside’s oeuvre is mapped by the thesis viewing 
the metaphysical-transcendental compound from the positions of 
philosophy, aesthetics, and ecology within a schema that has an 
internal logic shaped by Burnside’s pronouncements.  The feature of 
the compound -- that it will not precipitate -- is a feature of 
Burnside’s approach to the perception of nature, which manifests in 
the form of his collections.  Burnside’s criticism and pronouncements 
as a poetic and cultural commentator are examined alongside the 
texture of his poems to show that the interplay between these forms 
is his contribution to philosophical and cultural activity in late 
twentieth-century and early twenty-first century Britain. 
 
I.A. Prolegomena and Central Claims 
 
At the time of writing, Burnside has released ten volumes of poetry 
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beginning with Th and most recently GS.  2006 marked a significant 
period in Burnside’s career.  He released his first autobiographical 
work (AL) and published Selected Poems, signposting a termination 
point to a first period of subjective meditation upon the human 
condition.  Burnside has moved from the dwelling trilogy into a book 
on responses to art and spiritual thought, GS, while publishing his 
sixth prose work, The Devil’s Footprints (2007), and his twentieth 
book in as many years, the apocalyptic novel, Glister (2008).  His 
poetry continues to be published in literary newspapers and magazines 
and shows that he has extended the metaphysics of TLT.  The extension 
suggests that TGN represents a retrenchment or strategic retreat, 
pulling back to go further forwards.  The economizing of metaphysical 
contemplation in TGN occurs at the point in a process analogous to a 
stream finding its path: the way the water reaches an obstacle, backs 
up, accumulates a lake, and ultimately starts flowing again: the mind 
envisions an arrow’s line with a knot-like circle.  This reformulated 
energy is still under composition and cannot be analysed in full, yet 
the latest collection (GS) indicates it is Burnside’s post-dwelling 
priority. 
It does not come as a surprise to the author that Burnside has 
very recently revisited his mentor, Stevens, in the Faber series, 
‘Poet to Poet’ (Stevens Selected).3  Stevens is a towering influence 
upon Burnside, a poet “responding... to the demands made by 
twentieth-century philosophy and science for a new way of thinking” 
(Burnside in Stevens Selected xi).  Stevens’ invitation to consider 
questions “with a long philosophical pedigree” (Eeckhart 109) and to 
express their insight poetically (Critchley 4) are touchstones for 
Burnside’s exploration of Romantic ventriloquy and improvisation, 
constellating in an aesthetic that pushes “poetry and its maker out 
                         
3 Published in May 2008, subsequent to the candidate’s defence of 
this thesis.  See also Burnside, “The Wonder of Daylight.” 
Bristow 8 
of a servile, derivative position in society” (Robinson, J. 97), 
effectively positing his own work within a line of poetics that works 
in the complex field between making and knowing.  This is a site 
“which effectively illustrates some of the difficulties critics have 
faced” in articulating a critical paraphrase of an abstraction or 
‘neutralising’ of poetic forces within texts (Jackson).  It is a very 
difficult site where “nature, history, and ontology” are no longer 
foreign to each other for they operate within a fiction where “nature 
and spirit find themselves rather than being estranged in each other” 
(Rajan 311, emphasis added), something that I propose the Burnside 
critic should endeavour to enter into relation with.  My analysis 
suggests that TLT is a significant collection under the influence of 
Stevens, both as the volume in which Burnside realizes the ecological 
imperative within the philosophy of dwelling (at the mid-point of a 
trilogy on this theme), and because one may read the poetry within 
this volume as quintessential ‘late’ Burnside prefiguring things to 
come.  These are my claims and each chapter follows this macro 
perspective while offering important elements to each stage of this 
progression. 
The early poetry from Th to MOT begins with the individual 
navigating the spiritual and physical environment, which in its 
conclusion registers an idea of self that is viewed simultaneously 
internally and externally, reflecting upon subjectivity and 
objectivity.  I attend to ecological resonances with this in mind.  
Chapter one considers the theoretical framework within which to read 
a contemporary neo-Romantic poet while evoking how this particular 
mapping of the individual is exemplified by the writer inscribing 
himself into the text.  This leads to ideas of Burnside’s particular 
rhetoric of presence owning the intention of articulating the 
possibilities of ecopoetics.  Chapter two investigates Burnside’s 
early poetry, the idea of self, the other, and borders between the 
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two, which completes a particular use of mythical and religious 
iconography in the fourth collection, MOT.  Chapter three reads the 
poet’s transformation from the earlier solipsistic journey (where the 
majority of characters are an inflection or idea of the self) into a 
discourse upon healing as an example of Burnside navigating the 
environment without map, prescribed values, nor consciousness that is 
determined (or willing) to read meaning in every sign (and endorse 
the a priori) -- that which the phenomenological stance attends to 
but often fails.  This chapter observes the collection SIF, which 
contends with differing forms of remediation and repentance -- 
secular, religious, emotional, intellectual, and physical; the 
analysis portends Burnside’s move towards a poetics of dwelling in 
ANS, also within consideration here.  This later collection brings 
two important issues to the fore: first, Burnside’s return home to 
Scotland and his reflections on making new relations to an old place; 
and second, the articulation of this re-settlement as acutely 
meditative: I state that it is found through a particular engagement 
with the American poet, Wallace Stevens, and via an exilic 
consciousness rather than forwarding ideas of origin. 
I argue that this engagement pushes Burnside’s poetry towards a 
poetics of the metaphysical and the immanent through extensive 
contemplation upon what it means to dwell: that is to live and to 
think.  ANS ends with substantial thoughts on Burnside’s dwelling in 
Anstruther, Scotland, and prefigures the contemplative mode of 
settlement that configures TAD developed in chapter four.  I read the 
Scottish context into this volume as an extension of the idea that 
exile is a precondition to dwelling, and affords a mode of 
settlement, this is as close as I come to a British, Gaelic, or 
‘culture of dispossession’ framework.  As a form of anti-nostalgia 
and acceptance of the loss of origin, this progression anticipates 
the correct framework within which to read TLT.  It centres the 
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analysis in chapter five where Burnside’s most relevant collection 
for the project of ecocriticism is read for its vision of the 
ecological-metaphysical compound.  The conclusion to the thesis as a 
whole is thus a simultaneous conclusion to this final chapter.  I 
conclude the thesis with statements in the afterword. 
 
As a thesis on a living poet whose work is incomplete, and as an 
attempt to stage a thorough inquiry into Burnside’s poetry with 
limited published criticism, this work can only ever be provisional.  
Burnside’s oeuvre, which he has related to the concept of “an ever 
elaborating poem” (Burnside and Holloway, “In Conversation”; Burnside 
“Notes Towards an Ecology of Home”) is reminiscent of the idea of a 
metaphysical “single key” (Heidegger Language 161).  This takes it 
philosophical premise from late Stevens, the idea in “An Ordinary 
Evening in New Haven” (The Auroras of Autumn, 1950) of the apartness 
between eye and experience.  The “endlessly elaborating poem / 
Displays the theory of poetry” (28: 10-11), which, to Stevens, is a 
Heideggerian “barrenness that appears [as] an exposing” (30: 7), an 
understatement or poverty in which things slowly and intricately 
emerge.  It is that which through the power of reworking becomes that 
which “was something imagined that has been washed away” (30: 12) 
toying with repetition, memory, firstness and emptiness it finds a 
sense of remembrance or foreknowledge.  In Wordsworth this can be 
viewed as the “rhetoric of repetition”, or poetic ecosystem evoked by 
the poet “continuously present[ing] overlapping or superimposed 
relationships and patterns of relationships” (Kroeber Ecological 54).  
Ultimately it is what “sensitive readers without being mystics or 
romantics or metaphysicians” according to Stevens:  
 
feel that there probably is available in reality something 
accessible through a theory of poetry which would make a 
profound difference in our sense of the world (Stevens cited 
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Burnside in Selected x).4 
 
For Burnside, Stevens’ oeuvre is an ecological example of the 
theory of poetry substituting the theory of god: “the progressive 
development of human society toward an ideal of harmonious individual 
development and cooperative interaction” (Carroll “Stevens” 88-89), 
“because one comes to think of it” on repeated reading, Burnside 
stresses, as “a single fabric, a lifelong discipline” derived from a 
“disciplined mind at work over a long and thoughtful lifetime” 
(xiii).  As a representational semiotic system, Burnside’s poetry 
moves forward by circling around itself, revisiting and reworking 
images, themes, lines, and moments from his work and from specific 
poets and thinkers.  It is thus that I propose that Burnside’s neo-
Romantic intertextuality and the poetic architectonics of reflection, 
refraction and recreation as modes of synergy across things, is 
specifically problematic and perplexing: Graeme Richardson labels 
this “an extraordinary, extraneous life-support machine for one frail 
idea, the numinous” (144).  It is as if the poetry is predicated upon 
the lines of interconnection across a diverse range of thinking, and 
that it is predicated upon the processes of reworking, continuum, and 
emergence -- hall-marks of ecological thought.  The imagination in 
this paradigm is viewed as a cohesive interdependent, circular 
process and dialectical tension: a cosmology of human mind and 
external world that views creation as responsive and generative 
source.  This complexity has not yet been articulated by Burnside’s 
critics, but I aim to situate this under the aspect of accumulation 
and circling.  It is a central emphasis in my thesis. 
I read Burnside as a poet reworking poems and structuring 
collections and the oeuvre to create an ecology of meaning driven by 
                         
4 Wallace Stevens, letter to Delmore Schwartz, 26 Apr. 1948, Letters 
590. 
Bristow 12 
a poetic barrenness that relinquishes some of the poet’s 
responsibilities and therefore agency.  Above all other arguments I 
declare that Burnside’s most central statement, the belief in a 
contingent self and a non-contingent soul (“Iona” 22), is given the 
rhythmic “metaphysical-aesthetic point” (Heidegger, “Language in the 
Poem”) in Burnside’s praxis within an oeuvre conceived as one long 
poem (Holloway) and “a single fabric” (Burnside in Stevens Selected 
xii).  I am reading this as a “self-transforming continuity” (Kroeber 
Ecological 55) that once had imagination as a central concept but now 
finds the necessity to forward the individuality of each 
moment/unit/action within an empty space of possibility as a means to 
show the integrity of the whole.  Moreover, the variation of 
meditations upon “things seen and unseen, created from nothingness” 
(Stevens “An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” 28: 17 Collected) is a 
post-Wordsworthian creation/perception problematic in Burnside’s 
inquiry into the ‘I’, memory and home.  This Burnsidean denotative 
act is cyclical, frustratingly indeterminate, yet synthetically 
alluring.  In his oeuvre of reworked poems lies energy so delicate 
and interwoven that one poem can shift the focus of the body of work 
that aided its formulation within the series, and thus reformulations 
of the oeuvre are endlessly possible.  This poetic fabric, what 
Robert Crawford has called Burnside’s “‘poetico-eco-philosophical’ 
perception” of what science is (Contemporary Poetry 10), has 
determined the necessity for a chronological approach, which has been 
chosen in order to elicit useful academic counters for an initial 
analysis across the collections while remaining mindful of 
circularity, repetition and the ineffable stain in the co-extensive 
fabric of the mind and world.  It is no more than architecture to 




I.B. ‘Reckoning the Unnamed Fabric’ as Eco-criticism 
 
The implied reader -- a predisposition laid by the thesis itself – is 
interested by an inquiry into the heart of the paradox of Being 
forwarded by Burnside’s poetry: that of a contingent self and non-
contingent soul.  I begin my approach to primary texts following 
Félix Guattari’s political insight into the determining factors to 
the existence and intelligibility of discourse.  This speaks of the 
“components of subjectification” (36) over the subject model, and the 
common praxis of the subject group (128), in effect offering 
phenomenology that is rehabilitated to a complementary understanding 
between mathematical and intuitive mind.  It is the anti-essentialist 
discourse of relations not states.  “There is a kind of relationship 
of uncertainty between apprehension of the object and the 
apprehension of the subject”, Guattari states, “so that, to 
articulate them both, one is compelled to make a pseudo-narrative 
detour through the annals of myth and ritual or through supposedly 
scientific accounts” (37, original emphasis).  The detour, is 
composed of “repetitions”, “rhythms and refrains” (38), the supports 
to existence that authorize “a discursive intelligibility” (37).  
Through third-wave ecocriticism, this paradigm of authority can be 
seen by the reader to be deconstructed and reconstituted by 
ecological models, much like Burnside’s intertextuality and 
elaborating poeisis where power is disseminated, devolved, and 
accountable in its relations outwith the detour. 
Ecocriticism has moved on from Kroeber’s ethos “to make the 
humanistic studies more socially responsible” (Ecological 1), where 
an emphasis on “sensory, emotional, and imaginative aspects in art” 
over the rationalistic (2) meet the new stresses of materialistic 
“Neuronal Darwinism” or the definition of each organism through its 
interactions with its environment (7).  Recent positions include the 
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“explicit critical response” to the unheard dialogue between “text 
and the environmental surroundings” (Love 16) which translates the 
question of truth into the question of praxis.  Poetics as techne, 
therefore, is increasingly under scrutiny for its own understanding 
of its discipline and its relation to the human as “cultural 
creatures” (9).  For Phillips, the doctrine of social construction is 
now enveloped by scientific and literary versions of realism and the 
discourse of natural history, which challenge the idea that 
enculturation is alienation (that nature is socially constructed) and 
that our knowledge is solely representational (x-xi).  Nature may be 
difficult to realize in this new critical light, but the last thing 
to be argued as legitimate ground is a naïve realism to fulfil empty 
and negative statements born from the post-modern.  The broader post-
Romantic context views the modern separation of the substantive 
reason (as expressed in pre-Enlightenment metaphysics) into morality, 
art, and science, as a project that can rearticulate an understanding 
of world and self without an emphasis on moral progress or the 
control of natural forces.  These domains were arranged by the 
Enlightenment into aspects of validity, i.e. truth, justice, and 
authenticity.  Romanticism deprogrammed this arrangement to lay the 
grounds for Modernist inquiries into the structures of each of these 
realms of culture.  The eco-critical extension to this inquiry 
examines pragmatist and post-structuralist concern for things-in-
relation and otherness within sites of interaction, with particular 
bias to stressing the representational conditions under which human 
and nature are posited. 
Ecocriticism has remained marginal in cultural studies yet its 
beginnings in the academy in the early 1990s as a site of resistance 
to Anglophone conceptions of continental theory that denied access to 
the real world, situates it at the heart of critical thinking.  Here, 
human constructions (techne of art, thought, built environment etc.) 
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are viewed in the light of both the potential of negative poetics 
(relinquishing meaning or centrality of the human rather than the 
impossibility of communication) and the inseparability of nature and 
culture, environment and individual, as a means to read subjecthood 
(or being) located within the human and non-human world.  Reciprocity 
between text and environment, or the politics of representation in 
ecocritical accounts, therefore, has “tended towards the 
phenomenological point that language is a deconstructible system 
abstracted from experience and evolved through metaphor” (Wheeler 7-
8).  Moreover, it is acutely sensitive to the fact that categories 
and forms of knowledge cannot be mistaken for things, but 
acknowledges that its conditions of possibility as a critical 
methodology are “certainly real” in that they are based in the hard 
bottom of empirical facts.  I read an analogy between ecocritical 
politics of materialism and Burnside’s emphasis on history.  Both are 
evolutionary responses to bring forth the world.  Burnside’s poetics 
recapitulates rather than deconstructs the tension between an 
ecological poetics and one that is anthropogenic; the lyrical ‘I’ and 
the ontological ‘I’ in his poetics should be felt in association with 
Wallace Stevens, Paul Shepard, and Burnside’s foregrounding of the 
historical, I argue.  This foreground often evoked by the 
phenomenological -- or the writer’s response within the poem to the 
phenomenological experience -- echoes the ecocritical project that is 
increasingly “thinking about the semantic and semiotic envelopes 
within which... a successful realism may remain caught” (8).  One 
could turn to TLT as an ironic title, to the over-use of intertext as 
a means to offer relations and reworkings, or look at the particular 
stresses Burnside places in significant moments of the potentially 
transcendental and the potentially isolated phenomenological stance: 
 
for all of them, the predicate was home, 
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if not the world of others, then the world 
of all they left unsaid; that inwardness: 
the house behind the houses in their dreams, 
the house of cold, the rooms of fern and bone, 
the refuge in a squall, the proof in storms. (“By Pittenweem” 4: 
12-17 GS) 
 
Burnside addresses his critics by emphasizing exactness while also 
leaving this open to plurality and multiplicity.  The stress on 
“that” underwritten by the possibilities of language denotation, is 
to suggest a wide “predicate”, which Burnside posits logically not 
grammatically (i.e. the sense being that of an unspecified term or 
relation, not a clause containing something about the subject), it 
works to give the disparate list the quality of “muted anagnorisis” 
(Borthwick).  That is to say partial recognition coupled to 
linguistic trepidation is evident in the ethical qualification to the 
process of naming where the signified falls between multiple ascribed 
possibilities to be imbued with disparate aspects.  This is 
Burnside’s ecological disposition rather than a poetics of 
description.  The historical aspect here is registered by the place-
name (the town a few miles from Anstruther), the allusion to T.S. 
Eliot’s Four Quartets (1943), and by the “pilots and whalers, 
authorized privateers, / fugitives, botanists, ships’ surgeons, 
makers of maps” (Burnside “By Pittenweem” 4: 1-2) that have worked 
this area; they spark off this section entitled ‘History’, and echo 
in the silent traces of the ‘I’ which is filled at the end of the 
section with waiting, for the sake of feeling “the fullness of time 
itself” (Harrison Forests 161).  This is the historical presence 
where the immediate is correlated to the recollection of the past, as 
with William Wordsworth, “suggesting thereby” Harrison argues, “that 
the origin lies deep in the reaches of the has-been and that its 
presence is repeatable, or recuperable, only through poetic memory”.  
It is the anti-nostalgic poetic memory in Burnside’s hands that moves 
what happened into what happens, and reads the soul’s link to nature 
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in conflict with being condemned to the logos. 
 
I.C. Burnside’s Poetics Read as Ecopoetics 
 
As a progression in Wordsworthian craft, Burnside’s ecopoetics 
rethinks how imagination is intricately connected to experience, both 
on a personal level in response to history and on the level of the 
poet as a creator in alliance with the world which they behold.  
Here, nature as site (a temporal space and point of relation), shows 
that human engineered associations are key to understanding the 
meaning of place, and paradoxically, that place, ever temporal, 
relates to restlessness.  In Burnside this takes on an Augustinian 
edge, the spiritual quest which acknowledges that desire is only ever 
assuaged temporarily in ‘homes’ i.e. sites of our mental 
construction.  It is thus that two significant currents to Burnside’s 
themes require presentation here.  Firstly, this thesis’ epigraph 
from Heidegger upon the soul being underway and following nature 
(Language 163-4) reminds the Romantic scholar of Samuel Taylor 
Coleridge’s learning from Plotinus and from Friedrich von Schelling’s 
System of Transcendental Idealism (1800): that the soul is drawn in 
motion and we should not look for the source, but to wait for it to 
shine upon us (Sartor Resartus, 1833-34).  This metaphysical 
relationism is restated for the phenomenological scholar in 
Heidegger’s Being and Time (1927) when he suggests that the source 
which the geographer establishes for a river “is not the springhead 
in the dale” (10).  This means that it is not present-at-hand (or 
determined by ideas of terminus and origin), but ready-to-hand, i.e. 
discovered in its use: as the wind lives in sails of boats, the 
running river is a water power, thought-in-action is the site of 
awakening.  In Burnside’s poems the sense of resource always in use 
over standing reserve is offered in his attempt to freeze time or 
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accentuate the liminal site -- most especially at night, between the 
domestic and the wild or the natural and the urban -– where stillness 
or the border is viscerally alive and suggesting that the human, as 
with all of nature, is always already embedded and is never fully 
isolated.  Unique and liminal moments like that of New Year or the 
change of season, Burnside argues: 
 
are, in our experience, the moments when the person is 
susceptible to change, where being is raw, as it were, where 
identity is less fixed, more open to possibility” (“Poetry and a 
Sense of Place”, my italics) 
 
The indication of ‘our experience’ and ‘as it were’ suggests 
Burnside’s knowledge of the human enveloping of the moment or rawness 
of world within the linguistic exactly at the point when the poet is 
attempting to articulate outside this frame.  It is an example of 
Burnside dialoguing on the relationship between frames where he is 
entrapped, while also offering a view of the way out by forwarding 
and derealizing the frame.  I locate this within patience and 
discovery as process and single modality in Burnside’s metaphysical-
ecological compound.  It is why I chose to illuminate Stevens over 
all other poetic influences; the twist in Burnside is to address 
Stevens’ imagination and write of the ‘I’ as an isolate defined only 
through being enmeshed with the other. 
Burnside’s Stevensian reworking of poems as relational versions of 
others within a textual ecology provides this thesis with an 
imperative to promote these poems -- sometimes selecting the least 
effective poems of the collections -- in order to show the method of 
thinking behind Burnside’s ecopoetics.  These instances in isolation 
sometimes fail to fulfil the pretensions of the conceptual structure 
of the volume in which the instance of the poem resides; furthermore, 
these poems can become pulled by another line of pragmatism -- namely 
the influence of William Carlos Williams, or of Elizabeth Bishop.  
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However, I am suggesting that Burnside’s ecopoetics are to be first 
read in relation to Stevens and Burnside’s anti-dualist position on 
the paradoxical contingent and non-contingent self/soul dialectic, as 
a means to understand the identity of the lyrical ‘I’ within 
prolegomenon. 
With incredible consonance to Stevens’ ‘anecdote poems’,5 Ricou 
considers the dilemma of existential man’s claim to existence through 
his mark on the land: the curious duality of man as nothing and as 
everything he creates, a lone vertical figure upon a horizontal land 
that is dominant and primordial regardless of the effort to humanize, 
articulate, and imaginatively encompass land (Vertical Man).  
However, while Ricou posits a shift from James Thomson, George 
Crabbe, and Oliver Goldsmith in post-Romantic interior landscapes and 
technically defined and limited areas of contemplation, he argues 
that the paradox of a deep bond with world and the idea of nature 
read as man’s antagonist presented simultaneously, is one solved by 
prairie fiction’s double motif of intruder and of prairie as the 
mirror of emptiness.  Comparably,  Burnside’s consistent effort to 
write of ‘something’ and ‘nothing’ as ontological states and 
processes evokes existential thought and an inquiry into sense 
experience, “a sort of positive breakthrough to the essentially 
provisionary nature of the seen world... and the invisible region 
that hovers at our backs” (“The Wonder of Daylight” 55). 
As indicated by his use of the human ecologist Paul Shepard in TLT 
-- taken out of context of the anthropological contemplation of the 
prairie (Animals 35) –- Burnside’s poetry is charged by what Ricou 
(moving on from his consideration of the Confederation poets in his 
earlier work towards a deeper literary environmental aspect) labels 
                         
5 Particularly “Earthy Anecdote” and “Anecdote of the Jar”, but also 
“Anecdote of Canna”, “Anecdote of Men by the Thousand”, and “Anecdote 
of the Prince of Peacocks” (Harmonium, 1923). 
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“proprioception” (“Ecotopia” 55).  This draws from the lexus of 
sensorimotor accounts of vision and visual consciousness to offer an 
account of representation and mind (Noë).  Proprioception in its true 
sense, reads a wider chief co-ordinative centre or rather group of 
centres of the reflex system.  Vision is a skilful bodily action 
(comportment) more than a perception that happens to us.  
Proprioception confers with the other senses, most centrally vision, 
as a means to inform human conceptions on space and the physical 
properties of world.  In Ricou’s sense of the word, it confers 
primarily with the textual mediation of the world and how this 
informs our conceptions, too.  This is the physiological aspect of 
Burnside’s verse, which brings together mind and body, and marries 
the North American poetic to Bate’s vision of the post-Romantic 
(“Eco-Laurels”).  For Ricou, proprioception, as developed in the 
Black Mountain School, North Carolina, and the Tish movement on the 
Canadian West Coast, is a model of bodily stimulations enveloped in 
an interdependent closed system.  He clarifies this as a model of 
ecology reflected in the poetic process where the poet responds to 
momentary stimuli in the instant of perception and simultaneously 
acknowledges how his reaction and writing affects the perception of 
nature and the perception of language itself.  This aspect within 
verse and self-reflection, rather than stance, intrigues Burnside, 
for it is perspectival self-consciousness that keeps track of one’s 
relation to the world (Noë 2) and it supports interdependent exchange 
between physical ecology and mental ecology that Burnside draws from 
Shepard. 
I read Burnside’s most significant poems as constructions from 
this manner which negates the anthropogenic frame that presupposes 
nature as secondary subject: Burnside’s ‘I’ is part of the ecology he 
studies.  Bate is correct to mention Burnside’s neo-Romantic 
concerns, which I marry to this North American disposition: to 
Bristow 21 
investigate the possibility of “simultaneously resist[ing] the 
Romantic fallacy of ascribing feelings to inanimate nature”, while 
also “embracing the Romantic faith in the solidity and sanctity of 
earthly things” (“Eco laurels”).  However, Bate’s thesis has been 
criticized for offering a pre-political naïve pastoralism, which 
understates a relationship of the reflections upon political economy 
and the intellectual poetics of Romanticism (Phillips, Parham).  The 
radical politics of the local and the geo-political viewed through 
ecological and biospherical models is offered in Burnside’s writings 
(Polemic, “A Science of Belonging”, “Bunkered by Mr Big”, “Iona”, 
“Masculinity”, “Mind the Gap”, “Poetry and a Sense of Place”, “Strong 
Words”,), which can be read with proprioception as foundation.  
Moreover, it is captured in the second “History” poem of TLT: “but 
this is the problem: how to be alive / in all this gazed-upon and 
cherished world / and do no harm” (63-65).  The tension in the poetic 
line resonating with the parents’ fear of bringing a child into this 
world of ecological crisis and war is one married to the poet’s 
trepidation in naming the world but attempting to enter into relation 
with that beyond the virtual and the badly mediated while also 
recognizing the poetic result (often measured against or parallel to 
the phenomenological).  However, this thesis tracks the poetics of 
ecological consciousness and the ecology of poetic consciousness, 
which is the disciplined engagement of the lyric as a structured 
relationship to nature in the logos and fundamentally presented in 
terms of craft and intuition in the aesthetic of the contemporary 
era.  Here, Burnside’s poetry registers phenomenological experience 
within historical context.  I do not see Burnside draw this from a 
Scottish-Irish hinterland.  I clarify this here before moving to a 
brief comparative study of his contemporaries.6 
                         
6 In addition to the context offered through Oswald, Oliver and 
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In Identifying Poets (1993) Crawford reads Burnside’s complex 
development of the theme of home, whether derived from displaced 
roots or not, as “an awareness of the uncertain construction of 
identity” (146).  Crawford selects “Exile’s Return” (Th) but fails to 
articulate that there is no return, that a move back to origin is 
impossible as that origin is mere construct: it cannot, Burnside 
states, “be assumed like tartan” (3).  Although racked by memory and 
myth, our common universal (i.e. non-nationalist) condition is that 
we have moved on in the knowledge that “years ago” (16) we passed on 
stories to secure us, “pretending we could find our own way home” 
(17).  Our post-modernist notion of the destabilized self fuels the 
double stress on “own” suggesting fiction and possession, if read 
through Burnside’s later poetry and the poetics of relinquishment as 
something that we can only pass on (relinquish).  It is also, rather 
than an Old World emphasis of being of the land, the discovery 
modality that allows the land to arrive in us, moment by moment -- 
satisfaction, perhaps, over tormented humanity.  Burnside insists 
upon “a view of identity that sets terrain and habitat before tribal 
allegiances”, here “the integrity of place before the idea of nation 
or state, the pagan calendar before the atomic clock” can come forth 
(“Science” 93): 
 
It seems we have arrived.  Or, more, 
the place arrives in us, a cool 
waking to the smell of pinks and cloves, 
to milky twilights standing at the door. 
 
That sense of nothing changed – the cold 
metalwork of starlings on a wire 
and neighbours’ houses huddled in the dawn 
like clockwork toys, the old 
 
memories of streets and garden fires 
and rain-laced windows watching us for years, 
                                                                      
Graham in this exordium, I urge the reader to draw from p. 51, n. 19 
(Burnside’s listing of contemporary American influences) and ch. 4 
sec. II.A. (the context for Burnside’s refusal to engage with 
McGonigal’s frame in Irishness in Modern Scottish Writing). 
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expecting some event, just making fit 
our incomplete deceptions and desires. (“Home” CK) 
 
“Seems” stresses mental figuration over embodiment or emplacement.  I 
do not read these lines in the manner that Crawford reads “Exile’s 
Return” (Th), as the “uncertainties of identity and homing glimpsed 
in an explicitly Scottish context” (Identifying 147), because I do 
not see the highly personal example as context but as an example of 
unity brought about by the cast of the poet’s mind from cosmos to 
dwelling place.  It is the occlusion of bounded, labelled geography, 
rather than an indication of place that informs the paradigm and the 
language.  Burnside has spoken of Th’s two exile poems and his return 
to Scotland by stating that he “did not feel like an ‘exile’ in 
England, so much as exiled within a capitalist and industrial 
society”, one that undervalued “land, the arts, rational thought, 
civic values, compassion, the imagination”; while northern Britain 
may offer a different value space, Burnside stipulates “I feel just 
as much an exile now as I ever did” (Dosa interview 10).  His 
disinterest in “nations” or “belonging to a nation at all” (17) may 
well delineate the ‘national’ psyche that he attunes to, but it is 
more important to stress that he is “bound to the terrain around 
[him]”, that reflects “a relationship with a piece of land and that 
could be anywhere”.  This is a testament that I put under a little 
pressure in chapter four by presenting complementary Scottish 
sensibilities, but I am more sympathetic to the dispossession and 
humanist anxiety that Burnside promotes as a working-class anti-
capitalist who refuses to place self-determination and devolutionary 
values (sound ecological premises) within an acute and particular 
Scottish context alone.  The point of “anywhere”, for Burnside, 
derives from sympathy to a tradition outside of the islands: “I’d 
probably never have considered writing poetry without having been 
exposed to poetry” he states “from outside the British context” 
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(19).7  I feel that this should not be ignored when critically 
assessing his cultural poetics. 
In “Home”, much like in “Exile’s Return”, it is the false economy 
of the “making fit” of our stories to desires that will be forever 
“incomplete”, loose and open if we allow them to be.  In fact, the 
attempt to pin specific bordered places as context for a form of 
diagnosis and classification is exactly what Burnside’s poetic 
epistemology seeks to undermine.  As method this diagnosis is a 
version of scientific taxonomy that constructs a truth of its own, 
while strong to convince one part of the mind this method brings its 
futility into relief by the thoroughly convincing things and fullness 
that it leaves out.  I read Burnside’s poetry developing the interest 
in symbiosis and the transitions of the natural world -- evoked in 
Ricou’s proprioception -- as one where “Home”, open to any place, can 
be reread in “Koi” and “Blackbird” (TLT) especially, and throughout 
TAD and TLT as a poetic study of the exchanges between physical 
ecology and mental ecology.  This is the most important aspect of 
Burnside’s poetry and is the central point of interest for his 
readers.  It promotes poetry that is not a facile pastoral, or ‘back 
to nature’ politics, but a work seen as complex, nuanced and 
sensitive, working out of how nature comes back to us.  Here, poetics 
as ecological work beyond blood, soil, and categories, are the hub of 
the circle of hermeneutics reconfigured as ecopoetic proprioception 
in Burnside’s “post-phenomenological inflection of high Romantic 
poetics” (Bate Song 262).  My thesis tracks this both in Burnside’s 
poetry as an example which Bate crystallizes in this phrase and in 
the Romanticist intellectual hinterland and Burnside’s interest in an 
American tradition. 
                         
7 Central to this is not only the North American dimension that I 
outline in the thesis, but Burnside’s interest in Spanish twentieth 
century poets, Frederico Garcia Lorca, Antonio Machado and Jorge 
Guillen (Dosa interview 9). 
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I.C.i. Stepping Back to View Post-phenomenological Hermeneutics 
 
My thesis does not represent the measurement of traditional 
interpretive models against ecocritical and phenomenological 
criticism; it is fundamentally concerned with the progress in 
Burnside’s poetry towards an ecopoetics.  In taking his oeuvre 
chronologically, chapter by chapter, my critical methodology 
progresses to an experimental criticism in the final chapter, as I 
move towards what a phenomenological criticism could be for reading 
contemporary ecopoetics -- this interfaces intertextual theory, post-
phenomenological theory, and North American poetics. 
The role of the ‘Framework’ chapter is to act as ground for this 
development in the thesis; it is positioned as a single event for the 
reader, both clarifying my position vis-à-vis Bate within an 
ecocritical understanding of the post-Romantic, and indicating future 
critical moves.  The chapter following this, ‘Formations’, is thus 
radically different in its more traditional critical tools, that only 
later shift -- as the poetry shifts -- to grounds for reading the 
ecological aspects of the concept of ‘dwelling’ as both the verb to 
live and to think, respectively heightened in the collections 
represented in chapters four and five (TAD, TLT).  The parallel 
development in oeuvre and literary method finally rests upon 
intertextuality as a means to address the contradiction of non-
anthropocentric ecopoetics delicately centred upon an inquiry into 
authorial consciousness.  But, it is consciousness, I stress, that is 
more historical and collective in a wide sense, than it is authorial. 
 
Burnside is, perhaps, more akin to Mary Oliver than any other 
contemporary poet is.  This is stated not to compare genius but to 
associate their observational mode made through patience and tonal 
precision reflecting on the fictive transcription of nature.  Both 
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poets dissolve lyrical pronominal frames into subjective awe, which 
are collapsed as readers share the site of amazement and awareness of 
the distance to cover between nature and human, poet and reader (I 
speak of this as the lyric’s proprioception being paralleled in the 
reader’s experience of processing Burnside’s interconnected poetry).  
Burnside attempts to capture a view of the world while his work, like 
Oliver’s, is driven by contemplations of the conditions of 
possibility for experience, relation, and (re)construction; this 
predilection fuels their phenomenological dimensions.  These suggest, 
to me, that Burnside’s refusal to give voice to the natural world 
through plummeting the lyric into the consciousness of natural 
objects (trees, birds, rivers etc.), promotes a lack of 
appropriation/territorialization, and foregrounds an ethics of the 
‘I’ to report the immanent through encounters by which it is involved 
(particularly transparent in his deer poems).  It is here that a 
subtle difference between Burnside and Alice Oswald can be 
discovered, but more importantly, a distinction between him and his 
colleague at St Andrews, Kathleen Jamie.  Jamie’s The Tree House 
(2004) democratically wrestles between the conscious states of human 
and (those imagined) of nature as distinct ontological modalities, 
proffered by stance, aperture, and perspective working through the 
possibilities of phenomenalism.  This opposition can be viewed in 
distinction to her prose work, Findings (2005).  Here nature writing 
meets a fusion of autobiography and travel writing with the 
anthropocentric vantage heightened in an exploration of surroundings.  
These drive forth the domestic frame to negate any transcendence from 
the history of negotiations within lived experience, the site where 
no relations are fixed.  It appears to complement Burnside’s poetics.  
At the same time it understands “if we work always in words, 
sometimes we need to recuperate in a place where language doesn’t 
join up” (Findings 164) and the prose dwells in these places before 
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moving on toward psychogeography and a conversation with the natural 
world.8  This work fundamentally proposes a technique of noticing, 
what Sampson has identified as the “quality of attention” in new 
nature poetry (117); furthermore, it speaks of the time of world 
reflected in the time of reading, that which Burnside has spoken of 
in light of Jamie’s poetry: “for the duration of the poem the reader 
experiences the same way of looking” (Scott “In the Nature of 
Things”), something that resonates with his contention against nature 
poetry: “I never write poems about anything, but the context of the 
poem is metaphorical” (Dosa 11, original emphasis).  This is noticing 
instilled in the reader. 
I find a subtle difference between Jamie’s way of looking and 
Burnside’s metaphor of vision, the latter is poetry “creating a 
space” and intending “to stay close to a spontaneous impulse” (22).  
As an inescapably anthropocentric centring, this does not mean it is 
anthropogenic i.e. the experience is to the human but the world is 
not of the human.  The impossibility of thinking yourself out of the 
world in Jamie (a concern shared by Burnside) investigates human 
pathology within a poetics of intention and involvement, which does 
not resonate with the American impulse to the degree that Burnside’s 
poetry does: his poetic shifts back one degree into the more 
philosophical and abstract poetics of perception and the grounds of 
experience, rather than “the care and maintenance of our noticing” 
once in a site (Jamie Findings 109). 
Burnside’s human ecology in his poetry does not take the subject 
of nature as his starting point, either through the Jamiean tension 
in consciousness (or modality) or anthropocentric lens underwritten 
                         
8 See “Aird’s Moss” (2005) -- a palimpsest of recent wanderings 
contemplating the slow reclaim of nature in the post-industrial 
landscape of the author’s great-grandparents’ home transposed onto 
family stories, nineteenth century census ordinance surveys, 
histories, and union reports of the Lowland mining village of 
Darnconner, Ayrshire. 
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through refining techniques of observation.  Burnside, as with 
Oliver, takes the subject of human experience to bring forth the 
context of the madeness of our transcription of nature, in word and 
in mind.  He is a poet of the logos as much as one of the oikos, and 
much like the paradigm of his most repetitive motif, the image of the 
father lighting a fire, his poetics wrestle Promethean impulses and 
innovations with authoritarian context and affordance: he is 
constituted by but estranged from things (nature and culture).  Thus 
radical phenomenological poetics -- which in the final analysis of 
TLT neither moves inward to poetic consciousness nor displaces this 
with fragmentary objects -- offers the unification of these through 
the positing of history as the framework for our response 
to/from/within the world.  It marries de Man’s post-Romanticism to 
Burnside’s metaphysical inflection of the material: “to understand 
natural changes from the perspective of history, rather than history 
from the perspective of natural changes” (“Walter Benjamin’s Task of 
the Translator” Resistance 83).  I explore this in chapter five as my 
reading of TLT moves towards conclusions for the entire thesis, a 
move from a critical position that has read the text’s thematized 
reflections of its own relation to the structure of discourse. 
 
II. Contemporary Context 
 
The poetry of Burnside’s highly respected contemporary, Oswald, 
foregrounds a specific attunement to sonic formation that finds an 
equivalent project in Burnside’s loco-ego-description.  Ted Hughes’ 
poem “The Horses” (The Hawk in the Rain, 1957) introduced Oswald to 
the idea that “instead of describing something (which always involves 
a separation between you and the object) you could replay it alive in 
the form of sound” (Oswald “Wild Things”) -- a position restated in 
her reading of Season Songs (1976) (“Altering”).  Burnside posits 
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phenomenological experiences as a pre-requisite to ecological 
acknowledgement much as Oswald’s poetics of the “real” “presence” of 
sound operates beyond deconstruction; something clarified as the 
“linguistic and anthropological survey [which contests] that history 
should take precedence over geography [by positing that] the site of 
the poem can incorporate geography into history” (Bristow 167).  Yet 
Burnside’s counterpoint is delivered by historically contingent 
subjectivity distinct for its colouration via the motion of the 
landscape and the encounter between external world, sense perception, 
memory, and mood -- an emphasis on process and context rather than 
language to the degree pronounced in Oswald.  I shall clarify this 
further in my exposition of the ecophenomenality posited within 
Burnside’s poetics throughout the thesis. 
Oswald is Britain’s foremost ecological-geographical grounded poet 
whose reading of Hughes inspires her to reach for “the whole sacred 
and speechless background of nature”.  The documentary, local 
reportage and knowledge within Oswald’s poetry would not be 
undervalued by Burnside, yet his reflective stance and metaphysical 
inquiry opens his landscape-mindscape to the “speechless background” 
(Oswald “Altering”) in a different manner.9  While Oswald offers an 
absolute agency encompassing human and natural as twin elements of 
the same, Burnside is deeply engaged with the realm of perception and 
the implications of apartness heralded within. 
 
certain evenings a little before the golden 
foam of the horizon has properly hardened 
you can see a tiny iron island 
very close indeed to the sun.  “Excursion to the Planet Mercury” 
1-4 (Woods etc.) 
 
This distinct poem in the remarkable Woods etc. suggests that the 
poet can modernise and compress the lyric of Dart and the oral 
                         
9 See Burnside, “The Rhythms of Wind, Tide and God”. 
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(Georgic) tradition into unique imaginary semantic visions.  The 
poet’s understanding of the limits of perception promotes the natural 
world order over the human place within it, adumbrating the ‘I’ with 
the second person pronoun presented via the human pulse but dispelled 
by the larger cosmos.  The difference between Oswald’s indigenous 
poetics of the settler and Burnside’s vagrant poetics of re-
inhabitation -- although both of these are the reverse of 
colonization -- underlines the differences in the poets’ itinerant 
wanderings.  While Burnside and Oliver write of the encounter of 
nature, Oswald speaks of the interface between human and nature via 
the process of making (i.e. poeisis or work) while Burnside offers 
muted poetics to emphasize the potentiality of events, the suspension 
of thinking as contemplation of the conditions of possibility for 
experience.  Moreover, Burnside’s poetry does not evolve from a 
single point of origin, i.e. a tradition beginning with Wordsworth 
and finding influences running through John Clare and Edward Thomas, 
and through toward Ted Hughes, that is suggested by Oswald despite 
her incorporation of the classical.  It is a singular contention that 
I argue: Burnside’s poetry distinguishes itself from a British 
framework through its engagement with phenomenology and American 
post-Romanticism.  Thus, Wordsworthian restlessness of the human 
spirit -- that “something evermore about to be” (The Prelude, 1805 6: 
542)10 -- is given discrete tones of alienation rather than latent 
Christian revelation.  Thus I position Burnside alongside his 
contemporaries, Jorie Graham, Jane Hirshfield, Jamie, Michael 
Longley, Oliver, Oswald, and Charles Tomlinson.11  The British and 
Irish poets find significant forerunners in the nature poetry of 
Seamus Heaney and Hughes, while the Americans position themselves 
within a post-Transcendentalist and post-Modernist idiom.  All in 
                         
10 All references are to the 1805 text, unless indicated otherwise. 
11 See p. 51, n. 19. 
Bristow 31 
differing degrees are committed to an ecology of mind. 
 
Burnside and Oliver offer a challenge to the criticism upon Romantic 
consciousness that is predicated on the boundaries between self and 
nature, consciousness and unconsciousness, soul/body, and 
transcendence/immanence.  The Romantic attempt to unify these 
mythologically opposed pairs becomes a crisis in representation of 
alienated consciousness where new unities are only availed in 
transcendent imaginations.  As with post-Stevensian poetics, these 
poets understand the potentiality of events over intellectualized 
contemplations of the conditions of possibility for experience, 
relation, and (re)construction.  One may read an emphasis in the 
poetry from the a priori condition under which empirical objects can 
be further determined (Kant) to the experience and way of the world 
where the disadvantages of the phenomenological lyric is 
counterbalanced.  Burnside and Oliver write lyrics whose accent of 
the crisis of meaning is underwritten by contemporary crises of the 
disappearing world inflected by metaphysical colouration: “if this 
suggests late Romantic concepts of immanence”, Carol Rumens 
ruminates, “the religious sensibility often seems more eastern than 
western, more Zen than Judaeo-Christian”, beside “passionately 
conservationist principles underlining the reverence”. 
Burnside’s voice is consistent in the manner of Oliver’s narrow 
palette.  It is located in a state of awe vibrating with energy 
charged by an exploration of the tension between observation and 
visionary experience often located during cognition of the margin or 
the edge of perception.  Both poets take their subject not of nature 
but of human experience in the world often reflected in the encounter 
of nature, which enables them to investigate ideas of perception and 
epistemology, and modes of being.  Oliver’s consciousness motif is 
threaded by the movement of mind within natural cycles and is 
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articulated as a fluid immersion (McNew 65-66), whereas Burnside 
offers poeisis by forwarding relation of body to cultural history.  
Here, the qualification to pure phenomenological poeisis suggests a 
vision of soul travelling with body and mind susceptible to the flux 
of nature within history.  This is vehicle to the mental location of 
subjecthood within context.  It forwards the implicit question, not 
of the existence of soul, but as Christensen reads in Oliver, “how 
durable it is”, and if soul “is merely a product of consciousness 
that vanishes at the moment of death” (138); in Graham’s words it is 
“the mutability of the external meeting the mutability of the 
internal” (“The Art of Poetry” 66) and thus resonates with Burnside 
contingent-non-contingent paradox and desire to live as a spirit 
(Dosa interview 19). 
This poetic is gaining recognition in American literary theory as 
the common pragmatic mysticism and empowerment of the post-Stevensian 
fold, that which could be expressed as the poetics of doubt and awe 
coupled in a single track of potentiality.12  It is secured 
contemporaneously by Oliver and most acutely in Graham, as a 
spiritual process forever reworked to measure the contingent and the 
non-contingent (what is necessary and what is fictional).  The 
Weilian context reveals poetic expression of an immanent void and 
forwards the Stevensian imagination (and self) as part of a broader 
creation where the world arises simultaneous to the de-creation of 
self, resulting in the phenomenological dissolved into a wider, 
emergent process.  It is the post-Romantic version of the sublime 
                         
12 See Kit Fan, below, p. 332; also Ira Sadoff “Trafficking in the 
Radiant: The Spiritualization of American Poetry”, American Poetry 
Review, 34.4 (2005): 11-14, and Timothy C. Baker, “Praying to an 
Absent God: The Poetic Revealing of Simone Weil,” Culture, Theory and 
Critique, 47.2 (2006): 133-147.  These essays are given the correct 
theoretical and historical context when read alongside Joseph 
Riddel’s boundary 2 article “Interpreting Stevens: An Essay on Poetry 
and Thinking” (1972) which reads Heideggerian poetics and Helen 
Vendler’s analysis of Stevens in On Extended Wings (1969). 
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encounter where an approach to the void is an approach to the divine 
not yet manifest.  A site, traditionally, where poetry reveals its 
own limits; thus, for Stevens, promoting the qualified 
phenomenological, “the seeing and unseeing in the eye” (Stevens 
“Notes Toward A Supreme Fiction” 6:18 Collected), a version of the 
non-intrusive “conceiving self” (Dogget 284).  Burnside appears to 
lay challenge to this, or struggles in his attempts to achieve this, 
or forwards the difficulties or paradoxes presented in poetically 
constructing this position, as I shall show.  For Eliot, this was 
“passion, housed in the transitory and irrational, [which became] the 
main obstacle in his quest for fixity and permanence” (Sadoff 13); it 
is a quest abandoned in Burnside following an inquiry into binding 
and loosening (TLT). 
Extending this onto Burnside may read his presentation of drift 
over stability (TAD), and the cyclical return of nature and history, 
as a move to forward a critique of progress within the narrative arc 
of the myth of redemptive perfectibility rather than him offering an 
ecological phenomenological stance as the resolution of subject-
object relations.  However, in the light of Graham, Oliver, and Anne 
Carson, this poetic represents a dismantling of wisdom and 
incompleteness where the “text cannot be a creation complete in 
itself, but neither can it fully reveal the void” (Baker 138).  I 
read Burnside’s version of this being consistent with Graham and 
Oliver, and one that suggests Heideggerian ‘sparing’ in its 
incompleteness and prosaic nature, again elevated or attempted in 
‘full’ in TLT. 
 
Stevens writes on the possible consolidation of the internal and 
external: 
 
The subject matter of poetry is not that ‘collection of solid, 
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static objects extended in space,’ but the life that is lived in 
the scene that it composes; and so reality is not that external 
scene but the life that is lived in it (“The Noble Rider and The 
Sound of Words” 1942, Necessary 25). 
 
It is this space where slight shifts in attention in Burnside and 
Oliver dramatically highlight Stevens’ model of variation as an 
attempt to construct home in the same manner that he writes the self: 
as a verb, a vessel of process (Voros 83-84). 
In short, Burnside is as an interpreter or reckoner of our times, 
a practitioner of fictive truth highly sensitive to the world that 
exists for our perception and re-imagination as the word’s etymology 
suggests.  To stretch or to reach is retained in the Dutch rekken and 
German reken but lost in Old English.  The root rek found in recche, 
is “to tell, narrate, expound”, as well as to “pursue one’s course” 
and “proceed in one’s way”.  Old Frisian rekon and Low German reken, 
furthermore, designate a quality particularly used to represent an 
unobstructed street.  Burnside’s use of the verb for the anthology 
celebrating the anniversary of the publication of Silent Spring 
(1962) by zoologist and biologist, Rachel Carson carries ideas of 
measurement and transport in the pre-modern sense of unmediated 
realization in addition to judgement in the contemporary economical 
and theological use.13  Deploying this word as the raising of 
consciousness suggests that poetry -- as a visionary capacity of our 
species -– is something that runs against evolutionary progress as 
either random mutation or a response to threat, more it teaches us 
new ways of understanding nature holistically. 
 
II.A. Literary Review 
 
A considerable percentage of this thesis traces the space between the 
publication of Th and the publication of TLT.  I will briefly 
                         
13 Oxford English Dictionary 1 Oct. 2007 <http://dictionary.oed.com>. 
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introduce this through the criticism of Burnside’s British and Irish 
peers. 
 
Mark Wormald considered Burnside’s first collection as one that “sets 
out to formulate a creed”; a creed that marries the fidelity of the 
world of the poem to that of the world we share, to a science of 
community.  This is an accurate analysis illustrated by the early 
preoccupation with death, dreams, and memories in Burnside’s first 
three collections.  Burnside’s early poetic output works through an 
idea of individualism that acknowledges the empirical world alongside 
“intangible presences”; these presences, for Tom Nairn, show how “the 
borderlines between the actual, the tangible and dream, delusion and 
illusion” are deconstructed (178).  I follow Nairn and read this 
deconstruction coupled to an opening of the intellectual domain(s) in 
which the poems operate and during which “the esoteric connotations 
of such questioning is vividly encapsulated”.  The creed that 
interrogates epistemological frameworks finds its place within a 
poetics of settlement, as Alan Riach finds “the pact one makes with 
one’s childhood or self between selves” is one “touching the spaces 
between imagined certainties” (108) and this is why Burnside’s poetry 
is tinged with the metaphysical and the non-contingent soul alongside 
the empirical and historical ground. 
An initial analysis provided by Wormald, Nairn, and Riach, 
suggests a mystical poetics where an indeterminate site or selfhood 
resists the tangible.  However, Burnside’s poetry defies this 
mystical inflection -- as we see in his progression toward the 
empirical and to the ecological as a means to writing ‘home’ -- yet 
has remained concerned with a poetics of awe.  Th is unmistakable for 
its environmentalist inflection from the front cover photograph of an 
oil spill, the reference to the tragedy of the commons (“Runners”), 
and its use of the American Sioux figure Black Elk (1863-1950).  This 
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figure alludes to the elite “mythic”, which Paula Gunn Allen defines 
as incorporating the spiritual past, the mystery of experience, and a 
creative sense of ‘the word’ over a fictive sense; a site where the 
private self is redirected into communal reverie via non-divisive 
language that leads to the dynamic fulfilment inherent in sharing 
breath and song (242-5).  This imperative, incredibly, is sustained 
right through to the complex ecological poeisis of TLT.  It is sacred 
in that it involves “an intangible but very real power over force” 
(258), what Burnside has indicated as “right dwelling” over 
“violence” (Dosa interview 19-20).  This resonates with an ecological 
ethics of relinquishment as a means to restraining unsustainable, 
anthropocentric force, and couples with Burnside’s desire to 
“understand the choices, implications and possibilities of dwelling 
in a ‘world’” (“On The Light Trap” 8) with an intelligence attuned to 
that beyond the imagined certainties while also rationally finding 
the “moral dimension” to actions (Oxley 64).  Moreover, this site of 
Aristotlean rationality and Kantian ethics is viewed as energy, which 
is figured as being lost or “broken” in the title poem (“The hoop”) 
but is supported by the British pre-Christian Green Man deity of 
rebirth and healing (significant conceptual counters): it is perhaps 
the first move to open the aperture into Burnside’s ecological 
praxis.  Later, more subtle referencing to exile, ecological poetics, 
and American ideas of home (TAD, TLT, TGN) replay the energy field 
within the wake of Burnside’s indictment of late Capitalist failings, 
“the political ground zero of the Imperium” (Oxley 59). 
Moving forward to the reception of the TLT, it is obvious that a 
consideration of the volume in isolation can deliver negative 
conclusions upon Burnside’s output.  It has been argued, “a poem 
that’s exact about mystery without being exact about meaning is 
always going to remain meaningless”; that is to say, poetry is open 
to criticism when its modality is felt as a “descriptive that eludes 
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description” (Richardson 133).  Alongside Richardson, Lucas reads 
Burnside’s elusion as “irresolution” (29), Whyte as “befuddlement” 
(81).  For Borthwick, however, Burnside’s use of language “is 
calculated scrupulously not to evade but to capture the very quick of 
one’s receptive experience of nature”.  As such, Burnside represents 
a model of the peripheral mental climate within Scottish poetry as 
outlined in Sean O’Brien’s text The Deregulated Muse (1998).  O’Brien 
understands Burnside’s inquiry into belief, or upon the world absent 
of belief resonating with “insistent phantoms”, which underline the 
fact that “something in the external world answers to an inner 
requirement” (47).  Richardson’s criticism outlines the lack of an 
explicit and centred meaning; he rejects sentimental intuition in 
Burnside because it is bound up in repetition and thus suggests 
inexact mysteriousness or unknowing that does not deliver something 
more tangible than the allusion to the soul: “something” as alien and 
unfathomable (134).  This view is understandable and not wholly 
inaccurate yet it does not accept Poirier’s (Transcendentalist and 
Pragmatist informed) view of language where if it is to represent the 
flow of individual experience it ceases to be an instrument of 
clarity and more commonly becomes superfluity manifest, language that 
makes the world less stationary and more transitional: “an effort to 
refloat the world” (Poetry 40).  This is not to restate an intangible 
mystical element but, as I have shown in my reading of “By 
Pittenweem” (above) and I shall argue in chapter five when I read TLT 
in its full context, “something” does not represent uncertainty or 
vagueness in itself but should be read as a phenomenological based 
interaction between body and world: the inner requirement to 
reconcile, brokered by self and the impossibility of the 
phenomenological positing of the transcendental ego.  This self 
writes “by taking the part of the human individual” (Sampson 116) 
while also advertising poeisis independent from “systematic, 
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impersonal ways of thinking which attempt to disown... the very 
people who create them” (116-117).  It is the reverse view of 
Richardson, Lucas, and Whtye; as Longley has put it: 
 
When you capture something with precision, you also release its 
mysterious aura. You don't get the mystery without the precision 
(“An Outsider Searching for His Home”). 
 
There is a dependency of the lyric here upon the soft-knowledge of 
attunement.  This intuitive space is larger than the poetic gesture.  
It is a site where the languaged world is not necessarily considered 
only as a restrictive or compacted poetics but as a site of origin or 
heightened perception that lies outside the granular spectrum of the 
faculties of sense perception hard-wired to (reducible/determinate) 
meaning.  This perceptive realm can be understood as a mode of 
induction: a process differentiated from abduction and deduction, for 
it does not propose a singular directional agency (subject to the 
world, world to the subject) nor does it assume meaning to exist a 
priori (Peirce).  The creed or poetics of ‘something’ makes no 
initial distinction about the world in its initial encounter (it is 
not until the movement from the particular to the general where the 
formation of laws, principles, and judgements are found), and thus 
allows it to exist on its own terms. 
This is the phenomenological position taken in Bate’s review of 
Burnside’s collection where it is read as an ecologically sensitive 
model of knowledge and understanding -- or better, acknowledgement, 
an under-used ecocritical term despite its distance from finalized 
and categorical thinking.  Doubt alongside reason and argument is 
central to any faith or belief system, and before it is extended into 
hyperbolic rhetoric, it can enable a world to operate outside the 
human cognitive faculties -- or to extend this, to operate beyond 
technological apparatuses and the modern science of man.  Once these 
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are reduced, doubt evolves into an engagement with “something” but is 
in-itself a lesser form of pattern-seeking meditation afforded by the 
politics of visual encounters or pre-formulated categorical 
impositions.  We are reminded that it is possible to “simultaneously 
resist the Romantic fallacy of ascribing feelings to inanimate 
nature”, as Bate stipulates, “and to embrace the Romantic faith in 
the solidity and sanctity of earthly things” (“Eco laurels”), but 
also that it requires a particular politics of representation. 
To read the mystical as something impossible to capture without 
misnaming it is to lead to a false conclusion, I assert in my 
analysis of negative poetics in chapter one.  Peter Robinson falls 
into Richardson’s territory when he remarks that “the great theme of 
what can or cannot be redeemed is scouted by [Burnside’s] gestural 
verse” (11), for the gestural, to Robinson, can only signify failure.  
He continues: “[it is] neither inhabited nor inflectedly addressed” 
and thus remains within a world apart from the human.  Robinson notes 
Burnside’s use of the “fragment” and line that is “piecemeal” (11), 
that which John Redmond sees as “hastily written drafts of each 
other” (23), which actually emphasizes the “habitual nature” that is 
forwarded in Burnside’s suspicion of both intuitive emotion in 
isolation and the decisive presentation of science that these 
fragments and versions gesticulate towards.  As redress, to order the 
attitude or movement of something (self, verse) and to initiate a 
contemplation of something (object world, emotion) that operates 
beyond the linguistic world, it is a manner.  That is to say, the 
poetic resolution to this problem -- resisting ascribing human models 
upon the inanimate and assuring the (desirous) permanence and 
inviolability of the world -- should bring the way that things 
operate to the foreground rather than present how this can be reduced 
to human frameworks for instrumental advantage.  Here, the 
phenomenological technique coupled to the ‘I’ suggests an historical 
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politics of representation with an emphasis on ‘the way’ of the world 
and its terms, in Burnside’s hands it lends itself to Taoist 
inflection. 
Burnside’s attention to how things appear, how nature offers 
various agencies and manifestations forever changing through time, is 
central and an obvious ecologically sound motif.  It is this 
attention and consistent sensitivity that fuels Burnside’s resistance 
to anthropocentricism within a poetics of nature and being-in-the-
world; moreover, it is where his poetics are aligned to political 
dissidence and why it has brought anthologists to state that Burnside 
is “perhaps the most quietly and pervasively influential voice in 
British poetry in the last twenty-five years” (Paterson 26).  The 
following sections advance this argument by preparing ground for a 
phenomenological understanding of Burnside’s work that replays the 
anti-dualist metaphysical resonance of his poetry stressed in the way 
of the world and of the mind. 
 
II.B. Post-Kantian Preface 
 
As a neo-Romantic practitioner, Burnside is interested in the 
empirical and in the ineffable, in the gap between the unnamed and 
the named where the category of understanding is not present.  His 
ecopoetic effects sustained energy as process in the linguistic, 
post-intuitive state where (as with experience and intellection) more 
than sense data resides as an affordance for assertion and cognition 
by the human.  Rather than a necessary abstraction that relinquishes 
the visual to understand the universal, this ground and latency is a 
form of acknowledgement reminiscent of the site of possibilities of 
action defined by J.J. Gibson: the “complementarity of the animal and 
the environment” (127).  It is worth pausing here: 
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It’s not the bird itself, 
But what it does 
 
the vanishing - 
is what we come to learn; 
 
though nothing in the day 
feels different: 
 
the usual morning 
  street trees  lighted yards 
 the noise of traffic out beyond the point 
 
and hanging in the grey 
above our bed (“Blackbird” TLT 1:1-11) 
 
Human action posits faith within utilitarian ethics, the domain of 
intellectual responsibility, and the obligation to others.  In 
Burnside’s promotion of the bird in process as symbol of the 
possibilities of the imagination rather than imagination as object, 
its movement and the mind’s structuring are forms of the 
imagination’s representation of itself.  This is particularly 
enhanced by the couplet shifting into fractured lines where caesura 
affords opposition or daggered, multiple, and fragmented thinking yet 
moves to rest in a single view of suspension through the 
Wordsworthian deployment of “hanging”, which forwards our learning 
from our shared habitat.14  Here, the vanishing of transient bird 
meets permanence of human feeling; nature is entwined in the urban 
environment and human epistemology and dreams.   Viewing human 
projects and evidential relations as the wider self promotes truth as 
action not representation (Rorty “Faith”).  I wish to state that this 
thesis is neither concerned with the hinterland of intersubjective 
language games nor with enactive perception (body affecting mind)15; 
its objective is to widen critical positions that conclude with 
                         
14 cf. The Prelude (5: 404-422). 
15 While I have deployed Noë’s sense of proprioception, I maintain 
Ricou’s material and poetic rendering of this concept over the 
enactive (bodily) sense.  Thus my thesis is kept within Heideggerian 
phenomenology and does not enter the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-
Ponty (1908-1961). 
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statements about “complementarity”, a too easy consensus upon 
Burnside’s poetic inquiry into what is foundational in experience: 
the communion of “a song, a guide” (“Blackbird” 15), the site of our 
ethics and techne. 
It is claimed that Burnside is an authoritative voice in Scottish 
poetry (Paterson), a poet of paradox concerned with “combining an 
ambitious metaphysical reach”, Jem Poster argues, “with a sharp 
attention to the detail of common things”, where the things 
themselves inform the irreducible complexity of existence.  This can 
be viewed in post-Kantian light without ignoring language as a 
transcendental topos of shared meaning. 
The Romantic contemplation of order in the universe bearing 
analogy to human intelligence -- the correspondence or relationship 
between the structure of concepts and the structure of reality -- is 
part of the legacy that informs Burnside’s verse.  For Immanuel Kant, 
knowledge is the outcome of the interchange between sense and 
understanding.  His defence of Newtonian absolute space viewed as a 
spatio-temporal framework reads space and time as the essential 
conditions of sense perception not properties of objects themselves -
- they are terms that translate the world into consciousness.  It is 
a progressive view of a priori things available only as forms imposed 
by mind rather than a higher creator.  While David Hume argued that 
science is the only vehicle to detect the patterns of separate events 
in nature and that common life reveals the origin of ethics (A 
Treatise of Human Nature, 1739), the Kantian mind affords the 
possibility of synthesis, and opens the site of ethics to be debated.  
However, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason (1781) delineates the concept 
of dualism from the distinction between appearances (phenomena) and 
the cause of these, things-in-themselves (noumena) operating within a 
transcendent realm not theoretically knowable.  The unification of 
individual perceptions by the understanding -- given by the 
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categories as functions of judgement distinct from given concepts 
under which things fall, for they are derived from concepts that give 
unity to the synthesis of intuition (Young 110)16 -- is restrained by 
Kantian dualism.  The limits of metaphysics, of our knowledge and 
understanding, suggest the need for practical reason. 
Burnside’s “interrogation of the unending cycles of nature and the 
fleetingness of thought” (Lichtig) is coupled to the tension between 
an infinite world and a finite linguistic register emphasized by the 
poetic ‘capture’ of the world that alludes to the contingent self and 
non-contingent soul.  This in turn disputes a distinction -- or 
raises the stakes of the implications of extending a foundational 
distinction -- between noumena and phenomena.  The post-Kantian 
element to Burnside suggests that his project to rediscover the 
transcendental conditions of being from within an inquiry into the 
contingent self is one that measures only the quotidian and the 
empirical.  He claims, “that we can’t actually say that the spirit or 
the soul exists in any other way except through the material” 
(Burnside et. al., The Poetry Quartets).  This has contemporary 
implications. 
We are compelled to read a fundamental resistance by the poet to 
the use of land and energy as economic resources.  Burnside propels 
history into contemporary context to understand that “violence arises 
from the tendency to objectify others” (Dosa interview 19); not only 
does this action conceal the notion of soul, but promotes un-
meaningful relations, too.  This vision can liken the current use of 
                         
16 In Kant, intuition is brought to concepts.  It relates to a single 
object and is immediate (whereas a concept is general and mediate):  
not sensible but an immediacy or “phenomenological presence to the 
mind” (Parsons 70).  For Hume, intuitive reasoning is a priori and as 
thus cannot be used to ground inductive inferences (using past events 
to predict future events) for persistent regularities can logically 
end (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748).  For 
clarification and from hereon, I use the notion of intuition in the 
Bergsonian sense of being a fully developed method. 
Bristow 44 
the Scottish countryside to the ecological loss of the Highland 
clearances -- both acts of the “enclosure of the imagination” 
(Burnside “Bunkered by Mr. Big”).  However, Burnside’s stress upon 
practical engagement with everyday reality is open to a wider 
materialism, which through its theological resonance but ecological 
deployment provides his unique post-Romanticism.  This accent of the 
threshold and the provisional has been articulated most deftly by Don 
Paterson as “radiant meditations [upon the] transparent natural world 
numen” (26), the reader is directed to my reading of TAD (ch. 4) with 
this in mind.  Two points are to be made in respect of this. 
Firstly, rather than functioning as static borders, boundaries in 
Burnside are alive and active fields of practice, transparent to the 
degree that they show the thing (the object of perception, or the 
encounter) as a moment or event within a field where the human has 
trespassed.  This liminal voice is not simply peripheral, it is an 
accent of the hidden and decentred, or that which is in-between 
states i.e. in process. 
 
All afternoon, the blackbird comes and goes, 
returning the shade that glimmers in the blood 
to a silence between the trees 
and the winter sky, 
 
and shall I follow, taking up the life 
that waits to happen: creature memories 
and blood-heat; colours; stitchwork in the bones; 
the singsong heart that beats amongst the leaves? (“Blackbird” 
3: 14-21) 
 
The questioning voice is already answered in the emphasis of 
threading in ‘stitchwork’ echoing the positing of ‘shade’ as a 
darkened double and potential for metempsychosis.  Here, the idea of 
silence is given further meaning in the use of comma and breath, 
often evoked unconsciously before conjunction and article, stretched 
subtly by line ending.  Interestingly, as a form of relinquishment of 
both centre and autonomous self, this voice is most apparent in 
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Burnside’s public performances where the poet does not sing the 
poetry (the music emphasized or stressed) but foregrounds spaces of 
silence within the verse by accenting nothing like meter or sense, 
but words and whiteness, a space the human as language animal finds 
difficult to enter into (hence the question). 
By contrast, in an expansive modality, the effects of letting 
words linger and dwell in the spaces and moments between things, 
heightens points of connection and relation.  Presenting the shape of 
the poem with (non-)sound rather than through inflection offers the 
participation of the listener to enter poems neither “made, [n]nor 
composed” but “heard” (Burnside “Listening To The Silence” 8).  This 
participative poetics, heightened during performance, is not ground 
for reader response theory; it is indicative of the poet’s position 
with respect to structure.  It also relates to what Stevens envisions 
as the possibility of poetics: “Some aZuence, if only half-perceived, 
/ In the poverty of their words” (“The Planet on the Table” 13-14 
Collected).  Two statements assist an understanding of this here.  
First, as an extension to disinterest in form as a determinant (Dosa 
interview 22), Burnside views himself as a maker composing music in 
the mind exerting “no conscious decision on the shape of a poem” 
(Oxley 62).  Second, Burnsides’ auditory imagination is in tune with 
the lyric that offers “nothing less than a matrix upon which all time 
may be mapped” (Burnside “Place”), “taking up the life / that waits 
to happen” (“Blackbird” 18-19).  Thus, the poet views mediation as 
something overtly concerned with the synergy between the reception 
through things and the amplification by things (the individual as 
receiver, the poet as maker), and, moreover, reads the poetic site as 
the balance between the continuum and contingency of language and 
experience.  I see this being represented through the natural world 
“amongst the leaves” (“Blackbird” 21), embedded in relation and 
action.  However, this under-emphasis on form is troubling to the 
Bristow 46 
contemporary reader who is lead by the shape of the printed verse and 
deployment of meter, particularly expansive and under the influence 
of Williams after ANS.  However, I guide the reader into this 
Burnsidean realm through sensitivity to Stevens’ “long, discursive 
sequences of his later period” (Burnside in Stevens Selected xii) by 
reading the dynamics between language and experience as one given 
over to terms of life as rawness open to change (the Weilian 
philosophy behind Stevens’ elaborations) in my readings of 
“Halloween” (MOT) and “Epithalamium” (ANS), key landmark poems in 
Burnside’s oeuvre (ch. 3 and ch. 4, respectively). 
Secondly, in relation to Paterson’s comment above, I read Kant’s 
Critique of Practical Reason (1788) postulating a noumenal self in 
search of a supreme principle of morality.  The Lutheran matrix 
informing this self as a condition of free will, which leads rather 
than follows passions, is understood as a self-governing moral agent 
(Wood 71).  It is negotiated in respect to Burnside’s attention to 
the determined experiential and historic phenomenal self located 
within a site of repose and action.  I read this not located within 
leadership but somewhere between discovery and witnessing, the paused 
emphasis before following the way of the world (“Blackbird”); I 
stress this as early ground for the consideration of Burnside’s 
ecopoetic and thus posit critical analysis of this in chapter three.  
While Kant’s metaphysics places moral consciousness outside knowledge 
and into the region of faith, Burnside’s lack of moral emphasis in 
verse -- despite his exemplification of a mind raised by the 
imperative to awaken into right dwelling -- can be seen to organize 
knowledge to incorporate this consciousness to a degree.  Whether one 
chooses to read his poetry as an attempt to unify phenomenon and 
noumena at the point of relation (imaginative and realistic) or not 
depends upon the approach one brings to Burnside’s canon; what cannot 
be ignored is the fact that nature, now at a loss to its 
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independence, is increasingly intelligible.  A phenomenological 
criticism that is sensitive to each individual author and unfolding 
moment of an oeuvre should begin with an understanding of emphases of 
consciousness by the writer under examination.  I have suggested 
Stevens for it is he above all other influences that pushes 
Burnside’s contemplation of internal-external dynamics beyond post-
Romanticism. 
 
II.C. The Interior and the Exterior 
 
The final tercet to the late Stevens poem “Final Soliloquy of the 
Interior Paramour” (The Rock, 1954), delivers an idea of light as the 
concept of God being the supreme fiction created pragmatically by 
man. 
 
Out of this same light, out of the central mind, 
We make a dwelling in the evening air, 
In which being there together is enough. (16-18) 
 
The end lines take stage as epigraph to ANS, anticipating the 
quotation from Stevens chosen by Burnside for TAD entry in the 
Scottish Books Direct Catalogue (2001) in which he tempers the idea 
that his poetry attempts “revelation” as a support system to the 
human (“Asylum”).  This support is not, however, as Denis Donoghue 
argues of Stevens when emphasizing the human fiction, “the only way 
to heal the breach between God, nature, and man”.  The way, Donoghue 
reads is: 
 
By becoming God and rearranging things according to your own 
‘light’...  Hence we say, God and the human and the imagination 
are one.  The saint is the man of thought (15). 
 
For Burnside, this light is indicative of what Charles Rycroft (1914-
1998) has called the biological level of meaning, finding the 
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rational and spiritual at the paradoxical core of being: “the 
impersonal force within which is both the core of oneself and yet not 
oneself” (“Asylum”).  For the poet, a concern with textual creation 
or linguistic fiction is vital but its operation within an animation 
or agency of all living things (and the memory of the dead) is 
paramount.  This is emphasized over the rearrangements of the ‘I’. 
Moreover, an engagement with the empirical and verifiable during 
authentic, heightened selfhood signifies the suprasensible and shows 
the individual connected within the larger world and its council of 
relations.  This draws from Burnside’s theological education and 
forms the basis of my reading.  In Burnside’s use of Rycroft, it 
points to another interpretation of Stevens’ late poem where God is 
not the object of the imagination as in much Stevens criticism, but 
as suggested in “Adagia” and “A Collect of Philosophy” (Opus), God is 
understood as the agent of imaginings and the human an inhabitant of 
this mind (God).  It is possible to read this paradigm reflected in 
Burnside’s individual poems that resonate across volumes whose 
meaning is embodied by the texture of the oeuvre.  The human as 
inhabitant as such, resists both a poetics of negativity in the 
manner that Bloom suggests in his reading of the preceding line to 
the tercet, “How high that highest candle lights the dark” (15).  For 
Bloom, this line is an assertion of “less than [it seems] to assert”, 
since it suggests that the poem and muse have become “a dialogue of 
one” (Climate 359).  As Carroll comments, Bloom resists a reading of 
the poem as the muse speaking through the poet (A New Romanticism 
310), something readers are challenged to consider in Burnside’s 
forwarding of the limitations to the phenomenological poetic. 
 




when we venture from the road 
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into a realm of shades 
and fairy rings 
 
to claim this negative 
of grass and night, 
 
where rabbits scatter 
from our turning light, 
 
and, somewhere in the grass, 
an insect sings. (“Birth Songs” TLT 1: 14-24) 
 
That penultimate comma is too much: it pressures the reader into the 
slowly emerging knowledge with an overbearing precision, something 
too forcefully pushing intuitive poetic reception in time (meter) 
into an idea (thematic) -– an ironic failure within this ethic.  
Indicative of the voice urging an imagination of the child-state 
through nursery imagery and dream-like innocence, we reflect that 
this is hardly mysterious only made.  It is almost salvaged by the 
purchase of cinematographic lexis in the word ‘negative’, which 
offers the reader space to consider the binary of night grass and 
human light as self-reflexive imposition by the poet, but it has come 
at a cost: we are asked to “claim” this as the only world we can 
afford through slow reckoning.  In more successful moments where the 
muse does speak through the poet, as in Steven’s final phase of an 
interior voice in its “obscurity” (Bloom Climate 11), this vision 
offers a much greater world where the writer is not the arranger but 
the recipient of the light, which in turn affords a reading of 
paramour -- a devotional reference to the recipient of love (God, 
Christ, or Virgin Mary) -- as pre-conceptual: if there is nature in 
Burnside’s poetry (he knowingly admits), it should be operating here.  
The site that I have defined by extrapolating two poles, which rests 
within these, is the site of co-creation. 
 
III. In Conclusion 
 
In his reading of Brigit Pegeen Kelly’s poem “Dead Doe” (Song, 1995) 
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Burnside indicates his own project: 
 
[Her method is] a bringing forth of the process of working 
through a spiritual problem, a kind of extended meditation that 
is also a thought experiment, aimed at a more or less 
provisional -- one might even say ‘fuzzy’ -- conclusion, 
reminiscent of dialectic, or that Taoist logical equivalent, 
where dualism is constantly eliminated by the yin-yang cycle 
(“Mind The Gap: On Reading American Poetry” 59).17 
 
The emphasis is upon bringing forth an ecological process that 
reflects upon the metaphysical which speaks of a complex unanimity 
between the structures of the world.  Fixing this process to a poetic 
image within a moment in time is made impossible, for in doing so it 
“sets up a whole new set of possibilities” that destroys the notion 
of a static frame.  Moreover, in the instance of “Dead Doe”, for 
Burnside, the dead body evokes blind panic in the ‘I’ of the poem, 
panic instilled by the fear of a resurrection.  His poetry questions 
the foundation of this fear. 
Re-reading the etymology of panic, Burnside notes that it is more 
than fear or terror: “It is a glimpse into the fabric of the world, a 
glimpse, after all, of the divine, and it fills its recipient with an 
inspired awe, a more-than-human vitality” (61).  In the current 
climate of paranoia and ill-defined ‘terror’ (a sub-theme of GS),18 
Burnside turns to focus upon the security of home via an attention to 
the natural world, delineating the gap between the public narratives 
on offer and the possibilities of life.  It is in this site that 
poetry redresses emasculated human responses by refusing to accept 
the virtual and packaged world by attending to the wild, and 
awakening a maieutic sense that we are part of the dynamic world of 
possibility.  In Burnside, orthodox religious morality is shunned yet 
the science of things divine is protected by the typology where 
                         
17 Hereafter referred to as “Mind”. 
18 See also “The Wonder of Daylight.” 
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religious truth is indirectly examined in relation to the spiritual 
needs of humanity.  This pragmatic idea of bringing the world 
together while respecting difference and otherness is the address 
Burnside reads as “living spiritually”, being attuned to the earth 
(Dosa interview 12-13). 
One year after the publication of Burnside’s first collection, Th, 
the poet shared ideas about his conceptual framework: 
 
Poetry became for me, without becoming merely personal, a means 
by which I began to search for and find my home...  I have been 
interested in only a few themes... the idea of holy ‘ground’, 
landscape as home... the sense of a ‘home self’ which provides a 
base, from which one may travel (Macpherson 12). 
 
In the following chapters I suggest that Burnside draws not only from 
his contemporary American poets but also directly from the 
generations preceding them -- most notably the canonical Stevens, 
Robert Frost, Marianne Moore, and Bishop;19 these help me map 
Burnside’s early commitment to a “home self” as one that is sustained 
within his progression to an ecological poetics more than a decade 
later.  As such, his post-Wordsworthian British Romanticism wears the 
burden and the necessity to escape a post-Transcendentalist 
Romanticism.  This framework impresses a dialogic imagination and 
heterologous lens upon the writer whose negation of confinement to 
the page can be identified within Scottish internationalism, the 
“intellectual DNA” of north European kaleidoscopic syncretism 
(Crawford Identifying 63), but this is identification not 
assimilation. 
 
In ecopoetics territorializing or making claims about nature is given 
                         
19 Burnside cites Jennifer Atkinson, Mark Doty, Allison Funk, Joy 
Harjo, Jori Graham, Linda Gregerson, Rodney Jones, Mary Oliver, Eric 
Pankey, Brigit Pegeen Kelly, Chase Twichell, Charles Wright, and 
Robert Wrigley as influences and peers (“American Poetry After 1945”, 
“Mind”, “Presiding Spirits”; Dosa interview; Funk interview). 
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over to sensitive naming.  This is a central point to the 
phenomenological imperative.  An imperative tentatively located 
within a meditation upon the subsuming of nature under the laws of 
understanding, what Emily Dickinson calls the “cost” of perception 
(#1071), or “circumference” (#1620).  In ecopoetics a subordination 
of reality to the imagination is bypassed for an interest of energy -
- a Romantic “directiveness” or “eternal moment” (Bristow 171, 183).  
For Gaston Bachelard, the necessary paradigm for reading this poetic 
is concrete metaphysics; for Henri Bergson, the conclusion is to 
focus upon élan vital; and for Heidegger, this force is acknowledged 
and accessible when we rethink Greek physis: “outside of all specific 
connotations of mountains, sea, or animals... the pure blooming in 
the power of which all appears and thus ‘is’”.20  Physis, for 
Heidegger, delineates more than a region of beings, more a totality 
of beings in which the world is lit up, (“The Turning” The Question 
Concerning Technology 44).  Like an epiphany, this light allows the 
world to shine on its own terms: the human (subject) and the world 
(object) released from compartmentalization brokered by an encounter 
of difference shifting into relationship much like an ecosystem 
viewed in abstraction, gradually. 
The resurrection of the invisible or the absent into forms that 
are intuited, felt, and present informs the dwelling trilogy and the 
poetry following TGN; moreover, as in Burnside’s latest poems this 
glimpse is doubled by the view or stance that brings doubt to our 
place in the world, too.  It delivers a sense that we will enter the 
continuity of the world “as creatures to be transformed into new 
lives, new forms, in which nothing of the flesh and the dreams that 
are so tender to us can survive” (“Mind” 63).  This double-edge, the 
                         
20 Taken from Heidegger’s reading of Heraclitus (535-475 BC) in 
Gesamtausgabe ed. Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt aM: Klostermann, 
1975); cited Haar Song 8. 
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“internal dialectic” Burnside recalls from the biological continuum 
within the finite resources of the earth, is also the dialectic of 
the paradox of change and continuum and the radicalism he conceives 
in American poetry as a strong counter-current to “cultural 
totalitarianism” (67).   
Throughout Burnside’s poetry I find an expression of the 
ontological alternative to succession as the one and the multiple 
where life is viewed less in transition and more as becoming that 
endures (Deleuze Bergsonism 37).  Ralph Waldo Emerson speaks of the 
rotation of thought and the resources it draws upon (lines of 
philosophy and literature) reconstituted into new forms as union.  
Emerson uses the image of shells on a beach as temporary white colony 
to evoke ideas of settlement and to evoke the idea of non-opposition 
between material and ideal.  The symbolic metaphor posits that human 
technologies are elements, too, “forever renewed to be forever 
destroyed” (“The Transcendentalist”, 1841, Collected 1: 216).  
Burnside is interested in Emerson’s “fuller union with the 
surrounding system” and he gives this Bergsonian inflection, 
especially through dreams and recollections (later stressed as the 
phenomenological transforming into the writerly) and how these 
impress upon our momentary encounters.21  His vehicle is the 
gathering of a tradition that is composed not only of an attention to 
the empirical natural world but one that appropriates the redress of 
radical poetics based on the contemplation of the infinite and of the 
nothingness that comes to being.  By this I mean both the existential 
position that finds earth as resource from which we emerge and to 
which we return, and the metaphysical sense that being depends on 
nothingness or absence, a pocket in the world and in consciousness 
from which and in which Being and becoming are visible. 
                         
21 The direct engagement: John Burnside, “Homage To Henri Bergson” 
The Red Wheelbarrow 10 (2004). 
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1. Framework 
This chapter correlates ecocriticism and Romanticism as a means 
to highlight the phenomenological aspect of Burnside’s verse and 
the poetics of the hinterland.  I present language issues that 
arise from subject-object versus inter-subjectivity debates as 
being surpassed by a Romantic ecology resident in Burnside’s 
full speech -- or the poetics of ecological consciousness.  I 
develop this from an inquiry into the critical potential hidden 
within Bate’s conception of ‘post-phenomenologically inflected 
high romantic poetics’.  
 
I. Ecopoetics and the Romantic Heritage 
 
The politics of nature in the British tradition resistant to 
capitalist modernity preceding Bate’s research extends from the 
double-fronted critique by John Ruskin and William Morris upon 
industrialization and its spiritual impoverishment, to the post-
utopian view of Raymond Williams.22  Bate’s reading of the ecopoetic 
as “a post-phenomenological inflection of high Romantic poetics” 
(Song 262) is a crucial statement for my reading of Burnside and is 
pressured by Rigby’s reading of Romanticism.  Reading Bate’s 
restoration of the centrality of nature to Romanticism, may extend 
post-structuralism.  A critical position marked clearly to negate 
misprisons of transcendental imagination and non-correspondence 
                         
22 Bate aligns his theory of Romantic ecology in Song to F.R. Leavis 
by citing Culture and Environment: The Training of Critical 
Awareness, 1933, by Leavis and Denys Thompson.  This position was 
first outlined in “Culture and Environment: From Austen to Hardy,” 
“Culture and Environmentalism,” Association for the Study of 
Literature and Environment (ASLE) Symposium, Bath Spa University 
College, 3 July 1998, subsequently published in New Literary History, 
30.3 (1999): 541-560.  Reading the tension between industrialization 
and agriculture alongside identification with republicanism in the 
pastoral, Coupe argues, aligns Bate to Levis more than to Williams, 
for the latter’s dismissal of a nostalgic, organic community (“Bate” 
15).  I argue that Bate’s instinctive “mechanism of admonition” (Bate 
“Culture” 558) negates atavism and follows Williams’ construction of 
new consciousness.  Moreover, Bate’s reading of Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte, Leavis, and Thompson transforms social Darwinism into a 
thesis on the transport between nature and civility, which for Rigby, 
resists politics of nostalgia and offers a “pre-political” New 
Historicism (“Song” 396).  Coupe reads Leavis’ poetics and his notion 
of “enactment” and “embodiment” stated in Revaluation: Tradition and 
Development in English Poetry, 1936, and The Living Principle, 1975, 
as prefigurements of ecocritical appropriations of phenomenology. 
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between text and world is, however, to insist upon representation of 
the self-with-other and a challenge to the understanding of self as 
the sole narrator of history.  It is thus that I read significant 
gravity in the application of the theories of negative poetics (Bate, 
Rigby).  Furthermore, this particular contemporary aesthetic can be 
read as post-modern in the sense that the politics of autonomy and 
identity as self-representation (internal authority over external) in 
modernity have been superseded (or extended) into the acknowledgement 
of the limits of the self (humanism, anthropocentricism).  I review 
ecocriticism’s position on these issues here before moving onto ideas 
of presencing: I indicate to the reader that these are explicated 
separately in my criticism yet are coupled in Burnside’s post-
Romanticism.  In this chapter they help me move into debates in 
language theory through the terms of apartness and techne (sec. 
I.B.), which provides a platform for reading home and the ‘I’ in 
contemporary poetics (sec. II.). 
 
Charlene Spretnak argues that the paradigm of post-structuralism 
looks decidedly similar to a model of ecology; she claims common 
abstracted ideological concepts of “soft boundaries, diversity, 
adaptability, novelty – and inter-relatedness” (222).  Fundamentally, 
for Spretnak, the fact that our existence is dependent upon a reality 
outside of our consciousness (air, water, earth), restates Bate’s 
polemic that the post-structuralist referential fallacy is to be held 
to account (Romantic 56, “Out of the Twilight” 26).  While the 
consideration of how the social construction of nature and the 
primacy of the represented in late twentieth-century humanities 
failed to consider the relation between culture and nature to the 
conclusion that cultural mediation does not eradicate material 
existence, another metanarrative is being proposed: a structural 
paradox of the necessary transcendent holism i.e. that all forms of 
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life relate to the global biosphere interdependently.  Thus a 
decentred politics that recalls from a structurally constituted 
subject to develop the non-priority of a privileged consciousness (as 
with ecology), affords an epistemology borne from an acceptance of 
finitude and conditions of experience outside of self-grounding.  One 
can read Burnside’s ‘I’ of the individual poem operating within this 
constructed paradigm. 
Gregory Bateson clarified the “epistemological fallacy” in post-
Enlightenment Occidental thought as the incorrect choice of the unit 
of survival in the bio-taxonomy.  To Bateson, contemporary ecological 
science dismisses “either the family line or the species or 
subspecies” as, “quite obvious[ly] not the unit of survival in the 
real biological world (“Pathologies of Epistemology” 1969)(491).  The 
epistemic turn of the 1830s towards the cell from the organism, and 
the Darwinian notion of evolution at the genetic level have now been 
superseded by biological research into evolution within the 
ecosystem.  This new science learns that the correct unit of 
survival, “organism plus environment”, readdresses the 
epistemological error, includes interaction within the unit, and 
offers a new series of units or differences: “gene-in-organism, 
organism-in-environment, eco-system etc.” where to destroy one’s 
environment is to destroy one’s self. 
The Darwinian population model and biological genetic model, 
superseded by Richard Dawkins’ genotype plus environment (The 
Extended Phenotype: The Long Reach of the Gene, 1982), is modified in 
Ingold’s fusion of biology and anthropology, which “locates the 
organism or person as a creative agent within a total field of 
relations whose transformations describe a process of evolution” 
(“Anthropologist” 208, my emphasis).  The synthesis of sciences of 
mind and nature in Bateson, Ingold, and Shepard, suggest different 
degrees of socio-biology deriving from E.O. Wilson and the notion of 
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a creative advance into novelty in A.N. Whitehead yet all emphasize 
the organism as the embodiment of a life process within a holistic 
topological field.  Moreover, this new vision that emphasizes 
development, implication, and possibility (epigenesis) over 
evolutionist theories of causation and genesis, promotes ecology as 
the survival of ideas, programs, and units as “complexes of 
differences [within] circuits” (Bateson 491).  These “circuits” or 
webs of interdependence underwrite all things that exist 
differentially in the universe.  As a tropology of difference and 
otherness, the literary ecological abstraction conceived as the 
holistic originary site of differentiation sustains the philosophical 
questioning of essence, determinism, immediacy, and experience.  As a 
materialist suggestion of a complex harmony from diversity (Bate Song 
229), it is a non-transcendent paradigm of the immanent world.  
Burnside works from this position when he outlines the provisional as 
freedom to realize self, the liberation from permanence.  Burnside’s 
poetry resonates in such a topological field, a science of place, 
which stresses the ‘creative agent’ by drawing from American ideas of 
co-creation in response to the problematic of the non-anthropocentric 
phenomenological lyrical ‘I’. 
In Romanticist verse, this site or fabric was conceived as part of 
an active principle that commingles humanity and nature, a force or 
vitalism deeply interfused and connective.  Pantheistic-holism is 
remodelled in post-Romanticism by the collective, auto-producing 
self, which is at once different from others yet inextricably 
compounded within a connected, determining matrix.  Bateson offers 
the rethinking of logic, system, and order within the untamed genesis 
of evolutionary becoming, which relinquishes the need to think beyond 
the concept if the concept is complex and open.  I read this emphasis 
in Bate’s stress on the post-phenomenological and Burnside’s 
imperative to locate the ‘I’ not the mind alone.  Bateson discusses 
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the fallacy as an epoch subsequent to totemism (empathy with nature 
driving social organization) and then animism (extension of human 
mind into nature), as the third phase, “separation”: from the 
structure within which mind is immanent, which leads to faith in the 
transcendental (492-3).  Thus, the “eco-mental” system supported by 
Shepard’s thesis looks at this separation and argues that the 
evolutionary unit of survival equates identically with mind (Bateson 
491).  It is how we think that determines our survival opportunities.  
Disputes as to whether this mind should be conceived as a part of the 
world or apart from the world continue to disclose themselves as my 
reading of post-Romanticism outlines. 
 
I.A. Ecopoetic Presencing in Romantic Context 
 
William Wordsworth’s “Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey” 
(1798) dramatizes the poet’s thoughts on memory and the extended 
contemplation of being within time.  This poem argues, “we see into 
the life of things” (49) only with “an eye made quiet” (47).  This 
idea works beyond Wordsworth’s Miltonic allusions to blind 
mechanistic functioning and his extension of this toward a corporeal 
and self-regulated world, for its analysis of time develops his 
reflection upon physics and causality to incorporate the 
interrelations of the human and world conditions.  Dynamics of change 
and continuum in allusion to Wordsworth’s own great theme of 
advancement from childhood to maturity, and the effects of the French 
Revolution on a personal, specifically micro-scale during the 
preceding five years to the poem’s composition, are represented 
simultaneously in the image of the “setting suns, / and the round 
ocean” (97-98) as the dwelling place “of elevated thoughts: a sense 
sublime / of something far more deeply interfused” (95-96).  
Wordsworth proposes that an acknowledgment of the diurnal patterns as 
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the larger order of sustainable and evolutionary growth enables the 
eye -- once equivalent to the ‘I’ -- to lose its egotistical 
preoccupations, instrumental gaze, and inauthentic grounding: a form 
of non-anthropocentric minding.  The tension between subjective 
experience and non-identity that resists subjective sensation as 
witnessed here is underlined by Theodore Adorno’s idea that there 
remains a promise to be read in nature: the “not yet” as the 
“indeterminate” quality of the world.  This is restated in Adorno, as 
the deliberation of the beautiful in art that could be viewed as 
latency (Aesthetic 107).  Prior to this and within a different lexis, 
Heidegger speaks of the “no longer [of God being] in itself the not-
yet veiled arrival of its inexhaustible nature” (“The Thing”, 1950, 
Poetry 194).  Ecopoetics anticipates this by enabling futurity or 
promise as a form of differentiation and deferral that requires a 
temporal logic or radical anteriority that is other than the unified 
medium of time; it can be seen as an extra step (after existence) 
away from essence to presencing (especially acute in SIF).  This, 
however, is not assertion, but what Heidegger reads as an already 
renounced claim, “namely... to a binding doctrine and valid cultural 
achievement or a deed of the spirit” (Poetry 185).  I visit this at 
the very end of my thesis in terms of freedom within history. 
Wordsworth’s “something” evokes the intangible “motion and spirit, 
that impels / All thinking things” (“Lines” 100-101) even during this 
heightened awareness.  It promotes the idea that the point of 
relation (human to world) is one where uncertainty and 
inaccessibility surmount knowledge.  This impasse is written within a 
poem concerned with being at home and being with others during the 
poet’s struggle to resist subordinating the natural world to human 
instrumentalism.  It is the Romantic statement that our point of 
relationship with the larger world and the “life of things” is one 
where we must accept uncertainty, decline control, and offer 
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ourselves to the gap between things where “an eye made quiet” can 
rest and experience a connection to the more-than-human during time 
when the world speaks for itself, arising from the shadows of human 
history.  This version of the impasse as a statement not upon the 
limitations of poetry but on the relinquishing of human assertion is 
vital to an understanding of Burnside’s ecopoetics.  Furthermore, a 
valuable analogue for this understanding exists between, on one hand, 
Romantic studies underwritten by ideas of nostalgia and inheritance 
(and the necessity to break from these to enable the full potential 
of human and earth in post-Romantic verse), and on the other, in 
ecocriticism’s distrust for anthropocentric creations and reactionary 
positions, which either wish to reach back to a modality of being 
before the reduction of things to objects and resources, or recreate 
the split between human and world via an emphasis on inherently 
constructed natures.  I read the tension between the components of 
the analogue as follows: one wishes to disinter any narrative 
regarding the metaphysical, while the other -- although founded in 
historical materialist discourse -- can afford space within this 
inquiry for an idea of nature as invisible, unfathomable, and 
operative outside of (existing hegemonic) human material narratives.  
By extension, the ecological fabric and evolutionary processes 
alongside the interdependency of ecosystems across the global 
biosphere read as one borderless totality compounded by division and 
fragmentation, motions thus towards the current classification of the 
metaphysical.  Through readings of Burnside I critique this 
necessarily evoking transcendental spirit. 
Bloom argues that British and American poetry since John Milton is 
“displaced Protestantism” (Anxiety 152), in the case of English 
Romanticism “a Protestantism astonishingly transformed by different 
kinds of humanism or naturalism” (Visionary xvii).  This Calvinistic 
humanizing of the world -- Bloom’s conception of the Miltonic 
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Romantic contrasted to the classical, Catholic, and conservative 
discourse -- begins to draw forth.  With this in mind we can 
reconsider how biblical hermeneutics once accommodated literal, 
allegorical, figural, and typological reading practices until post-
Reformation systematic theology placed primacy upon the literal.  
This presents what is now an orthodox Protestant view upon the inner 
light of the individual’s soul negating the requirement for an 
intermediary while delivering spiritual autonomy, which I argue finds 
a new extension -- or a critique of summaries of this kind as 
unmindful over-simplifications -- in the ecological-metaphysical 
configured by Burnside.  While McGann reads an element of 
Protestantism in Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel’s notion that unity 
between human and divine is achieved via self-consciousness and 
internalized contemplation rather than a unity derived from immediate 
encounters with the presence of the spiritual (45), Burnside 
encounters the empirical-metaphysical without threat to spiritual 
being.23 
The growth of dissent and civil freedom based on the understanding 
of civilization as a human institution that Bloom is drawing from 
suggests that the imagination displaces externalised antinomian 
sentiments in Romanticism.  As we will see later, for de Man, the 
poem of imagination is read as aporia, an impasse before the worldly.  
The deManian uncertainty of reading signs can be read as a misprision 
of John Keats’ negative capability or as a celebrated antidote to 
Calvinist desire, in turn offering twenty-first century ethics the 
notion that we need not judge that which we cannot understand.  
Burnside’s naturalistic humanism proposes that the earth is enough if 
                         
23 As counter to the context here, the meeting point of philosophy of 
mind and sociology of knowledge delineates the relationship between 
orality, literacy, and biology; as examined in Greek intellectual 
history by Eric A. Havelock.  See also Harold A. Innis, Marshall 
McLuhan, Walter J. Ong, and Edmund Snow Carpenter. 
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man realizes his (material) spirit, freedom, and the possibilities of 
his condition.  As Martyn Crucefix identified, Burnside repeats the 
secular miracle of Rainer Maria Rilke, “Heirsein ist herrlich” (“just 
being here is glorious”) (34); true, but it is probably gathered from 
Wallace Stevens’ position in “The Rock” (The Rock) that “in the 
predicate that there is nothing else” (143), which operates with two 
levels of emphasis upon ‘that’: the indicative mood urging empirical 
consciousness, and the meta-predicate that describes the property of 
the predicate as the force that brings objects alive and in use, 
relinquishing the idea of the other worldly.  I have stressed this to 
indicate the resultant effects of Burnside’s negative poetics. 
 
By contrast, Rigby’s Romantic poetics of place is defined by the 
unhomely encounter of the other fuelled by longing (Topographies 88-
89), echoed in the disjunction between experience and record, 
embodied life and poem: “the non-correspondence of the written text 
and its earthly referent” (91).  The use-value of an emphasis upon 
the reductive or contractive force of the finite particulars of 
language, as illustrated by specific readings of Romantic poetry, 
cannot be fully projected onto artworks of the present day especially 
those that deploy “the way”, “something”, and “nothing” as denotive 
terms.  Rigby’s unpacking of the German background to Bate’s 
criticism provides ecocriticism with a highly insightful and 
invaluable reading of European Romanticism as a qualification to the 
transcendence of human imagination over the non-human, material, 
external nature, which Rigby characterizes as an “epistemological 
modesty” aligned to the “unsayable” nature of the world (163).  
Furthermore, I argue that the non-modal forms of language capitalize 
an expressive power distinct from inert prose, “that which cannot be 
characterized by an objective predicate” (Bowie Schelling 54) or that 
which is the music and manner of the world; and while this may be 
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unsayable to a degree it can be projected as something more positive 
than an impasse.  This is where Burnside’s poetics operate, 
counterpoint to the Romantic conventions that will be identified 
forthwith.  The extensive analysis in the following sections 
emphasizes how crucial Rigby’s pressure on Bate is to my thesis; by 
implication, I read further into Bate’s ecopoetic than the use of 
language opened by Rigby; thus the following is theoretical ground 
for my reading of Burnside’s poetry. 
 
I.B. Topographies of the Pre-Conditional 
 
Rigby prefers a post-modern inter-subjectivity, for her reading of 
the subject in the modern era is one contaminated by its domination 
of the object world.  Furthermore, for Rigby, “the inexpressibility 
of Earthly presence” (Haar Song 124) affords her ground for a world 
that exists beyond the (human) text and thus by extension, beyond 
textually constructed subjectivity.  Rigby’s negative poetics 
forwards naming as obliterating the singularity of things rather than 
disclosing Being, choosing to read a model of language as a tool 
rather than an event we encounter (Rigby “Song” 396).  Language as 
the event we encounter is Burnside’s self-reflexive point in 
arresting and stilling the phenomenological imperative as I have 
shown.24  Rigby turns to Yves Bonnefoy in order to realize a crucial 
element of textuality: “the perpetual falling short [of the poetic 
world]”, namely, “the way in which it both draws us in and sends us 
forth, urging us to ‘interrupt’ our reading by returning our gaze to 
the world beyond the page” (Topographies 12, 16; “Utopian”; 
Topographies 125-6).25  With respect to the self-deconstructing text, 
                         
24 This can be seen as the slowing down of poetics via the meta-
epoché of his epiphanies (examples in later chapters). 
25 Yves Bonnefoy, “Lifting Our Eyes From the Page,” Critical Inquiry, 
16 (1990): 794-806. 
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Rigby does not accept language as ground of existence even if this 
provides for the emergence of world as (textually) infinite.  I find 
that Rigby reads against Heidegger, as I shall show, and thus has 
limited application to Burnside. 
In his reading of Rilke’s “open” as pure perception, Haar (using 
Bonnefoy) contests that sense is not the priority of the poetic.  
Haar’s position upon the limitation of the subject is set to 
emphasize remoteness rather than proximity between self and world 
where intimacy is displaced by opacity -– a rhetoric resonating with 
terms of exile (Song 139).  Haar finds Heidegger’s pressurizing of 
Rilke’s open perception into the sense of metaphysical subjectivity 
and interiority, fallible.  The distinction between human and animal 
as shown in the eighth Duino elegy (1912-1922) is one of “shelter” 
and “rupture”: the former provided to the animals for their primacy 
to be open to nature; the latter for humans as a causal condition 
derived by going beyond this natural ground (Song 122).  For 
Heidegger, the nature of the animal and the primal ground of the 
human are identical (Poetry 100-101).  A singularity is forwarded 
despite the oppositional approaches to the same.  For Haar, there 
exists only an analogy between two different relationships.  Haar’s 
emphasis on man’s reflection as a form of objectification exposes the 
calculating interiority which rejoins him to earth.  This interiority 
or primacy of the ‘I’ is undermined by the effacement of the poem, 
the “invisible” aspect of the earth (Song 123), which in Rigby and 
Haar motions the world as unsayable while collapsing interior and 
exterior world to the point that the subject is relativized and 
involved in the world.  I read this as an emphasis of mind and world 
meeting, and human epistemology in Burnside.  This, to Haar, shows 
the world or heart that the human neither inhabits nor possesses 
forwarding only presentiment and will, not fusion or ownership.  I 
return to this debate by example of TLT in chapter five. 
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Reading across Heidegger to fully understand his analysis here, 
one recalls that the subject has to open up to a path which is 
delivered by understanding (Being 148, 201).  As with the model of 
affective disposition (stimmung) that is an anchoring of Dasein 
finding itself in place but not master of itself, thrownness 
(geworfenheit) is a structure that transcends each particular 
entity/body.  As two terms which relate to a third, befindlichkeit, 
the notion of already-being-found-in-place, they show how the world 
in which the body is involved has no “raw state” (Haar Song 57) but 
is always within relations.  This facticity, echoed in Ingold 
(Perception 244-250) and James (Principles 219-278), is understood 
when being is open to reception; it is not fitting sensations to 
categories that lead to judgment (Kant).  This distinction sustains 
an analogy itself to the way of the world and an epiphanic 
correlation to or meeting of this way, not a fitting derived from 
subjective or bodily intention but one arriving in concert with the 
emanation from/of things: 
 
The feel of the maze 
when I sleep in the afternoon 
then wake a moment 
in the house we left (“Flitting” FD 1-4) 
 
The two feet of the opening line stretched by vowels is continued 
in the half-rhyme in ‘sleep’ but ransacked by the over-elaborate 
syllabics of ‘afternoon’ opening into the semantics of the 
monosyllabic eye of ‘wake’ in turn slipping into an idea of loss and 
times past.  This is one of many examples where the relationship does 
not begin with body for mind delivers this comportment, but it is a 
strained evocative that must entangle itself within its own 
problematic of reconnaissance.  However, this self-refexion neither 
asserts the primacy of the ‘I’ as the sole agent of meaning nor 
asserts that all truth requires representation.  It attempts to 
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forward responsibility and care through involvement; in this poem it 
is emphasized through its absence or estrangement.  Haar understands 
this involvement noting that all is not relative to the ‘I’ alone, 
for it is relative to world, firstly (37).  In Heidegger, as with 
Rigby’s and Haar’s Rilke, self-possession is questioned while a deep 
and anonymous immense life is forwarded: the distinction is that one 
retains agency of the ‘I’ (Heidegger) while the other asserts (or 
requires) defacement of the ‘I’ (Rigby) -- Burnside lies in-between 
them.  A further qualification between understanding via stimmung and 
acknowledgement derived from physis is made below; this acts as a 
means to locate Burnside’s stance within an ecopoetic tradition which 
can better articulate its learning from continental philosophy. 
 
I.B.1. Apartness and Techne 
 
Theorizing the epistemological and ethical implications of the 
precedence of nature to culture is the challenge laid open in the 
ecocritical turn.  Ecocentricisms attempt to work beyond humanism; 
they lead “in the direction of a deeper immanence, or perhaps of a 
certain transcendence” (Rigby “Poets” 4) it is claimed.  Whether 
these are distinct projects or not is something Rigby’s analysis does 
not measure, but offers them as paths leading to “acceptance... of 
our corporeality... [and] interconnectedness [with our] earth others 
[Plumwood “Ecosocial”]”.  For Rigby, this is enabled by physis: a 
force prior to human making, which when coupled to a land ethic 
renders human technologies compatible with the life of earth.  Does 
this address and its intellectual domain historically formulated as a 
discourse upon the relationship between immanence and transcendence 
offer the right context to initiate an analysis of contemporary 
poetry?  A movement towards an answer lies within an analysis of the 
concept of the Heimat where the notion of exile is brought to the 
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fore. 
Extending Bate’s discussion of rootlessness in his articulation of 
the (ecopoetic) high Romantic drawn from an understanding beyond 
Friedrich Hölderlin to Rilke (Song 262-266), Rigby emphasizes 
“ecstatic dwelling” not as homelessness but “dislocation, 
dispossession, and desecration” (Topographies 90).  This concept 
signifies neither blood nor inheritance but responsibility and care 
for a place (whether one is native or not): 
 
It becomes apparent that some form of exile, or in Deleuzean 
parlance, deterritorialisation, is intrinsic to dwelling.  We 
must first encounter the absence or strangeness of a place 
before we can begin to attune ourselves to it in dwelling (“What 
Are Poets For?” 11). 
 
We learn that the precondition to (modern) dwelling is exile (Haar 
Song 139-140).  Rigby’s published version of this paper 
(“(Im)possibility”) deletes the reference to Gilles Deleuze.  
However, it is of value to read the original text signalling a theory 
of history as a process where control or order of land can be undone 
while additionally signifying a vector of weakened ties (or loosened 
points of relation) between culture and nature, people and place.  
Crucial ethics are delineated here. 
To insert this view on dwelling within an argument of the pre-
condition of exile requires further thought on Deleuze’s metaphysics 
where the deterritorialized is that which has not been subsumed by 
law and can thus enable desire to flow freely as a separate economy 
to that of power.  I remind the reader of my extrapolation upon the 
thesis epigraph (above).  To read deterritorialization not solely in 
its relative sense but accompanied by reterritorialization 
(signifying both historical cycles and conjunction with its absolute) 
would lead to the construction of two elements.  Firstly, (positive) 
“immanence” -- to exist or remain within the land (Deleuze Anti-
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Oedipus 176, 251, 257, 315; Philosophy 88), and secondly, to the 
notion of (negative) “subjectivation” -- a process preceding the 
constitution of the subject.  With consonance to ecology and an 
emphasis on life, this unlike a theory of determinate essence allows 
for the self to be read as an effect of the world, “one and the same 
essential reality, the producer-product” (Anti-Oedipus 5; Plateaus 
85) -- something not alien to Ingoldian perception and Emersonian co-
creation.  My thesis affords only a small space to clarify this here 
and in the following chapter, for Burnside’s vision of power within 
dispossessory ethics leads this outside philosophy and into pragmatic 
relations, which my thesis extrapolates in more depth. 
Deleuze’s notion of desire as “collective exile” (Anti-Oedipus 
377) is important in its ecologically sound notion of remaining 
within relationships: a vision of oneness made via the process of 
adsorption, which adheres to material contact (rather than 
absorption, which is assimilation as incorporation); I read this 
version of desire as one that promotes contingency over necessity and 
thus chimes with Burnside.  Deleuze explicitly recalls Fichte and 
Romantic notions of progress and purposiveness (Immanence 27) while 
offering a delineation of the concept of immanence as a non-dualist 
collapse of distinctions into plural monism or univocal envelopment 
of life.  The abstract and conceptual view on the openness of being 
embedded within networks of relations develops pantheism into a 
conceptual site where the (Cabbalistic) contraction of the infinite 
foregrounds events and process as forces against inscribed relations; 
this could lead us full-circle to Bloom.  However, the influence of 
Bateson can be read within the notion of the nature of mankind in the 
universe expressed in post-structuralist terms: as a spirit realizing 
itself in the rhizomatic non-arborescence of the plane of immanence, 
which allows for difference within the one mechanosphere of life 
conceived as an evolutionary a-centred connective, machinic network 
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of intra-assemblage and inter-being (Plateaus 556-58).  I have spoken 
of this as the paradox of the ecological-metaphysical metanarrative; 
i.e. the haunting fabric of doubleness which backlights Burnside’s 
conceptualized self and soul, above. 
Thus, Rigby’s notion of exile as precondition to the experience of 
dwelling is one that notes the historical formation of societies, 
their finite nature, and their dependence upon the land that 
constitutes immanent identity -- as such it is an empirical 
ecological Deleuzianism.  Moreover, it affords the poetic de-
realization of things into singularities the philosophical gravity of 
seeing the world for the first time within new contexts.  As such it 
reads equivalence between the precondition of the earth for human 
life and the precondition of exile for human settlement, which in 
turn outlines the need for the world to be rediscovered rather than 
inherited; a model of thought where learning and reinhabitation 
displace notions of (pre)determinism and inheritance: a model of life 
over history (an idea Burnside returns to in TLT).  It thus provides 
an exciting counter statement to misprisioned Heideggerian politics 
of soil in addition to resonating with the deconstruction of 
grammatical models of origin and institutions of power.  While 
Deleuze and Guattari offer a reformulation of desire as first order 
rather than second order (looking for products of desire rather than 
projections of desire, needs derived by desire rather than desire 
derived from needs Anti-Oedipus), I am offering only a parallel with 
Rigby’s first order of exile rather than suggesting that these 
writers share one metaphysic.  As such, my engagement with Deleuze 
and his revisions to psychoanalysis terminates.  However, as 
rearticulation of “at homeness – upon the earth” understood through 
experience of “being lost in the world” (Bate Song 260), it is such 
an important position that this thesis must examine how this is 
rendered and used. 
Bristow 70 
From this position, Rigby asserts her role for poets, “not so much 
to draw things into being through their song, but rather to draw us 
forth into the song of the others” (Rigby “Poets” 12, original 
emphasis).  This may involve the joining of human voices to land to 
compose works that have a dense site of intertextual references and 
semantic webs that “might be seen to mimic the complex 
interrelationships characterizing natural systems” (13).  This 
delineation of a poetic space sounds viable and ethical.  I believe 
it does not necessarily extend into a legitimate base for Rigby’s 
negative poetics as the only way out of human technologies.  I reach 
an ontological dead end with negative poetic theory where a reading 
of silence or poetic relinquishment equates to Wittgensteinian 
silence.  I find silence and non-meaning communicating significance.  
Whereas Bate asserts that poetry can bring forward the essence of 
exile and dwelling not just “in their linguistic particulars” (Bate 
Song 260), Rigby argues that linguistics are restricted by decoupling 
from a primordial temporality; “absence” and “strangeness” (Rigby 
“Poets”), therefore, become disconnection and non-relation.  Burnside 
envisions these within his poetics of reconnection: 
 
It flowered earlier this year, 
the meadowsweet, 
lining the ditches along the Kinaldy road 
with the dark and implacable perfume 
of mourning; (“Homage to Henri Bergson” 2: 1-5) 
 
In Bergsonian terminology connections and life are leaping flames in 
the spectrum of becoming; to Burnside this is indicated not by 
presence of objects but something “far out in the streaming fields of 
grass / where something – bird, not bird - / began to sing” (16-18), 
a time passed yet vibrating like the peal of a bell soaking the air.  
I do not overstate that Burnside’s mourning resonates with 
Heidegger’s meaning of “apartness” as the beginning of home rather 
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than its decay (Language 194).  It carries the sense of mourning that 
the perception of world and the divine within begins with 
acknowledgement that they are concealed by the logos (Poetry 223) but 
that we are impelled to uncover it and sing it into existence: 
 
the dark and implacable perfume 
of mourning; 
   not 
 
the mourning that comes of death, 
or a needless loss, 
but how the earth cries out to us 
the stark reminder of a life to come (2: 4-10) 
 
This is a reworking of Wordsworthian space that is “both an image 
of nature’s time rising out of the mists of antiquity and of the 
remembered past of human time” (Salvasen 156-57; cited Tuan 126).  
Now this topography is delivered by the poet’s inquiry into memory 
and perception encouraging attunement to the dynamics between mind 
and the given and the sense of loss -- the disposition underlined by 
an ecological crisis and mismanaged politics of separation.  The 
poetic study of the exchanges between physical ecology and mental 
ecology installs a three-fold dimension into time: the past as the 
soul’s memory, the future its anticipation, the present its 
attentiveness.  Memory offers more than the instantaneous; it allows 
Burnside to consider consciousness in relation to the universe and by 
which its distinctions are artificial.  The pull is to “be re-entered 
in the holy book” (Burnside “Homage to Henri Bergson” 4: 7), 
suggesting virtual co-existence, duration, and a move to the 
conditions of experience rather than the sacred.  It is implicit 
thematically in Burnside’s poetry and is mirrored by a 
phenomenological poetic that is without stress; sometimes this is not 
left in isolation but is ironically presented as being “haunted by 
nothing, not even the thought of a haunting” (5: 18-19).  This 
ontological alternative to succession is the sustainable ‘one’ and 
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the ‘multiple’ where life is viewed less in transition and more as 
becoming that endures (Deleuze Bergsonism 37). 
 
I.B.1.a. German Romanticism and Aesthetic Theory 
 
Rigby’s thesis concerning the failure of Romantic poetics -- the 
effacement within presencing written in the Romantic quest for the 
ineffable as that which slips human frameworks -- uses Hegelian 
aesthetic theory.  In his lectures Hegel recognized that “the beauty 
of art is one of the means which dissolve and reduce to unity the... 
opposition and contradiction between the abstractly self-concealed 
spirit and nature –- both the nature of external phenomena and that 
of inner subjective feeling and emotion” (Hegel 56).  The content of 
art, a principle of oneness, is read by its association with the 
Idea, which for Hegel, is the absolute (transcendent) God/Spirit made 
manifest in man’s actions. 
Hegel asserts that Romantic art fails to live up to the aesthetic 
ideal because its spiritual content outstrips its material means and 
thus always indicates something beyond itself that art cannot attain 
(Hegel 427-38; Rigby, Topographies 112). Rigby follows Hegel and 
Bowie (Schelling, Aesthetics) in outlining the development in German 
Romanticism from Friedrich von Schiller to Friedrich von Schlegel and 
on into Schelling.  Hegel’s conception of unity aims at overcoming 
Kant’s intuitive understanding as subjective not absolute -- the 
particular determined from within written as purposiveness 
(zweckmässigkeit).  Hegel’s idea that the principle of art is the 
unity that achieves absolute standpoint is indebted to Schiller.  It 
is a principle most especially formulated in Schelling’s philosophy 
of art within his System of Transcendental Idealism.  However, In 
Schiller, Rigby reads a post-modern aesthetic that would accomplish 
“the realization of the ideal” (Topographies 99) in its sublation of 
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the naïve and sentimental and its production of the divine, in effect 
realizing that which nature by itself cannot do.  This could provide 
common ground for Bate and Heidegger to articulate nature’s 
dependency upon man; however, it is Rigby’s emphasis on Schelling as 
an important historical case for ecocriticism that will act as my 
temporary focal point. 
The Romantic is both anti-systematic and oriented critically 
toward the limits of knowledge.  As a form of self-limitation, the 
Frühromantik developed non-foundational systems that respected 
rationality but retained a gap between theoretical knowledge and 
truth.  The avant-garde of Jena and the rise of the journal Athenaeum 
(1798-1800) extended Fichte’s pioneering concept of the world as 
negative projection -- the ‘not I’ -- by incorporating an animated 
force into this other: the “autopoiesis of earth” (Rigby Topographies 
102-3).  I argue that this model of a gap recalls Kant’s positioning 
of an ethical stance (above) and is stated in the writings of 
Emerson, which serves as the basis for an American interpretation of 
Idealism and as the representation of the natural offered in a non-
deterministic model of possibility and openness that cannot be 
subjected to schematic mapping.  It is a legacy Burnside explicitly 
draws from as he models subjectivity and finds the 
ecophenomenological limited by not being able to extend to the ‘not 
I’ that erases the ‘I’: 
 
we turn to the nearly blue 
of night on the glass, 
or stand out in the garden looking up 
at circles of counted stars 
and feel ourselves a little strange again, 
neutrals in the mystery of presence. (“Winter Holidays” FD 14-
19) 
 
It is the challenge to think of what one sees away from home and 
security but within other patterns that repeat themselves in their 
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own way.  ‘Blue’ is the Stevensian symbol of the imagination, an 
anti-symbol offering the vacuous represented in only sky: a site 
where we posit boundary, horizon and configurations of world.  It is 
what makes us ‘strange’, but how is this ‘neutral’ in anyway other 
than not being able to underwrite, configure, or make full sense or 
harness the presence, which only works to make distinction between 
human and world? 
For Rigby, Schelling’s vision of art as expressed in “Concerning 
the Relation of the Plastic Arts to Nature” (1807) represents an 
attempt to restore connections to the divine via methods beyond the 
artist’s intentionality.  Moving close to my position, this aesthetic 
is evaluated as enabling a continuity of mind and nature with the 
recognition of the limits of knowledge, in turn eluding human 
reductionism.  Here, Rigby reads Heidegger’s theory of the clearing 
(Poetry) exactly; it offers the bringing of Being to things not 
through their dependency upon man but more in the possibility of art.  
However, the emphasis on the incommunicable and the contraction of 
world to word in Rigby’s reading of Hölderlin’s exegesis of the 
poetics of earth draws to a position of the world as “ultimately 
unknowable” and also “properly unspeakable” (Topographies 122) -- a 
statement that dovetails with an under-reading of deManian 
deconstructionist theory and misreads the concept of the speaking of 
language.  This is central to philosophies of human agency and 
crucial to our understanding of Burnside’s ecopoetic. 
For Burnside, nature resonates with and alludes to the 
metaphysical but will not distil to singularity other than within a 
concrete and rational concept, that of ecology, as thus it is 
speakable and fathomable to a greater degree than in high 
Romanticism.  The epochal destiny of absent ground, the crumbling of 
metaphysics and of earth, the anxiety derived from the dispossession 
of the transcendental, and the desire for roots or indigence over an 
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attention to self-destruction are key counters that inform the 
theoretical texts that this thesis draws from and that I am outlining 
here with echoes in Burnside’s poetry.  This ecological foundation, 
moreover, develops German Idealism as interpreted in America in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries into a modality that could be 
called ‘non-willing perspectivism’.  It is the reduced ego, diluted 
anthropocentricism, and a lack of determinism; what Heidegger terms 
gelassenheit: a profound humility in which the gift of being is 
meditative and the call of language enables the thing to show itself. 
Although a language system of signs may be read as analogous to a 
natural system, its grammar, Rigby argues, “cannot be assumed to 
replicate the pattern of differences and connections prevailing among 
things-in-themselves” (Topographies 123).  This negative stance 
extends into the reading of various texts: the sublime’s 
“inexpressibility” (156, 202); the “incommunicable” vastness in 
Johann Wolfgang Goethe (172); the failure of disclosure in Wordsworth 
(180, 252); the failure to strive to contain nature in Hölderlin 
(190); the forces “beyond [Coleridge’s mariner’s] knowledge and 
control” (208); and the limits of human ordering and control in Clare 
(237).  While Rigby admits that her thesis is honestly “inconclusive” 
as to whether negative poetics of Romanticism should be extended or 
left behind as tools to read contemporary poetry (219), her 
determination is to resist the “effacement of otherness” (260) as a 
means to sharing the ambivalent, strange, and irreducible natural 
world.  This is to embrace the Romantic resistance to severing nature 
from science and matter from spirit within a redemptive ethos (261).  
As such, it negotiates a critique outlining the use of negative 
poetics as a means of sustaining the (German) elevation of the ideal 
over the real. 
Schelling’s influence on Emerson is the most profound of all 
Idealist thinkers upon Transcendentalists.  The idea of the Absolute 
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as the union of the ideal and the real, the world-soul and nature as 
the work of God, have strong parallels in Emerson’s contemporary 
(Welleck 51, 54).  My contention is that Heideggerian poiesis, which 
requires redemption to enhance relations, does not replicate this 
dimension and posit the other as remote (Rigby) but that it enters 
into this dimension, which is really Schelling’s point, too, in his 
exegesis of subjectivity as both grounded in nature and as its 
expression.26  Thus my post-Emersonian reading of the American 
tradition in chapter two offers a way into Burnside’s poetry as with 
my clarification of the Romantic hinterland of the ecopoetic 
articulated by Bate.  
 
I.B.2. Clarification of the Impossible 
 
Rigby’s challenge to Bate’s pro-Heideggerian poetics is centred upon 
its elevation of human speaking above all other voices or elements of 
the earth’s song.  This perspective upon hubris and non-
correspondence is derived from a negative reading of impossibility, a 
reading of poetics of Being rather than poetics of becoming, and an 
insistent negation of Heidegger’s symbiotic co-dependency.  I see 
this missing two terms that would advance a purchase on Burnside’s 
poetics. 
Naming, for Rigby, is the obliteration of singularities as a 
method of enframing; it is not a form of disclosure.  Hart’s 
appropriation of negative poetics attempts to negate de Man’s 
position, i.e. to extract theology from literary study due to its 
                         
26 Also René Welleck, “The Minor Transcendentalists and German 
Philosophy,” New England Quarterly, 15.4 (1942): 652-680, and 
Confrontations: Studies in the Intellectual and Literary Relations 
between Germany, England and the United States during the Nineteenth 
Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton UP, 1965); also Stanley M. Vogel 
German Literary Influences on American Transcendentalists, (New 
Haven: Yale UP, 1955), and pt. 2 Richard Berkeley, Coleridge and the 
Crisis of Reason, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2007). 
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incompatibility with reading (Moynihan 586).  Hart misreads de Man 
twice.  Firstly, by suggesting that theology is too determinate a 
referent for deconstruction Hart overplays de Man’s interest in that 
which lies “in-between”, resisting polarization of the political and 
aesthetic (593-94) -- that which is most succinctly deposited in de 
Man’s reading of the figure of Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  Secondly, 
mapping the deManian negative into theology to offer a counter 
argument to a philosophy of a positive descendental and empirically 
manifest spirit that enlightens, is to binarize faith and doubt, and 
to model de Man’s thinking into a site veiled by the darkness of 
unknowing where one approaches God as a de-regulated spirit beyond 
representation (Hart 286). 
This dichotomy is bad ground for the author of Topographies as it 
over-determines the thesis on negative poetics.  For de Man, poetry 
operates in a realm of transcendence that marks “the sign of the 
failure of the intention toward the eternal” (de Graef Serenity 87).  
The poet of permanence desires the eternal as knowable whereas the 
poet of becoming is aware of this failure and intends it.  In 
Burnside, the divided consciousness (faith and doubt) spurs spirit to 
fulfil itself; for Rigby, the impossibility of knowledge is due to 
the self-cancelling of the lyric (as annihilation) in its attempt to 
formulate a song of response to the secluded rather than “simulacral 
second nature” (Rigby “(Im)possibility” 441).  I need to bridge these 
positons. 
We return here to the correlation between rational mind and 
systematized world (the problem of language use within the domain of 
knowledge and reason), and the possibility within this process to 
uncover a secret living organism outside the mind content.  The 
Modernist extension of this -- to unconceal fragile and shifting 
allotropic and phenomenological states -- clarifies the contemporary.  
As a writer concerned with awakening the preternatural sensorium, as 
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with D.H. Lawrence, Burnside translates temporal ecstasies relating 
to the ineffable into the essentialism of the soul-in-flux and the 
intertwining of faith and doubt.  Both poets inherit Thomas Hardy’s 
social realism pitted against a cosmic background, but dark 
subterranean religious impulses and the architectonics of sublimity 
that defy literalism are given (an albeit difficult) passage from 
Modernism into the light empirical of the anti-essentialist ecopoetic 
by Burnside. 
 
There is always a place on the way 
where the path curls into the dark, 
 
into the smell of dust 
and the stillness of nettles. (“Dark Green” MOT: 1-4) 
 
Behind the Williamsesque urban history of remnants and whispers of 
the material world clipped into semantic clusters with high visual 
resonance, Burnside offers a model of continuation between forms, “an 
empty skull, a ribcage stitched with grass” (8) realised once one has 
stepped into “the shade” (7).  The darkness promotes neither morose 
nor dangerous undertones, but growth from nothing (Stevens).  As a 
means to focus on the micro, at this phase in his poetry which is 
attempting to escape the self and enter world, the expansive lines of 
co-extension of TAD are quite distant in the recoiling lines of this 
collection.  Here, the stress on ‘always’ echoed in line-ending but 
programmed in each breath so that “place” “curls”, literally 
enfolding upon itself while it reaches inwards to the “smell” and 
“stillness” of “nettles” through the physical movement of the tongue 
in the alveolar sounds.  Following this signal dimension to the local 
focus of the lyric, the poem plots a journey to “lived” and then 
“swells”, highly indicative of the ‘light empirical’, the positive 
sense of potential and futurity driven by but not bound by absence: 
this in itself is a challenge to poetic criticism channelled to 
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extrapolate the representative aspects of the lyric. 
Conversely, to the poetics of Being and the extra-rational mind, 
Heidegger’s poetics is not one of logocentric representation where 
Being can un-problematically become the theme of language, but as 
Clark argues, “[it is] the displacement of the realm of 
conceptuality” (“Being” 1013) -- as such it complements Bateson 
(above) and resists deconstructionist impossibility.  Moreover, 
contrasted to de Man, Clark reads Heidegger’s blindness to the 
“formal logic” of representation as an insight to the poetic force 
that “summons to presence” (1005) -- as Burnside indicates it is a 
momentary “place” that rests on “the way”, the combination of 
fleeting and resting (James Principles).  I confirm that this 
operates in Burnside’s co-creative ecopoetic by revisiting the 
linguistic theories that inform Bate’s and Rigby’s theses in my next 
section.  It provides the reader with an understanding of the 
applicability of negative poetics to contemporary poetics, a move 
that I make in this chapter’s final section. 
 
II. The Homeland of the Poem 
 
Andrew Bowie understands the German Romantic ‘I’ not as the 
spontaneous ground of epistemology but rather as that which endlessly 
“tries to overcome the ‘lack of being’ which results from its failure 
to ground itself” (“Romantic” 294, original emphasis).  I am reading 
this an indication to the complexity of Burnside’s themes: 
homesickness, exile in logos, and a ‘home-self’ seeking plenitude.  
Modern thought endeavours to establish the legitimacy for reason as 
the ground of truth while it sweeps away the notion of the deity’s 
pattern imprinted in the universe, a guarantee of world order 
slipping into a narrative of the fall into particularity.  I read 
contemporary ecopoetics as a new form of access to the world and the 
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self’s place within it while accepting the Romantic refusal to 
incorporate final divisions between the understanding of self and the 
understanding of world, as a new extension to negative poetics 
backlit by the inquiry into the exclusive principle of rationalism 
within the crisis of meaning.  As a signpost toward this position, 
Bate argues that the poem does not claim truth in-and-of itself but 
that it communicates the figural as figural: 
 
The poet is often more vagrant than dweller, for he finds his 
home in the logos and not in the oikos.  As Adorno put it... 
‘Words tend to bounce off nature as they try to deliver nature’s 
language into the hands of another language foreign to it’ 
[Adorno Aesthetic 108].  ‘We see into the life of things’ writes 
Wordsworth.  Ecopoiesis knows that things have a life, but it 
also has to recognize that it can only communicate that 
knowledge in the form of propositions by using the divided 
Cartesian language of subject (‘we see’) and object (‘the life 
of things’) (Song 149). 
 
Reading Heaney and Thomas, Bate understands the poet as a languaged 
human; this is set in contrast to the illiterate existentialism of 
the shepherd (Romantic 87-88, 96-115), which is the spontaneous 
ground to Bowie.  Moreover, as a restatement of the distinction 
between techne (human made works) and physis (world made works) his 
position extends into a theory of poetry as phenomenological ecstasis 
that communicates “dwelling and alienation in their very essence, not 
just in the linguistic particulars” (Song 260, original emphasis).  
It negotiates the linguistic prison as exemplified by Wordsworth’s 
use of negative prefixes in “Lines” alluding to indeterminacy (151). 
Bate’s human as a language animal (258) concerns Rigby, for its 
lack of ethical insight into the existence of the world before the 
evolution of humankind.  Furthermore, to Rigby it provides the sole 
rights of the music of the planet to the human, a hubristic elevation 
of man as the only bearer of language (Rigby “Poets” 12; sustained in 
“Song” 396 and throughout Topographies).  The idea of synchronicity 
with others -- which is emphasized by Heidegger’s emphasis that only 
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Dasein has a world -- however, underlines both Bate’s and Rigby’s 
theses and should be considered as a means to understand the 
limitations to their differences (both being informed by Taylor and 
Bowie).  I shall turn to this before further engagement with Rigby’s 
negative poetics. 
For Taylor, vocabulary articulates rather than creates 
understanding; language is constitutive of the world’s 
intelligibility, it is not a representational system of external 
objects (Bowie “Idealism” 241).  Taylor’s reading of Heidegger is one 
that considers survival and the history of Being as one of discovery 
where language enables us to find the connection to the historical 
essence or to think beyond our flourishing alone: Burnside’s priority 
in the dwelling trilogy that I locate as a concern following a move 
out of selfhood and out from ideas about healing and into a model of 
life: “the meadows they had laced with given names / muffled in snow 
/ the net of birdsong / gone” (“Adam and Eve” TAD: 14-17); “beyond 
what we know / as language / and pledged to a moon” (“Another Poem 
About Fish” TLT: 45-47); “the household we have in common / but don’t 
quite share, / sub voce songs, the garden’s unnamed roses” 
(“Annunciation with Zero Point Field” TGN: 22-24). 
This comes not from nature but from a constitutive theory of 
language and pragmatics, one that is opposed to instrumental 
enframing but pictures human life in a complex framework independent 
of language.  This is at the core of ecopoetics’ negotiation of 
representation politics.  Taylor argues that language does not 
prioritize the facilitation of ideas (classes, laws, rules etc.) into 
view but speaks of “the world of our involvements”, a world which is 
not seen as preceding us and indifferent but one that speaks of our 
positioning and “all the things [our involvements] incorporate in 
their meaning for us” (252).  This is not an anthropocentric 
elevation but an elevation of language over time.  Language speaks 
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and the human needs to listen to its dimensions, which are shaped 
less than a tool (Rigby) and more as the essence of being (Burnside).  
The agency of more than one subject (which is Bate’s use of 
Heidegger) permits a world that is not of our making, Taylor argues, 
but “the necessary context for all our acting and making” (263).  
This defines the background to all speech serving beyond ourselves: 
an idea of the human as shepherd and guardian, neither steward nor 
creator.  I read this in concert with Clark and I take this as the 
crucial element in Burnsidean ecopoetics, which I forward throughout 
my analysis.  I follow Taylor, reading this as the common space or 
opening of moods e.g. wonder, grief, terror, in a primordial 
relationship to thought (in contrast to the non-historical modes of 
anxiety and boredom).  This is distinct from passing temperaments and 
is non-instrumental.  It is the ethical ‘letting be’ of the dynamic 
potential resting outside repose/action dichotomies.  More clearly 
(and perhaps slightly reductionist), it is not “destining” (Taylor 
263), the strategy-less and unsustainable but a new method where 
expectation replaces will, and as Haar argues, “all the possibilities 
of praxis” are given their historical ground (“Attunement” 159).  
Again the site of our words and actions measured in degrees under 
ethical terms of practice. 
Haar’s theory of language centres upon a dichotomy between 
“affectedness” and “conceptual language” revealing that in the former 
to be thrown is to bear “projection [into] being with others” (159) 
as affect, while the latter merely names (161).  It is upon the 
former site, the ‘open’, that Haar speaks of Heideggerian thrown-ness 
(into time) as post-metaphysical and post-historical, for its 
relationship with being is new, seeing things for the first time 
where being thrown is always determined but only into a world of 
possibility (thus the historical dimension is sustained).  Thrown-
ness, therefore, is the situation where being is an issue for itself: 
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the Da of Sein, unique to humans as a clearing or space between 
things and point of relation before comprehension and encounter.  It 
is why Burnside foregrounds this state within a constructionist 
poetic, transparently offering his model of anthropocentricism while 
paradoxically attempting to capture light from the world (inspiration 
and enlightened facts), rather than trap it; it is why we are engaged 
with the post-Romantic investigation into the life-world: 
 
but nothing has ever spoken, nothing has come 
from the elsewhere I measure out in songs and dreams, 
although I glimpse, in spite of what I know, 
 
the guessed-at world where nothing has been said 
but everything is on the point of speaking (“Annunciation with 
Zero Point Field” (TGN: 52-56) 
 
If the human inquiry is read as one within the life-world then the 
world (inclusively conceived) evokes itself to itself as it declares 
that it is doing so or not.  More traditionally, the quotidian viewed 
either after “looking up from a half-read book” (57) or quarried into 
“songs” and “dreams” is left “on the point” or verge of finding its 
own voice in the poetry that resonates around it which results in 
Kantian projection yet is aware of the human imposition and thus lies 
in a site “in spite of what I know”.  Without the use of “nothing” 
this would be less arguable, I concede, and less available to the 
general reader, but I would like to stress that this device is making 
a phenomenological point.  Rather than positing ‘nothing’ as an 
entity, it is an attempt to strain language as a means to offer 
immediate experience that is so raw that it precedes attempts to 
describe it (Scruton 276).  Readers are constantly pushed over the 
tipping point between quiet poetics and the named world, or the 
mediated nothing, which always at that point becomes something, even 
if only “guessed at” and not reduced to taxonomy.  It is poetry about 
phenomenology, poetry using terminology from quantum mechanics to 
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indicate a low level of energy in interactions in nature turned 
metaphor by the un-use of words in the poem yet contrarily filling a 
space other than offering blankness (which in the zero-point field 
indicates an enormous energy that is not wildly evident).  It is the 
case of being involved in the world but uncertain as to one’s 
influence in reading the world, the Heisenberg principle brought home 
to language through a sense of being involved or thrown into world.  
This is why Stevens takes precedence in Burnside’s canon for his 
unravelling of this domain slips easily into Heideggerian poetics and 
the sense of the open.  As a model of thinking, thrown-ness in 
language is not contractive or simply a human language in essence 
(Rigby’s appropriation of Bowie, Hart, and Bonnefoy), but open-ended, 
drawn from mutability without dominance and offers the language of 
b/Being: that which speaks of possibility and potentiality and 
bridges mood (affectedness) and thinking (conceptual life).  For 
Haar, this bridge is delivered from “facticity and transcendence” 
(162): ecologically sound with respect to power dynamics and 
interestingly resonant with Burnside’s contingent self and non-
contingent soul. 
 
II.A. Notes Towards the Burnsidean ‘I’ 
 
Schelling’s Philosophy of Art (1802-3) does not constitute “a theory 
of language as correspondence or representation” (Bowie Schelling 
118; cited Rigby Topographies 120) but formulates a position where 
art can be read as a continuation of nature’s primary poesy.  For 
Bowie, Schelling makes the distinction between the “living” word of 
language, poiesis, and the “spoken” or “congealed” word.  The first 
corresponds to an “expanding” force whereas the latter, the material 
signifier, corresponds to a “contracting force” (Schelling 118).  The 
material dimension “allows meaning to be determinate at all by 
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articulating the infinite multiplicity of the world’s possibilities 
via a finite number of fixed and iterable signifiers” (93).  That is 
to say, the world of unfinished, developing, and emerging objects 
presents a problem to a limited array of signifying tools (Adorno 
Aesthetic), yet this does not conclude that a sum larger than its 
parts is impossible to communicate.  This tension is of course a site 
of strife reminiscent of Heidegger’s origin within art: the war 
between the concealed and unconcealed where language is read as an 
aspect of the world.  Its energy is the world evoking itself. 
Bowie’s analysis emphasizes Schelling’s departure from Fichte as 
“an expressly ecological conception of nature” (Schelling 46) where 
the System of Transcendental Idealism, the return of science to 
poetry, is an explication of self-consciousness that enables nature 
to be understood, whereas Fichte’s model sustained the Kantian split 
between interior and exterior (Bate “Culture” 553).  Horstmann 
clarifies that Fichte’s ‘I’ as self-positing agent is actor and 
product of act, as such it counter-posits the ‘not-I’ (125).  Zöller 
notes that the absolute ‘I’ is an empirical, finite human, and is 
thus not a master (202-3); moreover, the positing of the ‘not-I’ is 
the limit of the activity of the ‘I’, which is not the ground of 
willing but is rethought as the basic mode in which thinking takes 
place (206).  I find that Bowie’s explication is derived from within 
an ecology of the ‘I’, the ‘not I’, and the ‘Absolute I’, written in 
historical terms of psychological progression where objective nature 
is read as an elementary stage of the ‘I’ before consciousness, with 
each subsequent stage of development limiting the activity of the ‘I’ 
(Bowie Schelling 48).  Extending this argument into the foundation 
for the split between mind and world mismanages the grammar of 
thought that suggests a parallelism -- if not synergy -- between 
cognition and object, a fitting of mind and world and thus a movement 
toward reconciliation rather than disjunction.  Here language as 
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aspect comes forth and I encourage the reader once more to view 
Burnside’s ‘I’ as an attempt to outline this state.  It reads as a 
version of the Emersonian “not me”: nature that includes the 
subject’s body (Nature, 1836, Collected 1: 8).  Here, the body 
located in space is an object of outer sense; however, as a matter of 
greater significance, the subject is read as one in concert with the 
productivity of nature, part of the expanding force of the universe: 
 
What is meant here is something more mutually and functionally 
interdependent between mind and terrain, an organic relationship 
between the environment and the unconscious, the visible space 
and the conscious, the ideas and the creatures (Shepard Animals 
35). 
 
Nature as an organic totality that encompasses mind and matter 
(that emerge through time) offers composition of organic and 
inorganic nature that belies an opposition between mechanism and 
organism that thwarted Fichte.  This disputes inherently reflexive 
metaphysics and its determination to locate the mind within the world 
via reason, a fatal narcissistic flaw that Emerson claims, “sees the 
world as a reflection of itself” (10), for the absolute is 
irreducible to this reflection.  Moreover, this ecology forwards a 
conception of life (Being) not of individual (being): a field non-
dependent upon a subject. 
Idealism’s exclusion of naturalistic realism through absolute 
knowledge to reflect the nature of reality and therefore transcend 
subjectivity and Kant’s dualism, offers categories not only in the 
subject mind but as part of the object world, too.  Fichte’s 
reconfiguration moved transcendental thought towards a philosophy of 
nature.  Within his imperative to assert that a wholly objective 
world could not support “self-determining subjectivity” that 
articulates the objective world (Bowie “Idealism” 245), the 
possibility of a teleological structure to nature was elasticized.  
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This is deployed to assert that “nature cannot accidentally coincide 
with human principles of knowledge” but rather, as Sturma elaborates, 
“knowledge about nature becomes possible only because it is an 
organism and functions according to the same basic principles as we 
do” (234).  In his System of Transcendental Idealism Schelling 
envisions a structural system that reads the technique of nature as a 
self-organising isomorphism, wherein subject, object, and all 
disparate entities unite as counterparts of a larger spirit 
(Horstmann 132).  It is not far from a statement declaring these as 
aspects of an ecology (Bowie Schelling 46).  Ontologically this pre-
objective intellectual intuition is an immediate epistemic relation 
of spirit to itself (133), an absolute identity that can 
differentiate itself as subject from the world through pragmatic 
relations and experience.  It is what Burnside forwards in “Iona” and 
a model of an historical ‘I’ that the phenomenological attempts to 
reach. 
 
It’s gone before I’ve seen it: details 
changing 
     light 
imagining a world: 
     the play of wind 
and traffic 
   voices 
    footsteps on the street 
intruding on my thoughts like some 
perpetual fill of space 
     or coming home (“The Hay Devil” TAD 5: 13-23) 
 
The fleeting and urgent epistemic relation of spirit to self: 
here, a breathless spray of empirical events fluttering out into the 
loose line from the left margin are threaded by the phenomenological 
anchoring, which is “imagining” but also “intruding” on itself.  As 
an attempt to offer a lack of arrival while reading world from beyond 
the horizon of self, the phenomenological ‘I’ is limited in its 
capacity to draw the reader in beyond the reporting, collating, and 
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constructive ‘I’.  We have the field of energies that operate across 
human and nature, that is threaded in the life-world.  However, 
whereas Heidegger proposes a subject within the midst of 
environmental factors (time, history), this field represents the 
dissolution of identity into the (self-creative) agency of nature.  
But does the stress on disappearance and the stress on home, enable 
Burnside to move beyond the miraculous way of world and allow it to 
enter mind as if one state were attainable?  I feel that the 
technique of nature as a self-organising isomorphism posited by 
Schelling’s idea of the ideal and the real as different degrees of 
the same, not differences of kind, is one that the measure within 
Burnside’s poetry often falls short of when it is attempting this –- 
seen most especially when traditional criticism remains closed to the 
ecological aspect of the constructed poetic semiosphere.  It is this 
measure of different degrees of the same by which I understand 
Bowie’s ecological analogy and it must be the site where the limit of 
the phenomenological lyric (and traditional phenomenological 
criticism) is interrogated: in Burnside it offers, perhaps only 
knowingly in moments of self-scrutiny, the limit and negation of the 
phenomenological stance. 
 
An undercurrent in philosophy beginning with Fichte and reaching a 
modern articulation in Bergson considers purposiveness as a 
responsive method within the crisis of representation to negotiate 
(Kantian) transcendental apperception -– self-consciousness from 
consciousness of objects derived from the application of categories.  
I believe that a theory of negative poetics that draws from an 
argument that the world cannot be articulated (Rigby), and from a 
position that states intuition is higher than reason but cannot be 
languaged, is one that promotes inadequacy over the positive 
necessity of forming a parsing between world and word.  It is through 
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reading contemporary poetry, especially eco-phenomenological poetry, 
that one can enter this gap or impasse to view the ontology of mind 
in world and to locate world in mind simultaneously, regardless of 
representational failure or success.  Moreover, to overemphasize the 
linguistic system under terms of success and failure underplays the 
‘I’ as the highest principle of subjectivity in Romantic poetics; it 
is to understate the distinction of the synthetic mind (the b/Being 
of the subject) -- that which is prominent in this site -- from the 
thinking of the subject (the cogito) (Bowie Aesthetics 21).  The 
subject realm, drawing from Bowie’s ecology, forwards relationship 
not deferral, which underlines phenomenal activity over the semiotic 
and semantic burdened reflective stance (cogito), it is embedded even 
if it is not amalgamated.  This is not to mistake grammatical form to 
the subject as a metaphysical entity but to show the possibility and 
spectral dynamism of life; it is perhaps an understanding of the gap 
between synthesis and assimilation or between apprehension and 
comprehension. 
The example of this selected for the ‘ecopoetics’ section of the 
St Andrews School of English poetry magazine, The Red Wheelbarrow: 
 
I was thinking of somewhere else, 
the country, say, of how things look for others: 
towns glimpsed in transit: a play park, those salt-coloured 
houses 
where people like us are living a life like ours. (“Homage to 
Henri Bergson” 5: 1-5). 
 
It is a site delineating the original gesture of the poet and the 
poetics of receipt: a ‘country’ defined by ‘others’ yet one urging a 
greater fusion of nature and culture than that given over by the 
heavy-handed although probably off-handed improvisation, “salt-
coloured houses”, which stands as an admission of the potential 
difficulty outside simile: what Stevens calls “the intricate evasions 
of as” (“An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” Collected 28: 16).  It is 
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“the poem of the mind in the act of finding” itself and rethinking 
the notion of invention (“Of Modern Poetry”: 1), what Stevens’ calls 
“the cry of its own occasion” (“An Ordinary Evening in New Haven” 
12:1): the stage where poetry performs and which should be the site 
of its inquiry into its form, part of the reality itself and not a 
veil over that which lies behind.  In contemporary ecopoetics the 
site of negative poetics is reclaimed in the manner that suggests the 
use of the qualifier ‘negative’ only as a subtraction of the notion 
of one-way agency as Burnside’s poem indicates.  Here, the thought of 
the perception of others is of one reflecting upon the site under 
view to the mind’s eye, which leads to a view of the self communally 
enfolded into history.  Theoretically it can be seen in concord with 
Husserl’s “pre-predictive experience” that is life before it is 
“formulated in judgements and expressed in outward linguistic form” 
(Husserl $26, 27), a site of ever renewed and infinitely elaborating 
acknowledgement, a form of eternal return driven by poetic projective 
saying (rather than prescriptivism) of a world to itself rather than 
to a non-relational subject. 
This resonates both with Bowie’s elementary stage of the ‘I’ and 
the negation of preconception (above), and negotiates Kant’s need for 
practical reason following the limitation of reason derived from 
understanding delivered by the categorical judgement (introduction).  
It also rings true with Walter Benjamin’s thoughts on translation and 
the work of art as artefact without intention to an audience, a world 
unfolding to itself (ch. 5, sec. I.B.).  To clarify this briefly, 
Hediegger’s Being and Time reads ‘being’ not as an existential 
question of the (creationist) rise from nothingness but as a “fore-
theoretical historically determined intelligibility” (McGrath 340).  
Heidegger’s models of thrownness, language as pragmatically 
contextual, and death enfolded within life, complement his paradigm 
of intuition and appear to be the philosophical ground to the 
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majority of Burnside’s poetry.  I articulate this site as an 
intuitive-historical intelligence reflecting upon creation.  Husserl 
departed from the Kantian division of subjectively generated and 
received data of experience by positing the notion that the 
categorical and intuitive are not neatly divided as such, and 
moreover, that the given is structured i.e. it calls forth the 
category.  Heidegger believes ontological knowledge to be intuitive 
and that judgement of this is derivative and secondary.  Knowing is 
more complex than looking; it is more than an apprehension of a 
presence.  Thus intuition and immediacy (although regularly conceived 
as granular degrees of the same process of apprehension) are, for 
Heidegger, separated.  Mute sense experience does not allow 
unconcealment by itself, for the primacy of cognition within the 
process of intuition is coupled to the mediation of experience.  
Heidegger’s phenomenology frees up the basic experiences of thinking 
by annulling the traditional dichotomy between intuition and 
expression.  As a language model, the intuited is always already 
expressed; conversely, the primal expression, McGrath shows, is not 
the construction or projection of a subject but an intuited domain of 
meaning (342): this is what Heidegger means by self-manifestation as 
“its shining itself” (Time 79).  Burnside’s positing of the 
phenomenological frame (as in “Annunciation with Zero Point Field”, 
above) is not completely convinced by the collapse of modal 
difference between intuition and expression for it may remove human 
agency by too great a degree as it moves to promote the universal way 
of things.  I return the reader to Burnside’s proprioception: 
 
And say it was out there, out in the snow, 
Meshed with the birdsong and light 
The way things are real: a blackbird, a scribble of thorns, 
A quickening into the moment, the present tense (“The myth of 
the twin” (2) MOT: 6-9) 
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Here an empty and still non-revelation brokered by the need to 
instil world into language, into a ‘scribble’ of the given is one 
‘meshed’ by sonics and optics, world and mind.  The way things appear 
to the ‘I’ and the degree to which empirical sense perception 
guarantees the ‘I’ (or is a necessary condition to it), delivers a 
different reasoning engine where the mind does not order objects of 
its thought but accepts material input from the outside.  This 
triggers intellect to lead toward cognition of selfhood and world 
without a necessary statement (or complete account) of self-
consciousness or the total realm of existence as intelligible: it 
offers only the fictive imagined community, as stressed in the 
pressure for complicity in “say”. 
For Burnside, to enter into this way of the world neither presents 
the “after-image of nature’s meaningful silence” (Adorno Aesthetic 
109, emphasis added) –- reconciliation outside structured systems -- 
nor philosophical abstraction or inward reflection alone; neither 
does it eclipse these by attending to the referent at the loss of all 
other inquiries and contexts, which might be a dimension Burnside 
reads in British and Irish poetry.  The entrance promotes an 
understanding of the subject within this space, “the present tense” 
that could be termed in light of the Heisenberg principle ‘a modality 
of acknowledgement of the other underwritten by involvement’, or ‘the 
phenomenology of interdependency and creative interaction’; for 
Burnside, it suggests, “identity of [the] onlooker indistinguishable 
from the things perceived” (“Place”).  It is a fiction: 
 
as if this was the story of a place 
that I could tell without impediment: 
first thought, then form, a drift of native souls 
scattered across the land like seed or snow (“Uley, Glos”, MOT: 
8-11) 
 
The formation of thought from nature entering mind, is likened to 
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an imagined topos, a “sieve of consciousness” (12) which is the 
“making” of the “commonplace domain” (13).  Burnside’s collections 
are peppered by the phrase “the way” indicating his many variations 
of the lived world gathered via (phenomenological) intentionality: 
the directedness of the lyrical ‘I’ as an event of the world’s 
disclosure and as receptacle of the world’s expression; in “Uley, 
Glos”, it is only the title that inserts a border between real and 
imagined, “the giving up and taking on of names” (15), the way world 
reveals itself to the human or the way the human receives world.  I 
chose to clarify this further due to the import to ecocriticism of 
the Bate-Rigby dispute. 
 
Intentionality as consciousness of experience is the “egocentric 
predicament” (Sokolowski 9); a predicament that is not univocal but 
differentiated within consciousness depending on the object of 
intuition (public, private, past present) and the mood, state, and 
attitude of the subject, and the method of the objects’ appearance.  
While intentionality posits the precondition of the world as the site 
for disclosure to a subject -- the world being, to a degree, 
dependent upon human technologies for its expression (that is, for 
Heidegger, meaning is not independent of the world but that entities 
are meaning laden, words world laden) -- poiesis operating as an 
event decreates the subject-predicate model.  It posits the pre-
grammatical object world that negates the reduction or mistranslation 
of world into the “unfathomable” by tempering narrowly conceived 
negative poetics and offering insight into the subject who only 
receives the world via the unveiling to which they are indelibly a 
part.  It heightens awareness of the movement and destabilization of 
grammar as the event of language that discloses the world in the 
moment of apprehension.  I have shown in Burnside that it is where 
Rigby’s concern for anthropolatry (bestowing divine honours to the 
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human, above) is revisited, not as the inventor of systems but rather 
the process of language as “the medium through which being as system 
comes to understand itself” (Colebrook 85, original emphasis).  In 
its most complete poetic appraisal or “stylistic principle” -- as 
Buell has noted in Emerson -- it understands that “intellectual 
honesty requires being faithful to those oscillations between 
epiphany and blankness, to the inevitable incompletion of any ‘final’ 
result” (Emerson 113).  Incompletion does not spell unfathomability; 
it offers the embodiment of potential, which is the unfulfilled 
material self in Burnside’s poems, alive to the world unfolding. 
 
II.B. The Contemporary 
 
Burnside’s full speech is written and fuelled by Heideggerian 
projective saying (Language 66, 123; Poetry 39) where each instance 
of the word is in itself the relation of word to thing that retains 
the thing within itself: the “saying of the unconcealment of beings” 
(“The Origin of the Work of Art”, 1935-1936, Basic 198-199; cited 
Burnside “Strong Words” 260).  This voice re-politicised reveals 
“what already is” in the world (Burnside Polemic 6-7, original 
emphasis).  For the poet, it is resistance to the narratives of 
capitalist hegemony, for the modality of the lyric centres the human 
in “a spiritual way [as a] making of home” (“Strong Words” 260, 261, 
original emphasis).  For Burnside, poetry works in the area “where 
you can't say about the world, you can only show” (Herbert 
“Interview” 80): voice is a site of possibility. 
Indicative of Burnside’s early work, “Pleroma” (FD) speaks of 
fullness and plenitude as a relationship to place: 
 
...where you stop 
to meet the sun 
as if its light were something you had 
formed around, a brightness from within, 
the life before you are, that always was. (10-14) 
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In the sonnet-hymn, the voice reflects upon the centrality of the 
subject yet the self is pragmatically configured when reading is 
encouraged to engage with the spirit of development in the poem.  
Here the experience sees life as potential for relations.  It is a 
Rilkean theme of ‘loss as value’ remade as the positive within the 
unfulfilled state.  The line-break at “had” suggests the slipping of 
possession into eternal adaption; it is scaffolded by mood 
characterized by awe as tonality that maintains astonishment in 
looking, and whose voice finds origin not in human subjectivity (the 
recourse to interiority) but in the world (Haar “Attunement” 160).  
Moreover, to pause or dwell in the space of time is to open the 
encounter of nature not as a plane of difference that gives Being, 
but as pronounced in the writing of “life” as eternal and pre-
existent to the human, as an affordance of the knowledge that Being 
is differential in itself.  It is to write the occurrences of the 
world as events in a field, which extends beyond singularities.  This 
is an intellectual understanding of Shelling’s ecology, the event of 
language, and the site of world revealing itself to an embedded ‘I’: 
the ecological fabric within reckoning and yet beyond name. 
Despite the circumference of “you” in the opening and closing 
lines of the sense unit, Burnside is attempting an articulation of 
the circular reciprocation of being thrown and being projected into 
the possible, which as Haar identifies, locates a totality “in as 
much as the subject and the object are indissociable within it” 
(162).  It is interesting to note that Burnside achieves this through 
the second person pronominal emphasis.  The patterning of short feet 
echoed by the assonance of the vowel sounds ‘o’ and ‘a’ in “stop” and 
“was”, elongated in the middle line’s enjambment but essentially 
denoting a form of continuum across present and past tenses -- a 
version of life in form as with the growth from the sun in subject.  
“Stop” emphasizes oral quietude and the garden fire’s smoke barring 
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vision as incitement to enter outwith the world of sense impressions 
while also anchoring physical movement into a moment out of present 
time and without agency.  As a point of reflection and glance 
backwards it represents human and world as one via ecstasies. 
Respectively, the line-endings emphasize moments of stillness and 
reflection, the shift into poetic language and spatial hermeneutics, 
the need to concretise things, and to listen to the necessarily 
understated and simple sense of our primary selves.  This 
constellation reminds readers of “the fabrication of space in which 
any number of futures may happen”, a mode of living by “the 
inevitable narratives of emergence rather than the authorised 
versions of history” (“Fact Fiction History Myth...” 2).  Is this 
circular and evasive?  The music stretches fast mono-syllabics into 
expansive feet and accented rhymed vowels in “light” and “brightness” 
presenting an unfolding synecdoche of the small extending into the 
whole.  The relinquished ‘I’ reverberating in the sun’s bequeathing 
displaced by “you” as an indiscriminate objective ‘I’, moreover, is 
correlate to the music and effects self incorporated into other, 
while time, rather than deterministic and linear, folds back upon 
itself (as with “Dark Green” MOT, above).  Here the “always was” 
resonates with befindlichkeit, the human capacity to feel, 
particularly in respect to time.  Thus the poem instances ecopoetic 
‘fullness’, which Burnside named “pure space” (“Pleroma” 5).  If one 
posits a circle one will find a circle; if one posits a line one will 
find a line.  Within this poetic perhaps the critic should look 
closer at voice rather than configuring a frame? 
 
II.C. Burnside’s Voice 
 
Burnside’s performance commentary, Quartets, crystallizes several 
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poetic counters in a broader context.27  “Parousia” is the series 
that ends SIF and contends with the linguistic problem of writing the 
ineffable and the metaphysical that speaks of a continuum in our 
dwelling place, the earth, for which we are (at times and in certain 
manners) nostalgic.  Burnside comments: 
 
[Parousia] means the presence, in Catholic tradition... the 
presence of Christ on earth, as it were; the presence of Christ 
with us.  But I like to think of it in a broader sense.  I was 
brought up as a Catholic in Scotland and I was educated in all 
kinds of arcane Catholic beliefs and I thought for some time 
that I was very much involved with the Catholicism of the 
Catholic church, and then my interests broadened out and I 
turned away from, basically, the Christian tradition, and though 
I still use some of the iconography, I felt as though I was 
interested in a more widely based spiritual sensibility; so the 
ideas of parousia as explored in this sequence of poems... is 
more to do with the idea of the soul or the spirit and how it is 
wedded to matter; that we can’t actually say that the spirit or 
the soul exists in any other way except through the material.  
So it’s a kind of anti-dualist poem in that sense.28 
 
One could read this anti-dualism as being present within an absolute 
presence (of soul, or mind, wedded to matter).  A non-hierarchical 
model suggests animistic vitalism distinct from the material yet 
against Lamarckian biological vitalism that distinguishes between 
living and non-living things.  Burnside’s materialism relates to the 
non-contingent soul yet its basis is in spiritual sensibility.  This 
negates multiplied animality via inheritance and negates change 
driven by physiological needs; moreover, as his materialism resides 
not within a discourse of origin and that it is derivative of 
Romantic selfhood defined against authority, it is clearly non-
transcendental and can be particularized.  To underline this and 
emphasize the invisible interconnectedness of Being (the fabric that 
I have identified) Burnside’s reading ends with the paired poems 
“Geese” and “The Asylum Dance” (TAD), bonding a poem of the natural 
                         
27 rec. 2 June 2000. 
28 Supported Dosa interview 12. 
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world and the world of the mind in order to restate the non-material 
that is “wedded to matter”.  The poems end with these lines, 
respectively: “how the flesh belongs” (80); and “[figures venturing 
on form] as if they were all one flesh, in a single dream, / and 
nothing to make them true, but space and time” (85-86).  The poem 
offers a lyrical voice negotiating the processes of naming, 
perception, and frames of reference: key terms that I have introduced 
in this chapter. 
These lines are not necessarily deconstructive but perhaps lie 
closer to the Weilean conception of decreation, which Burnside reads 
in Stevens: “[naming] which has already shattered itself even in the 
sounding, so that there may occur only that which was sung itself” 
(Heidegger Poetry 139).  This model reads space and time as 
meaningfully relational structuring concepts, which as Kantian a 
priori essential conditions of perception re-activate the blind-spot 
with respect to the idea of presence in-itself beyond the individual 
-- something vacant and conceptual without a full understanding of 
their mutual reliance.  Here, embedded into the phenomenological 
flesh they allude to the ecological cartographic as the only 
metanarrative of energy.  Moreover, as a pragmatist conception of the 
flux of life outwith the conceptual, it relates back to Bergson: 
 
The definition that James gives of truth is one flesh with his 
conception of reality... And if the reality does not form an 
ensemble, if it is multiple and mobile, composed of criss-
crossing currents, the truth which is born from a direct 
participation in one of these currents – truth felt before being 
conceived – is more capable than the truth, which is simply 
thought, of seizing and storing up reality itself.29 
 
The fluid, interdependent world requires a mind derived from this 
knowledge of world outside economic thinking, to Bergson, and one 
                         
29 Bergson’s introduction to the French edition of James’ Pragmatism 
(1959); cited Sprigge 143-144; my emphasis. 
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willingly interdependent, too; it is a coordinate in its own right 
preferring entities over concepts, existence before essence.  This 
indication of the coordinate -- or the determining of our position 
within the universe -- does not necessitate a rejection of 
universalism via privileging the subjective self and the particulars 
of experience, but indicates that the experiential can dissolve 
arbitrary boundaries of the self while maintaining consciousness 
within complex relational dynamics.  Burnside’s phenomenology rests 
awkwardly here.  A difficulty that has been discovered via first 
analyses of Burnside’s poetry with respect to the Heideggerian 
spatial-logocentric contention in deconstruction, its influence upon 
contemporary criticism, and the understanding of world as component 
of our mental state.  This might not be the most suitable critical 
tool to explicate this state in normative terms, but it has indicated 
that component dynamics bring into relief the delicate utilization of 
world over models of panpsychism. 
 
III. Towards a Conclusion 
 
For Rigby, the pantheistic vision of Wordsworth and Coleridge implies 
“an understanding of the divine as simultaneously immanent and 
transcendent” (Topographies 48): not an authority beyond but one 
interfused (271).  Reading Burnside’s vision of the encounter with 
nature as the manifestation of this interfusion, or as a re-
articulation of nature’s indecipherable book of God’s second 
scripture irrespective of an interfusion (which does not necessarily 
state that nature has no principle, even if it has no semantic 
principle of practical utility), may be to offer too direct a 
conclusion in either case.  However, one cannot dissociate Burnside 
from three ideas that have been drawn into philosophical and 
historical context above.  Firstly, Rigby’s contention that complex 
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interrelationships of natural systems can be mimicked by web-like 
poetic texts as a way out of technological enframing, appears 
paramount to an inquiry into Burnside.30  Secondly, Bowie’s 
contention that the Romantic self could not become transparent to 
itself as an object of knowledge, must be analysed in the case of 
contemporary poetry to ascertain whether or not post-
Transcendentalist Romanticism and the ecopoetic consider this as 
imperative to understanding Being-in-the-world.  Finally and thirdly, 
that to assert the self as an entity channelled by language alone –-- 
a point of contention in the Romantic period and in subsequent 
criticism -- would offer the dependency of consciousness upon 
language as an overemphasis of the fact that we are thrown into life 
amidst an already existent language and are ever increasingly engaged 
with a mediated, material world. 
 
In “Iona” (2000), the essay on solitude, the quest for meaning, and 
the radicalizing of the spiritual within historical and cultural 
materialism, Burnside offers a paradigm of thought that can view the 
self via the poetic gaze upon the palimpsests of reality as the 
fabric of life.  The poet draws resources from the island as if it 
were a culturescape able to out-manoeuvre self and re-read historical 
systems of representation.  The church represents an expression of 
values and an image of continuity, both historical suffering and 
repression as a source to ideological construction.  It echoes with 
Rilke’s seventh elegy where once enduring houses have now passed 
                         
30 I am using the notion of ge-stell from Heidegger, as framework.  
Heidegger reads beyond the mechanical in his concept of technology 
(Question) as such it purports arrangement and tendency.  It relates 
to Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) thoughts on depositif.  The Latin 
root of which, dispositio, a translation of Greek house 
administration, oikonomia, evokes the sacred as that which is removed 
from the free use of man, and that which accents the historically 
contingent.  Heidegger would read this in terms of energy (as would 
Deleuze), Foucault in terms of (bio)power.  See p. 308, n. 73. 
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“completely / belonging to the realm of concepts” (53-54) with the 
counter-effect of shedding light on a subject whose stance is outside 
political grammar.  Burnside resists identity politics by viewing the 
geographic as an arrangement around a core e.g. a church or 
marketplace (Adorno Aesthetic 93).  Art’s representation closer to 
the Kantian thing-in-itself than mere subjectivity suggests to 
Adorno, physic; in Burnside we collocate time.  The cognitive, 
intentional site, written as an example of “stepping out into the 
open” (93), attains through placing the chapel as a site that denies 
a superimposed narrative, and enables him to take the thesis of the 
sublime out into abstraction to speak of Scotland and America, 
alluding to a poetic metaphysic of art.  Unlike Wordsworth’s late 
sonnets where metonymic chapels suggest the possibility of escape to 
places beyond (Kerrigan), Burnside’s site witnesses and endorses the 
fragility of earth and history; a position that provides the poet 
with a deep sense of connection to the point of revelation.  This is 
not an image of the connoisseur of art but is a reading of the 
“imprint” of time (Adorno Aesthetic 95), historical continuity and 
nostalgia triggered by the earth “ravished by utilitarian pseudo-
progress”, a backwardness geared to generate “a livable life” (95): 
 
Walking along a beach on an island at the edge of the Atlantic, 
you suddenly see yourself from outside, no isolated figure, but 
one woven into the continuum of human history (Burnside “Iona” 
25). 
 
This dispensable self is a model of non-egocentric life; how it is 
woven into the rhythm and melody beyond the linguistic is how it is 
not subjectless.  It is a view of recollection as regulated, calm 
thought gathering one’s self again as a form of possession.  As 
graceful momentum, it is characterized by the redemptive musical 
aspects found in the lyrical devices of expansive verse, those 
especially composed to emphasize echo, half-rhyme, and the subtle 
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nuances of extended articulation slowly emerging into different 
semantic gestures within a single complex pulse.  In addition to the 
line-break offering plural meanings, it is where cosmic white noise 
enables significance to replace the priority afforded to meaning.  It 
is another instance of preference satisfaction overridden by the 
worthwhile meaningful act: agency that registers Heideggerian 
thought. 
Furthermore, post-pastoral iconography in “Iona” reconnects to 
Romantic decay to posit a sensibility that is no longer an empty 
subject but a vessel of receptivity and the event of active saying.  
Burnside articulates bi-direction via allusion to Taoism in later 
collections; however, crucially here, it is not a ground but a being 
there in intentional disclosure, the horizon of Dasein itself as the 
affordance of an empirical world for us.  Philosophically, this 
detached perspective -- one that does not exclude the subject and is 
without recourse to identifying a principle of subjectivity -- does 
not state the subject as sovereign but negotiates the division 
between or relationship across sensuous particularity and 
transcendental essences in its non-representational offering of the 
horizon of experience.  Contemporaneous to TAD, this is Burnside 
establishing parousia within lyrical defiance in not being spirited 
away by the immediate or by mind.  A significant moment, I feel, 
where phenomenon and concept are both harnessed and negotiated.  
Chapters two and three develop the progression to this position. 
By offering consciousness as the site of interrelations and not 
the ordering of relations, this ecological ‘I’ can be read as a post-
Romantic distribution of the panopticon, where power is dissolved and 
“an inner self or soul is effected” (Colebrook 177): gathering 
resources for the human spirit internally rather than from external 
authority.  This can be read as the first step in Rilkean 
consciousness before the external world can reveal itself, or as a 
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phase before Stevens’ external self that is not autocatalytic but 
promotes itself within a larger field of complexity and as such is 
accountable and open rather than a veiled compression of fragments.  
It “fills the four corners of night” (“A Rabbit as King of the 
Ghosts” 19) as an identity dissolved into the site of renewal.  
Simone Weil has suggested that the incentive for seeking joy is not 
necessary in fulfilment derived from relinquished self-centring; nor 
is the ability to hear misery afforded, for “no corner is left for 
saying ‘I’” (Stevens 27).  This European-North American collocation 
informs Burnside’s ethics as each chapter will reveal; I revisit this 
in depth in chapter five. 
Burnside’s poetics can be seen as responding to an anxiety of 
human-world relations under the influence of Stevens and Bishop, 
while also inheriting the Shelleyan and Wordsworthian living tenor of 
the earth with consonance to phenomenologically conceived 
“reverberations” as a motif of the living principle of continuum in 
earth and in text, the opposite to causality (Bachelard xii).  This 
principle is symbolized in the cover design to TLT.  The front of the 
volume is illustrated with a Hopi emergence symbol centred between 
the poet’s name and work’s title.31  In line with the lack of 
metaphysical concepts that isolate world from dynamic experience, the 
symbol expresses the myth and meaning of emergence -- a labyrinth 
known as ‘mother and child’: a matrix of world energy and spiritual 
rebirth from one world or form to another, a dynamic circular unity 
(Allen, P. 247) and poetic forwarding of right dwelling.  From 
distance, the image looks like an amplified fingerprint, neither map 
                         
31 The Hopi people (Hopi'sinom, or “People Who Live in the Correct 
Way”) renown for the oldest continuously inhabited settlement within 
the United States of America at Oraibi, Arizona speak a language from 
the Uto-Aztecan family, which Benjamin Lee Whorf (1897-1941) noted 
for its linguistic relativity -- the absence of words or grammatical 
forms that refer to western notions of time.  See also Malotki 
Ekkehart. 
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nor maze but modality of identity.  However, to enter into and walk 
this path is more about becoming and existing on the journey of life 
than it is about destination or achievement: a circular model of 
interdependence where origin and destination represented as the same 
now articulates the disposition Burnside’s prose commentaries on 
contemporary poetry forwards (most especially “Mind” and “Travelling 
into the Quotidian”).  This stance drives Burnside’s post-
phenomenological poetics worked through an engagement with 
Romanticism and American verse that I endeavour to illuminate further 




Poetry up to and including MOT is read in response to research 
questions raised in the light of negative poetics clarified in 
chapter one.  Here, the position claims Burnside’s American 
post-Romantic influences have a relation to his lapsed 
Catholicism, which does not deny him the notion of a soul.  The 
qualification develops from the poet’s inquiry into the idea of 
self being transparent to itself as an object of knowledge.  
Over the following two chapters I map how this idea is 
configured and conceived in particular terms (most especially in 
this chapter via ‘precognition’) which I illuminate through 
various post-Romantic interfaces to Burnside’s early solipsism. 
 
I. Towards a Poetics of Home 
 
Twentieth century deconstruction views transcendence both as shelter 
from the temporality of being and as a descendental move beyond the 
signifier or form towards paradox and contradiction, or -- as in 
Romanticism -- beyond time and place to seek truth independent of 
these counters and of language (ch. 1).  American Transcendentalism’s 
interest in pragmatist notions of partial and finite knowledge 
(relational and temporal) drives it toward the source of life from 
which all relations or terms emerge.  Post-Transcendentalist post-
Romanticism disputes the idea of source, for it encounters 
fragmentation and diffused constellations of energy and power over 
and above notions of origin; by extension, this rejects the attempt 
to restore centrality to man while offering apertures to the referent 
outside of man.  I find this an interesting aspect of Burnside’s 
wrestling with the lyrical ‘I’.  Again, the lack of raw state applies 
not only to world but to mind, too; it is a point that may raise the 
stakes of the issue of co-creation, while certainly positioning a 
space for coloured and glazed rather than transparent subjectivity.  
I deconstruct this and show that the view is one that contextualizes 
man as embodied by nature rather than dispatching him from the scene 
altogether.  I advance two claims on these terms.  First, Bate’s 
conception of the ecopoetic and Rigby’s outline of German Romanticism 
now seem problematic if projected across the contours of contemporary 
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practice on their own, thus my thesis begins to install an historical 
differential in its understanding of Burnside’s poetic hinterland.  
Second, in rejoinder to the gap between Heideggerian ecopoetics and a 
philosophical treatise of nature, I offer Burnside’s engagement with 
literary modes deriving from New England and from post-Romantic 
practice.  This arrests a retrospective and teleological view of the 
traditions, and in my break from Rigby and Bate stresses an attempt 
to understand what a particular medial form means in a given 
historical context i.e. the neo-Romanticist in Burnside is to be 
viewed through historical forebears as a means to understand what is 
new and of interest in his poetry.  My position is also sensitive to 
Burnside’s position on the soul: “the underlying order, the 
fundamental connectedness, the soul energy”, he stipulates “runs 
through everything”; this, however, “cannot be described, only 
intuited” (“Iona” 23).  Burnside draws from phenomenology to evoke 
the intuitive process, heightening descriptions as they come to mind 
-- and that process itself -– while harnessing this to a particular 
disposition that wants to read home in a material sense free from the 
predilections of modern consciousness.  This, therefore, returns to 
the self and rethinks the possibility of transparency. 
Heidegger: 
 
Being subject as humanity has not always been the sole 
possibility belonging to the essence of historical man... nor 
will it always be.  A fleeting cloud shadow over a concealed 
land, such is the darkening which that truth as the certainty of 
subjectivity... lays over a disclosing event that it remains 
denied to subjectivity itself to experience.  (“The Age of the 
World Picture”, 1938, Question 132) 
 
I would like to superimpose this language upon Burnside’s poetry: 
 
the woman beside him, clutching a silver frame, 
 
her face dislodged, reduced to a puzzle of bone 
and atmosphere, the tremors on her skin 
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wayward and dark, like shadows crossing a field 
of clouded grain.  (Burnside “Swimming in the Flood” 18-22) 
 
The certainty of subjectivity drawing from an historical position is 
not available to Heidegger; the empty frame and relic of a home that 
once was is at once devoid of signification posited as point of focus 
on the other, and it acts as a symbol of loss and displacement in 
this poem.  I find undertones in this veil of the lack of the 
certainty of the ‘I’ that was prepared in Christianity by the 
certainty of salvation.  “Bone” and “atmosphere” collocate to stress 
finitude within an idea of ineffable change.  Yet it is the flood, 
not subjectivity, in Burnside’s poem that imposes itself upon the 
villagers -- something external bringing forth change.  More than 
highlighting how man cannot abandon himself from modern destiny by 
his fiat alone, it is this idea that world is charged by the sense of 
being unrestricted and free, heralded by the word ‘dislodged’.  One 
would think that the contingent self would transform while the non-
contingent soul would remain constant, however, it is the experience 
that is denied to subjectivity and escapes the human frame that is 
the focus here.  It is the enduring preoccupation for Heidegger and 
Burnside.  It is also prevalent in the poet’s American forebears. 
 
The mindset of Puritanism is aware of the poles of ratiocination and 
observation; as hermeneutic co-ordinates they are problematized by 
the vision’s two predicaments spurned by Reformation legacy: 
“alienated imitation” and “egocentric idiosyncrasy” (Manning Puritan 
193).  In considering the gap between a hidden and ‘unknowable’ God 
(nature) of Puritanism, with respect to intelligibility and 
indeterminacy (ch. 1), my approach follows de Man’s reading of Kant’s 
third critique indicating that the sublime lacks purposiveness and is 
transcendental (as opposed to the beautiful that is metaphysical and 
ideological).  Furthermore, judgement speaks of “the teleology of our 
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own faculties, specifically the relationship between imagination and 
reason” (Aesthetic 73).  This position, clarified in prose, is what 
Burnside reads as a phenomenological influence in the Americans.  How 
this operates or works as an influence is less easy to clarify 
without moving beyond the particular sensibility of each poem, but it 
does relate to energy in the poems (subject and technique) and to a 
sense of the provincial solitary inflected by a critique of an 
imposed power source or grammar, be that transcendental monism or 
corrupt epistemologies.32.  This is why Dickinson and Frost are 
prevalent here over Stevens.  I use the position in this chapter to 
develop thoughts on solipsism.  This is a first move as I extend this 
position to read perspective in chapter three.  These two chapters, 
therefore, provide the basis for my reading to widen out into 
thoughts on dwelling and ecology in chapters four and five. 
 
I.A. Lawrentian Latitudes 
 
D.H. Lawrence seeks a localized individualism as the universal i.e. 
that different places have different vibrations and effluences.  He 
reads the American rejection of European post-Renaissance humanism 
and liberalism as proof that a deeper form of being exists underneath 
or antecedent to mind where knowledge is considered a “death process” 
(76).  Much as consciousness raised the idea of sin, mentalized 
sensualism extinguished truth; Lawrence seeks the reverse where “the 
homeland of the idea, of the spirit” is laid to rest for that of “the 
blood” (119, original emphasis) or (universal) locally non-
transcended “world soul” (120).  It is where Walt Whitman’s refusal 
to build mansions (“Song of the Exposition”, Leaves of Grass 1900, 
“Preface” 182) meets Burnside’s use of Charles Bukowski (“The House”, 
All’s Normal Here, 1985) in TGN: the need to forget and relinquish 
                         
32 Manning Fragments 259. 
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human technology in its largest conceptual sense and to be put out 
into place.33  I see Burnside move to this position by going beyond 
the self through his inquiry into the self.  This is where, to 
paraphrase Lawrence, the free soul purified of ego enables one to 
have sympathy with (not for) the world (183-7). 
 
I.A.1. The Post-Puritan Matrix of Engagement 
 
An ecological matrix promotes the idea of disparate elements within a 
field of vision and experience, the nexus as middle ground between 
structures.  The reformed theology of John Calvin determines self via 
polarities: life and death, reprobate and elect, meaning and absence; 
by contrast, the Anglican mind eavesdrops upon the self in an act of 
acknowledgment and thus can “find a perspective from which to view 
[its] own littleness without belittling it, by recognizing a centre 
beyond [it]self” (Manning Puritan 16).  This latter perspective is 
closest to the central mind that has undergone inflection within 
philosophical doubt -- David Hume; Friedrich Nietzsche -- resonating 
with the theological implications and anti-essentialism.  It has been 
raised to another particularity, close to the ecological nexus, in 
the poetic expression in Stevens.34 
When Heidegger wrote “To build is in itself already to dwell” 
(Poetry 146) as a resistance to origins and to show how each being is 
a node in a matrix of movement through time, he opened an ecological 
aperture into his existential reflections.  The dichotomy in 
ecological ethics between the realist position claiming an immanent 
                         
33 Also Burnside, “The House That Jerry Built”. 
34 Critical context Melita Schaum, “‘Preferring Text to Gloss’: From 
Decreation to Deconstruction in Wallace Stevens Criticism,” Wallace 
Stevens Journal, 10.2 (1986):  84-99; Timothy Clark, The Theory of 
Inspiration: Composition as a Crisis of Subjectivity in Romantic and 
Post-Romantic Writing (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1997); and Vincent 
B. Leitch, Deconstructive Criticism: An Advanced Introduction 
(London: Hutchinson, 1983). 
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nature out there in the world, and the relativist position declaring 
the world as construct, opens a middle space where the “dwelling 
perspective” (Ingold Perception) forwards notions of co-evolution or 
the presentiment of nature and man in one.  This presents a totality 
that is both a biological and cultural organism; an eco-perspective 
upon the dialectical work-in-progress of nature attending to the 
world in our actions, continually.  Moreover, this brings into relief 
a pragmatic view of human-nature interactions through time and acts 
as toolkit to attune to Burnside’s self-soul dynamic.  As indicated 
above I have calibrated my reading of Burnside’s poetry to ideas of 
co-creation (Schelling, Emerson, Ingold). 
The phenomenological underwriting of the whole person active in 
environmental engagement where end-states, objects, and percept fall 
away from our knowledge offers the idea of the perceiver as product 
of perception (Ingold).  This resists both the linguistic trickery of 
focussing on an organic development of the human and the distraction 
of applying the notion of culture to the non-human: it rethinks the 
paradox of non-anthropocentric ecopoetics as a misprision veiling the 
more crucial emphasis on action/praxis/involvement/techne.  
Engagement as interplay offers a model of responsibility and 
response; as ecology of encounter, it works the concept of otherness-
in-relationship into pragmatics.  By writing the way of the world 
beyond adverbial relations (the meta-attribute that qualifies or 
modifies) ecopoetics takes each temporal site as a nexus of 
relationships.  Use of prosaic occlusion and the present participle 
affect the currency of relations: 
 
Something is in the wood but nothing 
visible.  Continuance; a filmy, brackish 
misting of oak and moss, 
cold as the shillings minted in the frost 
winking at the break of day through dusted grass: 
a faery money, changing in our hands 
to silverthaw.  (CK “Home” 1-7) 
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Here, Coleridgean rhythms and muscle in the verse evoke the sense of 
change in this series of prose poems, which stretches out into 
stanzaic form, and flexes into couplet and expansive music with the 
widening over time of the aperture onto world.  Here, the playful 
lexis of commodity culture is literally exchanged for a sense of the 
natural flesh of the wood and its undergrowth, evoking a sense of its 
isolation but of human involvement, too: it is a “vacant shroud” (12) 
but is “changing in our hands”.  This is not dualism but interplay as 
a node in a field; it is a gathering pregnant with past events and a 
chronicle of the moment in itself (Ingold Perception 1-30).  As such, 
it is dwelling as an enterprise to read fullness and participate in 
richness and futurity recalling Burnside’s “Pleroma”, which Lawrence 
understands as the giving over of the self to the larger “IT”, the 
spirit of place, communicated not by spirit but by blood.  This 
contour or vector of the universe’s creative process has a 
relationship with care (sorge) and is Burnside’s locale for the ‘I’, 
phenomenologically bound or not. 
 
I.A.2. Looking for New England 
 
The appropriation of Romanticism by the Transcendentalist movement of 
the eighteen-thirties in New England developed an aesthetic model and 
intellectual spirit within a very new nation.  Thus when Perry Miller 
emphasizes that Emerson’s philosophy “reconciles the practical with 
the speculative process” (250) he is speaking on the synthesis of 
primitive unconsciousness and civilized self-consciousness.35  This 
is set alongside the synthesis of revelation and reason, its effect 
is to localize the self vis-à-vis the non-self, whether that is a 
                         
35 Anonymous [Emerson and Margaret Fuller (1810-1850)] “The Editors 
to the Reader,” The Dial, 1.1 (1840): 1-4, 4; a phrase taken from 
Kant’s sixteenth and final part of The Critique of Pure Reason 
(1781). 
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monotheistic creator, or an integral, historical context for the 
nation’s identity, or a symbolized knowledge of God i.e. nature. 
Lawrence Buell emphasizes the literary quality of Unitarian 
sermonising and the examination of inspiration as a “distrust of 
structured spiritual development” (Transcendentalism 277, 179).  A 
world of guaranteed meaning being increasingly brought under scrutiny 
while also bringing into relief the idea that knowledge is humanly 
inscribed, are two attributes that inform Emerson’s new testament -- 
the call for an original relation between man and environment as a 
means to fix disunity within man himself (Nature).  He is Burnside’s 
earliest American mentor.  The Romantic problematic of creator versus 
free channel in the artist is given heightened linguistic and 
symbolic edge in this new epistemological aesthetic (Rotella), and it 
meets its match in the reflexive contemporary ecopoetic (Ricou, 
Bate).  Scepticism regarding the imposition and construction of 
meaning in Rotella’s sharply defined conceptual terrain rewrites 
American nature writing into a tradition of poetic thought that works 
across cultural materialism and Idealism, the oppositions of secular 
and sacred, and the complications of subject-object relations, 
phenomena and noumena, reason and intuition.  It is the legacy of 
such thinking pressing upon and through the grammatical, conceptual, 
and categorical constraints that is an overt influence upon 
Burnside’s poetic apparatus, which recalls the discovery of a 
“double-consciousness” (Emerson “The Transcendentalist”, Collected 1: 
213) and the lives and understanding of the soul (James Varieties 
1902), particularly pronounced in MOT.  I seek to clarify this in the 
remainder of this section before I turn to ideas of self-sufficiency 
and solitude (sec. II.) which are raised together to read doubleness 






Firstly, James McGonigal has understood the post-religious devices in 
Burnside as the “precognition and recovery” of aspects of 
Catholicism’s “ideology of sanctity” (“Recusant Grace” 65).  This is 
a significant theme prior to Burnside’s dwelling emphasis.  Secondly, 
for Rotella, Puritanism viewed nature as an immanent power of the 
transcendental, something that could be read by an elite and elect 
readership.  Furthermore, Rotella’s Stevens, a late years figure 
whose loss in the faith of God or nature as a source of the 
transcendent, signifies a post-Transcendentalist questioning of the 
authority of the experience of the transcendental through the act of 
creation.  I place these two issues as implicit centres of gravity in 
my reading of the hinterland. 
How creation has a history in Emerson’s extension of the Puritan 
mind allows us to understand Burnside’s use of Stevens -- a 
conflation of the late with the early Stevens: the voice of the 
disenfranchised and the voice posing the possibility of diffusing the 
inner self through a relationship with nature not God, a position I 
move to after qualifying the American position and Burnside’s earlier 
work in this chapter.  In Burnside it has the added problem of 
commuting world beyond the strictly anchored ‘I’.  Thus, McGonigal 
informs my conceptual reading of the early poetry (precognition) 
here, and my reading of SIF and ANS (recovery) in chapter three. 
 
For McGonigal, the ideology is “as difficult to question as [to] 
ignore”.  This Catholic qualification reads “Two Saints” (Th), where 
the desire for the spiritual beneath the superstructure of the 
everyday outplays Burnside’s move from his birthplace in Cowdenbeath, 
Scotland, to the mining town Corby in the English midlands, with 
understated disaffection.  The dwelling place of the writer’s first 
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primary school, Saint Brigid, symbol of the sacred fires of Ireland, 
is quashed by the English school, Saint Columba’s High, which 
represents “Anglo-Saxon” materialism, that which cannot talk about 
the soul but would “be happier with poems about vacuum cleaners” 
(Herbert “Interview” 75, 79).  This humorous aperture upon the need 
to connect to ritual and memory is turned into graven seriousness 
especially acute via the significance of Halloween.  Burnside draws 
from Hallowtide rituals as symbolic cultural events.  These suffered 
attack during the reformation, yet as Nicholas Rogers notes, despite 
Queen Elizabeth I removing the commemorative ceremony of the faithful 
departed from the litany in 1559, Scotland and Ireland enjoyed 
unchecked fire festivals into the seventeen century (20-30).  They 
are not mere forms of ritual but events of resistance and sites of 
dissidence, one that forwards the producer over the consumer and 
suggests that the meaning of place is the product of the human 
relationships and history afforded by and constructed within the 
site.  It enables a fresh view on the self/soul contingent/non-
contingent issue. 
McGonigal’s reading is accurate and unyielding.  A glimpse at one 
of five sonnets playing out Adamic naming, Grail narratives, the 
Green Man, the ploughshare, and the opposition of spring and winter 
in “The quest” (Th), suggests that the absent Christ within these 
motifs is indicated but overshadowed by the “dangers that attend 
visionary effort” (“Recusant Grace” 67).  Following McGonigal, I 
would like to detail Burnside’s secularised Catholicism within a 
post-Transcendentalist idiom. 
 
I rise in the waxen dark.  The snow 
is steady and exact, with time enough 
to fill the city... 
But living has become a testament 
to prey I did not take and ventures wrapped 
in careful flesh.  A fear of accidents; 
new snowfalls leaving tripwires in my path, 
Bristow 115 
the vertigo of finding my own depth. (“The quest” 4: 1-3, 10-14) 
 
Here, the premise to be exact is forgiven (or ironized), for the 
darker energy such as the shadowy “tiger” (8) is allowed to flow.  
Steven’s discovery through “inexactnesses” (“The Poem That Took The 
Place Of A Mountain” 11) is given new life in the sonnet’s turn 
working in proximate relation to an idea of regret.  This transforms 
the animal and primitive sense of the poem into a mode of conscious 
thought, the cost of putting “flesh” into feeling reflected in the 
precision of pentameter relinquishing the deeper, wider self.  
Burnside double binds the semantic space by using the word “prey” to 
highlight oppositional agency, yet when read in conjunction with 
“testament” to indicate a statement absent of (the presence of the) 
creator one reads a plea to an other.  Therefore, the poem attempts 
to bridge a gap and offer more than artistic representation or 
completion, it forwards thinking as a step beyond precognition and 
wishes to recoil from this.  With a stress on “wrapping” as reflexive 
allusion to textual event, one can read this running into the “fear” 
of materializing spirit without due care.  Such practical reason (or 
blind faith), however, is held in balance by the arrest induced by 
the poem’s wider self-reflexivity.  The “waxen dark” does not 
collapse the divide suggested by the dichotomy running from human to 
animal and on into surface and depth, light and dark, presence and 
absence, but it operates in a separate space, a site of reflection 
only possible when material culture is not seen as running right 
through and across.  There is a space, therefore, for human action or 
reason, willed dwelling over passivity/interfusion. 
The poetic intelligence deconstructs opposition in reference to 
the luminous surface of night as a site of arising not decline; 
however, the bridge, if not a levelling of terms but a permanent 
faith, is resisted in as much as it is an imagined loss of 
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equilibrium that resonates in the final image.  This arrives as a 
form of ownership in the use of possessive adjective (“my”) but it 
arrives after the move from “I” to “living”: as thus, one can read 
the non-contingent creative energy driven via temporality and 
interrelation dynamics: it is the crucial watermark to the sonnet 
series.  This is a difficult semantic site to critically extrapolate, 
and it is a complex way of working out some of the problems Burnside 
wishes to resolve from his phenomenological influences.  It is almost 
a private mind-game for the poet, almost slipping too much from the 
poetic sphere. 
However, energies that interact with childhood sensibility, 
ancestral ghosts of nature’s temples, and the entrance into language 
(or the sensibility before the world fractures into consciousness) 
are the very essence of Th.  McGonigal reads two other dimensions in 
Burnside’s early work: (i) how “the numinous must exist in some sort 
of tension with the numerate world” (68) (CK); and (ii) how the 
pursuit of the real self, the dark animal predator alive in the 
precinct of the undergrowth and the imagination, is challenged to 
surrender to “the meagre sanctuary of home” (“‘How morning sometimes 
works’” (14) FD).  Are the three co-ordinates simply one: the 
absence-presence conundrum writ large?  Or is Burnside offering 
self/soul dynamics conceived as a complement of the finite and 
timeless? 
The iambics of the last three lines (above) offer little 
resistance to both these lines of inquiry yet do suggest the logos of 
pheno above all else.  The use of plurals to effect ideas of 
chaos/contingency, weather, and a line of defence is matched by the 
mono-syllabic “fear” as traced echo in the couplet’s line-ending 
half-rhyme “path” and “depth”.  These operate the flash-light upon 
Burnside’s wading consciousness, which is left stranded in the open 
outwith the linguistic world and critically aware of its 
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constructions: it can be read as a form of trespass into nature’s 
canvas.  These constructions are its only defences or navigational 
devices; now naked and defenceless in the triggered spotlight the 
poem moves into tentative verse, attempting to pull back the 
contingent, human created interface and allow the world (or soul) to 
reveal itself.  Listening closer one can almost hear the trepidation 
in Burnside’s meter.  While the first two feet of the line give 
stress across “vertigo” in its first and third syllables, it seems, 
however, caught by the pressure of the dying cadence and the last 
three syllables of “in my path” and “my own depth”.  Here, the 
alternation of “my” from unstressed to stressed ironically elevates 
the human and removes some strength from “depth” to the point that 
this last note pulls down the word it derives from.  Turning 
“vertigo” into anapaest and lowering the height and radiance in song, 
this (as with the troubling sustained ‘r’ in “tripwires”) is 
Burnside’s emphasis upon the earthly and the unassured ‘I’, repeated 
throughout Th toward MOT.  It operates to push open the space between 
spoken and unspoken, the mantra and spiritual fidelity of a shaman 
quality where, McGonigal argues, the poet can wander between 
“temporal gaps” opened up by speech and “learn to inhabit silence and 
white space, unpeopled or snowed-in places” (67).  I read these as 
semantic gaps that the mind dares to bridge but cannot in the site of 
precognition.  The poem’s voice is one urgently wishing to commute 
this to readers; it is visualized in the poetic metaphor.  The “waxen 
dusk”, the dark of night before giving way to morning, is the site of 
potential awakening; it is a solitary’s threshold and smooth, 
lustrous surface.  Despite the connotation of the pallor of a corpse 
it emphasizes a closeness, which as patina is the gloss on the soul 
while also the ability to follow traces beneath what has been 
expressed as the “habitual sway” by Wordsworth (“Ode: Intimations of 
Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood”, 1803-6, 11: 5).  
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In Burnside’s poem it is not the death of innocence but an unpeopled 
wider agency. 
McGonigal has spotted the acute outposts of Burnside’s solitary 
mapping: the hedges, kitchens, streams, and border towns that he is 
tasked to return from with findings and reap as sustenance for making 
home.  Nevertheless, the textual manifestation -- although deemed 
from scientific analysis -- has detoured into negative theology where 
one is unable to speak of the divine, “where things are transposed 
into their own mirror images or anti-echoes” (69).  This unease is 
derived from absence but I choose to read this exactly as McGonigal’s 
reading of the word “Virgin”, as pre-conceptual: thus, 
unfathomability or negativity is one that misses our Kantian and 
scientific categories and is alive to other epistemologies that play 
along the surface and feel that which operates underneath.  This 
emphasis by Burnside’s attention toward sacramentals and not the 
sacraments gives life again to the elements, the things not the 
ideas, which is, of course, an Americana in microcosm. 
 
I.C. Another Dickinson 
 
Burnside has spoken of deprivation in terms of social structures 
working to reduce spirit and offering life “as consumers, as members 
of the corporation and congregation”; poetry speaks of “the world 
elsewhere” available once actions are dispelled, “A naïve man’s idea 
of possibility, which Emily Dickinson called ‘a fairer house than 
Prose’ [“I Dwell in Possibility” #657]”36 (Funk 18, 19).  Burnside’s 
Dickinson is signalling impartiality and gentility, to which I would 
add unfinishing: an equitable quietness as open chamber to 
possibility.  It is where the contingent self can meet the soul.  
Eleven years earlier Burnside offered an abandoned project, “Another 
                         
36 Also “They shut me up in Prose” (#613). 
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Loneliness”, leading from Dickinson’s poem “There is another 
Loneliness” (#1116) as the end of an engagement with prose poems 
(Herbert interview 83-84).  It illuminates Burnside’s use of 
Dickinson to read contemporary American poetry and thus outlines the 
territory I am bridging between the New England mind and the 
contemporary ecopoetic. 
Later, Burnside turns to Brigit Pegeen Kelly’s poem, “Dead Doe” 
positing a physical and imaginary distance between human and non-
human at an urban road-kill scene.  Burnside reads the gap as 
“unbridgeable”, for the fact that the bystanders fear a resurrection 
if they come into relation with death and the animal, or as the poet 
phrases it “presence” and “ghostly blossoming” that extends the 
deer’s relation “spiritually and lyrically” to others (cited Burnside 
“Mind” 57-59).  This is not phenomenological poetics but an emphasis 
on the non-contingent. 
The need for contact through a reduction of ill-defined fear is a 
significant compound for Burnside (TGN, GS), yet his emphasis on how 
the poet sustains distance by refusing to push provisionality in the 
poem to a dead conclusion is telling.  The “slant of light” 
(Dickinson #258) as mode of perception and keen positive panic 
envisions expectation -- in “Dead Doe”, the soul -- in an 
“unanticipated form” (60); that is to say Dickinson affirms vitality 
via ambiguity in language and thought as a resistance to terminus.  
Apposite to Burnside’s interest in terror, awe, and panic, this 
practice -- which can be translated and used as a phenomenological 
influence -- is an unwillingness to conform to preconditions; it 
delivers the gap or distance between things into a clearing for 
contemplation, and enables “certain” new formations in the world and 
mind.  It also suggests fluidity and continual movement within 
inexactness: the right source of influence Burnside appears to seek. 
In “There’s a certain Slant of light” the example of a winter’s 
Bristow 120 
afternoon light as institutionalized oppression (for it gives without 
physical trace) provides “internal difference” as the site “where the 
Meanings, are”, stressing existence outside epistemology and 
scripture but within internalized pain: what one feels in the mind is 
over and above what one can literally see (not sense) in the world.  
Marjorie Perloff reads both the personal pronoun in the poem as an 
ambiguity that urges the possibility of multiplicity, and reads the 
poet unable to “identify [the] free floating fear” but able to 
“describe how it feels” (39).  This particular indeterminacy outplays 
a post-structuralist blind spot by reconfiguring negative poetics of 
cancellation or contradiction as “differential poetics” (49), as an 
order that “cannot be explained or understood” outside the poet’s 
“inner most being” (38-39), a curiosity that qualifies the claim to 
anthropocentric lyricism by collapsing internal and external, which 
is further accentuated in the disorienting verse form: 
 
When it comes, the Landscape listens –- 
Shadows -– hold their breath –- 
When it goes, ’tis like the Distance 
On the look of Death –-- (13-16) 
 
Dickinson’s gaps focus attention on the nameless and upon disjunction 
and rupture.  They stress two factors.  First, the insufficiency of 
language to capture the bonds (the conjunctions and prepositions) of 
continuity, by extension the nexal points of relations that are never 
limited by time or space.  Second, the transitive pulsation of mind 
neither arrested nor enclosed -- as it would be by an anchored ‘I’ 
either in control or trapped by the Husserlian reduction (either 
epoché or eidectic) -- is one viewed in cross-section.  The rhyming 
quatrains, as Perloff notes, have alternating lines of stress and 
irregular syllabic pattern (three and four feet lines; 7-5-7-5 and 8-
6 counts), which enforce breathlessness in the first three stanzas’ 
double-stressed line-endings and line-beginnings.  In the final 
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stanza (above) the secondary stress on “landscape” differentiates 
itself from the shorter second line where breathlessness is now named 
and sustains its endnote over the cadence of the third line to hammer 
its rhyme with “Death”.  For Perloff, this breathlessness as with 
Dickinson’s “blankness” effects “essentially congruent” meanings 
across the seemingly multiplicious pronoun, “it” (40) rather than, 
Perloff clarifies, the Derridean lack of centre or the Deleuzian 
rhizome without origin or terminus (39).  This emptiness enables a 
reading of death prefigured in the opening line’s light.  The 
congruence declares that death is already part of the process of 
light and enlightenment; it enfolds the premise and conclusion in 
one, which in turn, through the particular indeterminacy enables a 
view of the continuum without origin, a cyclical process constructed 
without falling back on the ‘I’ but indicating the self in the world.  
It is an alluring forebear to contemporary ecopoetics. 
Dickinson’s octet, “There is another Loneliness”, speaks of a 
presence that is neither desired nor provided, “but nature, 
sometimes, sometimes thought” (5) that befalls and enriches beyond 
human comprehension and will, yet is part of the continuum across (or 
within) human and world.  I have indicated this as a key motif to 
Burnside’s notion of soul.  Burnside uses this as an opening into the 
self as a haunted being in his series “Another Loneliness” as a 
version of Wordsworthian strangeness of the soul on the earth and an 
attempt to understand one’s involvement with others.  The eleven 
short prose sequences drive into a metamorphic flux of vignettes: 
“the way, in a folk tale, the actions of one life transform the shape 
of another”; “still communities among the firs”; “an off-season light 
on the teacups and pictures”; “fabled meetings”; the afterlife as “a 
memorised district of plum trees and fishmongers’ shops”; and “the 
order of Sundays” (Herbert Interview 83-84).  This is a vast array of 
transmutations through narrative and perspective alongside past 
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events formed tangibly into mental regulation.  Does this propose 
exactly what a phenomenological influence might be for Burnside?  
Compressing this again, they read as the sometimes existent and 
sometimes thought: the contingent world and the contingent mind 
resident only in symmetry.  The opening and closing statements 
operate on exactly this scale of double-consciousness: 
 
You begin with the fear of dust, but summers accumulate and 
settle at the household’s edge, in the stone out-rooms and moss-
threaded walls: birds’ nests; moleskins; shinbones stitched in 
grass.  Slowly, you merge with home; slowly you become 
invisible.  Leaf mould and fernseed drift across the floor, and 
fates are sealed, another kind of healing. (83) 
 
Death in the opening lines of seasonal variation betokens healing as 
the enduring continuum; where this state of knowledge exists, the 
self dilutes in the manner that the edges of home dissolve into an 
identity equalized with place.  Here mind is enfolded into place, but 
only through the promotion (even if it is the promotion of 
instability) of the subject; again interestingly this is written in 
the second person.  It is dwelling mirrored in the inevitable 
meaninglessness and futility of life, which is rich: 
 
The gift of the random: a private life, embedded in the silt of 
memory: a whiteness on the air, like lime or frost; damp 
fingerprints of anthracite and mud.  How you live through these 
mystery years: a surprised participant, passing the same 
households of steam and linen, and meeting, day after day, those 
beings you once mistook for others, and now understand as 
echoes, figments, parsings of a self. (84) 
 
Contingency, embeddedness, and traces written in drifting pools of 
locales for living forward notions of difference emerging into fluid 
spaces of unity and interdependence (“parsings”).  Nature and mind 
work together to read the myth of fern seed as invisibility 
communicated to the elect, and to read anthracite as a stone endowing 
energy rather than lying inanimate.  Burnside often pushes further 
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than his forbears, entering into the coordinates of flora and fauna 
within their ecologies and yet located via human technologies of 
names/taxonomy.  Wrapped inside a sequence where home is offered to 
an open mind, the “echoes” and “figments” of nature “sometimes” is 
not dependent upon light, fable, and memory, but is exposed through 
attentiveness to all three -- the undercurrents and invisible 
energies in these and the world, the vast wealth afforded by the 
reduced ‘I’ and an expansive textual field.  I see these as 
precursors to Burnside’s poetics that adopts this metaphysical order 
but is tantalized by the necessity to deposit the grounded ‘I’, here 
made significant by the second person as a means to step outside of 
the self.  The way the poet works this domain in his earlier poetry 
is more slight and relaxed, and perhaps makes better reading than 
that witnessed in later verse where it is terse and intense. 
Dickinson’s variant word-lists and dashes purport that words are 
not priceless; her resistance to (proto-Modernist) verbal autonomy 
(product) gives way to silent transport (process).  While Dickinson 
questions the purpose of nature in which we dwell via her “Sublime... 
founded upon her unnaming of all our certitudes into so many blanks” 
(Bloom Western 308-09; cited Perloff 46), her dislocated Gnostic 
silence affords vision in darkness.  Language that initiates the 
movement of thought to exist within nature does not limit word or 
world by remaining within thought’s boundary alone.  This is a post-
phenomenological influence. 
 
I.C.1. A New Outlook 
 
Reading the New England outlook as one that viewed language as an 
organising force within the theology of the disinherited helps to 
understand the paradoxes and oppositional logic within Puritan 
thought.  Calvinism’s promise that signs of the divine exist on 
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different planes to the corporeal crystallized America’s “embattled 
opposition” to (European) centres of worldly experience (Manning 
Puritan 1) and delineates a way of conceiving the American attitude 
to the outside and to the other.  Consequently this leads to the 
notion of the division between God, man, nature, and man located 
within consciousness of sin.  This appeared first to Puritans as a 
structuring principle and the justification for the sentence of 
reprobation and the arbitrary nature of grace for the elect. 
The influence of Coleridge upon Emerson where reason and 
understanding are differentiated in terms of faith (inward vision) 
and reason (rationalism), respectively, translates into thought as 
the possibility of perception with an emphasis “upon [a] beneficent, 
all-pervasive, and self-regulatory moral law” (Milder 103).37  The 
“wider self” qualifies Emerson’s solipsistic man as law unto himself 
(James Varieties 405).  I read a certain level of correspondence 
between James and Emerson; however, I do not follow the trend in 
scholarship outlined by Bense that reads Emerson as post-Idealist.  
Bense articulates the distinction between James and Emerson, most 
especially the human capacity to see absolute truth and the eternal 
(divine) within the instant in Emerson as contradiction to the 
Jamesian notion of order always being in the process of making (366-
367) and pluralism (375).  However, the cosmic soul operating outside 
the individual is read by Emerson as an illimitable “universal” mind 
of which man is a temporal incarnation (“History”, 1841).  Perhaps 
this is the second phenomenological aspect of Burnside’s poetics of 
self and soul.  If so, as the deep background power that resists 
possession, it abolishes time and space, and offers the site in which 
                         
37 Emerson’s reading of Thomas Carlyle’s (1795-1881) Aids to 
Reflection (1825) and “State of German Literature” (1827) is central 
here (Milder 103); so too “Sign of the Times” (1829) and Sartor 
Resartus (1833-34).  Also see Sanja Sostaric, Coleridge and Emerson: 
A Complex Affinity (Dissertation.com, 2003); Marx Garden (170-179); 
cf. p. 76 n. 26. 
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“the subject and the object are one” (“The Over-Soul”, 1841, 
Collected 2: 160).  Emerson’s temporal incarnation of the non-
contingent relates to James’ uniform religious deliverance consisting 
of “uneasiness” and its “solution” (Varieties 400).  This provides an 
almost Arminianist qualification to the ego, the Copernican astronomy 
overriding the Ptolemaic world as mere resource for education of the 
private individual (Milder 111) offering man as part of the stream 
whose source is hidden.  In addition to being precursor to the 
Heideggerian epigraph to my thesis, this provides an ecologically 




The marginalized wonder of the everyday and the use of customs 
provide the conceptual starting point for Burnside’s third volume, 
FD; it represents Wordsworth’s “blessed mood” where the human blood 
and frame is “suspended”, where “we are laid asleep” and “become a 
living soul” (“Lines Composed...” 41-46).  This position is an 
incredible development from the running ‘r’ of “hear” and “repose” 
echoed by “orchard” and “groves”; a world as yet “unripe” but almost 
silently transforming “copses” to make ‘corpses’, drawing the 
underwood further down into notions of mortality (2-15) but later 
blossoming from this knowledge.  Rather than an indifferent alveolar 
trill, this is perhaps dialectical: the Lancastrian northern emphasis 
echoing lowland Scots “ruggedness” over the sylvan (Bate Romantic 
27).  Across sound and sense as one it is the determination of the 
way one relates to the world, the temporal comportment of 
phenomenological intentionality (verhalten) which is the intertwining 
of human and world in location prior to objective positing or 
subjective perspectivism.  This indigenous hinterland to Burnside’s 
precognition touchstone resists prescribed signs and is witnessed in 
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human song.  I see this repeated in a distinctly different poem: 
 
I dream of the silence 
the day before Adam came 
to name the animals, 
 
the gold skins newly dropped 
from God’s bright fingers, still 
implicit with the light. 
 
A day like this, perhaps: 
a winter whiteness 
haunting the creation, 
 
as we are sometimes 
haunted by the space 
we fill, or by the forms 
 
we might have known 
before the names, 
beyond the gloss of things.  (“Septuagesima”) 
 
As the lead poem to FD, this is charged with the claim for an 
authentic mood finding the mystical in the quotidian and the 
spiritual in the customary within a pragmatic premise that leads from 
Heideggerian “saying-gathering” (Being 30-31); it is perhaps one of 
the most simple poems, intentionally so.  “Septuagesima” also offers 
a view of the artist, in George Santayana’s words “as a dreamer 
consenting to dream of the actual world” (Life 39) -- the view of the 
artist pushing against the pressure of reality like Stevens, but the 
application of art by discipline heralding intuition that represents 
actuality, and automatism over spontaneity i.e. being pulled by the 
non-contingent rather than asserting self.  Burnside uses this 
collection to show how language is grounded in the body, in epistemic 
action (knowledge and acknowledgement), and in the mind; we read the 
behavioural environment as source and site of language, existence, 
and dream.  “Septuagesima”, therefore, can be read as a poem 
delivering the need to understand the footprint of the human by 
offering the site of origin, “winter whiteness”, a double haunting of 
seasonal repetition evoking the possibility for creative relations 
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upon a blank canvas.  This delineates that which operates before and 
underneath our “creation” and forwards the failure to question how 
knowledge is structured, or moreover, how structures come into being 
and mutate through time.  For Burnside, this applies to the creation 
or emergence of self and text. 
Lines from the Spanish poet exiled in America, Jorge Guillen, 
preface “Septuagesima”: “Nombres.  Estan sobre la patina de las 
cosas” (“Names: they skate on the surface of things”).  While 
reticent to name, this poem recalls Emerson’s resistance to Idealism 
in “Experience” (1844), to reduce intellectualism and calculation as 
a means to live in the moment and by impulse, following the play of 
the moment and crest of a deeper force: “to skate well on [surfaces]” 
(Collected 3: 35).  As an acceptance of our inability to penetrate 
the hidden, it suggests an element of purchase or embeddedness in the 
flux of the world once dispatched into freedom that abides outside 
the life-form, (34); it follows Emerson's (Jamesian) image of the 
bird in perpetual movement between boughs and brings self-soul 
couplings into macro perspective.  To Emerson this is the radically 
spontaneous and disorganized “practical power” (49) that genius must 
shape.  To James, it is the deconstruction of concepts as a means to 
open up the unfathomable.  By this he means the Pragmatist condition 
to understand that which we can only name as “the thickness of those 
passing moments”, for we fly over surfaces and sometimes rest, 
reading the laws of nature as if on skates, finding “only 
coexistencies and successions” (“Bergson and His Critique of 
Intellectualism”, 1908, Pluralistic 112).  To Frost it meant more 
than stasis or recovery of old ground but superfluity of the non-
egotistical, “the mind skating ideas round itself as it moves 
forward” (my emphasis; cited Poirier Poetry 64).38  I propose that 
                         
38 Robert Frost, letter to Louis Untermeyer, 10 Mar. 1924, Collected 
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this is the mind behind Burnside’s project to rework poems and to 
create an ever elaborating poem: it is radical as skating tempers the 
gravity of absolutes and is actively self-critical and circular, a 
rigorous energy motivated by non-conformity.  The logic behind this 
is to illuminate the possibility of the artwork as a semantic 
offering that opens up thought beyond representational structures or 
the ontic determinations of ontology (i.e. real as opposed to 
phenomenological), the showing outwith the logic of fixed forms while 
provoking non-deterministic models of thinking to reconsider textual 
accidents as the site of meaning (as with Bate’s conception of 
Heideggerian ecopoetics, Song 262).  It is a push forwards and it can 
be missed if seen as only the mental stasis and preoccupation within 
the redrafting of earlier works.  For the poet, knowing how things 
are in the world and celebrating the mystical fact that the world 
exists resists the “new fascism” of contemporary hegemony manifesting 
in a corporatized society of “the atomic clock” (Burnside “Science” 
93, 100).  As we shall find when reading TLT, it is a summoning of 
history within silence that operates “beyond the gloss of things” 
(“Septuagesima”), yet with non-appropriative purchase.  One needs to 




Burnside’s solitary in his first four collections can be read in 
light of the titanic figures of Wordsworth and Emerson.  Bate reads 
through abstract intelligence in Wordsworth towards an active 
principle while also finding a radical humanism of a working paradise 
or pastoral built through relation and involvement, as in book eight 
of The Prelude (Romantic 22-29).  I apply this throughout my reading 
of Burnside, but first, to recap how I arrived at this imperative to 




Manning reads a gulf in mindsets between Puritan and Anglican, the 
“alienated” and “egocentric” pitted against “the recognition of a 
centre” beyond the self (above) without a consideration of communal 
materialism.  Burnside’s poetic line uncovers the gaps between these 
two positions by following a breakdown in confidence witnessed in 
American post-Puritan writers, read in retrospect as solipsism that 
rejects epistemology i.e. a mind that refuses to see outside the self 
and takes the loss of the word of God as an inability to achieve 
spiritual re-generation: a position quashed by Dickinson and flatly 
ignored by Stevens.  The failure to comprehend the world and its 
vastness witnessed in the frontier as a penetration into the other is 
one fuelled by paranoia.  Herein the dichotomy of grace and 
domination where the self oscillates between self-assertion and 
ratiocination and with self-abnegation before authority (Manning 
Puritan; Miller, P.) provides an initial sketch into the background 
of Transcendentalism and Emerson’s ethos of self-reliance as 
liberation from alienation.  I am outlining the individual mind in 
this chapter yet develop this ground in chapter three with specific 
attention to breakdown, self-assertion and healing in SIF and ANS. 
 
II.A. The Excursion into Solitude 
 
“Self-Reliance” (1841) to Emerson spells letting “the subject be what 
it may” (Collected 2: 27), which is the first step to universalise 
deep private feelings upon humanity and is the manifestation of 
realizing that imitation and envy are valueless in comparison to 
self-expression.  This model is at the heart of the Transcendentalist 
vision of the self as “redeemers and benefactors, pious aspirants to 
be noble clay plastic under the Almighty effort”, rejecting the 
conspiracy of society to repress while advancing through “Chaos and 
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the Dark” (28).  This has strong echoes with Heideggerian ‘letting 
be’ as indicated above and articulated by Zimmerman and Haar.  This 
American view finds its later expression in Walt Whitman’s “free 
channel” (“Preface” 496) and in Santayana as “inner attention” or 
spirit that “suffuses all actual feelings and thoughts... so 
conceived is not an individual but a category: it is life in so far 
as it reaches pure actuality in feeling or thought” (Dominations 55).  
This latter fragmentation could represent the phenomenological 
critique of human construction by forwarding elements in description 
before offering a theory of causation.  However, there is a desire to 
push beyond this position both in the American hinterland and in 
Burnside if not in Heidegger. 
“Spontaneity” and “Instinct”, the essence of the aboriginal self 
and primary wisdom, “Intuition”, is the deep source or “common 
origin” to which the independence of solitude and self-reinforcement 
lead (Emerson Collected 2: 37).  However, Emerson writes that it is 
impossible to interpose calculations of the relations between the 
soul and the divine despite these modalities, for “its presence or 
its absence is all we can affirm” (37).  An essential qualification 
to liberal freedom is the following allowance: “prayer as a means to 
effect a private end, is theft and meanness.  It supposes dualism and 
not unity in nature and consciousness”; this unity is to be found in 
our (unaided) actions (44).  It proposes that freedom is not the 
ability to will whatever one chooses, but because what we do affects 
what we are and how we can be, rather than unchecked self-assertion 
freedom is an understanding of our actions within a larger fold and 
through forms of relinquishment.  I differentiate the Emersonian 
positive dialectic of co-creation that dissolves the non-identity 
problematic from the thoroughly Romantic notion of freedom that is 
challenged by later interpretations of Emerson, for its emphasis on 
living wholly from within and positing the integrity of the mind as 
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the only sacred thing.  Again, thought-in-action is forwarded as 
poetic and philosophical forebear to the contemporary ecopoetic. 
 
II.A.1. The Wordsworthian Qualification. 
 
The Excursion (1814) reads animation between “all things” (9: 5), a 
statement toward the end of the poem upon an active principle derived 
from an exploration of three characters, representing mind and soul 
in development.  Wordsworth’s attention upon the Solitary as a double 
symbol of early youth and reflective consciousness, posits the union 
of endurance and despondency corrected via the realization of inner 
psychological reality, a widened version of self-reliance.  As 
Bushell has argued, this is enabled only through the interplay of 
narrative voices, the being-with-others and consolidated recollection 
of tales from across multiple personas, which draws the mind to 
itself: it is not an isolated solipsism but one considered embedded 
in context of action and interaction, narrative and response.  
Bushell has noted that the second narrative of the Solitary is the 
sole first person pronoun of the whole poem; it is strikingly 
distinctive and a remarkably significant device for self-exploration 
via the loss or reduction (or remove) of converting or translating 
meaning into narrative in isolation, within the larger consideration 
of integrating death into life and education over instruction.  For 
the Wanderer and most especially the Pastor (representing storied 
contemplation of the spatial distribution between churchyard and 
valley, a geographic poetic), memory is a device that brings 
reassurance and affirmation, whereas the Solitary’s memory is 
dysfunctional.  His narrative is primarily a treatise on the 
limitations of memory and the inability of imagination to recreate 
identities through stories (Bushell 229-30).  This presents a larger 
treatise of continually shifting centres of consciousness that mark 
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the unfolding of Wordsworth’s text as an indeterminate but active, 
living event. 
Bushell’s Iserian participative reader model is complemented to a 
degree by Hickey who reads a shift of the poet’s role from 
autobiography (The Prelude) to the writing of a community (149), but 
with greater emphasis on voice and communality than Hickey’s 
ventriloquism.  Thus, despite memory foregrounding an impasse between 
world and experience, Wordsworth’s Solitary of The Excursion is not a 
spectator of nature-as-object but as with the consolidation of 
diverse perspectives, he is immersed in the form of revelation 
derived through nature-as-process.  It is an influence Burnside 
wishes to harness into his self-soul dynamic turned transparent.  
Wordsworth’s despondent declaration: “I called on dreams and visions, 
to disclose / That which is veiled from waking thought (3.686-87)” is 
an attempt at making himself part of the scene that he encounters; 
here, to negate the frame of the dispossession of life that once 
fuelled the past.  The death of his family suggests recovery through 
the effort drawing from memory and imagination but also the education 
from solitude (385-410, 776-845) as a means to take the oppositional 
“I” out of the role of finding and from authority.  This shifts 
monologue to the representation of others and the questioning of the 
inadequacy of some responses to world.  It comes in the correction of 
despondency in the next book: 
 
I have seen 
A curious child, who dwelt upon a tract 
Of inland ground, applying to his ear 
The convolutions of a smooth-lipped shell; 
To which, in silence hushed, his very soul 
Listened intensely; and his countenance soon 
Brightened with joy for from within were heard 
Murmurings, whereby the monitor expressed 
Mysterious union with its native sea. 
Even such a shell the universe itself 
Is to the ear of Faith. (4: 1132-1142) 
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The progression in ‘countenance’ is particularly acute for the word 
not only commutes bearing, but suggests comportment (intentionality) 
and is specifically used when designating the behaviour of two people 
towards each other; as an intransitive verb it is underlined by ideas 
of pretence and making that unconceal the “within” of the boy.  This 
is the faith in the world of bi-direction manifesting in specific 
moments in time. 
Moreover, assonance and vowel softening across alliterative steps  
expand and contract poetic breath in a single move.  “Curious” and 
“countenance” work in the fashion that “murmurings” and “mysterious” 
are coupled as with “union and universe” but the running on of vowel 
sound in “curious” (‘u’) into “murmurings” (‘u’, ‘i’) and 
“mysterious” (‘i’) brings these ideas into greater relation and act 
as shaping sonic element to the larger motif of cosmic union.  As 
poetic device the soundscape spreads words into a larger site of play 
while also contracting each element into a tighter mould –- an 
undulating modal breath in itself that is experienced as spatially 
elasticized and entangled grammar simultaneously.  This duality plays 
across “silence” as the context for a vision which has “listened” or 
where “faith” is begot by curiosity; it finds its post-
Transcendentalist expression in the “momentary and eternal nature of 
durée” (Burnside “Science” 101).  
 
For Burnside, the use of the solitary is a method for exploring the 
limits of subjectivity and its interface with or creation of soul.  
This operates as self-examination, not through the assimilation of 
stories of others as a continual process (Bushell 104) but through an 
interdependence drawn from memory, dreams, and presences of others.  
These are seen as twins to one self or “parsings” (above, i.e. an 
instance of resolution into component parts) brokered as living 
events united through repetition and the collapsing of the pronominal 
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frame -– as such, Bushell’s dialogic model applies.  Burnside wishes 
to develop Wordsworth’s remarkable listening self of “inland” “joy” 
wedded to the material world as a means to collapse, or speed along, 
the phenomenological imperative.  Thus in technique, the embedded 
narrative of others is given to an extended communion between selves, 
often the work of mind running across disparate selves in time and 
synthesizing these to a countenance of a singular yet schizophrenic 
‘I’.  As Abrams notes, in Wordsworth evoked materials are brought 
together under different laws for different purposes (Mirror 181); 
for Nasir, The Excursion demonstrates this principle of the 
imagination “to modify, to create, to associate” (34-36).  Communion, 
for Lyon, is the faculty of passionate intuition by which the eternal 
and infinite truth is apprehended, yet this lies within the mind, 
nature’s active principle, and the transcendental realm.  Bushell, to 
a larger degree than Hickey, brings this faculty (or debate) back 
home, from mind to community.  Burnside forces these into a singular 
vice of self accumulation. 
These first two elements universalised by Lyon could be used to 
understand the early Burnsidean solitary and most accurately to 
handle the pronoun in MOT where each instance reads not as an 
individual subject but as mutual subjects.  Thus mutability not fixed 
monologue: 
 
and someone is having the dream 
I had for weeks: out walking on the beach 
I lifted the pebble and split it 
open, like an apricot, to find 
a live child hatched in the stone (“The Myth of the Twin (1)” 6-
10) 
 
While Wordsworth’s Solitary underlines a conflict between normal 
consciousness and solipsistic determination not to yield to it, the 
bond with a benevolent providence carries into Burnside’s solitary, 
who as with Wordsworth’s, is tasked with strengthening not overriding 
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this bond and thus develops self from the co-existence of two 
perspectives offered as the site of externalization.  A godly faculty 
that can be exercised, is in Burnside’s vision, a temporal and 
spiritual link between man and divine.  Is this an attempt to 
undermine the individual and open up a theory of essences by 
disputing the spatio-temporal individual existing in one place at any 
one time, something underlined by the notion of the double, and the 
extension of self into separate identities in time and states of 
waking life? 
This is tricky.  The poem of the dream of another as self-same is 
a promotion of Husserlian eidetic reduction.  Here, an essence 
designated validity as an element of an individuum (the dream story) 
is then put into an idea (the reflection of the dream as energy state 
within the pebble-apricot) and thus meets this particular 
phenomenological paradigm.  Evolving consonance blurs “dream”, 
“beach”, then “hatched”, as a movement from mind to world to new 
origin; it is definition through re-evaluation and yet threaded with 
resemblance (‘I’ and sound), highlighting degrees of egotism across 
the poetic space and running through any bracketing or 
conceptualizing.  As the Solitary of The Excursion has sorrow 
consoled, Burnside’s fruitful simile creates the image of two perfect 
halves deconstructing to formulate a third term, or other life form 
and new possibility beyond the pronominal frame.  I chose to read 
this passage with a mind to relinquishing auto-insemination and 
elevating the poetics of reintegration as a form of dialogue, thus 
the Cartesian foundation is adumbrated by the human act (to be) 
understood as one of free being motivated by reasoning its relation 
to others.  I urge the reader to bear this conclusion in mind as the 
thesis moves forward. 
Burnside’s child-man and pebble-beach scene creates an image that 
reflects upon the science of man’s ability to open up the atom and 
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find complexity on the scale of a solar system.  Moreover, within a 
poem about a dream and the shores of consciousness -- disparate 
perspectives and points of relation to self -- imagery is no longer 
fitted to circumstance as with a self-reflexive phenomenological 
field positing mind in relief to objects under scrutiny.  Yet imagery 
does render an emotive state -- but what is this?  Firstly, one can 
read neither a mechanistic universe marking time nor an eternal 
recurrence of the same, but the morphing fruit-child suggests a 
dynamic force unlimited by concept and open to reasoning.  Secondly, 
reading this as metaphor, the dream is a force striving forwards 
towards vitality: a new life-form provided via the élan vital.  As a 
representation of the lyricist’s aspiration this transforms the 
moment of recognition and kinship (looking at the pebble and finding 
a self, not anti-self) into completion: now this once absent life-
form has a life of its own and it is to this phantom that we connect.  
An identity has been established through the co-creation of self and 
soul.  It is the “sub-soil” (Bergson Dreams) of a creative space 
fleshed out into imagery.  I find a reading of an encased and hidden 
image inflected into discovery as a birth process, which could be 
read as the internal manifestation of the dialectic of the 
phenomenological that must reach beyond the mind for its measurements 
and its language.  While this is distinct from Wordsworth’s Solitary 
healed through intercourse, again the ecological potential resonates 
with the Romantic notion of fulfilling human spirit by entering into 
relation; it also liberates human from world without transcending 
world. 
Riddel explains that this model relates to the notion of advance 
by habit or repetition forwarded by the Harvard logician C.S. Peirce 
(Purloined 88).  It is thus incompleteness –- Wordsworthian 
“thoughtless impulse” (MS.B 289) -- that is forwarded, that which 
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Bergson reading James calls “an invention” (Mind 255-256).39  Thus, 
Burnside’s metalepsis commonly deployed as trope for organic nature 
not yet realized (Adorno) has two functions here.  First, this 
development runs across repeated sightings of grandfather and father, 
and different ages of the autobiographical “I”, and within a 
conflation of these two to enable a view of a schizophrenic and 
fragmented identity yet one borne through an extended vision of time 
and existential interdependency (self and world/soul).  Second, it 
recalls Gaston Bachelard’s writing of the shell as a space of 
inhabitation and an acceptance of solitude, reflecting literally on 
the performance staged in appropriated narrative.  Moreover, this 
reverberates into the metaphor of the immensity of world that is not 
in miniature, here becoming available in all its glory as an original 
dwelling enclosing well-being and most pertinently as a slow 
formation (Bachelard 4; 105-6).  Read together as mirrors that unfold 
upon themselves yet extend the self through time as an inland faith, 
it can be read not as the lamp or the constitutive autonomous self 
but a recuperative force spilling over the boundary of 
internal/external, which bears an analogy to an organic yet 
determined nature through dissolving (but also in thanks to) the 
phenomenological aspect of the lyric. 
 
The mature mind celebrated in Wordsworth’s second book of The 
Excursion can read “the hand / Of silence” (711-12) and spiritual 
presences as “mute Agents” (724).  This is bequeathed at the very end 
of Burnside’s solipsistic journey in the final poem of MOT.  Here, 
Burnside’s “deep silences” are not disengaged, but are framed by a 
deep focus where “something” is denotative.  This resists the charge 
of indeterminacy, and as McGonigal argues, is an “after-echo or quasi 
                         
39 See p. 225, n. 51. 
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radioactive half-life of early experiences” (“Analysing” 23).  This 
is the domain of poetry that twins not solely contrary selves but 
also “underworld and modern world, past within present, natural and 
supernatural presences” (25).  Agency within and beyond self: 
 
There is that perfume in the shade 
that is almost viburnum, 
traces of snow and water in the light, 
a blankness along the canal 
that waits to be filled 
 
and, given the silence, given the promise of frost, 
I might have welcomed this as something else: 
the taste of windfalls moving on the stream 
a faint god’s partial emergence 
through willow and alder.  (“The Solitary in Autumn” 6-15) 
 
Burnside’s olfactory mnemonic coupled to space transforms Dickinson’s 
slant of light into a creaturely navigation of domain with Shellyan 
inquisition.  This is centred within circular time where beginning 
and end are one (as with Dickinson) via an emphasis on unfinished 
process “the promise of frost” followed by a shift in tense through 
unrealized potential in the following line, turning event into memory 
in one poetic moment.  This collocation of future and past amplifies 
into a larger sense of time given by the symbolic qualities of the 
trees.  Both willow and alder require wet areas for growth, a more 
quiet metaphor than that of ‘God’, alluding to the ultimate 
manifestation of a continuous thing, here to the hydrologic cycle and 
to the affordance of (pre-human) sub-aqueous life forms, the slow 
forming genesis from drifting planktonic life.  Moreover, willow 
symbolizes grief for unrequited or lost love.  As the site of only a 
“faint” god that is “partial” (as the identification offered is one 
being “almost”) it suggests uncertainty or unfulfilment in the trace, 
an idea of progenitorship that fills the silence delicately in 
mourning.  The post-origin identity that instils significance rather 
than emphasizes absence is a particular (human) voice.  In conclusion  
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the Wordsworthian dimension emphasizes exchange, the Burnsidean 




I elect a few poems and their historical forebears to emphasize the 
post-Transcendentalist pragmatic view of “double-consciousness” 
secularized as post-phenomenological negative poetics of self and 
soul. 
 
III.A. The Calendar as Grammar 
 
“All Hallows at Newbrook Farm” (Th) attends to the markers of our 
calendars and the natural “season of hunger” (11), “outside” and 
“beyond” (8-9) the empirical to define the voice demarcating terrain 
beyond the binary of life-death through the progression of the soul, 
given significant expression in the ritual markings of “Halloween” in 
the close of the poetics of solipsism. 
Halloween is the ingathering and reorganizing of the community and 
marks the observance of human dependence upon the land and its gifts.  
Without a direct relation to the Latinate feast Día de Muertos, the 
Celtic pagan festival Samhain registers kinship with the earth and 
the souls of the departed within the festival’s zone of withdrawal 
from the laws of time and space.  The gateway is not only from summer 
to winter, but for the dead to the land of the living.40  Burnside’s 
ecological mind, poetic saying and full speech, is pregnant with the 
gateway in MOT and his post-Wordsworthian inconstancy: 
 
I have peeled the bark from the tree 
                         
40 See James George Frazer The Golden Bough (London: Macmillan, 
1890), J.A. MacCulloch The Religion of the Ancient Celts (Edinburgh: 
T&T Clark, 1911), and Edward Muir Ritual in Early Modern Europe 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997). 
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to smell its ghost, 
and walked the boundaries of ice and bone 
where the parish returns to itself 
in a flurry of snow; 
 
I have learned to observe the winters: 
the apples that fall for days 
in abandoned yards, 
the fernwork of ice and water 
sealing me up with the dead 
in misted rooms 
 
as I come to define my place: 
barn owls hunting in pairs along the hedge, 
the smell of frost on the linen, the smell of leaves 
and the whiteness that breeds in the flaked 
leaf mould, like the first elusive threads 
of unmade souls. 
 
The village is over there, in a pool of bells, 
and beyond that nothing, 
or only the other versions of myself, 
familiar and strange, and swaddled in their time 
as I am, standing out beneath the moon 
or stooping to a clutch of twigs and straw 
to breathe a little life into the fire. (“Halloween”) 
 
Clarity and assertion in the tuning fork and late Yeatsean 
declarative “as I come to define my place” foregrounds time in a poem 
that shifts across the senses (visual to olfactory and touch) 
suggesting in the multisensual that nature is not framed for us, and 
writing a deeper connection to the place (in the shift from ‘I’).  It 
is an example of Thoreauvian living, a deliberate stance that is more 
A.R. Ammons than Jamie’s invisibility (“The Tree House”, The Tree 
House).  Moreover, topos is mapped via the peal of bells in the 
distance suggesting displacement and worlds existing beyond direct 
involvement at the edge of consciousness.  Both represent levels of 
enaction: formerly bodily ethics and laws of physics (the first two 
stanzas), latterly memory and fire (stanzas three and four). 
Within this dual and conflicting charge the elasticized motion of 
the poem gathers text into a mythological landscape of the passing 
natural rhythms of planetary life held in suspension (as with 
“Blackbird” TLT, 36).  It is the finest early example of Burnside’s 
vision of the lyric as aperture into the timelessness of place 
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through attention to a specific moment, a paradox that delivers the 
“standstill of eternity” where there is no distinction between the 
living and the dead (“Place”): it is his first significant 
achievement of fusing self and soul via the transparent ‘I’. 
The now timeless (through various repetitions) and final image of 
an anonymous figure overlooking the landscape caught in a sense of 
doubleness, moves to light a fire, to ignite thinking and the power 
of gods within this stillness.  This is a vision of self viewed 
outside of self and it marks a double gathering or two-fold movement.  
Firstly, the connection between the present living voice and the 
double of the late grandfather (the significant paternal figure in 
the volume, recreated as a twin in the figure of the poet), 
represents a marriage of minds.  It is not unlike Bishop’s version of 
Carlos Drummond de Andrade’s “Family Portrait” (Translations in 
Complete) whose multiplication of “living and dead relations” (48), 
perceives “the strange idea of family / / travelling through the 
flesh” (53-55).  When read as twin to Burnside’s father (AL) and to 
the ghostly, skeletal figure viewed on a November evening (“Lazarus” 
95) -- all explicit references to this image of lighting the fire -- 
it acts as mental grammar to diverse selfhood (the one passed into 
many gathered back into union).  Secondly, this fusion is exaggerated 
by bodily action and is extended into the gathering of human and 
natural realms.  The choice of phrase for the clutch of twigs is not 
only synonymous with the collective noun but is a shift into a verb, 
which in effect enlarges the sense of happening and making within the 
poem, in turn echoing the principle of becoming.  The present tense 
in “sealing” is emphasized over the past-perfect “swaddled” to 
promote the notion of authentication slightly more than the more 
quiet metaphor of (Christian) binding; it is noticeable as is the 
prolepsis of TAD attributes, namely shepherded being and free 
individualism.  Furthermore, Burnside kindling the fire that is the 
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responsibility of the adult male during Samhain brings into relief 
physical involvement in the world derived from our mental attunement 
to a larger principle of evolution within things.  This intuition is 
inward in early Burnside yet enveloped by larger presences.  I recall 
American influences to finalize thoughts on this poetic that have 
been discovered in Burnside’s work. 
 
III.A.1. New England Perception 
 
Emily Dickinson and Robert Frost exemplify the three levels of 
perception New England poetry incorporates: (i) the provincial; (ii) 
the mode of instruction; (iii) and the poetically inward.  That the 
human is transparent and nature is of the divine is a thought that 
runs from Jonathan Edwards into Emerson; Dickinson’s yearning for 
grace and Frost’s penetration of the veil, however, are written 
against theology and science, crucially as “scenic moments” praised 
for what they are (Mulder 552).  Most specifically in Frost, the 
pastoral is an isolated realm that knowingly points beyond its own 
limited world turning the poem into an initiation of the 
transgression of borders one must make to create relations in the 
world.41  It is the signal most complete model for reading early 
Burnside.  Frost and Dickinson are compatriots in their use of 
conversation as context, and of local colour; these methods 
relinquish pictorial poetics for an emphasis on process where, in 
both poets, the provincial becomes instructive (when the object 
invested with moral value transforms sight to insight).  This shifts 
to the third degree of perception, inwardness, when slant and 
cautionary scepticism probe hauntings and double-consciousness to 
find (in the immanence of textual correspondence) personal/human 
revelation and the indifference of nature.  Brought together these 
                         
41 Also Lynen’s The Pastoral Art of Robert Frost (1960). 
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deliver the ‘I’ into acceptance that unreason cannot be known.  The 
poetry suggests that Burnside wishes to push this position through 
from his own experience of craftwork. 
As a means to do this in CK Burnside is keen to analyze our 
ordinary homes of thought and our fictions, or Idealist purposes; 
thus, in self-reflective fashion he must forward process: 
 
the way a memory runs on 
from somewhere unrecollected 
and vast, 
how you always imagine the suburbs 
busy with bonfires and hymns 
at Halloween, 
when every house is lit, a déjà-vu, 
leading through street names and churchyards 
from nothing to nothing. (“Source Code” 6-14) 
 
Again, as identified in chapter one, “the way” draws attention to how 
the process comes into being and how the process exists to human 
minds -- of pathways (directions) and existential phenomena (how 
things are and can be).  The mind here extends into world, which is 
central to the early solipsism.  Resident in the companion section 
“Chain Work”, this poem alludes to the raw computer program that is 
not able to interface with other systems or objects until it has run 
through a translator, or compiler.  Moreover, “Chain Work” itself, 
while foregrounding writing as performance, that of language 
referring to itself in a chain of signifiers drawing upon difference 
in the semiotic system for value, takes its name from the lexis of 
information technology, too, specifically software engineering where 
programmes are combined to operate together yet across a domain via 
distinct and individually task-specific modules.  Placed together, 
one can read a model of object engineering advanced as middle ground: 
it is a new statement of the potential of phenomenological poetics 
that is set in relation to proprioception, or self-reflection upon 
the foregrounding of description as world comes to language.  
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Moreover, as a model of relations and identity this system correlates 
to the co-creative identity discovered in “Myth of the Twin” (1) 
above.  Rather than either an enclosed and solipsistic or non-
portable language, or an embedded, non-detachable involved language, 
this explication of the raw and the embedded replays Heidegger’s 
promotion of the sense of ready-to-hand, objects involved in praxis, 
energy in play and motion.  Moreover, in Burnside it has consonance 
with a central mind that is determined to connect to the infinite or 
ineffable while remaining true to the finite and the historically 
material -– thus, in abstraction, bringing the dynamics of the “Myth 
of the Twin” (1) poem into relation with “Halloween”.  To further 
emphasize the debt to the American influence, I argue that the 
proximity of these poems to Idealist completion of nature’s forms and 
the traditionally conceived phenomenological stance is qualified by a 
particular compact with nature. 
 
III.B. The Frostian Compact 
 
Stopping short in the poetry of Edward Thomas connects the macrocosm 
to the microcosm.  His love of detail much like that of John Clare 
prefigures Frost’s poetic sensibility.  Thomas is a fascinating 
element to Frost’s Anglo-Americanism, providing an edge to his 
Emersonian Romanticism and mixing the neo-classical rationalist 
qualification with elements of the British Georgian.  What Abrams 
coined “infinite aims for finite man” (“English” 56-58) alongside the 
truth of human experience through revelatory realism, are modernized 
into an independent poetic or “particular angle of vision” (Simon 
132); it is a conglomerate that echoes Burnside’s self-soul inquiry 
and his accommodation of Dickens’ lyrical forte.  Thomas’ Clare is 
similar to Stevens’ John Crowe Ransom (Opus) -- a combination of 
peasant and adventurer that denies a split between literate and 
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illiterate sensibilities (Bate, above).  Most centrally for Thomas, 
Clare betokens an ideal poet whose use of words allows things to 
“play on” (“Feminine Influence on the Poets” 1910, Thomas 30). 
This approach neither turns world into representation nor uses 
language bent toward correspondence but offers a site where words 
“half-wild and imperfectly domesticated” are sewn into the substance 
of emotion and perception registered during the moment of the 
experience to renew “what had before lain dark and unapparent”, that 
which phenomenology cannot access.  It is that site which Bate 
envisions as the strict role of the Heideggerian ecopoetic to uncover 
and bring forth (Song 260).  Heaney disregards the distinction 
between the lived, illiterate sensibility, and the learned 
consciousness, for his poetics are tuned to the marriage of “the 
geographical country and the country of the mind” (“The Sense of 
Place” 1977, Preoccupations 131).  For Thomas, this is delivered as 
experience within the aesthetic via common speech and straightforward 
poetics.  Burnside would accept Heaney’s reading of religious from 
religare –- to bind fast (133), and is more successful in mapping the 
two conditions in “Halloween” than in “September evening; deer at Big 
Basin”, for the vestigial promotion of the law of feeling in the 
former over the phenomenologically acute story-telling of law of 
mind.  However, I do see this latter poem crystallize some issues 
that my thesis has raised thus far, and I shall return to it.  While 
Wordsworth would democratize this law of mind through communion, 
Burnside is attempting to place it in a pattern of myth and symbol 
both personal and universal.  Where Wordsworth would contemplate, 
Frost sympathises and thus draws the subject closer to the referent; 
an engagement that Thomas saw at the core of Frost, and called, 
“natural delicacy”: an attention not to overwork the poem (128, 130).  
These preoccupations inform my readings by assisting my understanding 
of the way Burnside’s lyric is particularly configured. 
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In Burnside, the site of civilization is liberated into “nothing”, 
as above: 
 
The village is over there, in a pool of bells, 
and beyond that nothing, 
or only the other versions of myself, 
familiar and strange, and swaddled in their time 
as I am, standing out beneath the moon, 
or stooping to a clutch of twigs and straw 
to breathe a little life into the fire. (“Halloween” 18-24) 
 
Indicating home “over there” draws from pragmatic linguistics.  
Deixis is a process whereby an expression is reliant upon context; 
the village composed by definite article is neither nostalgic site of 
origin (Oliver Goldsmith’s “Deserted Village”, 1770), or negative 
view of rustic life (George Crabbe’s “The Village”, 1783) but in 
spatial relation it is the relief from which the viewpoint declares 
itself against.  Collocating this to ‘nothing’ suggests potential and 
primordial elements to the construction before entrance into mind or 
culture, symbolized by the Promethean impulse.  As mechanism that 
affords the distinction between ‘now’, ‘then’, and ‘here’, place 
written as “there” is not only geographical site but also Burnside’s 
comportment and intention where experience lies allusively within 
imagination, memory, and presence.  In TGN, the boundaries between 
“here” and “there” are conceptually forced; in MOT these co-ordinates 
marry fragmented time, and as context for other possible selves, they 
conflate future, past, and present.  Here, Burnside’s allusion to the 
day following All Saints’ Day where prayer for souls in purgatory 
symbolized by the ringing of church bells, is an absence that is made 
into an image of music for others coming from an expanded selfhood 
and a contrast of human symbolic noise with earth’s silence.  Deixis 
locates the entity in space and time but is embedded by Burnside into 
social context to provide a culturescape rather than attempt mimesis: 
the phenomenological voice is dropped as history takes precedence 
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over nature.  Later, in “The Solitary in Autumn”, darkness “recovers” 
a garden’s creatures to replay this as the self-regulation of nature 
within an unauthorized delicacy; this move could be viewed as a 
development of bio-geographic mapping of terrain (via deixis) into an 
ecological mapping of interactions.  This cannot be resolved by this 
thesis but I stress that it is driven by the certain compact that I 
further qualify here. 
 
III.B.1. Frostian Politics 
 
The Frostian moment in A Boy’s Will (1913), and North of Boston 
(1914), born from cosmopolitan pessimism and native faith is 
delivered beyond physically laboured attunement and within 
intentional mental glimpses.  For Burnside, if one lacked 
intentionally out in the open one would not feel the close (but not 
necessarily local or indigenous) unauthorized “holy spirit” 
(“Lazarus” 91).  In “For Once, Then, Something” (New Hampshire, 1923) 
-- Frost’s version of “What mystery pervades a well” (Dickinson 
#1400) -- evasive nature is considered through the human stance that 
only reflects itself, being “wrong to the light” (2).  This self-
reflection as singular interest is rested momentarily when 
reflections are deemed surfaces available to be plummeted beyond and 
puzzlingly reveal itself “Through the picture, a something white, 
uncertain” (9).  Frost reached for the patch of white reflected in a 
man-made well of water (container) but as with the effort to decode 
the neutral and virginal (“Design”, A Further Range, 1936) -- the 
chastened impulse in early Burnside -- he knew that it was false game 
to gather more than “something” from the moment.  It is an example of 
Frost’s position that as poets, “We shall be known by the delicacy of 
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where we stop short”, offering judgement and restraint.42  Words and 
spaces help the mind to move by resisting the anchoring or tightening 
of poems to a regulated (Platonic) background and to remain secure 
about the possibility of connection -- it is not a domain owned 
solely by the post-phenomenological ‘I’.  Burnside offers this 
explicitly in MOT: 
 
a silence about the house 
like a wider self 
a lifelong, unlaboured attunement (“Home Farm” 4-6) 
 
Liberation to Frost is the attempt to re-energise or sustain the 
“play” in the natural world without shattering its energy:  “His 
poems move by melting, build up while breaking down.  They stay in 
motion; playing is their work” (Rotella 60-61); this is poetry 
yielding a language that positions reader and protagonist as a point 
or field of vibrant intersection (Poirer Knowing) -- something 
posited by silence and nothingness in early Burnside and 
rearticulated through intertextuality in Burnside’s later mimesis of 
nature’s web-like structures (see ch. 5). 
 
Much like Frost, Burnside’s poems stay in an energy track, shift in 
the wake of preceding poems, and while finishing their own 
performance they set up the next poem.  Before the native tradition 
of self-reliance in Mountain Interval (1916), North of Boston’s ideas 
of home and of the possibilities to create habitations are soundings 
of the lyrical mode where the findings of materials are echoed in the 
undersign of unstructured, mediation free, normal speech.  Frost’s 
early impulse is to register the need for our having to discover the 
world anew for ourselves.  His particular vision of man discovering 
nature’s value informs Burnside’s eye and his sensitivity to the 
                         
42 Robert Frost, letter to Sidney Cox, 19 Sept. 1929, Collected 714. 
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implications of necessity for intervention.  This becomes a thematic 
concern rather than an influence of technique in Burnside’s poetry, 
providing readers with a new version of Frost’s theory of value 
located within labour, in the process not with the result.  Points of 
intersection as in “The Wood Pile” echo throughout Burnside: 
 
The hard snow held me, save where now and then 
One foot went down. The view was all in lines 
Straight up and down of tall slim trees 
Too much alike to mark or name a place by 
So as to say for certain I was here 
Or somewhere else: I was just far from home. (4-9) 
 
Spiritual growth away from people and influences are part of willed 
disorientation here.  As with the “lack of sound” in “Mowing” (A 
Boy’s Will) where a constrained act of the imagination in process 
forwards the writerly presence of the poet talking, here action 
relieves the dramatic situation.  To be “held” by the snow is to be 
placed somewhere else beyond a singular framework and ironically 
close.  Frost's premise of communion is different from Stevens'. 
The latter replays an Emersonian vantage point of a world that 
reveals itself in forms, which have in part been placed there by the 
human imagination, including dreams to confirming one’s existence.  
Frost differentiates himself from these positions and Wordsworthian 
sustenance, by facing the possibility that human existence is futile 
and meaningless.  The Burnsidean solitary instils the Frostian 
attempt to find home by propagating the self through a discovery of 
identity via the other (Poirier Knowing 172).  Furthermore, we follow 
the Emersonian energy field that flows through life to waken into 
renewed life, distinguished from nature, for it is built upon will 
and consciousness not on cycles or design (180): 
 
Both the viewer and the view are made to seem at least latently 
mythological either by being put in a reciprocally enhancing 
relationship to one another or by suggesting the degree to which 
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human consciousness prevents rather than assists such a 
relationship (137). 
 
The thematic of the dramaticized exchange of “West Running Brook” 
(West Running Brook, 1928), offers speaking as a true measure and the 
permanence of human exchange.  Impoverished dwellings and barren 
funereal landscapes dominate A Boy’s Will, and as with “Ghost House” 
are precedents for Burnside’s “Owlpen”. 
 
III.C. Accumulative Knowledge 
 
but this is my only parish, 
a space without chairs or bells 
and an altar that smells of mice 
in the wet-weather dark, 
 
my only church this half an hour 
of shelter in a sudden fall of rain. (“Owlpen” (MOT) 7-12) 
 
Here memories remain in the place that can possess eternity but is 
“uninhabitable” to the human (“Lazarus” 92).  However, they can enter 
our knowledge from interaction and inspire our dwelling; as such they 
recall Wordsworth’s ruins. 
Wordsworth’s “The Ruined Cottage” (1797) is a site where the poet 
confirms that he shall “no longer read / The form of things with an 
unworthy eye” (1: 515).  However, the later Wordsworth, a wandering 
figure whose intense relationship with the sensual world not 
characterized by self-conscious observation and memory but 
attunement, can be read in “Owlpen”.  Burnside reworks the central 
image of refuge for the solitary to forward a sense of permanence 
gathered in man’s capability to adapt to the environment.  Bate 
gestures toward a sense of “survival” within a thesis of place 
(Romantic 34).  Survival through connection to the indifferent 
environment is to live beyond into a necessary consciousness: one not 
attuned to metaphysical pantheism but one that recognises the 
existence of nature, its inexorable processes that guarantees human 
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survival, and brokers an extensive self whose survival is co-ordinate 
with that of nature. 
The shift in title from “At Owlpen” (Th) represents a development 
from deixis to Dasein: the lyrical voice being there without recourse 
to reference, deconstructing and elevating the phenomenological.  The 
shift in Burnside’s reworking of the Romantic lyric to engender the 
soul rather than quest for individual permanence or spirituality 
recalls Thomas Hardy’s use of Yalbury, for in Thomas’ words, “it 
emphasis[es] the littleness, yet save[s] it from abstraction” (Thomas 
75).  This particular conception of place inserts the paradigm of the 
Anglican version of self (Manning, above).  In Burnside’s early 
poetry, place and self combine to show a multiplicity of subject 
positions to question “the reality of the self as the primary 
focalizing device”, I continue this inquiry in the next chapter for 
this can be read too rigidly and determinate of meaning, offering the 
“I” as disappearance or self-assertion something too strict, Buell 
argues, for an environmental sensibility (Environmental 179).  Its 
best expression is in the American place poem in MOT. 
 
III.C.1. “September evening; deer at Big Basin” 
 
As stated earlier, I elect the following poem as a means to collate 
several issues proposed in this chapter and to offer the route out 
from an engagement with Burnside’s earlier verse. 
 
When they talk about angels in books 
I think what they mean is this sudden 
arrival: this gift of an alien country 
we guessed all along, 
 
and how these deer are moving in the dark, 
bound to the silence, finding our secret in their way 
and making us strange, making us all that we are 
in the fall of the light, 
 
as if we had entered the myth 
of one who is risen, and one who is left behind 
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in the gap that remains, 
 
a story that gives us the questions we wanted to ask, 
and a sense of our presence as creatures, 
about to be touched. 
 
A trinity of sense units combine to write an autumn evening in 
America’s virgin redwood state park in California’s Santa Cruz 
mountains.  The first is a storyteller’s enunciation of an intuition, 
an exposition of the idea that a different world is actually present 
or connected to this world.  The second brings this idea into a 
relationship with an empirical life form caught within our gaze, 
which in turn reflects a greater sense of our contingent existence as 
objects being looked at from another modality: “found” flattens 
hierarchy and subject-object relations leaving the reader within an 
expansive object field, that which has been indicated by the 
influence of the concept of communion (above).  A third phase 
requires the mind to shift the reading of the initial development of 
the poem into a higher imaginative plane: it moves outside the 
opposition of “they” and “we” into a view of Dasein, which has its 
being for its own; this occurs most interestingly as the “I” has 
slipped to the communal and a multi-sensual input from the external 
world.  This gathers Burnside’s inquiry into the transparent self and 
the emphasis on others: this is not ratiocination but an individual 
case within an implied community of language users emphasized by 
“books”, “myth” and “questions”. 
Furthermore, this site of the poem alludes to “the gap” recalling 
the American development of the jeremiad from the genre of the 
impasse between the divine and the human, now emphasizing the 
ecologically connected realm borne out by separation yet evoking 
self-soul relations.  Any inference to mind is qualified by intuition 
over certainty, a wider world over the pronominal field.  The need to 
return to purity is not suggested by Burnside’s position of the “we”, 
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but the need to recognize myth and our involvement in the world as 
communal elements in relation to others is being forwarded.  
Moreover, as a version of Stevensian nostalgia that cannot find 
adequate forms of belief, the imperative to fill the absence with 
experience is signally promoted yet it is one that has learnt from 
the phenomenological awareness that deposits the feeling in mind on 
top of the virginal world.  Nevertheless, the absent space suggests 
relinquishing the desire for more meaning by re-installing tension 
between heaven and earth to increase our knowledge of the 
contingent/non-contingent relation, these are offered as neutral 
consolation in our own stories, for it is more urgent to realize 
their neutrality once we have formulated the right response to 
emptiness, it is this response that drives Burnside, as it does 
Stevens.  Philosophically, therefore, the poem attends to nothingness 
as the phenomenological space before cognition, the absent ground 
from which we arise, empirically and socially/fictionally. 
The interior that I have identified is a drama brokered by viewing 
the self as one item in a site of encounters.  “I think” moves toward 
a knowledge-pattern of “all that we are” without abstraction or 
scientific reduction; while it promotes the structure of a system 
outliving its content it is a form of instress or energy field that 
sustains the uniqueness of the moment, the essential quality of the 
encounter, which “bound to the silence” undermines the (poetic) 
structure.  How could, one wishes to ask, a phenomenological poetic 
in isolation sustain itself under these terms?  To speak too loudly, 
to use incorrect grammar, or to add an unnecessary extra poetic foot 
on the fallen bracken would make the deer disappear and the moment be 
reduced to a potentially empty and invaluable nothingness.  This in 
turn throws the individual back into relief: 
 
It is the creation of this self that is, ideally, one with 
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itself, with other human beings, with created nature, and with 
the supernatural (Martz 322). 
 
The creation of a second self comes through angst.  Through the 
meditative silence and reticent voice, Burnside’s art slows things 
down.  The language of “September evening” is not the context-bound 
purposive, efficient ordinary language of homogenised technological 
time, but a method of thinking where equivalence, recognition, and 
forms of efficiency dispel themselves.  This offers the wider self-
scrutiny of instress within a pattern where all is unique or if it 
has been encountered before it resides in the moment of precognition 
as if for the first time.  Much as the figure coming into the 
encounter, readers are driven to stop.  Our unthinking or inauthentic 
selves are pressed by the energia of art into better thinking beings, 
better dwellers of the historical inscape: to be “touched” is to 
reconfigure the self as a site, an openness, the scene of connection.  
It is in thanks to the quiet that the gathering (of human and animal) 
can raise Dasein’s voice and release its identity without reduction 
to hermeneutic systems.  This modality, the Heideggerian presence 
resting gently within the forest of letters in the poem’s title, is 
exactly Bate’s ecopoetic gathering (Song 262) that enables authentic 
encounters.  It is one that heralds latency or promise, the “about to 
be” as an ethical position before action, bringing “the sense of our 
presence as creatures” and participants in collective development, 
the precognitive and intuitive complicity of animals. 
 
IV. Provisional Conclusions 
 
Burnside’s solitary is deeply involved in the scenes he encounters.  
In “Septuagesima”, speech is not privileged over writing, for it is 
silence that is desired, something that has no originary lack.  
“Halloween” is a vision of nature supplemented by education, but this 
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addition rather than reveal a lack within the plenitude becomes an 
essential condition of that which requires completion as with 
Emerson’s notion of world existing for our education (“History”, 
Collected 2).  This does not deliver finality, however, but as with 
“Urphänomen” (FD), it models involvements.  Read alongside “Chain 
Work”, rather than an endless supplementary deferral of an other, 
this process is forwarded as the thing for contemplation itself 
within the consideration of isolationism, rawness, or de-coupled 
potential as opposed to an immediate presence.  At moments these 
tease out the possibilities and limitations of a phenomenological 
poetics.  Thus, the poems offer the provision of all that there is, 
not as deferral but as forthcoming.  “September evening; deer at Big 
Basin” clarifies this.  Looking again, the poem foregrounds 
difference between real event (the historical deer) and fiction 
(textual angels), which is the foundation of experience; moreover, 
the epiphany is driven by this encounter.  This may raise the 
question to what degree is this reconstituted presence?  Contiguity 
and succession are rejected for an intuition of essence (ousia) 
dispensing with linearity to afford temporal priority, for the 
emphasis on the stories that “we guessed all along” (4) delivers 
thrownness that denies a static origin and suggests continuum.  It 
foregrounds the mind in action and suggests that the gap between our 
knowledge and the operations of the world requires interpretation and 
animation, the thrust of practical reason within an impasse, which is 
offered by scrutiny of the gap and silent fabric before the 
phenomenological/intentional agent speaks.  But this thrust too is 
relinquished in the poem for a vision of our potential (over an 
emphasis upon action), at one with the animal yet distinctly 
different.  It is delivered through a single foundational experience 
that reads diffuse elements of agency (deer and human in one site of 
dual-trespass) being enfolded into a single nexus.  Rather than self-
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effacement, Burnside’s shared matrix is background to all our 
stories, an ethical stance outrunning the projected phenomenological 
experience of the animal and the narrative of the ‘I’. 
 
IV.1. Moving Forward 
 
The need to arrest the self and consider time, as with Wordsworth’s 
third epitaph (“Epitaphs Translated from Chiabrera” [Gabriello 
Chiabrera] 1810), brings the value of the knowledge of death viewed 
from the treachery of the world’s promise.  This harness of time and 
its potential, suggests God alone is valuable of trust and that all 
power must inevitably relinquish itself to his “eternal doom” (19).  
This reformulates the consideration at Leven Sands (Morcambe Bay) of 
the death of Maximilien Robespierre (The Prelude 10), whose beach 
scene is replayed in Burnside’s “The Myth of the Twin (1)”. 
Wordsworth’s poem resonates with historical crisis and personal 
dismay given over to the mental traveller’s chance encounter with the 
static world of the dead.  As another instance of “virtual 
omnispresence” (Ferguson Counter-Spirit 155), Burnside’s spiritual 
autobiography leading from growth in proximity to death, is only a 
loose echo to the gravestone of Wordsworth’s Grammar School 
headmaster.  More, it is a view of existence defined in reference to 
(absent) others imagined as versions of one’s self (the pebble-
apricot) rather than a proleptic self-epitaph.  This is Wordsworthian 
inclusion of the reader in the environment, involving themselves in 
the readable signs, deposited in the retroactive dreamscape: “someone 
is having the dream”, the ‘I’ and the ‘Not-I’ and the “stories” we 
“guessed at”.  Therefore, it operates an internal address not unlike 
Stevens’ variegated voice and the Winander boy forwarding an original 
poetic voice.  The connection to Wordsworth’s prose works on epitaphs 
and the immortality ode could offer a framework to read the figures 
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of deprivation that destabilize the self in Burnside’s SIF.  I do 
read an ecologically and relationally sound intersection between 
subject and object instilled by the “The Myth of the Twin (1)” urging 
its reader to re-enact this reading, as with the emphasis of “say” in 
“The Myth of the Twin (2)”, which evokes an implied community of 
language users that construct the world, the lebenswelt of common-
sense understanding of how we are situated, situated in life.  
However, the transcendence of suffering via the self-revelation that 
epitaphs afford is one where the human soul is reanimated in a 
revisionary process that effects a new being and there may be more 
potential in projecting this dimension onto Burnside. 
As with Burnside’s early poems Wordsworth’s vision of a past self 
or old perception is closed while the poetic self is reconfigured via 
a discourse that opens the gap between life and death and inscribes 
the self as agent within this and as one moving forwards.  It is thus 
that Burnside’s ghost figures and dual selves of double-consciousness 
outplay the anticipation of death in books five, six, and seven of 
The Excursion driven by the Solitary’s integrated and active debate, 
and develop into the neutral consideration of death and evil in SIF 
and ANS, for they forward life to be enjoyed and endured. 
Moreover, Wordsworth’s geologically inflected notion of language 
as connective tissue and intermediary between origin and tendency, 
“notions inseparably co-relative” (“Essay Upon Epitaphs, 1” 1810, 
Prose 2: 51), is curious to my inquiry.  Self-perpetuation via 
inscription and the possibility of making the invisible (the spirit) 
visible (the letter), examines preservation and partners both the 
central idea of the human soul as immortal and that consciousness of 
this fact provides the ability to remember others and face our 
mortality (53-58).  Burnside’s poetry, wracked by such contemplation 
of cultural and personal memory, offers silent, intuitive faith as 
grounds for reconstruction.  I suggest that this is developed within 
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an accumulative poetics that pulls towards Stevens and Heidegger.  
Wordsworth’s idea of language as the incarnation of thought (84-5) is 
heralded as the resolute vision of the faint reverberations of life 
within death: “vanishings” via forgotten “High instincts” (“Ode: 
Intimations of Immortality” 9: 15, 18).  Thus, the significance of 
potential life in Burnside’s stone. 
The greater extension to this and the radical reading of 
potential, nothingness, and the metaphysical aspect of self-soul 
dynamics comes in my Weilean reading of Stevens later in the thesis, 
treated separately as not to disturb the teleological arc I attempt 
to map through Burnside’s progression in craft deposited in these 
early chapters.  As indicated in my reading of McGonigal I have read 
Burnside’s early work with respect to “pre-cognition” on the terms 
forwarded by Burnside’s poems and McGonigal’s reading of the spirit, 
and I shall turn to two more collections to consider a sense of 




Self-possession is examined through new expression given to 
themes of flourishing and autonomy in Burnside’s exploration of 
relational space in SIF and ANS.  In the former, introspection 
has now shifted toward the community at large and into social 
psychology, while the latter explores the domestic scene in the 
wake of earlier findings. The following questions arise: (i) to 
what degree is living read as the insurmountability of human 
concern for others?; (ii) in the absence of this position, is 
there only space for neutrality or indifference?; (iii) to what 
extent does the development of ‘pre-cognition’ into ‘recovery’ 
suggest that rationality (choice and purpose) differentiates 





Burnside deploys murder, violence, and rape to bring vitalism into 
question under the aspect of the human struggle for adaptation, 
survival, and co-existence as a second order to general will or 
striving.  Here one can see a development from intuition and 
phenomenology (up to and including MOT) into interdependence and 
outward reasoning; rather than as a means to forwarding “radical 
illumination” of world, the readerly act is challenged to make “a re-
attunement to the continuum of objects and weather and other lives 
that we inhabit”.  This should be measured alongside what Burnside 
has called “an attempt at oneness, a renewal of the connection to the 
continuum of the real, a discipline for happiness” (“Travelling into 
the Quotidian” 60). 
  In similar ways to representations of the dark, urban backdrop 
of Britain in the 1980s and 1990s that haunt Burnside’s prose 
fiction, SIF does not argue that modernity is a reason for flight 
into nature but posits post-pastoral landscapes -- the economic and 
social interdependence of country and city -- impregnated not with 
reason but with dual agency.  Point-of-view, therefore, is 
substantial in these collections.  In SIF, Burnside simultaneously 
considers the mediated versus the unmediated and the notion of an 
objective vantage.  Moving film, photographs, radio, and forensic 
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science are devices that objectify and neutralize human and 
environmental perspectives.  As a continuation of the development 
from solipsism to the view from outside of the self, alien 
consciousness and technologically enabled objective views (camera, 
forensics) suggest that inconsistency between mind and object 
acknowledges an a priori structure in the human.  This need not read 
meaning in all signs but can assert meaningful relational concepts 
that endeavour to press towards an understanding of presence-in-
itself without taxonomizing: it is a method to present the way of the 
world and terms of renewal.  In this chapter, I read ideas of renewal 
and of the self through the post-theological dimension to Burnside’s 
engagements (sec. I.), which in turn delineate notions of order, 
vantage, and impulse (sec. II.).  These emerge into a lyrical 
identity whose voice offers themes and techniques (sec. III.) 
developed in the chapters that follow as the thesis and the poetics 
settle upon an examination of dwelling. 
 
I.A. Linking to American Nature 
 
In a similar fashion to Frost’s figures, Burnside’s protagonists in 
ANS attempt to master self as their encounters in nature are 
discovering in its contours the order of the world.  Once more, 
rather than subordinating the world to reason or acknowledging that 
self is in obeyance to that which it surveys, the (Puritan) trappings 
of interpreting the world are given over to tapping into its energy.  
In Frost we note an increase in the value of instinct that recalls 
Emerson’s notion of “untaught sallies” working alongside self-
recovery and humility to provide the naturalist with an “occult 
recognition and sympathy” (Nature, Collected 1: 40) with the non-
Bristow 161 
human world.43  The reader is to bear this in mind as SIF is 
analyzed. 
The position at the end of Nature (VIII “Prospects”) is where 
Emerson’s monism looms: “bruteness of nature is the absence of 
spirit” (44) and is therefore temporary; if considered as evil it is 
part of the process of the good.  Milder argues that Emerson’s 
position on nature recalls a deep Calvinism that has not been 
relinquished (i.e. evil as a structuring principle and justification 
of punishment for the reprobate); for Milder, it is optimism that 
requires acceptance of the victims of an indifferent force and to “a 
creed that consigned the vast portion of living beings to perdition” 
(127-128).  For Santayana, evil is not means to our higher selves in 
the sense that life is infinitely correctable within immortality; 
rather than a subjectivity whose primary focus is self (adventure), 
the development of the soul is an unfolding of “a known idea” 
(discipline) (Interpretations 124), the eternal that is not enslaved 
by change -- this correlates to Burnside’s paradoxical self-soul 
dynamic.  Furthermore, rather than a notion of evil utilized in its 
“good effects” Santayana calls for thinking of the possibility that 
“God could have regarded as a good something which has evil for its 
condition”, for that reason it is “profoundly sad and equivocal” 
(125).  Santayana offers a non-Emersonian vision of “an alien and 
overwhelming power” that cannot be humanized and thus rationally 
deliver sense and beauty (133), which would not explain evil but 
condone it (137).  This intellectual presence informs my reading of 
SIF and ANS. 
 
For Frost, reading evil as a filter of the world’s benevolence is 
                         
43 Distrust for formulae and theory; praise for the injection of 
instinct into evolutionism by Bergson and the entomologist Jean Henri 
Fabre (1823-1915).  Robert Frost, letter to Louis Untermeyer, 1 Jan 
1917, Collected 692. 
Bristow 162 
close to denying its existence in as much as Emerson’s notion of the 
circle has only one centre, the good as the source of the continuum 
(“On Emerson” 1959, Collected 865).  Frost’s critique of Emerson’s 
Idealist monism forwards his own dualism of spirit and matter 
implicated in the perception of all things.44  I have indicated that 
this compact is akin to Burnside’s early stance (ch. 2, sec. III.B.).  
Moreover, Poirier reads the Emersonian circle as one of the soul’s 
creations that finds itself as a governing text of sorts (Poetry 24).  
While Burnside has written against dualism in terms of spirit and 
matter as separate, SIF appears to complement Frost’s idea of 
necessary and instinctive “doubleness” (“The Future of Man” 1959, 
Collected 868).  This is not a commitment to Santayana’s God of 
ambivalence or his critique of the omnipotent soul, nor does it posit 
modernist knowledge existing in opposition, but dual energy (that 
which I have called “the black within the green”) is qualified as 
part of the process of adaptation to world: it is the governing text 
that Burnside constructs.  The poet posits an ambivalent position 
with respect to prescriptivism and restraint in SIF.  Whether this is 
a vehicle to foreground the temporal and contingent or means to 
critique the need to reconcile experience to the structure of belief 
is something that the reader is left uncertain about.  It is the 
central issue within the contours of these collections and I wish to 




SIF can be read as negotiating early themes by foregrounding notions 
of self-possession over the innocence of man pursuing instinctual 
gratification; furthermore, ANS appears to understand this context as 
                         
44 See Peter J. Stanlis, “In the Clearing: Continuity and Unity in 
Frost’s Dualism,” Humanitas, 18.1 (2005): 86-114. 
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a means to reflect back on the self and the potential jeopardy it 
faces by positing a level of assurance within the lyrical “I”.  As a 
development from Burnside’s early poetics, possession of the 
environment is not an option, neither is subsumption, thus an 
expanded perspective is required.  This has been witnessed in the 
loose line, in aleatory (intertextual) poetics and in an awkward 
deconstructed music of the ‘I’ (ch. 2).  The view from the organism 
concerns the value of the environment as either threatening or 
enabling; from the environment’s vantage organisms are either 
disruptive or beneficent members.  SIF portends that the human is 
capable of considering both perspectives but that this is neither a 
simple task nor easily represented as morally neutral.  This may not 
be resolved by my thesis or by Burnside’s poetry, but it is an 
interesting problematic that should be considered within the moral 
issue of self-possession that is raised in the light of a pragmatic 
and ethical control of nature.  Furthermore, over and above the idea 
of adaptation to a pre-given environment, the processes whereby the 
environment of an organism is continually under discovery according 
to whether it impinges on its ability to survive or flourish, or if 
the environment affords meaningful relations, appear to be more vital 
here: it is a disposition particular to humans that reads the 
environment as a site of intention, and it is this contour that SIF 
sets forth more than any work preceding it.  ANS returns to 
individual ethics as one no longer an inquiry wracked by solipsism 
but possession.  Thus, the presentation of a creative continuation of 
meaning through relation (rather than a responsive preservation of 
value) tempers the notion that all flourishing is to be endorsed 
while also promoting relations as extrinsic properties to things.  
This non-instrumental view reads meanings in life, not of life; it 
rests as a challenge to values of conservation and forwards a need to 
renegotiate the transition of the past to future in new terms -- it 
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is picked up in TAD as a version of land ethic. 
These counters develop an early concern for memory and space, and 
they inform my reading of SIF and ANS and assist reconsidering 
Burnside’s pre-occupation with “double-consciousness” and 
epistemology as indicated in MOT.  I motion how they have a 
relationship with healing, recovery, and home, alongside the 
contemplation of human agency. 
 
II. Order and the Submerged self 
 
Later, he would see her on the screen, 
trying to smile, as they lifted her on to the dock, 
 
and he’d notice the frame again, baroque and absurd, 
and empty, like the faces of the drowned. (23-26) 
 
“Swimming in the Flood”, the lead and title poem, ends with three 
negative adjectives and a simile speaking of death; it portends an 
ugly collection and transparent connection to mortality.  The 
metaphor presents fluid and disruptive energies and the location of 
the human within this.  The female neighbour rescued from the flood 
that erases a village is seen clutching a picture frame whose 
irregularity or whimsical ornamentation underlines the grotesque 
nature of the scene, yet its emptiness reflects back upon the site of 
possibility of mediating and making sense of nature’s energies.  Her 
countenance is “dislodged” (19) to stress home with the sense 
suggested by Scot’s thrawn i.e. the face distorted by frowning, yet 
to emphasize to be unsure -- freedom over obstinacy as a dark 
‘letting be’: 
 
her face dislodged reduced to a puzzle of bone 
and atmosphere, the tremors on her skin 
 
wayward and dark, like shadows crossing a field 
of clouded grain. (19-22) 
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The face suggests a form of knowledge-exile.  While “dock” echoes 
with “baroque” to emphasize a contrast between the form of mediation 
and the real landing space for the rescue boat, Burnside reverses the 
pathetic fallacy to read human surfaces successfully from the lexicon 
of nature.  This technique can be read as an attempt to dispel self 
assertion of the anthropocentric lens.  The “atmosphere” or 
psychological climate likened to “shadows” and “clouded grain” reads 
the fruit of cereal crops under threatening skies that are “wayward”; 
it is a perverse, cross-grained, and intractable natural agency 
Burnside forwards.  Moreover, the “puzzle” reminds us that we are 
reading a poem that imagines the protagonist’s dreams recollecting 
the rescue.  It is a third instance  made more complex by the poem 
being a frame itself, asking readers to imagine the survivor 
(watching a newsreel of the incident in a time delay and recalling 
mental images of the scene) and fitting this construction outside of 
the poem to the mediated ‘text’ within the poem that the survivor is 
presented with.  It is this meta-perspective that Burnside wishes to 
reveal through use of the camera “panning across the surface” (8) or 
“homing in to focus” (10) that requires particular attention, for it 
is there to emphasize the degree to which each individual is 
“dislodged”, displaced or removed from home/evidence/origin.  The two 
survivor figures are refugees from their dwelling places through an 
act of nature, while their constructed village lies intact beneath 
the new reservoir.  To what degree Burnside has reversed surface and 
sub-surface from culture over nature to nature over culture is 
perhaps too simple a co-ordinate for this volume, but the mediation 




“Science” and “A Distant Cousin” lead off from the opening poem to 
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expand and revisit Burnside’s interest in failed epistemology and the 
double self or the soul “submerged”.  The relationship that the first 
three poems have with the epigraphs from Stephen Langton and Terence 
is two-fold: firstly, upon destruction and cleansing; secondly, to 
human understanding.  The first epigraph from the Archbishop of 
Canterbury thought to be the first person to divide the Bible into 
chapters translates thus: “Wash what is dirty, water what is dry, 
heal what is wounded.”  The second text from Terence, the Roman slave 
whose learning and aptitude set him free and who was bestowed the 
rare honour of his master’s name translates: “I am a human being; I 
consider nothing human alien to me.”  The Christian theme of the 
flood is a form of punishment and new beginning, which couples to and 
arrests human empathy.  Burnside’s poems suggest that the forces of 
violence are part of the larger motion of nature; judgement upon 
these is to be reserved while considering the domain of freedom, the 
immersion in its dynamism and complexity, and thus finding a new path 
to be healed in its glory.  Thus, the polarity between extension and 
contraction, the desire to flow and move within a larger fold, yet 
limit this realm to a determined agency or morality given the context 
of relinquishing judgement.  Furthermore, ideas of autopoeisis are 
not heralded as a new term for the more orthodox phrase, ‘divinely 
created’, but are troublesome in that the relationship to the human 
appears (to the human) to be determinable within conditions.  I do 
not overstate that the epigraphs stress human forced divisions and 
naming, in tension with the need for healing. 
SIF relates to that energy which science has relinquished from 
mapping, something “rhythmic and steady, / a sine wave of grace and 
attunement” (“Science” 19-20): a simple periodic oscillation or 
pattern that occurs frequently in nature, the source that Burnside’s 
protagonists ignore, unite, or relate to with differing degrees of 
agency whose subsequent effects differ in kind.  As grace it is 
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revisited in “Wrong” as “an undertaker’s skill with flesh and bone, / 
a single-mindedness, a dark sense of being” (1: 13-14) and “a logic” 
(4: 13) that understands or is connected to the desire or drive to 
kill.  This poem ends with a filmic emphasis: “scene”, the “cut” of a 
film, and the parents of the murdered child finding “that sense of 
themselves / as seen, like the people in movies” (5: 1, 11, 26-27).  
It is an objective sense of blood, which is Burnside’s microscopic 
point of focus in nature, connective tissue to “the old creatures” 
and “brothers from somewhere near Eden” (“Argentine” 13, 16).  It is 
the Lawrentian impulse reconfigured to enable a macro vantage upon 
the human. 
 
II.B. The Vantage Point 
 
The news bulletin in “Swimming in the Flood” takes a panoramic view 
across the opening couplets viewing the destruction in motion “as if 
by design” (5).  Loaded in terms of intelligence, this line delivers 
perspective challenged by the figure’s dreams and his reading of his 
neighbour’s face, at once further removed in its comparative view of 
the field, and yet literally closer to the object in focus both 
physically and psychologically.  In “Wrong” the reconstructed 
television evidence provides the family with a “sense” (1: 14) of 
themselves, but this, too, is ironic.  In “Home Movie”, we are closer 
to Burnside’s purpose to track a distinct motion in mind and world.  
Here, the voice of the murderer confesses, “I should have left the 
village reels ago” (12) alluding to the spool or cylinder upon which 
film is wound and to the revels of the villagers, “the dance on the 
moonlit green, / their stubborn games / of death and resurrection” 
(9-11).  As Andersson has come close to understanding, this 
distancing in time and through moral reflection -- the emphasis on 
“should” –- denotes subjectivity that has fled from self when 
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confronted with the enigma of its own being.  It is Heideggerian 
inauthenticity, where one is lost in anxiety and where objects lose 
meaning: being thrown appallingly back into one’s individuality, cut 
off from the lifeworld, disconnected from the imperative to care 
(Sorge), and blind to the knowledge of the finite and vulnerable 
world.  This figure has come “from the distant city” (7) and has been 
triggered by the solstice celebrations into an act out of concert 
with these “games” but operative within the same locus.  This could 
be pushed as another view of the ecosystem from an interest in 
Emerson and Santayana.  Considered as an enabling motion, the reel 
suggests agency that is not thoroughly motor-driven but one that 
enables an amount of passivity or wheeling from an initial, external 
impulse; when read alongside the insistence that “I should have 
guessed / listened / known” (14, 16, 19) we are unsure of the degree 
of social conditioning or the amount of free-will in operation.  Read 
once more it is clear, however, that this is an inquiry into vitalism 
and self-possession.  It is emphasized in “Home Movie” by “reel” 
operating in place of a unit of time and odd slip suggesting a lack 
of purchase on reality which in turn promotes a possessive self, 





In “Home Movie” the dead are viewed “in their cradles of drowning” 
26).  Extending the flood theme in the present participle actively 
motivates the cleansing as a dominant grammatical device, which 
forwards incomplete action when conjugated with a verb i.e. ‘to be’.  
This has profound implications for Burnside’s lapsed faith, it is of 
interest to see him use this within the consideration of blood as the 
figurative melting of forms (identities and lives), and as symbol for 
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the locus of continuum and dynamism -- as such it negates sterile 
consecration.  I consider this below after reading his use of voice 
or mask but it is worth turning to initially here in the context of 
vantage point and of skill, two ways of rereading agency and 
epistemology (Burnside’s central early concerns). 
 
The dissolved presence of Christ in Burnside’s poetry is often 
inflected by blood as in “Home” (CK), “Urban Myths” (FD), and 
“Lapsed” and “The Resurrection” (MOT).  These reverberate with the 
dark soul that has new emphasis in SIF.  A knife is held “too 
reverently” in “Wrong” (1: 5), for the desire is to have “an 
undertaker’s skill with flesh and bone” (13), but this skill has 
killed a child who is left “staring through water and leaves, and a 
remnant of warmth / bleeding away to the absence of love and mother” 
(4: 15-16).  Once more readers are presented with the compact between 
human and death (Frost, Lawrence).  We view another drowned body 
given significance by the fact that a partial trace of body heat to 
origin is a footprint metaphor written as a child “bleeding away”.  
The child-man memory dynamics are located in the background but 
Burnside promotes the flowing or letting of blood; it indicates a 
form of agency that negates Herausfordern (Heidegger Question) by not 
forcing or challenging forth, yet it also suggests both the victim 
merging with the environment and the fluid psychosis of the murderer 
who lacks an ethical point of reflection.  It is morally challenging 
to equate these or sit neutrally in our reading.  This anxiety in the 
general reader offers a view of innocence and experience existing 
outwith nature, imposed via a sterile category to consecrate an 
antique value: we are being pushed to think with the poet in SIF.  
This plays out in “The Old Gods” where the “abandoned” (11) site for 
“derelict” (6) forces does not negate the “condemned” (1) or the 
ability to exercise “the skill of return” (16): 
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the science of bleeding through, when anger or fear 
is fuzzing the surface, 
making us dizzy and whole. (17-20) 
 
A natural force as indicated by “bleeding” can penetrate the active 
feeling of passion or rage and the emotion apprehending future danger 
or peril, existing in confounded states of consciousness.  This can 
provide simultaneous instability (loss of equilibrium or access to 
vertigo) and fullness.  These are two extremes, which the waking, 
moral self rests in-between as a non-dualist modality that mismatches 
our morally instructed cartographies of psychosis.  Furthermore, it 
promotes the wild as a level of domestication and the human as 
strangers to this domain in our social or moral selves.  It teases 
readers with the normality and rarity of this state.  Is this 
something that would come more easily to us if the mind was loose? 
In “Natalie”, two sonnets suggest the use of “blood” as a sign of 
potential.  The girl’s material desires are no less than trees and 
beehives, which became the desire for “the possible ghost” that is 
like “a sense of herself, / almost impossible, always about to begin” 
(11, 12-13).  Nevertheless, this connection to nature is one that is 
a unique organicism, exemplified in the three-foot line of the second 
sonnet.  Stating “She bled through the noise of the sea” (2: 1), the 
inherent property of matter’s ability to adapt itself, echoed in the 
poet’s sensitive shaping of nature to poetic breath and metre, is 
provided in the stress on “bled”.  It is softened in degrees through 
“noise” and then it is spread out into “sea” via assonance with “she” 
as one singular and extended movement in calm. 
Burnside has set this collection with marks of dissolving bodies 
letting themselves into a larger, protean world.  It is impossible to 
forget that these are victims of rape, murder, and incest, and that 
the poet’s tone is sometimes so distant from pain that readers are 
morally confounded.  Albeit that the use of the camera motif can be 
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read as an ironic aperture with respect to the corrupted or distanced 
view of man coupled to a post-pastoral vision or a technologically 
enabled creative-destructive universe, there is another point to this 




Burnside places four poems together before the central poem “An 
Ordered World”.  These convey two perspectives from a sexually abused 
child, three readings of abduction, and the personal recollection of 
teenage sex (a Wordsworthian moment of transgression and guilt), 
respectively.  The collection’s central poem effects a subtle turn in 
poetic treatment that develops the deployment of camera/perspective 
and blood motioned above in the poems leading to the last sequence of 
“September”, “Rainbow” and “Parousia”.  I shall outline these four 
phases and stress fluidity, dual agency, and recovery to underline my 
argument. 
 
II.C.1. The Multiplicity of Impulse.   
 
Actions and emotions of others inaccessible to one’s sense safeguard 
the self from dispossession; furthermore, they open up our sense of 
the limit of the human i.e. what is humanly possible.  Thus, a view 
of the other and of immorality brings into relief the necessary 
fiction of the rational soul.  How this is constructed and its 
relation to an autonomous self is under question, too.   
 
Burnside’s incestuous paedophile absent from the scene in “The 
Sexton’s Daughter” is not representative of institutional religion 
but a figure that bridges the gap between Catholicism and the pagan.  
The Sexton’s non-clerical office is responsible for the custody of 
the church’s fabric (sacred objects), and as warden of graveyards and 
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bell ringing, he represents Christian provenance and symbolism.  
Burnside neither humanizes this figure nor crudely suggests an evil 
(either secular or religious) force residing within.  While his 
actions are reported through his daughter and are unquestionably 
morally depraved, the actor’s will cannot be determined either in a 
privative sense of lacking moral rectitude or in a theological 
context.  Burnside’s post-innocent signs written into a landscape 
seemingly vacuous of meaning, left with only a focus on traces that 
act as covenants with the reader, encourage readers to suspend 
judgement, accept a current of the unfathomable, and to enter inside 
the poem’s energies.  Thought-in-action once more within the artwork: 
 
At night I would climb to the attic 
to see him nude: 
bear-shaped and senseless, he harrowed me under the sheets, 
while I moved on, through reeds and irises, 
to where my voice was floating on the lake, 
brighter than silver, threaded with water and venom, 
drawn to his whimpers and cries, like a Halloween moon. (18-24) 
 
The nominative personal pronoun is deployed in ten instances (eight 
first-person singular, two third-person singular masculine), 
suggesting dominion by the victim, while an almost equal measure of 
accusative pronouns (two first person “me” over one third personal 
masculine “him”) and an imbalance of possessive determiners (three 
“my” to two “his”) suggest overall control and authority in the 
poem’s female voice.  Dominion and submission are highly sensitive 
co-ordinates within an inquiry of this nature and appear to be at 
stake in “The Sexton’s Daughter” and its recasting in “Catch-Kiss”.  
In the first poem the finality of “His” (24) half-echoes the passing 
of sound in “kingcups” (4), the burial sight of golden marsh 
marigolds offering a form of sovereignty.  It is alive sonically in 
“fish-skin” (8) as the resurrected body bleeding into “wings” and 
“flesh” (9) and it also plays within “the bandwidths of summer” (15) 
and along “his whimpers and cries” (24).  This is another broad 
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dominion of time with Christian resonance distempered by animalism 
feebly inarticulate in the human but pivotal to poetic emphasis of 
the struggle to accept the foreignness that comes from relinquishing 
self-possession.  Most notably the daughter climbing to the attic, 
“drawn” (24) to his call and him being “bear-shaped” (20), however, 
takes these out of the purely human domain in the final stanza.  This 
is not the relinquishing of civilized consciousness but an emphasis 
upon the natural world as the last simile suggests, while the ability 
to violate and to submit are plainly humanly possible.  Furthermore, 
the “Halloween moon” (24) half rhymes with “venom” (23) as biblical 
symbol of poison given over to the semantics of a noxious influence 
compounded by the word “harrowed” (20).  This refers to the symbolic 
castration of Mary, and the victim’s mother in the second and third 
stanzas, but more emphatically to the state of being crushed or torn 
psychologically, and yet primarily referring to both the agricultural 
action of the harrow and the biblical sacking of Hell.  The general 
reader is presented with an exhausting array of signification that 
destabilizes words as a remove from experience.  I argue that 
Burnside is not attempting to reduce the guarantee of meaning to 
alienate us further from world, but to posit capability situated out 
of total control and within a plurality of agencies or complex 
semantic nexus, it is a form of intertextuality that disables the 
lyrical ‘I’ as central authority.  These poems resist poetic analysis 
and problematize gaps between events, emotion, and recollection, as I 
shall show. 
“Catch-Kiss” takes the voice of playground innocence and enters 
into the mind of the Sexton’s daughter through her attempts at 
representation and processing of trauma.  Read without relation to 
the preceding poem (above) it suggests paedophilia.  Considered as 
another attempt to write experience the reader’s gaze turns to the 
two levels of recollection.  The first foregrounds the present tense 
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processing of experience shifting into a future state where things 
are less direct and the use of the third-person that views the self 
as “someone else”.  The second italicized voice is the direct emotive 
recollection of the moment of experience set within the attempted 
therapeutic expression, an unfinished process as the last two lines 
indicate: “waiting to be released / from her buckled sleeves” (31-
32).  This disturbing scene represents the trapped, unprocessed mind 
of the trauma victim; its scenic objectivity overrides an emphasis on 
passivity and traces a connection to the prison of self-possession 
that the perpetrator faces.  Here, the lines derive from “a scrap of 
memory” (1) yet their ventriloquism is no simple lyrical tableau 
enacting either empty personas or a reduction in the agency of the 
‘I’; neither does it show a loss of confidence in communicable 
relationship between events and significance, language and 
experience.  They work to offer perspective upon the other as a means 
to understanding the self. 
The opening section to “Lack of Evidence” reads the woods where a 
found body lay and attempts an objective point-of-view in the poetic 
“slow fade of evening” (1) and the rational police reportage, 
“Katrina: twelve years old” (15) yet the alarm call pierces through 
this measure: “Did no one see her vanish in the grass, / leaving 
behind this stain, like a chanterelle?” (11-12).  Again the 
indeterminate sense of a trace as decoy reflects on the poem’s title 
to suggest a world operating beyond empirical evidence or categorical 
insistence but one that is in song and nature.  After claiming that 
“I set her free” the abductor develops this didactic epistemological 
dimension: 
 
We are pure souls, buried in flesh, 
traces of ether, hanging in a web 
of blood and hair, 
immersed in muscle, pinned to gravity. 
Our life is penance.  Death is our release: 
ascending through a mist of atmospherics, 
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faint as the dwindling echo of Creation.  (2: 1-7) 
 
The suggestion of purity outside asceticism negates the Catholic 
premise of the pollution of the soul through living.  In its five 
qualifications.  It recalls Burnside’s early poetic treatment of the 
soul as a temporal cluster of consciousness wedded to matter.  Yet, 
here it has its first expression in terms of death and of a continuum 
via a platform provided to an immoral voice to burden the reader with 
considering our mortal state as a physical prison and the degree to 
which release via any means can be viewed as morally sound 
liberation. 
However, the poetry operates at a level of irony.  These voices 
question the degree to which one has to relinquish the autonomous 
self, or the notion of self-possession, in order to integrate fully 
with the world.  As Andersson notes, “The killers and rapists... are 
hopelessly lost because they have failed to surrender.  Instead they 
resist.  They are persistently self-possessive” (38).  This 
possession enables connection to the concealed dark energies of the 
world, which is necessary to reach pleroma, yet an “extremity” of 
this energy in action by the murderers and rapists lacking “the 
feeling of strangeness” is an acknowledgement of that which escapes 
our techne and will always elude us. 
Alienation from the world is the principal to understanding that 
not all can be possessed.  The “wider self”, the forms without names, 
and the fabric of silence beyond the human suggest that our communal 
selves presuppose “the recognition of our non-personal, non-social, 
‘neutrality’, the ‘otherness’ of our self-possessive autonomy” 
(Andersson).  By implication Burnside’s persuasive poetics of 
resurrecting this otherness gains a deeper sense of self even if it 
is ultimately limited. 
* 
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Burnside confirmed his view of the discipline of poetry as “a way of 
finding a place in the world” as part of the 1994 New Generation 
Poets publicity (McMillan 75).  This navigation is considered without 
neutrality “and ultimately as a (sometimes dark) celebration of 
kinship, death, regeneration and love”.  He clarified this later as 
an engagement in “an act of repentance”, “‘to wish to amend’, ‘to 
reconsid er’” (O’Rourke 6).  One can hear the Latinate etymology of 
pentirsi behind pentimento as repentance and correction, echoing 
strongly with Burnside’s sense of Stevensian elaboration (above) and 
his continual reworking of poems over time as extended meditations.  
However, the stress on ‘celebration’ read into “Lack of Evidence” 
suggests more than “penance” as an orthodox religious discipline i.e. 
self-mortification as an expression of guilt for sin.  Stripped of 
its purgatorial connotation it denotes an amendment of one’s life 
into spiritual obedience.  I read this within Burnside’s sense of 
religion in the sense of “reconnection” (AL 178), a method to regain 
participation within one’s environment.  This complements his 
definition of grace as living the full life and “making ready to 
willingly and contentedly surrender its place here to whatever is to 
come” (Oxley 60) -- the ultimate letting be into life and making good 
of one’s necessary habitat of “estrangement” (Harrison 265). 
 
 
II.C.2. “An Ordered World” 
 
The fifteenth poem of twenty-nine divides the collection into two 
halves while its final line highlights the determinate three-beat 
rhythm to underline the dark and uncertain epistemology of Burnside’s 
penitence: “vestigial, demonic, inexact” (24).  These adjectives 
under-qualify the “presence” that this collection sets at a distance 
i.e. “ether” (2), “hiss” (9), “filmy ferns” (14) etc. which cannot be 
accounted as an “algebraic fingerprint” (19) by “the finest 
Bristow 177 
instruments” (21), for no mathematics relates to the degenerate 
survival, the supernatural, and the imprecise energies that challenge 
ordered belief.  “An Ordered World” clarifies the themes and 
techniques above while the promise and fitness of things in the world 
is subject to irony; as a negation of appropriative knowledge, it 
foregrounds the message itself over determinate meaning -- life over 
reason, energy over will.   
 
II.C.2.a. Other Voices 
 
The perpetrator’s voice in “Schadenfreude” (in turn recalling “Wrong” 
and “Home Movie”) has a subtle increase in ethical reflection than 
witnessed in the first half of the volume, which foregrounds moral 
instinct.  “I knew in my secret heart / I was up to no good / and 
relished the inexplicable / malice of being” (11-14), in effect tunes 
the malicious enjoyment of the pain of others into a guilty 
recollection of teenage sex.  Poems residing in the second half of 
the collection after the didactic clarification of “An Ordered World” 
cultivate this voice.  It is unclear if the persona in “A Swimming 
Lesson” is that of the murderer in “Lack of Evidence” (whether he has 
killed Natalie and Ellen MacInnes), but it is certainly a chillingly 
calm expression of guilt that flits into two highly-charged, 
possessive and socially disconnected passages. 
The poem’s first two sense units open with “maybe”, neutrality 
considering luck, talent, or skill of the victims while urging 
possibility and uncertainty.  These are overlooked for the faith in 
the “transformation” from child to swan to fish to weed; an unashamed 
certainty in “the bodies we shed” (58) as we move out of life.  The 
murderer thinks of this metamorphosis as natural but also in terms of 
a contract: “taking a form from the water and making it hers, / 
accepting its favours, repaying the debt in kind” (17-18).  The 
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financial lexis opens up a sense of commodity and treasure, an aspect 
of the voice’s fetishism beyond original indifference.  This is borne 
out in two manners: first, the attention to objects: pebbles, lips, 
eyes, and clothing; second, the body’s spirit “merging with the tide” 
(16) returning from where it was loaned, and the body’s arrival “for 
everyone to share” (69).  However, the poet denies complete consumer 
control over the victim in the final movement of the poem where 
nature refuses to relinquish itself to human desire, while a human 
body devoid of life wracks the perpetrator longing for serenity.  
Here, rather than asking us to sympathize with the murderer’s 
unfulfilled desire to remember the woods, fishes, and barley fields 
close to the site of the murder, we are given the lasting negative 
image pressed in his mind: 
 
but all I can see is the mud in the lines of her face, 
and the scatter of leaves 
that someone has brushed aside, 
revealing the clouded skin, and the gas-blue eyes 
where thinking has stopped, 
like the calm at the edge of a snowfall. (77-82) 
 
Burnside’s collection may allude to the need to connect to the 
dark energies of the world but he has made it impossible to empathize 
with a man who called sexual encounters “lesson[s]” (30) and the 
child victims of his abductions “unreturned” bodies.  We may find 
that he has stepped beyond the moral border.  Here, the soiled face 
melts into the wooded arena like camouflage as with the bleeding of 
forms in the first half of the collection.  Whether this 
foregrounding of the victim is ambivalent or not, it out-sounds the 
unknown perpetrator and gives the victim a last stay against 
transparent commodification.  I feel that it is in a manner not 
unlike Gian Lorenzo Bernini’s portrayal of the metamorphoses of 
Daphne (Apollo and Daphne, 1622-25, Galleria Borghese, Rome), opposed 
to the rape of Proserpina (Pluto and Proserpina, 1621-1622, Galleria 
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Borghese, Rome). 
Burnside arrests the moment of action and mediation, as with 
“September Evening; deer at Big Basin” and later in “Parousia”.  The 
two ellipses that indicate the spaces in-between the linguistically 
determinate or processed experiences and emotions work to foreground 
slowness as an enterprise of art allowing the world to arise.  In 
this space we read of the victim’s skin “clouded” and her eyes “gas-
blue” -- both elusive and ethereal descriptors.  The attention to 
vapour suggests transcendence but this twenty-one line sentence and 
largest semantic unit of the poem shifts from a recollection of the 
victim’s passage along the river to the discovery of the body and the 
two separate realities in the murderer’s mind.  I read the word 
“thinking” (79) terminate victim and perpetrator.  This extends to 
the world echoed in the victim’s habitat resonating with her absence, 
and in the poetic equation of her composure to the tranquillity at 
“the edge of a snowfall”.  The dependence upon the natural world for 
our measurements posits that we cannot operate above or outside this 
realm, its co-ordinates, or be anything but its inhabitants: any 
“edge”, therefore, should be read as an ironic and imposed terminus 
upon our many selves in nature.  It is also an instance of short-
circuiting serenity that is delivered not by possession and control 
but by relinquishing authority to the elemental. 
 
II.C.3. Rooting: “September”, “A Private Life”, “Parousia” 
 
In “Natalie” the victim “bled through the noise of the sea” (2: 1).  
In “In the Psychiatric Hospital” -- an autobiographical recollection 
of Burnside’s stay in Fulbourn Hospital, Cambridge, as a psychotic, 
suicide risk (AL 246-47) -- the female patients who are victims of 
sexual abuse by their fathers are written as “bleeding away through 
their dreams” (12).  In “Cathy” (a fellow patient during Burnside’s 
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stay in Fulbourn) the figure plays with a doll as if it were a dead 
body.  “Cathy” indicates the love of a replica in absence of the real 
as a motif of responsibility and devolved empowerment; in terms of 
the title poem the contingent and transferable nature of emotions are 
motioned.  Moreover, the figure could be another version of the bored 
pupil who turns to killing (insects) for pleasure forwarding social-
environmental causality alongside negative masculinity (“Wrong” 4, 
echoed later in “Husbandry”, TAD).  However, this figure tunes into 
“infinity” and “a purer mind, a cleaner way of seeing” (“Cathy” 2: 
12, 14).  She is an artist who paints to exorcise her trauma and 
depression.  Her work “seeps into the desk” (3: 8), which she lets 
“bleed” (3: 9).  These intangible, morphing selves and indistinct 
agencies in this last poem are considered as a flowing pool of “names 
and fears” that suggest “a garment of presence whose purpose she 
cannot fathom” (3: 8, 9, 11, 14).  This is Burnside’s shape-shifting 
force.  It runs through things manifesting in good forms (“Barren”), 
the iniquitous (“Searching for Lambs”) and sometimes singularly 
indeterminate forms (“The Old Gods) in different places and at 
different times, and can be channelled creatively.  Thus, in “Barren” 
a similar soul to the graveyard persona that brings life to the 
deceased operates in “A Miracle on Market Day” but we have moved 
through a desire to reconstitute and Burnside can now read the “blood 
warm” cattle at night positively harnessing this energy.  It ends 
with their bodies homed to “the purr of the darkness within, and the 
rich wombs breeding” (15) which portends -- in its shift from 
“bleeding” to “breeding” -- futurity and healing that reside in the 
final movement of the collection where a greater emphasis on dwelling 
is evident.  I shall now bring this to the fore. 
“September” is Burnside’s signature poem.  He works from an 
imagination set within falling light, turning to the dark as a moment 
of “grace” (7) in “gloaming” (8) -- a word used poignantly by Bishop 
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and Sorely MacLean, and he uses the voice of “Halloween” and the tone 
and register of “A Private Life”.  In the earlier poem, following the 
internal focus of private mental landscapes (“In The Psychiatric 
Hospital” and “Cathy”) the desire of the poet is to connect to the 
wider landscape via journeying.  The authenticity of this experience 
is tempered by the poet provoking our conception of this interface 
“like memory” in “A Private Life” (4).  This places the poetry within 
Burnside’s past, into the mining villages of Lumphinnans and Kelty in 
close proximity to the poet’s hometown of Cowdenbeath, Fife.  Three 
words dominate this poem.  “Smudges” relates to the towns, pencil 
sketched and blurred to vision; “scratched” to their names, clarified 
and permanent in writing; but it is the people quietly looking out 
onto the world who turn back to the domestic scene that are most 
significant: in their wider selfhood they witness “their struck lives 
gathered around them” (12 my emphasis).  It is an epiphanic shock and 
striking sense that denotes “rooting” beyond the flawed writing 
indicated by “smudges” and “scratched”, better techne is available to 
humankind. 
In “September” the laying of foundations is made not by turning 
inward but by the connection to season, light, and heat: “a stepping 
out / to gloaming” (7-8) afforded by attunement to the latency of 
being, “something of myself” (12): 
 
as lyrical and poignant as the sound 
of little owls and foxes on the hill 
hunting for blood and warmth, in the yellow bracken. (12-15) 
 
The “yellow bracken” suggests the warm orange-brown fern of dry hill-
sides read as a tone diluted by the desolate plains in twilight.  
This suggests solitude rather than deprivation, for Burnside’s 
loneliness as with the owls paired by foxes is a lyrical conversation 
with the energy of “hunting”.  The animals stimulate the mental state 
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in “September” in arousal both piquant and tender yet driven by the 
need to sustain one’s self over venery.  It is a fine balance that 
Burnside has attempted to work in-between the extremes of self-
relinquishment and self-possession.  “September” and “A Private Life” 
suggest that this is possible from internal and external points of 
reference; thus rooting is giving agency inside and outside self. 
Finally, in “The Rainbow” the biblical covenant returns to the 
protagonist of “Swimming in the Flood” as if to come full circle, 
leaving “Parousia” as post-script and ending chorus.  The tableau is 
rich.  The flood has now passed but the house is bereft of divine 
grace and man is now connected to the tidal force rather than the 
tricks of “ephemeral” (12) landmarks.  The traces of his neighbours 
who came to bury the drowned horses resonate in “the locked 
barometer, / the clock stopped with silt, / the almanac / drowned in 
the fire” (21-24).  To look back across the poem we note duckweed and 
mud “shrouded” (18) the horses.  It is the only theological vesture 
derived from the sign of murder (above), or an unfathomable force 
that denies empathy as it is located in the past tense.  We are 
driven to locate the present sense of belonging and the writerly act 
that achieves this.  Our inquiry is connected to the failed effort by 
duckweed to carpet the surface of the blue element green, to make a 
landing site of the protean, locating home close to all this water, 
and finding the moving spirit in a fixed earth.  Finally the tools 
for measuring atmospheric pressure and time, forecasting technologies 
of weather and climate are arrested and left suspended in a visual 
image.  Burnside wishes to fold all previous signifiers into this 
closing shot.  It is significant that the progression of atomic time 
is negated by a loose stratum of soil and that the annual tables of 
information and astro-meteorological forecasts are ruined by 
resisting inverted dual elements.  This is a poem and a song of 
earth, fire, and water highlighting the sense of the sky and an elegy 
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For de Man, parousia has been treated by interpreters of poetry as a 
false refuge in consciousness, a place where soul protects itself by 
misrecognizing the impossibility of unification with a centre or 
origin.  Schmidt shows that Heidegger’s Hegel outlined the dependency 
of object upon subject in par indicating ‘to us’, promoting 
subjectness.  Whereas subjectness can be read as non-ideal i.e. at 
work in the concrete particular, Heidegger laid challenge to the 
notion that there is either something beyond beings or a common 
denominator to being (Schmidt 23) -- his preference is for an 
emancipation of the future, recuperation disentangled from the past.  
We witness Burnside struggle to achieve this disposition, urging 
forwards in mind and loosely in aesthetic form, but racked by memory 
and repetition: the pull to a straight line always being bent by 
nature’s circular gravity.  If Bishop is mentor Burnside is failing 
her ability to travel as an alien, or he is offering his poems as 




In “Parousia” the poet wishes us to imagine “this charged / sky” (1: 
2-3) in order to liken it to “a biblical presence” (1) or second 
coming version of parousia.  This atmosphere extends beyond the 
present moment, for it is not only happening now but “before” (3) the 
storm’s arrival, and in the future, while the trees are seen 
“streaming with rain” (5).  It takes the imagination to make this 
widening available, for the mind is photographic and works to “cut 
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out” mathematical points in space rather than “sew the pieces 
together” (Bergson Matter 31, 33).  Prolepsis leads to thought: “but 
I think, if it came, there would be / something more subtle” (1: 8) 
where things become “closer” (9), “intimate”, and “sudden” (11), 
which for Dennis O’Driscoll, marks an epiphany of the intimate, “of 
spontaneous neighbourly love” (111).  Burnside’s scene with “limes 
trees around the station” (4) develops a Coleridgean confinement into 
a potential journey.  The allusion to the cross (via crucis), 
however, is the secularized pilgrimage into the post-pastoral almost 
technological realm where trees “streaming with rain” and later 
“fields and timber yards... moorhens’ nests and oildrums full of 
rain” (2: 7-8) co-exist.  Yet the post-pastoral site remains 
underwritten by energies only accountable via images drawn from 
nature: “vixen and weasel, barn owl and pipistrelle” (16): carnivores 
and nocturnal dwellers “understood” (15) in this new proximity.  This 
is familiar and significant territory to the Burnside reader, 
although the natural world bears an altogether new significance in 
its qualification to the “I” and its ability to harness self-presence 
within holistic presence.  I have read this as another qualification 
to the appropriation of the world; I expand this once more. 
“Companion self: not me, but echoes / breeding on the skin” (2: 1-
2) finds the Emersonian ‘I’ of interrelation rather then the Fichtean 
ego while also a double-consciousness that cannot be killed off but 
is breeding as it is bleeding.  Qualified as “a half-life of touches 
and blows, the sub-microscopic / pattern of resurrection” (3-4) it 
purports mind and body as conductors interposed between objects 
working in reflex or voluntarily.  In distinction to an enclosed 
world within a world (solipsistic or Idealist centre of relations), a 
model of influence and impressionability is presented where contact 
suggests that matter does not pass through the universe unsullied but 
that it is pulled and pushed by the universe’s forces (extensions of 
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the matter).  Thus, “resurrection” denotes a rational and modern idea 
of self-heal and constant process. 
The third and fourth sections attend to the notion of the border.  
SIF challenged notions of isolated states especially in its vision of 
bleeding and transformations suggesting fluidity.  “Parousia” holds 
the notion of a willed crossing between states, or at the very least, 
acknowledgement of the difference between states.  “It was less of a 
stream than a border: / a rill over wheat-coloured stones, then a 
sudden / dimming” (4: 1-3) indicates a temporary trickle following 
rain and connoting the verbal sense to form by flowing where each 
reflects the other as motioned by the stones’ texture of grain.  Yet 
this otherness is not within the same to the conscious mind, it is 
“the far side” that “was stranger’s country, a half-mile away” (4: 
9). 
Burnside writes this as a peripheral pathway, the posterior 
extremity (or physical terminus) of a domestic horse, and “a glimmer 
of slate in the distance” (11).  The last image, following apartness 
and difficult vision (‘dimming’, ‘distance’) is of a house roof: 
terminus, shelter, and border or human horizon of vision.  As 
“distance” it connotes comfort apart from self, and as a picture of 
his mind is metaphor of the division of home into homestead, land 
into private places.  Moreover, home or the human is conveyed in all 
three units but gives way to the “dog-fox” -- a pre-existent hybrid 
(from “Summer”) -- echoed in the third movement, where “soul becomes 
/ conceivable, immersed in viscera, / and mind endures, in wisps of 
meat and bone” (16-19).  This complex stanza’s intratextuality and 
peripheral vision returns to latent predator knowledge within the 
domestic (n.b. the seven natural qualifications to the metrical 
measurement “half-mile”) while also suggesting that which is hard-
felt against the temporal, rational engine.  This weds matter to 
perception and spirit to the interior to achieve notions of 
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difference that one can transgress or traverse.  The final 
accumulative binary that I have delineated plays out in the double 
octet of the last section: 
 
All resurrections are local: 
footprints bleeding away 
through marsh-grass and water, 
a sound you can almost hear 
of the flesh renewed 
in the plashing of rain 
or a quick trout 
breaking the stream. (5: 8) 
 
Witnessing the uninterruptible processes of nature while making human 
sense of the energy via the lexis of body is a terrain Burnside 
constantly marks.  Here, following mind inflected metaphysically and 
spiritually, the stream is broken, not fixed: the image of the flood 
recovers as the significantly ecological term for the human element, 
the “footprint”, dissolves when the transitive and fluid but 
indistinct world can operate.  It is the site where the “plashing” of 
rain out-sounds all other noise, erases distractions, and affords the 
clarity of newness: 
 
For the sign I have waited to see 
is happening now 
and always, in this white continuum 
of frost and spawn: 
the blood in a tangle of thorns 
where it stiffens and pales, 
the hard bud splitting through ice 
and the nailed palm healing. (5: 9-16) 
 
This is Burnside’s version of Williams’ reconciliation through things 
not ideas in the image of saxifrage (“A Sort of Song”, The Wedge 
1944).  “Now / and always” upholds a logic of each temporal nexus 
extending beyond itself but is significant as an isolated aperture 
and wide angle upon extensive space and time hooked by the 
historically contingent present.  A continuum is modelled by the 
effects of winter and its pure white forms, an invisibility that 
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casts out into futurity as represented in the cradling of fish milt.  
Earth’s reproductive agencies are given biblical force yet 
restoration gives way to revival promoting forward direction and 
spirit in the final two images: the latter imagined and mythical 
brokered by relaxed ‘l’ sounds; the former witnessed everywhere and 
conveyed via punchy monosyllables and onomatopoeia.  “Bud” relates 
more than sonically to “blood” offering rawness, indispensable and 
true to the energies of renewal and growth.  The opening of the 
couplet provides nothing less than a reverberating dynamism and 
creative evolution resonating across the calm surface of last things.  
It has not reassured the human but it has responded well to world. 
 
While the early poetry enacted gnosis over organization, aporia in 
SIF is difficult to grasp, for the degree of psychological 
verisimilitude the lyric enacts with murderers and rapists.  This is 
not posited to disable poetic faith or to reconfigure submission to 
the world from a paradigm of self-effacement, but does suggest 
negation of the subjugation of world to self-interest.  As we move 
towards ANS, ataraxia (tranquillity undisturbed by trauma) and 
eudaimonia (well-being) rise on the horizon.  This occurs while a 
(Puritan) world of unfathomable significance and corrupted faculties 
is retranslated into an increase in vigilance.  This is a pre-
requisite to accepting the foreignness of the world as fact, the 
prologue to the art of losing and living within the world that 
disowns.  More than Williams, one is made to think of Bishop. 
 
 
III. A Normal Skin 
 
If SIF shows a redemptive journey turning away from society and 
trammelling the contours of nature as a return to first things, ANS 
Bristow 188 
assists our consideration upon whether this period in Burnside’s 
oeuvre considers that journey as one in which we share the ultimate 
laws of nature or not.  Burnside did not posit a mechanism whose 
purposiveness is morally calculable, nor was redemption figured as an 
element within a journey or return to origin.  Moreover, the 
connection to the power source was not a promotion of self-
sufficiency via exile from society or a retreat to nature.  
In the use of woods and rivers as the locus of dark forces without 
direct referencing to a post-pastoral consciousness that is aware of 
the annihilation of time and space by the technological age, Burnside 
promoted the sustaining and irrevocable persistence of nature in SIF.  
To what degree is this a pre-text to sustaining the “I” outside 
agencies of the self, and to what extent is this scaffolded by a 
primal cord to nature or harmonic, connate existence? 
The epigraphs to ANS appear to promote this collection as more 
philosophically complex than its forbear but they are in direct 
relation to these simple and central issues of environmental 
aesthetics: 
 
When the mind is like a hall in which thought is like a voice 
speaking, the voice is always that of someone else. 
         Wallace Stevens 
 
And if the soul, too, my dear Alcibiades, is to know itself, it 
must surely look into a soul. 
         Plato: Alcibiades I 
 
  Out of this same light, out of the central mind, 
  We make a dwelling in the evening air, 
  In which being there together is enough. 
         Wallace Stevens 
 
For Heidegger, the human act is to be understood as one of free being 
motivated by reason and understood through dialogue.  One can see 
this in Frost and Wordsworth, too.  Yet, here, Burnside offers 
Stevens.  It is profound to argue that a loss of self can be attained 
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by recognizing the other as a version of one’s self, but the 
performative structure of dialogue does promote the subject position 
turned outward (Bushell 102-9).  The larger context for Burnside is 
that the foundations of man are in spirit, and for Stevens, the 
spirit of poetry is the ultimate being.  The degree to which a 
Transcendentalist version of redemption (that views the world as 
broken, determined by man as disunited) is found in the descent of 
spirit to its rooting in the material world appears to be a matter of 
view upon relationships.  Here the risk of substantiation is none 
other than continual renewal witnessed in the natural world (Frost 
“But God’s Own Descent”, In the Clearing), which can be echoed in 
strategies of repetition, elaboration, and accumulation. 
However, reading across these epigraphs we begin with Stevens 
(“Adagia” Opus) and a large mind of which thought is but a character, 
as my reading of Stevens vis-à-vis Bloom and Carroll (ch. 1).  It is 
a way of stepping outside one’s conscious self or noting that this is 
relatively small on a personal scale.  While Stevens attempts to 
overcome the experience of discovering that we can only see ourselves 
via others (or think of ourselves in terms of our discoveries of 
things in others) made through his attempts to create a central mind 
or single voice (Andersson 36-37), this otherness leaves the human 
behind yet does not dispatch him from the scene.  Socrates’ 
discussion with Alcibiades posits that knowledge comes from 
interaction with others, a commitment to dialogue and exchange in 
turn reflecting upon the self in a larger world and how we connect to 
the soul.  The autonomous self is relinquished for what Emerson 
called the ability in loneliness to “behold the beauty of another 
character, which inspires a new interest in our own” (“The 
Transcendentalist”, Collected 1: 208): as with Wordsworth (especially 
Home at Grasmere) that which is “lodged” in one forces the other 
“home”.  While Emerson stresses the sovereignty of the individual and 
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the ability to access the absolute, Burnside is emphasizing the 
dependency upon others, something leading from MOT and the solitary, 
and given a Shakespearean twist in TLT (43). 
Stevens’ final lines are from “Final Soliloquy of the Interior 
Paramour” (The Rock), which has considered the imagination’s role in 
providing protection or support in our modern poverty or lack of 
single faith or foundation, where “we forget each other and 
ourselves” (10) and find that we are together.  This union over 
singularity is attainable, we note, if we are aware of our 
foreignness to ourselves and aware of our need to locate the other as 
a step towards understanding our position with others.  This trinity 
is dialectical only in the sense that listening shifts to looking and 
then as third term into being.  Thus, there is compliance to the 
Stevensian imperative to allow the relation its true and full 
fruition: “Let be be finale of seem” (Collected “The Emperor of Ice 
Cream” 7).  It is more a feat of association by Burnside, amplified 
in “The Man who was Answered by his Own Self”.  Here, the domestic 
setting of a dream flicks between monochrome and colour to suggest 
states of mind reflecting on self and self with others.  The larger 
context of religious poverty enables people to tune in “to nothing, 
to their own selves, calling home” (39).  It is a useful poem to read 
the epigraphs as indexing the themes of love, solitude, and domestic 
arrangements, which ANS begins with a restatement of SIF’s concerns 
but opens out into the construction of dwelling and enables a shift 




III.A. Three Phases 
 
Burnside formulates ANS on the same terms as its forbear indicating a 
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direct parental relationship over and above the usual progress from 
collection to collection.  As with SIF, twenty-nine poems lead from 
the title poem and are separated by a middle poem that operates to 
modify a series of epistemologically concerned poems, leading to a 
longer contemplative poem.  Here, “A Normal Skin” replays notions of 
pain, order, and will and then moves into notions of difference and 
compromise on the domestic scale (“A Process of Separation”).  As a 
development of the parent collection, poems of navigation and 
attunement are centred by “Simon of Cyrene”, which in a similar 
fashion to “An Ordered World” turns the collection into another 
series of poems pertaining to the grounds of knowledge, yet this 
operates on a wider level.  Here, “Vanishing Twin” recollects 
Burnside’s dead sister’s dreams; “Agoraphobia” reads the map of his 
partner’s vision; then “Unwittingly” turns on the epigraphs to speak 
of measuring the self within self and world.  Following this 
sequence, Burnside has shuffled two decks of navigation -- ‘floating’ 
and ‘love’ -- that increase the inflection of place, which is 
foundational to “Epithalamium”.  I read this as Burnside’s entrance 
into the mind that orchestrates TAD. 
 
III.A.1. “A Normal Skin” to “A Muddy Road” 
 
“A Normal Skin” explicitly emphasizes our ordinary point of relation 
to the world indicated by the physical boundary of flesh.  The poem 
begins with an image of an eczema sufferer dismantling a collection 
of (material) clocks and sustaining their order mentally.  It is a 
view upon surface boundaries, decreation, and the vantage of the 
neighbour.  The image of breaking our constructions as a method of 
inhabiting the world has a Stevensian flavour, yet as it turns away 
from the neighbour and gives itself back to the self the poem 
suggests ideas of listening and feeling that are typical Burnside.  
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More critically, one could view the change in focus from the metaphor 
of machine falling to the semiology of self as a post-
phenomenological priority. 
We are told that over the knowledge of how things are made, “the 
order she creates / and fixes in her mind” (13-14) is imperative.  
This mapping enables the voice to turn to his partner and suggest how 
gravely he is misunderstood yet the two instructive modes of 
reasoning replay ideas of order and pain as a means to make a 
dwelling place: 
 
   What we desire in pain 
is order, the impression of a life 
that cannot be destroyed, only dismantled. (18-20) 
 
What we desire in pain 
is reason: an impression of ourselves 
as wounded, explained, 
coerced from a destination.  (26-29) 
 
This voice echoes with the Emersonian faith in regeneration that 
displaces all other knowledge systems.  Here, as a restatement of the 
convincing, urging voice of “Lack of Evidence” (SIF), a rhetorical 
deviation into “impression” of selfhood motivates indication, stress, 
or emphasis as pressure and therefore will, promoting the instinctual 
meta-narrative of redemption, perfectability, and enlightenment as 
backdrop to contingent things.  However, the poem suggests that 
complete (finite) destruction or purification is impossible; 
furthermore, rather than degeneration a form of disintegration comes 
from violence or suffering, always leaving something that remains and 
is open to possibility and growth.  The untangling chinks of white 
space are slightly symbolic here, resonating with this collection’s 
epigraphs, the self-effacement and relinquishment of early poems, and 
portending ecological conceptions in later verse. 
These compound in the four words “coerced from a destination”.  
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Here, constraint normally thought of in terms of origin is derived by 
futurity, but rather than being compelled ‘by’ a force, we are driven 
“from” it.  This reconfiguration of the expected line into semantics 
of reverse logic forwards a sense of thrownness and futurity, 
circularity, and determinism by mortality, purposiveness rather than 
essentialism.  I argue that these are highly important abstractions 
to make from Burnside’s poetics.  This complex and philosophical 
colouration infuses Burnside’s contemplation of partnerships as 
energies working the border between self and mind on terms of 
difference and the compromise of selfhood within the domestic scale.  
This is an important element to verify the poetics of home; 
furthermore, it has particular significance in the development from 
surfaces to pathways made via “A Process of Separation” and “A Muddy 
Road by Adam Johnson’s House”. 
 
“A Process of Separation” is prefaced by a fragment of Williams’ 
triad in “The Ivy Crown” (Journey to Love, 1955) from the collection 
dedicated to Williams’ wife, as with Burnside’s collection.   
 
   The business of love is 
      cruelty which, 
by our wills, 
   we transform 
      to live together. (38-42) 
 
The choice of late Williams is acute: suffering and the confrontation 
of death, where renewal via contact with the world and through ideas 
of inclusiveness is central to his work following the two volumes of 
collected poems (1950, 1951); it provides the conceptual bearing to 
Burnside’s volume and gives Burnside purchase into Americana beyond 
the Lawrentian impulse..  Williams’ poem views the non-accidental 
(willed) tryst or “lie” (1) as a contract that fluctuates seasonally.  
Williams’ imagination bridges the gaps between differing degrees of 
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happiness and comfort as “confinement” (6).  In Burnside’s poem, 
iambic pentameter eventually gives way to the sense unit made via 
triad, echoing Williams’ music and his unique auditory imagination 
driven by commingled union of meter and image (an increasingly sharp 
influence upon Burnside’s loose-line from ANS onwards).  Shortness of 
breath in short lines and the dictates of realms of consciousness 
speak of ghosts in terms of snapshots of memory underscored by the 
decaying yet present bodies and shells of animals and insects within 
the territory of home, and the fusion of these forms as a fragile 
means of touch or connection to the wider self. 
 
So much of flesh is grass, you find yourself 
in ramsons and the smell of bittercress, 
in mullein and foxgloves, lighting the summer nights (3: 21-23) 
 
while I construct this tunnel in the dark: 
cockchafers; worms; a cobweb of blood on my tongue; 
and all the time I long for transformation. (27-29) 
 
His partner is constructing pagan spells to increase security.  
Garlic ramson and cruciferous cardamine suggest exorcism.  The grey 
rosettes of verbascum and foxgloves are ornamental brightening 
elevated in the golden classical mythological messenger of gods.  By 
contrast (yet an exaggeration of Dionysian impulse) the masculine 
figure uncontrollably deploys the highly destructive and armoured 
cockchafer beetle and images of death.  We should read these figures 
closely.  The first folds into the world like the assonance of 
“flesh” with “grass” and “cress” and promotes the ‘s’ sound leading 
to the mythical and covenantal messenger that “keeps us safe”.  The 
second figure is trapped between reality and desire exaggerated by 
the voice of pursuit and escape echoed in the punctuation that scans 
urgently but discontinuously.  Both of these are extensions of earth 
energy.  In the poetics, two rhythmical periods undercut by smaller 
fragments marked by an array of semi-colons and commas enforce a torn 
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mind and sense of fragmentation across human and world.  The disarray 
exists within an emphasis in these poems of contrast between partners 
where the male is equally at one with the world but implicating a 
fretted holism in addition to serenity or at-oneness in the feminine.  
These extensions, therefore, are means to “the art of erasure” (5: 8) 
in an early period of consideration of an unhomed self. 
Inspiration from the American painter Andrew Wyeth whose bleak 
landscapes of the painter’s Quaker settlement home in Pennsylvania 
brings Burnside to echo the imminence of death in the native and 
subdued poetics of “Muddy Road by Adam Johnson’s House”. 
 
It’s this knowing the land by the names 
of neighbours: the long-deceased 
 
and the newborn (1-3) 
 
The interval works to show the division yet interrelation between 
life and death, the immanence of childhood attunement within adult 
memory where “Under it all, the pure geography” of the spirit of 
infancy is alive and things reveal themselves as if for the first 
time: 
 
you stopped at Kuerner’s barn to warm your hands 
and saw a young buck pouring from the roof, 
 
the ankles crossed, the last thick cloud of steam 
hanging around the muzzle and the groin 
 
its dying the heat you breathe 
in the first chill of winter. (10-15) 
 
An allusion to the austere work of Wyeth’s Chadds Ford paintings, 
especially Tenant Farmer (1961, Delaware Art Museum, Delaware), 
spills into the poem in the final image, and as readers of the 
regional poetics we must enter a domain that is not our own.  The 
shortening of line and the minimizing of beat from pentameter to the 
three-stress line delivers the hanging animal into a sense echoing 
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the physical arrest along the pathway.  Again, Williams’ technique of 
propulsion (projective verse) seems to be a strong influence here.  
The final couplet’s lines, bereft of words to equate to the length of 
narrative lines, push the sense of stopping short and evoke immediacy 
of the material artwork resulting in an unfinished finality yet their 
work is fulfilling.  As in Williams, this shortening of word and 
action bring the contrast between heat and chill into a 
horizontalized shared space of the living and dying, the 
internalization of one life into the other as this is primarily an 
image of destruction as creation in the sense of depicting predator 
as progenitor.  This trajectory continues and in turn colours the 
sense of the last line, for the notion of death runs through “chill” 
potentially made crisper into ‘kill’ but penetrating the body as 
coldness both literally in the heat and in the absence of sympathy in 
the necessary and neutral slaughter.  This realism anchors the 
metaphysical and biblical register into a consideration of the 
humanly dwelt world, what we share with others, the cost of our 
presence, and the site of meaningful relations beside liberty in 
negation. 
 
III.A.2. “Simon of Cyrene” and two epistemological streams 
 
Compelled by the Roman authorities to carry Jesus’ crucifix (Mark 
15.21-22, Matt. 27.32, Luke 23.26; contradicted John 19.16-17) Simon 
of Cyrene symbolizes action devoid of sympathetic generosity or free 
will and being thrown into a context outside of self agency.  The 
fifth station of pilgrimage acts as site for Burnside’s model 
bystander, who “like everyone” (15) should be involved in another 
world, implicated in a different history.  Informing the second 
section of ANS with a politicised stance, this models the imposition 
of a role that requires a critical attitude to the role with the 
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effect of widening his realms of thought, as indicated above and 
introduced by his mind reaching to his children, wife, and garden.  
This human extending across time and ploughing resources for the 
future -- an Old Testament idea given a new voice not unlike John 
(12: 47), less of judgement more of saving and it is split into two 
streams of thinking, detailed below. 
 
III.A.2.a. The Floating World 
 
The cover design to ANS centres a hand-carved wooden, female Japanese 
Noh mask (Onna-kei) taking its shape from Buddhist sculpture and 
representing joy, anger, grief, and happiness in one image; it is a 
photograph of neutrality that hides three states of dynamism.  
Burnside extends this thread in “Ukiyo-e”, “A Noh Mask”, and 
“Floating”.  The first poem recalls Jane Hirshfield’s same-titled 
poem in its treatment of the prints in contrast to the moving world 
(Gravity): the suspension of animation in ancient Tokyo is one that 
“readies itself for the first pale stars / that will not come” (17-
18).  It settles in the section “The Other Earth” where poems are 
disconnected or out of time.  As with Hirshfield, Burnside enforces 
the notion of temporal rooting in his self-reflexive stance on the 
manifest ink by reading place as a loose co-ordinate through the 
collapse or extension of time: that is, memory in and out of time 
impressing upon the present as a way of thinking and acting (“Ukiyo-
E”). 
Burnside develops this model into “History” poems (ch. 5) but the 
development in this collection in “A Noh Mask” works upon 
psychological identity and offers another view on the Williams 
quotation, “negotiated space, between the smiles” (25) and the 
potential for the richer self “That’s waited in the flesh / to be 
expressed” (17-18).  It may reflect Lawrence but would also denote 
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Williams’ music of spring.  The final poem moves out of the Edo 
context by focussing on the sub-text of anchoring somewhere together.  
This takes Bob Dylan’s springtime lyric “If Not For You” (New 
Morning, 1970), for the need of the other as a means to a better 
navigable world-placed self, where the cosmological forces do not 
appear misaligned from individual destiny, perhaps circling back to 
Williams and Journey to Love.  However, “Floating” endorses the 
dislodged foreignness and blurring of vision and song, “a slowed / 
current” (20-21) captured in “the last / glimmer of day” (9-10).  
These poems weave separate treatments of place and motion with 
Burnside returning to his concern for perspective, and beginning his 
quest to sing Anstruther into the canon of Scottish poetry. 
 
III.A.2.b. To Scotland 
 
The movement from “A Photograph of old West Fife” to “Anstruther” is 
the most concentrated poetry of place-names in Burnside’s oeuvre, and 
it is the beginning of an emergence of the theme of dwelling and 
ecology entwined.45  “A Photograph of Old West Fife” is the most 
expansive poem of this collection, attempting to represent a stream 
of consciousness with the poet back in Cowdenbeath.  Situated on the 
road connecting the parallel Old Perth Road and the High Street, the 
train station at the easterly end and the Firth of Forth to the south 
and east, brings memories of place and travel to trigger sense-
impressions that “make me strange” (24) when detached from home.  It 
is a curious alien consciousness that derives from a return home; it 
could suggest fulfilment yet also a journey that allows for knowing 
                         
45 Five places are named in titles of seven poems.  Up to TGN, the 
ratio of poems with place-names in titles are as follows: ANS (6/29), 
TGN (6/30), MOT (7/54), TAD (2/23), Th (3/48), FD (2/39), CK (1/25), 
TLT (1/27), SIF (0/29).  GS (4/11) is over-represented by the four 
quartets.  Twelve places are named within nine poems from “Ukiyo-E” 
to “Epithalamium” in ANS; nine places in eleven poems in “The North” 
to “Dundee” in MOT. 
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things in immediacy without pre-existent experience or categories.  
This sensibility leads from images of innocence into unknowing, which 
as a development dilutes the exilic frontier. 
A burst of energy comes forth in several short poems.  “Children 
Sledding in the dark, Magdalen Green”, recalls the site near 
Burnside’s writer residency at the University of Dundee during this 
first period back in Scotland.  “Shiochie’s Hill, Dunkeld” and “At 
Moniack Mhor” replay the foreignness of “An old Photograph”, 
inflected by the ancient (fairy) name for Stanley Hill by the 
Cathedral in the ancient capital of Kaledonoi, and the Scottish Art 
Council’s creative writing centre in Kiltarlity, Inverness-shire, 
respectively.  These snapshots promote ideas of rebirth and 
regeneration, and lead to themes of love in “Félicité et Perpétué” 
and “Floating”, while “Anstruther” marks the mature voice of Burnside 
that “Epithalamium” develops as the guardian of his own prison.  
Thinking of this in terms of the exilic frontier, we are offered an 
expression of protagonist in two languages: floating and permanent, 
fluid and sturdy.  Heaney calls this the “double capacity” of poetry 
to promote the security of the intimately known and the insecurity of 
the boundless (“Something To Write Home About”, Finders 48).  It is a 
resistance to terminus and marks a connection to the world “lying 
just beneath the surface and just beyond the horizon of the actual 
words we speak” (57-57).  Here, continuing the poem of recollection 
and working ghosted selves into the environment, the border posits a 
direct consideration of the metaphysical space of possibility over a 
space-place opposition: 
 
The far shore, that I used to think 
was somewhere strange, 
 
the lighthouse that once seemed large 
and fishing boats beneath the harbour wall 
 
are forming anew 
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within this fold of mist 
 
more real than ever, harder and more precise, 
and nothing ghostly in the way 
 
the cold welds to my skin 
and lets me know 
 
how quick I am, how quick I have to be 
to go on walking, blindly, into silence. (11-22) 
 
The Cellardyke shore between John Street and Burnside Terrace, which 
the poet visited in childhood and lived close to during the poem’s 
composition is wrapped in haar and is transforming the poet’s 
sensibility into a new point of relation (as with “Haar”, TGN).  In 
awareness of the construction of worlds (faith and knowledge) and 
“what little I / we know of houses” (“A Process of Separation”, 
“Epithalamium”) this clouded realm dissipates into the poet seeking 
reality in what he cares for.  As with Williams’ poetic it resonates 
with pronouns drawing identity from place and carries an 
autobiographical edge of making a new home and working to reconcile 
desire and love, an Americanist human affirmation, not revealed 
truth.  It is captivated brilliantly in Williams autobiography and 
his reflections on the personal nexus of the precisionist, Charles 
Sheeler, moral transcendent significance in Shaker furniture, and 
alienation of resilient Russian exiles in the Hudson valley: “nothing 
can grow” he states “unless it taps into the soil” (Autobiography 
334).  Once more in Burnside, however, it comes from Stevensian 
blankness. 
For Wordsworth, the ideal reader is “quick”: both tutored and 
natural, and in cooperation with the world, much as the poem is a 
contingent, cognitive horizon hypnotically nudging the reader to 
formulate judgement (Prose 3:66).  To Burnside, the word connotes 
holding fast to our being in time, as with Augustine’s Confessions 
(397-398) and Heidegger’s trilogic reading of vorstellen as place, 
standing, and understanding (“The Thing”, Question).  These are all 
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terms for reassessment yet intimately related to mastery of self 
without making it one’s own.  Furthermore, the final sense of 
“bodily” in the word suggests that the last lines are not the 
negative critique of missing the world through speed (or hastened 
modernity) but understanding the importance of the phenomenal world 
and the connections made when felt physically.  This is Burnside 
coming out from the shadows of forebears and offering, perhaps, what 
could be termed in another paraphrase, ‘how bodily one has to be to 
erase the self’s mind and walk richly into the silent non-human 
dimension.’  We have read this before but this is the first of many 
poems to a new dwelling, folding love and respect into a new sense of 
being.  This voice cradles loose, flowing, and flowering couplets 





The collection’s long poem alludes to the ancient tradition of 
celebrating the wedding day, in which Sappho, Pinder, and later 
Catullus would deploy nymphs and shepherds to offer material vision 
to present what a modern reader would understand as the poet’s 
personal joy.  Burnside has chosen to preface his version with lines 
from the anonymous German folk collection Des Knaben Wunderhorn (The 
Boy’s Magic Horn) to suggest negation of a divine or transcendental 
force.46  The poem speaks of the distress of humankind, which in the 
afterword to the early nineteenth century collection by Achim von 
Arnim “the loss of vernacular culture [is likened to] the dwindling 
of the forests” (Rigby Topographies 222).  Rigby reads this in the 
                         
46 “Da kam ich auf einen breiten Weg; / da kam ein Engelein und 
wollt’ mich abweisen, / Ach nein! Ich liess mich nicht abweisen!” (“I 
came to a wide road [broad path], where an angel appeared and wished 
to force me back: ah no, I will not be turned away!”). 
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context of high Romanticism, particularly Joseph Freiherr von 
Eichendorff and the rejection of pantheism and endorsement of 
ambivalent Catholic revelation latent in folk culture: 
 
The physical world of nature, unredeemed by divine revelation, 
was potentially more malign than divine, its ceaseless 
whisperings speaking siren-like to our archaic inner nature, 
awakening longings that continually threatened to draw us away 
from the safe terrain of righteous living (222). 
 
Rigby’s penetration into Teutonic conservatism in the 
revolutionary Napoleonic age prefigures Burnside’s use of the natural 
world’s annunciation and his struggle with consciousness and 
perspective in an attempt to sustain the right connection to this 
presence in a world declining into ecological loss.  These specific 
lines from section thirteen of The Magic Horn, “Urlicht” (“ancient 
light”) promote the thematic concern upon dying and pain, going to 
heaven, wanting to be with God, and of God giving eternal light.  I 
look at a few moments to see how this is affected. 
“Shekinah” is the first phase in diluting or secularising the 
spiritual presence of God denoted in the Hebrew sense of the word.  
This opening poem belies the pastoral blend of myth and reality in 
its repetition of the phrase “I’ve heard” (1: 1, 9) turning away from 
the musical aspect of the element of myth.  This personalized 
structural element falls away to the objective pronouns “It’s” and 
“Its” (20, 27), indicating an emphasis on the world felt and world 
unseen: status, and (dis)possession respectively.  This turn follows 
Burnside naming the towns of Fife: “Lochgelly” -- the deprived and 
isolated pit town; “Pittenweem” -- the fish market for Anstruther and 
only surviving working harbour of the East Neuk; “the Isle of May” -- 
home to the twelfth century monastery and modern national nature 
reserve; and “Markinch” -- famed for its sixth century preaching 
station, financially less independent since the recent closures of 
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the last paper-mill and the Haig whisky factory.  The order of these 
places in the poem represents an easterly shift from Cowdenbeath to 
Anstruther, a biographical journey and marked change in the Fife 
landscape from the working-class underprivileged and forgotten towns 
to the Fife coastal tourist route and sustained industries.  Markinch 
lies mid-way between these points and is in position to couple with 
the preaching ground emphasizing the fall from religion running after 
the fall from industry.  The emphasis of the end geographies is not 
unusual; shadowed by the contemplation of nature (the Scottish 
National Heritage site since 1989) they carry through into the idea 
of dispossession.  Furthermore, these places are named before the 
line “where floodlit tractors / labour and churn” (21-22) providing a 
complex vision of man wrestling with nature given Burnside’s unique 
post-pastoral frame. 
Right at this very juncture Burnside exchanges mechanical 
agitation for the differing forms of empathy that husband and wife 
have toward nature: 
 
the way you feel the turning of the tide 
beneath the house, or somewhere in the roof, 
or how I sometimes linger on the stairs, 
listening for nothing... 
beguiled by the pull of the moon 
and the leylines of herring. (33-36, 38-39) 
 
The partner’s tidal connection enfolds earth to sky while the 
husband’s accomplicity is driven by the manifest energies of moon and 
sea, which details a sense of imprisonment in both while antagonism -
- underlined in the difference between “feel” and “beguiled”, the 
intuitive and the self-deluded -- is rife.  The antagonism and notion 
of dispossession, the fall from nature and industry, can be seen as 
resolved by following Burnside’s structural logic. 
The internal attunement of the first poem shifts into the husband 
wandering in “Heimweh” to denote remote longing and pain or 
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homesickness.  Written famously by Lawrence in New Poems (1918), 
Burnside’s version, rather than wishing the destruction of home from 
his memory, replays Lawrence’s plea for destruction of home and self, 
shadowed by the critique of intellectual dehumanzing.  The domestic 
scene is not charged in the way of the soldier at loss from his home 
identity, but its strength derives from within the frustration of 
home and lifeways as restrictive containment.  Moreover, other than 
making the connection to Coleridge’s “France: an Ode” (1798) upon the 
homesickness of the Swiss (Heimwah) affected by the invasion of 
France, uniting themes of conservation and Republican politics (Bate 
Romantic 113-4), Burnside’s momentary thought of leaving home and 
facing the sea is connate with a form of release or disappearance, 
another letting be.  It is “weightless and clean, as if they have 
stepped away / to the near-angelic” (20-21), provided by nothing 
other than “the thought of distance, endless navigation” (16).  It is 
a curious link to the German folk tale in that it suggests a denial 
of social consciousness (represented by the angel) in wishing to push 
the human spirit to its edge while also connecting to the domain of 
angels or the other worldly.  With this in view the sense of 
entrapment, as with a lack of social conscience, begins to falter in 
the second phase. 
The third poem to “Epithalamium”, “After the Storm” recalls 
Hölderlin’s feast day poem (“Wie wenn am Feiertage das Feld Zusehen”) 
and suggests a connection to Burnside’s theory that radical change 
such as an act of violence can “vouchsafe” the other world that is 
resident within the everyday.  This finds “the intense stillness that 
comes thereafter” as a form of renewal where “the logic by which we 
live, day to day is [understood as] only a subset of a wider, more 
mysterious order” (“Travelling into the Quotidian” 61, 69), the 
Coleridgean reading of childish joy extending into human sympathy in 
maturity.  This position derived from thoughts on freedom through 
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violence comes troubling close to the issues of SIF; however, this 
poem is content with trappings of habitat if a large sense of 
openness and connection is resident inside the dweller’s mind and in 
the fabric(ation) of the house.  Rather than an isolated home 
sheltering from the storm, Burnside views his home as a means to 
“what we might discover of ourselves” (25); knowledge: 
 
more than a gust of rain, more than the wind, 
more than the Halloween ghosts we might imagine. 
Those animals that figure on the walls, 
those creatures we imagine on the stairs  
are real, and we must give them shapes and names, 
feed them with blood and salt, fix them a bed, 
make shift, make good, allow them this possession. (32-38) 
 
Totemic consciousness charges this poem by working to dwell with 
things as a means to sustain the fiction or intuitive empathy that 
relinquishes human ownership.  The inclusive subjective pronoun 
dominates the end of this poem while the natural world is abstract 
and general.  The emphasis is on willed action as something giving to 
the world: to “feed” and “fix” is to nurture and construct but to 
“make shift” and “make good” has a double register.  In the first 
instance, a decreated sense of a temporary schematic, ‘makeshift’ 
split in two, allows arrangement to live in its poverty of order and 
failed union, or the necessity of separation and division.  In the 
second sense, less moral judgement than form of atonement, to hold 
one’s place by reparation: to “fix them a bed”.  As an effort not to 
reduce energy but, as one notes the eleventh syllable spilling over 
the iambic prison, it is to give something its place in the world on 
its terms and its “possession”, and thus develops SIF in totality. 
Finally, the title “VIII Beholding” draws from Wordsworthian 
sensorial contemplation and Stevensian mental consideration while 
also suggesting the sense of obligation and engagement triggered by 
the epigraph from Williams in this collection.  The poet’s desire to 
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fill the day by gathering apples and making a fire to connect to the 
Halloween spirits is framed by the bedroom scene where the husband is 
awake and his love lies sleeping; it is a blurred world between 
monologue and dialogue: 
 
  Your hair is the colour of whey 
and your hand on the pillow is clenched, like a baby’s fist 
on a figment of heat, or whatever you’ve clutched in a dream... 
  
  Now, suddenly, you’re talking in your sleep, 
your face on the pillow like one of those paper masks 
we used to make in school, for Halloween, 
talking to someone you’ve dreamed, while your white hands 
fasten on something fragile or easily lost, 
a strand of hair, a ring, a stranger’s arm, 
the promise you have to remember, that brings us home. (5-7, 34-
40). 
 
The insomniac wishes to apologize for his deliberately cruel and 
furnished way of viewing things.  In turning to his partner, he 
idealizes her feminine dream-state rooted in the fluid and spiritual 
world and one able to move into his temporality.  Yet the fabricated 
mask, the comparison of hair to milk, and the white hands portends a 
fragile, constructed surface; these represent neither idealized 
images of purity nor something simply opaque.  When viewed as 
emptiness or transparency they bring the submerged world into relief.  
We are lead to read in this manner by extending the metaphor of 
rising to the surface of the waking state to capture the transitive  
world as the clutch or encirclement of something foreign; this echoes 
with the graveyard the poet desires to walk and enter beyond its 
façade, indicated by the conjunctive stress and contingent sense of 
alternatives in the use of “or” in this section: 
 
or wander all day in the kirkyard, reading the names 
on strangers’ graves: their plots laid side by side 
with those they loved and hated, those they feared; 
friends who betrayed them; children who watched them die. 
It’s what they meant by coming to this place 
and choosing to remain, though decades fastened their hands 
to kindling and wire, and the dampness that seeped through 
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 the walls 
all winter long.  (26-33) 
 
Outside musical arrangement, the eye follows the path of each poetic 
impression finally given Williams’ voice in “all winter long” after 
prosaically imitating Wordsworth.  This poem is problematical because 
of the conceptual aggregates that too easily lead and strangulate the 
poem.  It is possible to read the concept of rambling without a fixed 
abode leading to a station of thought, which in turn leads to a 
(self-reflexive) comment upon predetermination (“what they meant”), 
echoed in the protagonist’s casual roaming that leads towards a 
certain course, particularly an intellectual beholding of terminus 
and continuum.  It needs to be more expansive and less self-
reflexive: the materiality of the poem does not need to indulge in 
itself here but would be better to open out.  The second, third, and 
fifth lines quoted here are metrically more determined than others 
but do not manage to underpin the semanteme of the whole passage.  
“Wander” meets “stranger” to the same degree that “fastened” meets 
“dampness” but other than this emphasis on foreignness and a shift to 
fluidity Burnside has only played with assonance in the ‘w’ sounds to 
bring “who” and “what” further away from the interrogative or 
demonstrative and into the diversity of “wander”, “watch”, and 
“wire”.  Here, within this music, the poetic line resists 
constructing a grammatical field or lexical depth; it is an 
understated moment where the covenant with world via phonetics 
undulates in proximity to the referential. 
It can be read as a form of desert music, the un-use of song which 
is more successfully achieved across wide spaces.  One feels a loose 
connection to Williams: 
 
  I have eyes 
      that are made to see and if 
they see ruin for myself 
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  and all that I hold 
      dear, they see 
also 
    through the eyes 
      and through the lips 
and tongue the power 
   to free myself 
      and speak of it. (Williams “The Yellow 
Flower” 60-70)47 
 
Williams’ treatise of the natural and unnatural acknowledges the 
mental climate of gentle appropriation of thing for self.  Here, the 
ability to “tongue the power” (accompanied by “Deep Religious Faith” 
and “The Mental Hospital Garden”), purports the sensuous inflection 
of the poet’s skill in this phase of contemplation of (personal) 
suffering.  This moment in Williams’ oeuvre is unique in that the 
foregrounding of poetics -- simultaneous to the poet moving away from 
triadic form -- is one that requires a new medium to locate life 
pulsating with death, with the additional impulse to “free” the self 
and in-so-doing assert the self in the wake of finitude and horizons.   
  In Burnside, the use of line-breaks and blooming loose lines 
instances his practice (as with Williams) of spatial form to 
emblematize the ‘make shift’ of the mind and its consolations and 
marriages.  Originally, however, in Burnside’s poem, strict, non-
patterned verse operates to collocate partner and graveyard image 
emphasizing terminus, roots and the will to “remain”.  This fusion of 
the living (although temporarily disconnected from life in her dream 
state), to those beyond life is compounded by the comparison of hair 
to “whey” emphasized as line-ending finds the sonic Scots stress 
“way”, an example of the tongue as verb (as in Williams above).  One 
senses that it is not for the poet to sing these relations but for 
the poetry to make patterns across them, finding dependencies in 
their coexistence within the semantic field, attainable either 
through complex stanzaic form or loose line. 
                         
47 The Desert Music (1954) in Collected and Pictures. 
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Here, Burnside’s dense verse compels the reader to note a reverse 
in the imagery of nature and culture, from the tractor action of 
“churning” to this less manipulated, sinuous and graceful self.   
Moreover, reading the graves as a permanent resting point is humbled 
by finding that each deceased figure was once aware of the 
temporality innate to their fire making, fencing, and gathering.  It 
is a Wordsworthian humbling of human predicament -- the temporal song 
-- while also connecting to the (more Modernist) suggestion of 
transformation and growth.  The damp drawn from the sea replays water 
imagery undermining human construction and enhances an imaginatively 
palpable moment, which is normally not striking, for it evolves 
slowly.  This element ties back to the shift from machine to hair, 
for it opens up the sense of time delivered by “all” folding into 
“wall”.  Division collapses between male, female, and life and death 
as the noun “kindling” develops into a process that delivers another 
noun suggesting progeneration in nature.  This as with the entire 
poem is informed by the female presence and now enfolds a sense of 
bringing forth the young: “kindling” as bequest or willed 
transference -- it is a significant development from the son 
traumatized by the image of the father posited as dark figure 
negating confrontation in being turned away to the garden fire.  This 
tight and understated meaning shows Burnside informing his sense of 
‘beholding’ as both reference point (as obligation to dwell) and to 




SIF represents an awakening from the dream state of MOT.  A detached 
and cinematic eye, which is not reducible to consciousness (or moral 
perspective), suggests that the lyricist has practised observing 
himself but now wishes to detach the self from observational agency 
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or dismantle the mental camera so as to witness the self and the 
other in the scene one composes and mediates.  It has strong 
resonance with “Home at Grasmere” and the constitutive psychology 
leading towards inclusive wholeness, a state realized through 
understanding the necessity that humanity can be completely realized 
within inhumanity (Kroeber “Home”). 
Gathering and modes of reconnection pronounce Burnside’s lyrical 
consciousness entering woods and rivers to enjoin the subterranean 
and deep impulse of life.  There is neither retreat nor sanctuary 
from these journeys; in their discoveries they suggest that the 
pastoral is no longer a symbol of simple reconciliation.  In SIF, 
there resides a post-modern vision of power in that there is no 
central discernable controllable locus.  In ANS Burnside journeys 
into the Fife heartland and coastal villages to bring the human 
element back into the frame yet the journey of love and the filter of 
pain saves the inner drama of the self from solipsism or central 
union.  ANS forwards transport above residence.  This places the ego 
within the perspective of a community of human beings in turn 
emphasizing the difference between our social selves and how we are 
defined by love, where in the latter mode the factual is displaced by 
mystery and we are offered a “disinterested invocation” that is part 
of “self-renewing” (Burnside “Strong Words” 261). 
This chapter has outlined dependency upon others and the level of 
human concern for others.  How these relate to notions of recovery 
may differentiate the human from other beings but does not separate 
human existence from the world at large.  In identifying the change 
from MOT’s crepuscular mind while turning towards the children who 
are killed in SIF, one can read their literal abductions (and their 
metaphoric weight as lost primary sensibilities and revelations) to 
discover Burnside revisiting imperfect enlightenment but set within a 
context that denies the presence of God in nature’s violence.  This 
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works to shun a Manichean reading of (moral) experience while also 
emphasizing particular human attributes of the murderers and rapists; 
moreover, the notion of ethical good as absolute in theory is 
challenged by good and evil together in practice as a means not to 
underestimate nor obscure the infinite distribution of forces in the 
world.  In turn, this brings into relief man’s originality and the 
law.  Later, in ANS, the investigation of life is not made via 
categories of “religion, politics and sociology”, but as Redmond has 
suggested, through ignoring these counters (11).  Thus, the focus on 
the human expands into a vision of the creativity of the human 
spirit, and how we continue to pair, make homes, and acknowledge 
tensions created by these pacts.  I read this collection outplaying 
Burnside’s theme of living as “the tragedy of attachment [that is] an 
essential and beautifully human predicament” (“Iona” 22, 23): an 
aspect which love clarifies as the contours of human existence but 
must negotiate the undertow of violence or discrimination therein.  
While the title poem suggests further contemplation behind life’s 
mechanisms, these ideas are (amongst others) wrapped into a 
conceptual container of the domestic arrangement, partnerships, and 
solitude to bring into relief the frustrations and distractions of 
the inhabited and relational world.  It is from here that Burnside 




TAD represents the constitutive psychology of community via the 
(historically) inclusive poetics of place offering an emergent 
discovery of self.  A Wordsworthian context accounts for this 
yet a richer textual ecology including Scottish and American 
influences scaffolds a reading of Burnside’s empirical and 
speculative itinerant wanderings driven by understated 
contemplation of transhumance and permanence.  This combination 
suggests the need to commute involvement beyond phenomenological 
perception resolved into impressions or ideas, yet poetic 
limitations in consciousness being reduced, in part, to language 




TAD provides further insight into how Burnside’s poetic forms and 
patterning drive his creative engagement with home, most especially 
with fluid and expansive modalities, both striking and remarkable in 
the lead poem “Ports”.  David Morley‘s reading of GS indicates a new 
direction in Burnside’s attention to “networks of panic and longing 
[“Ny-Hellsund: ‘6: Going Back’” 12]” alongside “scavenger warmth / 
emerging from the cold [“By Pittenweem: ‘V: Beginning’” 43-44]”.  
These are too easily confined to separate realms labelled human and 
animal, the cognitive and the intuitive -- I am not equating mental 
ecology with epistemology, and physical ecology with ontology, here, 
but am suggesting that a lack of foundational distinction between 
mental and physical is of interest to Burnside (cf. Merleau Ponty, 
Bateson).  In extension to my critical interpretation of Burnside’s 
earlier poetry, this non-opposition infused with Lawrentian 
theological negative capability underpins identity derived from an 
ecological nexus of history and place.  It is the attempt to 
reconcile wholeness with localized textures.  The sensibility I map 
here has dark and light combined, and negates the utopian, 
Zoroastrian prevailing of light: the “severity of outlook” in Robert 
Creeley, Frost, Dickinson, and Williams (Kleinzahler) therefore, is 
echoed in Burnside’s “black in the green” (“Fields” 1: 43), which is 
a modernized version of Wordsworth “not dreaming of muffled life” 
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(“Home At Grasmere” (conceived as Book 1 of The Recluse) 428).48 
However, within this realm of neutral humanism the poetry begins 
to problematize stance in terms of form and content, setting itself 
up to undermine its objectives as a form of dispelling the singularly 
anthropogenic.  The latter poem that Morley chooses above, uses the 
metaphor of low temperature for an insecure home frontier (due to 
interchangeable identities), emphasized by being “not really bound to 
this place, / but here by choice: / pledged to the first thaw” (1: 
26-28) an oscillation rescued into mutability by another force 
(“private use” 32)/  This could denote poetic construction and 
vagrancy in the logos while also being comforted by mutability.  I 
read this recalling Wordsworth’s “cold” of the “Realities of Life” 
that are “more bountiful than hope” (Home 54, 58).  Recognizing this 
as being situated between the faith in imagination and the faith in 
world is the most vital and necessary starting point for 
understanding this aesthetic. 
Morley is correct to view the presentation of these themes under 
an original aspect -- the post-dwelling trilogy forms.  However, to 
argue that GS indicates the inexactness of Burnside’s deployment of 
language as something new (88) is incorrect: I have viewed this 
within negative poetics as an issue of great importance following MOT 
and am arguing that this reaches a particular importance in the 
phenomenological language of TLT.  Yet here, in TAD, the Romantic 
notion of a self transparent to self and dependant upon language that 
Burnside has wrestled with since FD, is implicit (yet understated) in 
the poet’s attention to the made lyric in relation to human practice 
and involvement.  The ecocritical need to explicate kinship, 
husbandship, and sustainability are terms that resonate on the 
periphery of Burnside’s consideration of human techne, an analogon to 
                         
48 All references to “Home At Grasmere” follow Darlington’s editorial 
to MS.B.  Hereafter referenced as Home. 
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“human habitations, human modifications of terrain” in TAD (Funk 
interview 20) -- keynotes that are reflected in the four framework 
poems “Ports”, “Fields”, “Settlements” and “Roads”, stipulated as 
“the four main elements of human dwelling: shelter, cultivation / 
agriculture, community and journeying”.  How these ideas translate 
into poetry and how these ideas resonate with the reader can be seen 
in the example of “Fields”, which I use as a template for reading the 
collection as a whole. 
 
but all I found in there was mould and spoor 
where something had crept away 
          to feed 
          or die 
or all I can tell 
     though for years I have sat up late 
and thought of something more 
         some half-seen thing 
the pull of the withheld 
        the foreign joy 
I tasted that one afternoon 
       and left behind 
when I made my way back down the hill 
with the known world about me. (“Fields” IV: 63-76) 
 
The twelfth poem of twenty-three is an absolute centre of Burnside’s 
poetic mark in this collection.  The figure is expectant of change 
following the burial of his father, but is only “gifted with absence” 
(61).  The persona in the past is not offered anything more 
verifiable in his freedom than mould and spoor contrasted to the 
detached, reflective self that has slow reckoning and affords space 
to go beyond the record of experience to offer valuation of 
experience.  I argue that the poetics of absence is one of 
reintegration in Burnside, as forwarding by replaying the moment of 
experience.  It instances the resultant effect of Burnside’s 
constructivist and self-referential poetic, regardless of the 
detrimental effects this might have upon heightened poetic 
consciousness it attempts to instil this self-consciousness within 
the floating poetic.  Moreover, “the pull of the withheld” is the 
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Lutheran shroud of the poem “Settlements” and the Heideggerian 
concealment of world and divine as that which offers the true quest 
where the science of dwelling is discovery, and thus estrangement 
from what is already known.  An emphasis on source seems to 
contradict madeness; however, while the emphasis on the body over the 
soul suggests traces of life in decay (mould) and tracks (spoor), 
these elements are a single path connoting “loose” and “friable” 
earth (OED) symbolic of the necessary historicity of human life which 
is means to promote that which is ripe for further cultivation.  It 
is the theme highlighted by labour in the gardens (section 2 and 3) 
and denotes something operating beyond and yet within all 
contingency. 
The section quoted begins with the sense of vision “immers[ing]” 
(7) world and brings the reader back to an engagement with 
Wordsworthian natural spontaneity for speech, yet promoting 
stuttering or jagged contemplation as accentuated by the broken 
lines, unsettled pauses in thought and image (“All I can tell” echoes 
with “I can’t recall” (1: 66)), and uncertain recognitions within the 
deployment of alternatives.  There is consonance with Wordsworth’s 
imprecision (“cannot”, “seemed”, Home 3, 35,) suggesting the need to 
take inspiration yet not dependency from memory and history: it is 
forgetfulness that raises an anchor and beautifies the soul (386-87).  
Furthermore, “or” is used thirteen times in the poem; in this section 
it resonates with “foreign” and in its mirrored expansive opening 
section (framing the two dense middle sections) it bleeds into 
“chore” to promote the domestic procedure and the observance of human 
integration into larger (alienated) patterns.  What it means to 
present this rich emotional feeling in words without the naked 
dignity of simplicity in the post-Wordsworthian lyric suggests to the 
critical reader how the poetic medium can, if at all within a lexis 
of uncertainty, connect to the creative source of life as a means to 
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"renaturalize human sentiment" (Harrison Forests 157) a predicament 
heightened by constructionist poetics.  The coexistence of things in 
the poet's mind can be seen in discord, “to feed / or die” 
(Burnside), but as man takes over the creative process his attempt to 
secure living energy beyond the finitude of language is assisted only 
in the advancing of possibility -- this is the only naturalizing that 
can take place.  It is thus that Burnside’s use of the conjunction 
can be viewed rhyming deliberately with “spoor” to suggest a route 
where the ineffable “something” is not given a noun but provided with 
many potential possibilities, the unnamed signified imbued with 
multiple aspects delivered through the conjunction.  These 
possibilities lie within the mind’s conception of world and its 
fleeting moments of anchorage.  It is Burnside’s awareness of 
phenomenology here -- that which is critiqued as something purely 
subjective and lacking democratic access without context, as in the 
use of the metaphor of transcendence and isolation resting above the 
“known world” -- that suggests contradictions within this poetic 
‘centring’.  The poet and poem dwell in the logos but that is a site 
of estrangement itself from the transitory quickness of mind in the 
temporal mood: a motif that resonates with the larger human condition 
that we inhabit estrangement when we stay in one place (Harrison 
Forests 265). 
This intelligence within the poem is a healthy extrapolation of 
the fact that the one constant is change, an incursion on our non-
relativist values greeted most tenderly and skilfully with circular 
merging and complex echoes in this poem.  The voice of “Fields” is an 
amalgam of biological mirrors, which not unlike Kroeber’s 
Wordsworthian “interanimations of memories and prophetic intuitions” 
(Ecological 55) instances poetics and identity driven through 
correlation of the living voice with the dead, where “a new life 
burrows free”, (Burnside 4: 58) half-seen yet within “the pull of the 
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withheld”.  It suggests that consciousness is only partly reduced to 
world but what is beyond the linguistic?  I have spoken of a 
structure that undermines itself or willingly fails to live up to its 
expectations, and I have spoken of absence, the withheld, 
possibilities, and estrangement through what is made.  This poem 
offers itself as an example of Burnside’s anti-poetic, where the 
foregrounding of these abstract notions through the poem (but only in 
its relations between stanza, section, volume and oeuvre, rather than 
by image, metaphor, or self-contained poetic arc) suggests that the 
greater poeisis is not operating in “Fields” but that the poem is a 
centre as much as it is a vortex and an absent nexus: “Fields” is an 
unfinished and open space for the poet’s and reader’s muse to gather 
resources and create relations, an affordance for the contingent and 
futurity, the site of our fictions.  Wholeness, therefore, is 
temporal and spatial. 
This version of creative evolution, while not a direct denotation 
of pantheism, is reminiscent of Burnside’s idea of “soul energy” 
(“Iona” 23) reminding new readers of Wordsworth (and as suggested by 
my reading of Stevens as inspirational figure to Burnside) by 
connecting the poetics back to a co-creative Orphic poet, “Working 
but in alliance with the works / Which it beholds” (The Prelude 2: 
274-5).  In “Fields” I read this being an alliance of culture and 
nature resulting in the poem offering movement, fluidity, and 
alienation from stations of thought paradoxically enveloped in a 
compressed lyric that desires larger unfolding and openness than the 
human can offer alone.49 
In Home Wordsworth constructs a lyric that forwards the dynamic 
mutability of mind and world, and embraces the “guardianship” (31) of 
                         
49 Wordsworth’s use of “behold” River Duddon Sonnet 32 (11) is given 
terms of fluidity over “lingering” (2) within earth that is “opened” 
(10) and seen from a particular sense of “afar” (11). 
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the other, as both contentment with one’s lot and an accommodation of 
discord.  It is the poetics of re-integration conceived as “Something 
that makes this individual Spot” (164), the human relation to land 
within the poetic mind.  The “willed drive to make his life march in 
step with his art” (Sharrock 167) is achieved by the poet forwarding 
how humans can be stirred by the “motions” (Wordsworth Home 25) of 
the place within its “bounds” (42) i.e. “psychic freedom... 
assimilated into an awareness of the flow of time” (Kroeber “Home” 
133).  The boundary that is alive to its internal history instances 
“plenitude [as] a function -– paradoxically -– of the Vale’s 
limitations” (Kroeber Ecological 54) in Wordsworth; it is attained 
through “an act / Of reason”, an historic consciousness that is 
“without restraint” (Home 33).  The mind that can see clearly and 
commute “inherent things from casual / What is fixed from fleeting” 
(131-32) offers a mirroring of human and nature that can “lift the 
animal being” (673) without recourse to a naïve pastoralism but 
enters “the grounding of sensory experience in conscious wholeness of 
being” (Kroeber Ecological 54).  One can read this influence 
Burnside’s poetics. 
 
I.A. The Attempt at an Ecological Voice 
 
Burnside’s return to Scotland after twenty-eight years charges TAD 
with what W. N. Herbert has praised as the Scottish spiritual psyche 
and meditative eulogy offering the thought that “Culture grows 
through the slow interaction of a sensibility with a location and its 
people” (“Coast”).  To what level of accuracy human perception can 
act as an exact witness to the world’s changes highlights the intense 
pressure that the phenomenological and ecopoetic lexicons operate 
under.  Moreover, the question Morley pronounces, “What is the nature 
of a dwelling made of those particles called words?” (87), appears to 
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be the essence of the period between 2000 and 2006.  In this period, 
Burnside’s poetry takes particular caution to acknowledge the 
presuppositions that phenomenological poetics exploits and is 
dependant upon.  Much like Wordsworth, Burnside posits that telling 
and listening are by necessity part of the greater relation that is 
man’s ‘throwness’ or comportment to world: “strangers” (Wordsworth 
Home 34) dispossessed in the logos but intersubjectively aligned.  
Aligned to the fact that disowning is balanced by the sustenance of 
creative interplay.  Sharing place and history is something that is 
achieved not by having nature presented before one, but realized as 
Wordsworth says, “when I move” (995), something that reads unity 
within dynamics and beyond perceptual realities by drawing from the 
temporal and historical constitutive psychology of community 
“liberat[ing] man” from “perceptual responsiveness” (Kroeber 140). 
   
II. Dwelling 
 
Adorno argued that dwelling in the twentieth century is impossible; 
that the modern house disconnects man from his environment and that 
the best mode of conduct is “an uncommitted, suspended one” (“Refuge 
for the Homeless” Minima 39).  In the context of possession and 
consumer culture Adorno notes that it is “part of morality not to be 
at home in one’s home” and that man has lost “the principle of... 
limitation”.  How one is to disregard things and yet care for the 
world and how man can be reconciled to a form of alienation as a form 
of limitation upon and clarification of the human, is the Judaeo-
Christian dwelling plight written in terms of a revised virtue 
ethics.  Burnside faces this head on.  In TAD, life is not written as 
the satisfaction of desire but an acknowledgement of ever moving 
temporal aspiration where the integrity of solitude meets the 
compromise of belonging, and beyond Wordsworth’s understanding of 
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discord as completeness within the sanctuary of home, any fixed 
station is viewed in tension with the lure of escape. 
 
II.A. Ecologies of Home 
 
Seamus Heaney’s retreat to County Wicklow in 1972 was one of the most 
significant journeys of an Irish or British poet of the last century.  
Burnside’s move to Anstruther in 1994, while less easily politicized, 
is one that not only motivates his non-nationalist and non-
regionalist stance (“Standards”; Dosa interview 17) but emphasises 
his position that flatly refuses to deploy the metaphor of the fabric 
of the Scottish nation, yet also offers land ownership as key to 
self-determination (“Parliament”; Dosa interview 15, 17) and makes an 
identification between Celtic and American cultures above ideas of 
Scottishness (McGonigal Water 236-7).  Burnside negates an anchoring 
in the British tradition by turning to Robert Frost and American 
ideas of home to deliver his particular conceptualization of place in 
TGN, extended in the deployment of John Donne’s metaphysical metaphor 
of the exploration of America in “Varieties of Religious Experience” 
in GS.  However, an asylum culture in TAD that continues to press 
upon Burnside’s poetry leads from a fresh engagement with Wordsworth, 
which needs unravelling. 
 
II.A.1. Wordsworth and Stevens 
 
While Bate aligns Burnside to Stevens for his resistance to project 
upon the inanimate and his persistence in conceiving the material 
foundation of world as sacred (“Eco Laurels”), Karl Kroeber dispenses 
with any correlation between Stevens and his Romantic forbear on an 
aesthetic level, the supreme artifice of fiction being “finally, 
foreign to Wordsworth’s ecological-anthropological enterprise” 
(Ecological 61).  Before I move into a consideration of Wordsworth’s 
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return to Grasmere to precede my reading of Burnside, a little 
clarification and reminder of this thesis’ foundation is required and 
should be read as paramount.  The British Romantics read by Bate and 
Kroeber have three particular qualities: (i) imaginative 
subjectivity, where thoughts are constitutive of emotions and the 
capacity for simultaneous joy and suffering shapes poetic approaches 
to subjects; (ii) attention to need, desire, independence, and 
society as degrees of mutually constitutive psychology, which attunes 
poetic approaches toward holism in terms of an attention to 
individual elements, reads each contributor involved as part of a 
historically constituted state of affairs and therefore as a 
responsible agent: Burnside has called this “narrative interplay” 
(“The Wonder of Daylight” 60) and it has resonance with Romantic 
civic preoccupation where actions have specific consequences, and 
resonance with ecosystem integrity derived from individuated 
organisms; (iii) the awareness of this poetic sensibility in contrast 
to a rational and impersonal industrialization inherent to Romantic 
representations of identity.  Burnside is clearly aware of this.  The 
pitfall in extending the concerns of mind into a solipsistic or 
forgetful project of emancipation in the post-industrial age has been 
clarified: 
 
Romanticism is probably dangerous for someone like me.  My 
recent poetry has a sense of the sacramental, an affirmation of 
transient physical being, but with nothing transcended (Hopkin 
interview). 
 
Speaking with TAD and TLT in mind, Burnside identifies materialism 
antagonistic to Platonism and pietism charged against Romantic 
Idealism while also pitching his work against criticism that has 
identified Romanticism as forwarding the private consciousness as 
distinct from phenomena.  For Burnside and Wordsworth consciousness 
and phenomena are inter-relational, the dynamic between the two 
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constitutes a sense of home and the site of the soul. 
One can read Wordsworth’s use of the wind and the clouds in Home -
- symbols of the imagination and identity carried and infused by a 
larger force -– bringing the human into relief but not positing human 
consciousness or dwelling as fixed and entirely separate from nature.  
Being distinct from the natural elements and independent from the 
wind and yet through imaginative (and historic) acquaintances, Home 
is where discord is recorded and accounted for, much like commonness 
is seen as complete in the poem.  It is where human technology is 
both apart from the fluid, organic world, and is configured 
rationally to enable one to read of our motional enclosure in 
fellowship, albeit if that is “remembrance of a jarring world” 
(Wordsworth 836), a “neutral exposition” (Sharrock 168) and 
acceptance of discordance in itself.  This edge provides the poet 
with an understanding of nature and mind as mutable, derived from the 
evolving interaction between humans and environments.  This is where 
Burnside and Wordsworth meet, but there is also America. 
 
Tell me, Ramon Fernandez, tell me, if you know 
Why when the singing ended and we turned 
Toward the town, tell why the glassy lights, 
The lights in the fishing boards at anchor there, 
As the night descended, tilting in the air, 
Mastered the night and portioned out the sea, 
Fixing emblazoned zones and fiery poles, 
Arranging, deepening, enchanting night.  (“The Idea of Order at 
Key West” 44-51) 
 
Stevens’ poem looks for more “ghostlier demarcations” (56) of the 
scene than those driven by human technologies of mastery and fixing: 
he wishes for the mirror over the lamp.  Stevens’ understanding comes 
from dispossession and from knowledge of the cost and the pragmatic 
role of human mediation and artifice.  The posed question is a plea 
for a non-theoretical and non-appropriative representation of the 
referent reduced to the context for the human song.  It is 
Bristow 223 
underwritten by irony and the principle that to be certain 
(fundamental) is to be incorrect.  Burnside reconsiders this via the 
light trap -- how world appears to mind: 
 
In daylight it would seem 
almost absurd: 
too sentimental 
      gauche 
        inaccurate 
a weekend sailor’s image of the sea 
 
but now 
  as snow descends into the rings 
of torchlight 
    and the sky above the harbour 
darkens 
  it is only what it seems. (“Ports” 3: 89-100) 
 
One notes an inquiry into labour in this collection, although 
qualified in this early instance suggesting elevation of thorough, 
vocational work.  The boat named “Serenity” epitomizes our 
constructed sense of home born from desire and loss, while reflecting 
upon how personal psychology is representative of a larger mass; for 
Kroeber, that is to acknowledge “how we may live discoveringly” 
(Ecological 81).  The image arrives at the end of a poem concerned 
with the endurance of life over this enjoyment and with how we fit 
into the natural scheme of things, perhaps overemphasized by 
“inaccura[cy]” of the reporting faculty.  Here, the need to discover 
within the mind is also unmistakably matched to Stevens and the 
desire to live in the spirit as one that attempts to marry what 
“seems” to being, or to what “is”. 
 
II.A.2. Grasmere at Home 
 
John Kerrigan finds three phases in Wordsworth’s sonnets: (i) a 
troubled temporality where clouded vales offer him no lodging in 
“transient and unattainable dwellings” (47) that signify the 
“unhomeliness of human homes” (48); (ii) the restrained orbicular 
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mode where graveyards provide his “last Central Home” (“Tuft of 
Primroses” 1808), an immutability I have touched upon in the period 
of writing upon epitaphs; and (iii) the latter phase, 1814-1850, of 
“heavenly dwelling...detached from that web of worldly circumstance” 
(51).  The first reemphasizes the New Testament claim that 
homelessness is man’s proper state.  Kerrigan cites the book of 
Matthew and it is in Matt. 8.20 that Jesus remarks that unlike the 
foxes and birds, man has nowhere to rest.  This restlessness coupled 
to the notion of letting only the spiritually dead bury their dead 
families (8.22) promotes this chapter as one considering both the 
cost and testing of discipleship and as one offering an extreme 
poverty.  This contrasts with the latter phase of Wordsworth’s 
sonnets losing the imaginative grasp and lending themselves to 
abstraction.  It is thus that the middle phase is most relevant to 
TAD and my reading sustains the Worsworthian impulse identified 
earlier, the epitaphic consciousness born from a sense of history 
that infuses the ‘I’ into the site of cognition.50 
                         
50 The voice of Home is constructed in threefold: (i) the 
Wordsworthian sense of (personal) history and return (to place), 
forwarded as frame in the opening passage and as unity across first 
and third person, subjective and objective; (ii) the phenomenological 
experience reflected in nature, as with the fast and swirling passage 
on birds (278-301) offering coiled dynamism in world that evokes and 
is mirrored by an orbital consciousness where the human impulse can 
construct “An art, a music, and a stream of words / That shall be 
life” (621-22); and (iii) the balanced construction of universal 
tensions or combinations by interweaving oppositions.  These are 
resident in the dark and light passages, e.g. difficult snow (216-
239), darkness (257-277), and the missing swans (322-357) coupled to 
Dorothy and William as domestic pairing, while also resident in the 
domination of the historic tales that inject feelings into the poetry 
in the second half of the poem.  These instil how discoveringly and 
responsively “persons [abide] like the place” (404).  The co-creative 
poetics of concert is what Kroeber calls “an ecological unity” and 
“rhythmic continuity” (“Home” 132).  The tales are the embodiment of 
the human history of the locus; through a promotion of both “Labour” 
(Wordsworth Home 440) as integrated technique of the human, and the 
sense of faith pushing through hard times, they are symbolic of 
Wordsworth’s sense of intimacy “which lay within our reach” (201) in 
its earthly, animated, and married world: that which the human is “in 
the midst of” (236).  This is particularly accentuated in the tales 
that take tension and complementation as subject and form where the 
Bristow 225 
Kroeber’s sense of ‘holiness’ as constitutive psychology derives 
from Wordsworth’s emphasis on inclusive wholeness, this comes from 
dwelling in mind, resting in thought as well as building a home: 
 
I forgot 
My haste, for hasty had my footsteps been. (Home 6-7)51 
 
Kroeber reads this as more complex than a substitute for religious 
experience (Ecological 53).  The human can play within the greater 
“intercourse of knowledge” (Wordsworth Home 756), promote growth as 
the true constant (over change), and can act out figures within the 
dynamic settlement of society, “deliberately fitting oneself into a 
natural organization consciously discerned and appreciated” (Kroeber 
                                                                      
Wordsworthian fusing of disparate tales of union and breakdown is a 
creative collocation of history and discord (over ornamentation and 
resolution), concert with the motion of the place in Home, “the 
interplay between the poet’s inner, imaginative life and his 
sensations”, Kroeber argues, “his impressions of external realities 
in the circumambient vale” (“Home” 133). 
51 I read two significant late interjections during 1812-1814, when 
Wordsworth reconstituted ideas afresh in resumption of his work on 
the abandoned text (Wordsworth Home 25).  Before Wordsworth makes the 
claim of fitting world to mind in the prospectus, he adds a plea to 
his addressee and a qualification to his imagined ideal state: 
“Forgive me” (MS.D 692) is an acknowledgement of his intense craft 
isolating him from his partner.  Home considers craft while 
contemplating that the world has offered itself to him as material 
for more than history or fiction; it states that these paradisiacal 
neighbours, once considered “of old / In the deep ocean” (MS.B 997-
8), become like those “of old / Sought in the Atlantic Main” (MS.D 
801-802).  MS.D represents a deepening of his position in “Tintern 
Abbey” with the poet of his early forties having more than twenty 
years to reflect on the beginning of the French Revolution (1789) and 
thirty years of consideration of the end of the American War of 
Independence (1783).  The emphasis on America here (MS.D) suggests an 
unrealized ideal with greater potential, the source for his 
imagination in social and political idealism coming from a chief 
principle without the vale.  However, I choose MS.B over MS.D for the 
following reasons: (i) the opening in first person over third person 
emphasizes “Place” over “Station” (MS.B 17, cf. MS.D 17); (ii) 
solitude is his possession (MS.B 83) rather than an invitation of 
nature (MS.D 71); (iii) while both manuscripts state that the 
protagonist “cannot take possession of the sky” (MS.B 288, cf. MS.D 
199) the former engenders attention that can “Rest” (MS.B 105) rather 
than “Fix” (MS.D 105).  Respectively: geography over mind; willed 
involvement not passivity or repose; gentle possession over unethical 
enframing.  This trajectory qualifies Wordsworth’s term “Mount with a 
thoughtless impulse” (MS.B 289, MS.D 200). 
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“Home” 135), lacking concern of cultural contamination to a degree in 
its acceptance of the historical record as continuity of man’s 
creative accounts. 
In ANS, readers came to a new understanding of “quick” as the 
purchase of self outside possession and as lyrical allusion to the 
endowment of a larger life than singularity affords -- either that 
singularity of the isolated individual, or the derealization of 
external world via poetic singularity.  Here, Wordsworth commutes 
similar potential in the individual spirit, something realized 
through the combined efforts of integration with place and 




Breathe in the air of fellow-suffering 
Dreadless (448-50) 
 
Labour marries human to the “native element” (451) and as a 
reflection on craft suggests re-integration of “other solitudes” 
(459), the consolidation and unity of historic records of place as 
part of how we fit into the nature: an emphasis on the prize within 
(166), which understands suffering within the context of community 
and withholding. 
Wordsworth’s move in December of 1799 into Dove Cottage, Grasmere, 
until 1808, for Bate, was a claim to home if read via Home as a 
particular dominion derived outwith possession (Romantic 101-2): an 
aesthetic between “a naturalized ‘dwelling poem’ and an ‘alienated’ 
prospect poem” (103).  Contrast Burnside: 
 
I still can’t resist the girls on the promenade 
walking the front in lipstick and brand-new hairdos 
the boys from the caravan parks come out 
to stand in the bars all night 
         like their father’s ghosts 
sullen and proud 
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    and as lost in the world they inherit 
as stray dogs 
        or mink 
 
and forgive me 
     that I cannot leave or stay 
that I’m only a moment away 
       from being unseen 
 
forgive me 
     being not the man I seem 
not lost or found 
     but somewhere in between. (“Roads” 5: 94-110) 
  
This is not the human quashed by temptation but it is a figure of the 
poet who has habits and recollections that dispute and anchor his 
wandering impulse, resonating with the claim that “I’ve never really 
mastered coming home” (86), that is disowning an idea of final 
salvation.  “In between”, unhyphenated, deconstructs the sense of an 
interval and intermediate space or time, potentially suggesting 
intervention more than temporality.  It is tentative.  The voice is 
aware of the danger of slipping into a linguistic frame where “being” 
becomes unseen once more, while simultaneously asserting contemporary 
purchase through experiences imaginable to a wide audience of urban 
dwellers.  The wholeness of the local as a version of Wordsworthian 
holiness, in-between Bate’s two states, is under consideration in my 
reading of TAD and Burnside’s fossil record of cultural memory. 
 
II.B. Post-Pastoral Syncretism 
 
William McTaggart’s double-bind is the arrival and preaching of St 
Columba and the departure of Scots to the Americas,  witnessed in The 
Coming of St. Columba (1897, National Gallery of Scotland, Edinburgh) 
and The Sailing of the Emigrant Ship (1897, National Gallery of 
Scotland, Edinburgh).  It brings together the events of 1,300 years 
separation to consider spiritual intervention and the creation of 
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Celtic civilisation lost to material plundering.52  I find this 
important to the Scottish notion of asylum as understood by the 
artist Will Maclean who is a significant presence in Burnside’s 
collection.  His extension of McTaggart’s project within these terms 
enables a foothold on Burnside’s poem “The Unprovable Fact: A Tayside 
Inventory” that emphasizes the cultural psyche that tempers TAD.  His 
collaboration with Burnside shows how both artisans can be seen 
responding to the post-World War Two poets, Iain Crichton-Smith, 
Sorley MacLean, and George Mackay Brown and their concentration on a 
local and particular place mindful of the national and international 
political landscape, local texture reconciled to wholeness.53 
Sorley MacLean’s poetic speaker has been read as an interior 
debater of fragmentation drawn from a Presbyterian-Marxist conflict 
and Scottish resolution to scientific rationalism in confrontation 
with mystery (Gifford Green 72-93), rather than misunderstood as the 
mediation of a transcendent ordering power beyond human 
understanding.  Heaney reads this better by understanding what Terry 
Gifford has termed the “history of struggle, which has a continuity 
in the present” in place-naming evoking history on the scale of 
visionary objectivity (Pastoral 108).  Heaney calls this “high 
romantic voltage” (“Introduction” 1) twinned with modern guilt or “a 
self-castigating intelligence” (7); a sensibility that he views in 
Hugh MacDiarmid, Frost and Stevens (“Bog”).  It is how limitation (of 
human) leads to exaltation (of world) without dispelling 
subjectivity.  As with Burnside’s extension to Wordsworthian craft it 
understands how pathos derived from relationships in the mature being 
is not a substitute for the unthinking, irresponsible joys of 
                         
52 I follow Errington’s dates.  See Lindsay Errington, William 
McTaggart 1835-1910 (1989). 
53 See Louisa Gairn, “Aspects of Modern Scottish Literature and 
Ecological Thought,” (2005).  I would add Norman MacCaig (1910-1996) 
to this antecedence. 
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childhood that disappear.  It is a continuation of spiritual 
presence, how sorrow of the “emotional geography” leads to “spiritual 
geology” (Heaney “Introduction” 4).54 
From McTaggart to Sorely MacLean, Scots consider how fragile and 
miraculous memory and evocation are in exactly the frame outlined by 
Heaney.  Will Maclean’s found object art in Driftworks connects at a 
very deep level with Burnside’s poetics in “The Unprovable Fact: A 
Tayside Inventory”.  There the worldview of matter is not at one with 
geometrical intensity but is like artistry that has been articulated 
in ecological terms by Garrard: an historical portal whose residual 
nature provides access to lost cultures and opens new views on the 
present self (“Heidegger”).  Burnside’s poems appropriate this 
mechanism for apocalyptic vigour.  The death-toll of man’s 
technological deployment is evoked in Maclean inserting three ghostly 
hooded fishermen within the ‘mediciners’ section of the illustrated 
poem.  The ‘fishers’ identities are fused to gulls’ skulls, the 
skeletal fish-men inserted to comment upon the collapse of fishing 
communities and their unrelenting social consequences rather than a 
celebration of modern science.  These three figures are echoed in the 
illustration to ‘surveyors’ where three angels oversee the earth.  
The middle figure holds a globe scarred with cartographic reference 
points.  As a symbol of the model of positivist philosophy, or bad 
science, which either “deny or repress the existence of subjective 
space, intersubjective space, or ‘human’ space and phenomenologically 
objective space” (Priest 7), the exposed vanishing points of humanist 
Newtonian cosmic geometry (the lines of longitude and latitude) 
destroy eternity through taxonomy and dissection.  By contrast, it 
                         
54 I refer readers to Coleridge’s reflections on Wordsworth’s 
immortality ode, in Biographia Literaria (1817) 1:58, in conjunction 
with the reflections in chapter fourteen.  See Kathleen M. Wheeler’s 
Sources Process and Methods in Coleridge’s Biographia Literaria, 
1980. 
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recalls Burnside’s version of the shell, the inhabited pebble that 
outstrips geometrical vision (Bachelard 47) and is, in Williams 
words, neither imprisoned nor “impressed by the ‘laboratory’” (“Deep 
Religious Faith” 50-51, The Desert Music, 1954). 
Through Maclean a dark and indelible surreal narrative turns the 
age of discovery into an agent of homelessness.  How this relates to 
spiritual dwelling could be read through engagement with Wordsworth 
but I would like to universalize this by extrapolating fresh insight 
through Moore and Heidegger.  For the latter, the biggest devaluation 
of spiritual thinking is not the positing of God as ‘unknowable’ or 
his existence as ‘unprovable’ but by those whose posit faith in God 
as the highest value without having considered Being fully (Question 
105).  For Burnside and Will Maclean, to work from the concept of the 
unprovable is to negate unspirited negative poetics.  The 
authoritative light posited by Burnside throughout the dwelling 
trilogy is Wordsworthian immanence of subjectivity or intersubjective 
and historically conceived values, offered through the singular point 
of view in “The Unprovable Fact: A Tayside Inventory”.  Perspectives 
across bodies of men from explorers to husbandmen promote progression 
towards intimacy and feeling from detachment and objectivity in this 
poem.  The array of labourers evokes the environmental understanding 
in “The Valley Plan of Civilisation” (1925) by Patrick Geddes55.  
While harnessing the movement index (i.e. dynamics and freedom) that 
Geddes gives to landsman and sea-farer before being armed, Burnside 
is keener to extend this out of the contemplation driven by social 
sciences and biology to resist the frame of Scottish particularity.  
One is asked to withdraw a little. 
 
 
                         
55 Patrick Geddes, Spokesman for Man and the Environment, ed. 




Collocating the closing remarks made by Heidegger in “Building 
Dwelling Thinking” to the Darmstadt symposium on “Man and space” in 
August, 1951, beside the final lines of Marianne Moore’s response to 
a gift from Elizabeth Bishop in February, 1940, transposes these 
texts and forwards a modernized single move reminiscent of 
Wordsworth’s Home: that love should be considered if it is enough to 
secure us in respect to the dwelling plight.56   
Burnside reported that Moore was the first poet he read who 
inspired him to write poetry himself (“Dead Poets”); his use of her 
poem, “The Paper Nautilus”, regarding Bishop as protégé is the more 
poignant for the dedication of his volume to mentor and editor, Robin 
Robertson.  An idea of inheritance and forbearance as anxiety within 
the eternal recurrence of power struggles reconfigures the issue of 
tradition and individual talent.  However, the master-slave dialectic 
(the revolutionizing of modes of relation, the Marxian view of 
solidity that becomes unfixed) does not perfume the sanctuary of 
asylum in the poetry to the greatest degree -- a post-Romantic 
sensibility which resonates with ideas of nativeness, venerability, 
and promise of speciation owns this space. 
Burnside takes the closing lines to What Are Years (1941), Moore’s 
collection that meditates upon time, mortality, and eternity, through 
birds, animals, and speech, alongside poems upon restriction and 
possibility as signified by the title poem, which is an act of 
“willed control, not contingencies” (White Hadas 54).  Moore’s verse 
is renowned for its elaborate logical structures and tight-rope 
syllabic meters.  However, towards the end of “The Paper Nautilus” 
Moore shifts the pattern from syntactic linearity to spatial forms 
                         
56 See Moore Letters 381, 382, 388; and Bishop Letters 57-59, 89 and 
Prose 131.  “The Paper Nautilus” first published as “A Glass-Ribbed 
Nest” in The Kenyon Review, 2 (Summer 1940): 287-8. 
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sympathetically shadowed in the images that come towards the end 
(folds in the horse’s mane, wasp-nest detachments) and offers 
prescient counters for understanding poetic movement.  The poem moves 
toward openness in both form and metaphor: it distils space and 
freedom to offer a site in which the poet allows the other (her 
protégé) to emerge.  It resonates with the Heidegerrian ecopoetic (of 
earth concealed as other) that I have been outlining in this thesis.  
Moreover, the poeticized guardian-like pelagic, surface-dwelling 
cephalopod mollusc presents love and freedom, inner and outer, 
motherhood and artistic creation while also promoting identity 
founded in independence: I discover an American patriotism turned 
toward individuals and then toward the natural world.  This is 
wrought reciprocally by the unifying symbol of the paper nautilus, 
something complementary or relational to Wordsworthian accumulative 
integration.  Its significance cannot be understated. 
 
III. On the Way to the Poems 
 
Heidegger’s Darmstadt lecture, delivered at the height of a great 
housing shortage and upon the eve of the sixth anniversary of the 
bombing of Hiroshima, in the Hessen city severely damaged during the 
Second World War, is unmistakably a political statement on 
technology.  It confers that merely building more houses does not 
give thought to the primal condition of being human.  It is here that 
the poetic expression of architecture -- that of making place -- is 
considered as a means to situate the human i.e. give grounding and 
meaningful context as an ethos or domain out of which things appear 
or are made possible.  As an applied and relational version of 
Wordsworthian meaning where the topographic and bodily enfold (over 
the absolute and relative) it could be termed ‘emplacement’ if it 
involved what Heidegger insists that we have nothing but: history, 
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time, and language.  These three causal operators are given free play 
in Burnside’s four hub poems: “Ports”, “Settlements”, “Fields”, and 
“Roads”.  The poems instigate my analysis and highlight my emphasis 
throughout this thesis on technique as a means to show inclusivity 




The lead poem to the collection names two boats discovered by the 
wandering poet, Research and Serenity, which predicate the themes of 
discovery and the notion of satisfaction or emotive settlement.  
These names indicate that the poetry draws from a two-fold 
consideration of whether (i) interfaces between these two realms are 
necessary, and (ii) which direction dependency runs between them.  
These are not resolved in the poems but are coexistent, as in 
Kroeber’s identification of living “discoveringly” (Ecological 81).  
In Home Wordsworth brokered an ecological voice by interweaving 
disparate elements to offer the imagination to exercise creative 
synthesis while ensuring that each individual element is not equated 
but given clarification of its own singular contributive elements.  
Stevens understands that the sum of humanly created perceptual 
experiences overrides the Romantic reading of mind over world, in 
turn allowing a site for the “creative listener” (Voros 10).  In 
Burnside, the last boat is “what it seems”, a label “for something 
wanted / and believed” (“Ports” 100-102), thus desire and faith are 
indelibly linked by metaphor to the perceptual realm and to what is 
given.  The tension or interdependency watermarks this collection and 
Burnside’s consideration of labour, identity, and death give the 
relationship its first treatment here. 
The poem opens this volume with a mischievously playful double-
bound allusion to poetic heritage.  Dialogic imagination is given 
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over to the first three words homed in a separate line, “Our dwelling 
place” and lead to shoreline considerations of shelter, the sky, 
gulls, and the road behind the shore-facing houses of Burnside’s home 
in Cellardyke.  “Tolbooth Wynd” (10) ends the first sentence.  Its 
indistinct reference and common name for a customs office near 
docklands, however, opens up our thoughts on naming and on trade 
(metaphorical operators for ownership).  The first of these follows 
the background theme of self-reflexive mind and irony, the poem as 
construction.  Coming hard after “forecasts / gossip / theorems” (3-
5) it forwards the difficulty of linguistic foundation: “the choice 
of a single word to describe / the gun-metal grey of the sky”.  
Difficult, for the light from the firth is catching the play of birds 
and one word will not do justice to the creative dynamic presented to 
the poet who must move with world.  The painterly dark grey is 
indistinct and dull yet offers a tint of blue, the vertical symbolic 
colour of imagination (Hölderlin, Stevens, Bergson).  It needs 
dwelling upon due to the presentation or craftwork surrounding this 
line, overemphasizing the nomenclature and indicating an opening 
outwards, as with the Heideggerian emphasis available to Moore. 
“Gun-metal” is common enough for Elizabeth Bishop to use it twice 
in the first two tercets of “Roosters” (North and South, 1946), 
affecting rhyme and standing singularly in the middle of each unit: 
“in the gun-metal blue dark” (2), “the gun-metal blue window” (4).  
It is an unlikely appropriation for Burnside as A Cold Spring (1955) 
could provide better coastal inspiration in its title poem as could 
“At The Fishhouses” or “Cape Breton”.  However, the underdeveloped 
early morning light and vantage to the world opens Bishop’s poem 
about the cry of the natural world threading through the town and 
displacing individual perspective.  This evokes Wordsworth in our 
reading.  It is classified as “uncontrolled” and “traditional” (21) 
while also referring to claims to home and ways of living.  Bishop 
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paints the town as a dynamic mosaic of sounds not all visible to the 
inhabitants at all times; to Burnside it represents giving over a 
familiar and fixed world to the fluid soundscape of the unfamiliar, 
the movement of mind.  The spatial map provided by hearing informs 
cortical integration not the sensorial; it finds its ultimate 
expression in how “Old holy sculpture” (85) could capture the scene: 
home, work, and materials not used for scripture present themselves 
with assistance from the poet.  It is only now that the poet can turn 
to physical labour with craft linked to the primitive and the wayward 
having been indirectly forwarded. 
The salvage crew frame “Ports” in an effort to circularize and 
foreground constructed dwelling pitted against the vicissitudes of 
coastal life.  Leading from “Wynd” signalling a narrow street, the 
labourers’ workspace is seen in terms of restriction: “caged in a 
narrow scaffold” (1: 25), which is a well humoured negotiation of the 
claim that we harbour narrow minds and only a “handful” (13) of terms 
for our locatedness already widened by the expansion of Bishop’s 
compound.  Furthermore, the particular choice of “narrow” (25) 
recalls Wordsworth’s reading of Robert Burns in respect of homeliness 
(Kerrigan 65), which opens to a sense of sharing a space with the 
dead in Burnside’s allusion to graveyard poetry: “In ways the dead 
are placed / or how / they come to rest / I recognize myself” 
(“Fields” 1: 1-4).57  Giving a single line to “or how” works to 
foreground the conception of the experience over the personal record 
to offer possibility and multiplicity; but Burnside’s pun on 
“harbour” (3: 57) shifts noun to verb as a move from naming to 
happening.  It is no worse than Wordsworth’s use of “Stern” in Home 
(224-229).  Both contemplate space to indicate a mental disposition 
and physical world fitted into a single (ambivalent and mutable) 
                         
57 Also Burns “Elegy on Stella” and Wordsworth “Poems on the Naming 
of Places IV: ‘A Narrow Girdle of Rough Stones and Crags’”. 
Bristow 236 
directional word.  We are caught in a familiar battle of 
representation but with an increasing emphasis upon human material. 
The gun colour enables a contrast; it is not carried through to 
the workers who are matched to “the ghosts / of umber and blanc-de-
Chine” (26-27).  The earthy and ligneous brown suggesting shadow and 
protection is linked to its opposite (the stark, monochrome, ceramic 
artefacts) and betokens that the fictional consideration of home is 
mere synthesis and manipulation but is also co-creative with the 
changing world we witness.  Later, these figures are given a 
different order: 
 
They’re swaddled in orange or lime-green 
overalls 
       their faces sheathed 
in perspex: crouched to the blue 
of their torches 
           they are innocent 
of presence 
      flashes and sparks 
dancing in the blackness of their masks 
as if in emptiness. (3: 34-43) 
 
Far from idealizing their labour, this reading arrives after 
contemplation of death (underlined by the echo in “swaddled” to 
“Halloween”, MOT) and has specific notes of a critique beyond a 
countering of the sentimental.  This post-pastoral emphasis comes 
from a particular insight into the poetic reflection of the 
labourer’s task to protect things that are not enduring.  Underlined 
by the emphasis on light, the contingent compound of action and time 
within the praxis of husbandmen is located within a void or 
“emptiness”.  In the scene where men are setting their owned objects 
in order, Burnside can only make from what is given to him in the 
spaces between the switching, flash-based light, and the dark of 
torches and night.  The poem works in this unclarified vortex.  The 
“flashes” are temporal insights, illuminated sparks of momentary 
raised consciousness rather than the prolonged sense of light as 
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enlightenment (cf. TLT).  In this collection they relate to 
Heidegger’s conception of “the turning” as “lightning-flash” where 
language negotiates oblivion and harnesses presence (Question 44).  
It is a modernized view of the Wordsworthian context and situation 
but it situates the contemporary poet as figure in the knowledge of 
this temporal and fictive integration (cf. their “innocence”).  This 
aspect informs a phenomenological reading, indebted to the sense I 
take from Kroeber’s Wordsworth, where the light provided by the 
labour is not derived specifically from either blowtorches or 
soldering irons in Burnside (one the agent of destruction, the other, 
healing) -- the why of the world -- but affords the scene its reading 
-- the how of the world -- the gathering of opposites, much like 
research (intinerancy/discovery) and security (calm) fuse to offer 
home.  It is craft that suggests revealing over manufacturing, the 
Heideggerian poetic bringing forth of world: Being entering into “its 
own emitting of light” (45) -- the forwarding of craftwork, the 
origin of art (Heidegger). 
Adjectives from the natural world are collocated with commercial 
technology to propose that the men are “swaddled” (“Ports” 3: 34) in 
the world, saturated in this environment of two forces.  It chimes 
with Moore in this sense as an evocation of protective binding that 
restricts action, but also to the close of solipsism in “Halloween” 
and its use of the word.  However, motion overwrites enveloped 
pictorial elements or what “presence” references.  The energized 
dance reflecting on the labourers’ masks suggests the life that is 
latent in all “emptiness”.  These two terms literally bracket dark 
and light in this sequence and communicate how “the harbour belongs / 
to men at work” (32-33).  Burnside’s figuration does not forward an 
ignorance of interplay and submerged energy but promotes a sense of 
innocence (or neutrality) and potential: this freedom from restricted 
artifice and from mindlessness as emptiness enables the workers’ 
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isolation and keen rooting to the harbour.  The poet desires this in 
his craft.  We read that they cooperate with their tools and become 
“immune to everything / that moves or falls around them / isolates / 
suspended in the constancy / of fire” (49-53).  The mode of belonging 
could be critiqued for detachment and selfish pursuit but the scene’s 
overriding sense of suspension within a non-contingent fabric 
suggests both relinquishment from territorialization and an 
involvement with material locality.  The notion of constancy in the 
primal elements motions beyond the fabrications and techne of 
torchlight working against the given.  Furthermore, it points us 
forward -- yet incontestably different in ontology -- to the geese of 
the following poem, reassuringly instinctual: “homing” (“Geese” 21) 
via the body and not mind.  This is contentious, but I believe these 
framing figures instance progress in the poet’s attunement to the 
scene, which comes from the contemplation of his neighbour and the 
graveyard, bringing Kerrigan’s context into play and Garrard’s 
vertical anthropology (below), too. 
The second section, titled “Urlicht” promotes non-foundational 
thought caught in “a catalogue of wrecks / and slants of light” (2: 
3-4).  While living is seen as establishing relations within a 
reality that has been fragmented via Dickinson’s lexis, the 
prerogative is to forward the relationship to self as an internal 
relationship falls away.  It is much like the wrestling against decay 
of the “forced” (11) vision of the farmstead dweller is rejected for 
the “plumbing” (40) into time of the coastal inhabitant.  Burnside 
begins to incorporate stories of fellow dwellers in Anstruther.  The 
diver works through wreckage and “has burrowed in the mud / to touch 
the mystery of something absolute” (42-43).  This absolute is the 
notion of death translated from the cargo holds of German sailboats, 
Falkland carcasses in the heritage reserve’s Victorian designed 
estate in Fife, and Welsh coal-boats.  These are particular 
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historical references to human manipulations of land and sea in terms 
of cultivation, trade, and war, all seen through the lens of decay.  
We should contemplate two significant factors. 
First, the word “neighbour” preserves the trace of building as 
dwelling (Heidegger “Building Dwelling Thinking”, Basic 348-9) -- the 
common good that suggests the law of commandment falls to the new 
life of the spirit in the law of members, as in St. Paul (Romans 
7).58  It is significant that the neighbour’s forename matches that 
of the poet.  The extent to which this is a regress of identity -- 
which, to Garrard is the challenge laid bare in accessing things, the 
“rupture of identity [the] very principle of dwelling” (“Heidegger” 
174) -- or a reading of the self-same in the other, bears out in 
Burnside’s underlining of the need to read the scene on its terms not 
via human will, solely.  Secondly, the sense of light and what it 
enables us to capture in the labourer’s scene, is translated into the 
diver’s camera betraying “the picture he wanted” (2: 87), which is 
the “animal silence” (91) that resists being locked into a static 
container.  This bleeds into the third section “Moorings” via 
enjambment across the words, “that” and “kinship” (2: 45 - 3: 1). 
The semantic expanse over the white space troubles grammatical 
readings and the spatially displaced enjambment undermines the first 
word as conjunctive or relative pronoun.  Moreover, while different 
to an article this word floats toward a preposition in the indicative 
mood but its spatial form indicates a confused conjunction-
preposition before one clause and following another.  As an 
expression of the world’s existence, it ties an alien indicative 
deictic to temporal blood-deep comradeship while simultaneously 
commuting energy outside a standing reserve.  This is unique to 
                         
58 Also Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism 
(Stanford, Calif.: California UP, 2003), and Slavoy Zizek, Eric L. 
Santer and Kenneth Reinhard, The Neighbor: Three Inquiries in 




     When we go walking 
early 
    at the furled edge of the sea 
 
we find dark webs of crabmeat 
         herring-bone 
          wet 
diaphragms of stranded jelly-fish 
 
spring water mingles with salt beneath the church 
where Anstruther’s dead are harboured in silent loam 
 
sea-litter washes the wall where the graveyard ends 
a scatter of shells and hairweed 
         and pebbles of glass 
made smooth 
   in the sway of the tide. (2-15) 
 
“Beneath” offers perceptual prominence enabling context not 
relativism and adding perspective we would not ordinarily have.  
“Walking” and “early” promote the innocent nomad as “furled” through 
lingering consonants suggestive of the roaming impulse leading to 
future development, much like the Williamsesque placement of “wet”, 
dangling and enfolding three meanings operating across the past sense 
of “furled” which limits development (from one perspective) and 
offers that which is always already developed and has a future (from 
another).  Furthermore, the rhyme between “sea” and “meat” gives 
singularity to the “herring-bone” and “wet” as stranded words 
littered on the edge of the verse.  Yet the stress on spring and 
water writes of one force opening up to the world rather than being 
stagnant.  It is accepting of life stripped of vanities (“meat”, 
“bone”), spilling not unlike the expansive verse that collocates 
“herring-bone” and “pebbles of glass” in the same vertical semantic 
thread.  This latter register suggests the labour of the ocean 
transforming -- or releasing -- the manufactured and synthetic into 
an identity with a non-alienated place. 
Furthermore, qualifiers include “furled”, “mingles”, and “scatter” 
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within the flotsam beneath the graveyard of St Nicholas (Anstruther 
Wester).  This church terminates the harbour and looks easterly onto 
the town of Anstruther and the half-mile of coastline separating it 
from Cellardyke harbour, Burnside’s home.  Individually these 
qualifiers suggest a neat gathering or compass, as a fisherman would 
make his sail to a horizon of a central perspective, but they also 
signify the undulations and rhythms of life at the edges.  Burnside’s 
peripheral vision and concern for unnamed borderlines that links the 
wild and domestic releases things physically united to combine or 
confuse previous order, thus leading toward wide and irregular 
distribution.  In contrast to the flotsam that the diver is intrigued 
by, these items of sea-litter or dead forms are inconspicuous; they 
are also patterned and associated with “spring water” (3: 9) and 
bring forth an undulating rhythm, “in the sway”, “of the tide” (15).  
This integrated music develops into a free verse deconstruction of 
Wordsworthian holy terminus into the ‘habitual sway’ of co-creation, 
as I shall indicate. 
Kerridge has argued that litter is an overspill from nature’s 
instrumental system (“Small” 192); the ecological abject in Burnside 
is filtered through verbs: we reread “scatter” to connote the 
radiation of life, or its affordance, seed that dispels any sad and 
singular terminus yet also reduces each to its limit.  The sea-litter 
knocks against the walls of the dead who “are harboured in silent 
loam” and the awakening that the overspill attempts is of peace 
inflected within the promotion of the earth as clay, the call for all 
our creations to be co-creational with the larger cycles, the “loam” 
that is the substance of the human body.  We find that it is not 
easily at rest in a simple enclosed system.  The word is doubled in 
the half-rhymes with “bone” and “stones” while also spatially and 
sonically locating “belong” to work the sense of the earth as 
material into the site of a record or monument.  Any suggestion of 
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purposiveness here is deconstructed in the various senses that 
Burnside incorporates into his sense of settlement throughout the 
volume, which moves away from the monumental and leads into the 
dynamic.  This transforms an indication of fertile soil as a place of 
dispossession and incorporation.  The nexus over the static reserve 
is presented once more.  It is how we should read Burnside’s versions 
of history, despite the fact that it requires a particular 
phenomenological tuning that short-circuits the pleasure of the 
poetry operating outside this modality.  It is a loss, but perhaps a 




The Burnside reader approaches “Settlements” not only with the 
defamiliarized notions of journeying unravelled in “Ports” but with a 
history of poetry in his oeuvre outplaying false epistemologies that 
govern the way we think and settle into our lives.  This foundation 
is twisted by an apocryphal quotation from Luther: “God answers our 
prayers by refusing them” (TAD 23).  The poem at first appears to be 
configured for us to think not of man’s actions but of how they are 
received: to decentre man and foreground autonomy or the necessary 
non-existence of God.  Prayer is grounded in the assurance that it 
obtains its desire, but Luther is stating that God does not yield to 
man’s petitions.  Lutheran fellowship requires prayer in order that 
we know that we stand before God, a necessity to prove that we are on 
the road of the Gospel and the Law.  It is submission in the sense 
that it is graced participation in relation not petition; a deep act 
of theistic belief that God is for man but that the initiative to 
prayer is not regulated by man but by the reshaping of desire for 
what is truly desirable.  Thus, Burnside is more concerned with 
humility than with faith strengthened by an absence of grace (or the 
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presumption of divine intervention seemingly unfulfilled).  The 
epigraph could be read alongside the thesis of decreation (cf. ch. 
5), but within this section of the prolegomenon I move to the theme 
of the ‘withheld’ rather than Burnside’s poetic practice. 
The epigraph restates Hölderlin’s position that there is no 
measure for earth (“In Lovely Blueness...”).  In “Roads” Burnside 
speaks of “the pull of the withheld” (4: 70), which plays into the 
collection’s central sense of insufficiency, the irretrievable and 
incompleteness in the world of expectation, not the German 
transcendence of division.  The protagonist’s unrequited (and 
possessive) love in the title poem signifies this most explicitly to 
commute how possession and power are central concerns for the poet’s 
masculinist ecopoetic.  This asylum register revisits an ethics of 
relinquishment within the demands of “Settlements” and rather than 
promoting an idea of touching the silence of God, Burnside works 
through a sense of strangeness toward a post-theological sense of 
being unprepared and being granted.  While grace may fill an empty 
space, entry to the void is only possible once this has been made; 
grace makes the void, it prepares itself, Hölderlin convinces us, by 
making us homesick, separating us from origin or source.  Again 
Burnside’s poetic vortex comes to light. 
The first section, “A Place By The Sea”, forwards fear and failed 
navigation in lieu of a wide darkness that is rich and strange; the 
fourth section “What We Know Of Houses” enfolds “A Process of 
Separation” and “Epithalamuim” (ANS) into this collection.  The poems 
of union through difference link by reworking their lines into the 
title of the subsection “Settlements”.  This poem links directly to 
“The Men’s Harbour”, too, beginning with the word “Sunday” but 
speaking explicitly of the pre-Christian Picts.  The descendants of 
the aboriginal Caledonian small farm communities populated by folk of 
nomadic transhumance and fixed transhumance does not instance that 
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Burnside is interested in national life-ways.  It uncovers spiritual 
inheritance to entwine the notion of holy ground and our quest for 
meaning within our contemplation of home.  Critical inquiry is 
impelled to move towards Wordsworthian secular humanism. 
 
  I like to think of them 
on days like this 
perched on a shelf of rock beneath the trees 
watching their children 
       thinking of their stock 
then stepping out 
    to sacrifice 
        or blessing 
as we have stood together in the shade 
made awkward by the quiet of the place 
a darkness that continues while the sun 
brightens the fields 
        and gardens fill with light 
in market towns or tidy golf-hotels 
above the sea. (10-24) 
 
Spilling through these lines are the jarring ‘k’ sounds of “stock”, 
“awkward”, and “market” echoing the clan’s name and offering the 
detached view of the animal neighbours as commodity.  These are 
masked by the endnote of “sacrifice” meeting “sun” through the 
stressed ‘l’ sounds in “blessing”, “fields”, and “fill” -- a 
heightened sense of play outshining the harvest but only into a 
terminus point of the double sounding “golf-hotels” to signify the 
contemporary reduction to objectness of Scotland’s green spaces.  
However, the “unverified” “holy ground” that Burnside alludes to is 
underneath this top layer of commercial land ownership, a world where 
“thinking” is jammed between “sacrifice” and “blessing” as an 
interesting triangulation suggested in the shape of the verse on the 
page.  We have the non-contingent as source of positivism when 
certain techniques of living are given up, or decentred. 
This bitterness gives way to a larger allusion.  MacDiarmid’s “On 
a Raised Beach” (Stony Limits, 1934) is deftly brought alive in the 
shelf of rock and quietness, yet this silence to Burnside makes us 
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“awkward”, almost uncommon, special, or rare.  The turning against 
the grain opens into a reading of spring where stonewalls have been 
plummeted by gorse and the perfume of nature is wrapped in its 
destruction: 
 
Unseasonable    stubborn    everyday 
-- it’s bright as the notion of home: 
          not something held 
or given 
   but the painful gravity 
that comes of being settled on the earth 
redeemable    inventive    inexact 
and capable of holding what we love 
in common 
    making good 
with work and celebration 
         charged 
to go out unprepared into the world 
 
and take our place for granted 
          every time 
we drive back through the slowly dimming fields 
to quiet rooms 
     and prayers that stay unanswered. (28-45) 
 
Projectively, breath is fast and fleeting, almost daggered in the 
first half of this section, calm and smooth by contrast in the later 
lines that read clearly and need no explication.  Their principle is 
pinned by the two three word lines (28, 33) monitoring that which is 
continuous (i.e. not limited by season) and that which is redeemable 
(i.e. the dynamic and non-systematic), respectively.  Here, any 
attempt to fix, clutch, or trap the spirit would not make good of our 
dwelling, for we are “charged” both in the sense of being 
energetically inspired and triggered by our relation to the immense 
natural world, and endowed with the responsibility of right dwelling.  
This complements the ecology of poem, oeuvre and tradition instanced 
by this poem.  It affords a mind untroubled by unanswered prayers, 
acknowledges the continuance and repetition of the “dimming fields” 
and “quiet rooms” to find peace in darkness: taking our world for 
“granted” in the true spiritual sense of something being bestowed to 
Bristow 246 
us in our allotment that is admitted.  The Lutheran matrix given 
inflection by the land ethic is Burnside’s lasting religiosity or 
ecological sense of the given and the integrated.  The next key poem 
secularizes this philosophical abstraction further, which would 
represent a larger problem for readers if the poetry did not anchor 
this to the humanly willed modification of the environment.  History 




“Fields” promotes a sense of health and security within a 
contemplation of cultivation and agriculture as backdrop to personal 
history and identity.  Alongside “Roads”, this works through 
Burnside’s final poetic representation of his father, a psychosis 
that fades as a presence in TLT and TGN; however, turning on the 
figure that links outward to a historical sense of fields, this poem 
anchors the sense of fields as limited domains.  As such it recalls 
Wordsworth’s Home but what kind of ecological voice operates here?  
In terms of inheritance, it recalls Moore’s epigraph but it is 
associated with legacy and zones constructed to control crops, animal 
habitats, and disease flows.  The figure is an agent in the 
slaughtering of cattle, an action together with the destruction of 
infected areas and quarantine measures, border controls, and 
surveillance, reflects back upon the human dwelling and the limits of 
our freedom within contemporary science.  Poetic inflection, however, 
promotes an understanding of a (lost) directive principle. 
 
   Once 
in rural Fife 
     and Angus 
       farmers held 
one acre of their land 
      untilled 
       unscarred 
to house this mute 
Bristow 247 
concurrence with the dead 
choosing from all their fields 
one empty plot 
that smelled or tasted right 
        one house of dreams. (26-37) 
 
One reading notices people and place scattered, “untilled” and 
“unscarred” in contrast to the writerly “concurrence” that “house[s]” 
our dwelling and we recall the Wordsworthian imaginative synthesis 
over Stevens.  Moreover, the two spatial forms evidence a 
technologized push towards the literal in the last six lines.  The 
half-rhymes press thought into shape but create space for the words 
to resonate subtly in their own space as with “held” and “land” 
inside “untilled” purporting an empty or loose control of words, 
while simultaneously registering a form of husbandship in the word 
containing others (“held”).  The voice’s claim to kinship with the 
dead comes from being unfulfilled, underlined in the commitment to 
the land shown in the withdrawal from cultivating an enclosed space 
known as “Gude Man’s Land” or “Devil’s Piece”.  This is given full 
artistic imagination in “The Hay Devil” traced in the Gaelic 
neimheadh, originally given to a Druidical grove.59  Again, readers 
are carried into an eco-phenomenological poetic that is fragile and 
dependant upon the willingness to engage with the silent, historical 
hinterland. 
A century after reformation, the General Assembly of the Church of 
Scotland would fine farmers for not working the gudeman croft.  It 
was an effort that coincided with the banning of bonfires at Beltane, 
Midsummer, Halloween, and Yule through concerns that the memory of 
pagan boundaries of sacred sites would gain advantage over (and 
outlive) the work ethic; a practice that began to be forgotten only 
as late as the early nineteenth century (McNeill 21-22, 59).  Using 
this sacred practice to highlight our modern contamination condition 
                         
59 For example, Navitie, Fife between Loch Leven and Cowdenbeath. 
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(“Fields” 15-16, 73-76) and to colour the poem’s consideration of 
modifications made to the protagonist’s garden as a form of 
colonization, Burnside sustains the technique of creating as 
something brokered by discovery and reformulation -- creative 
ecological principles.  The two gardens formulated as palimpsest, 
blueprints implicit in each other, lead the poem into a consideration 
of our mental faculties in the third section to highlight the 
material manifestation of myth that is the field.   
 
Who blurred the sheep with scab? Who curdled milk? 
Who was it fledged the wombs of speechless girls? 
They knew, and made their standard offerings 
and called it peace.  (3: 20-23) 
 
That knowledge is a compression of the threaded, inter-relational 
energy across the lives of the poem’s characters and places (Agnes, 
Angus; Agnes, father) is a position mannered in a way that 
Wordsworthian community in Burnside can be seen as indicative of an 
invisible fabric of interlocking systems of inter-assimilation.  
These return once more to his father, only this time the poet is an 
adult and is terminating the other’s material presence.  Preparation 
for this has come to us through poetics charged not by the necessity 
of naked navigation but the possible insight from blindness as in the 
sixteen lines that follow those above, developing the delicate 
moments of knowledge in microscopic transactions that trusts the 
eternal threads -- as indicated in the uraninite (pitchblende) 
reverberations.  Here, Burnside loses the reader via an indeterminate 
pronoun operating across former self, father, and God; a dialogue 
moving into trilogy and then out into a dance from an emotional 
boundary (“what I would not dare” (28)), where the unsaid speaks 
deeper.  But the poem requires correlation to a boundary, or 
limitation, to be housed itself in the right ethical site; thus after 
a final recollection of his father and the notion of dismissed 
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authority, heightened perception and new freedom issues from the poem 
reconnected to earth.  Here, the autobiographical persona reconnects 
to the reader as a storyteller: 
 
I buried those clothes in a field above the town 
finding a disused lair amongst the stones 
that tasted of water 
        then moss 
          then something 
sharper 
     like a struck match in the grass 
or how he once had smelled 
      home from the pit 
his body doused in gas 
      and anthracite. (4: 35-45) 
 
Total unity is not desired in the broken iambic pentameter of the 
last couplet fragmented into two, while reverse stress and rhythm 
coming in the final four syllables promotes another voice or 
perspective than the opening persona.  Schizophrenia, individuality, 
wholeness, and multiplicity are resident in those lines.  Readers are 
left to read either a misconstrued or a badly configured voice, or a 
mode that betokens possibility (as witnessed in the wider self of 
MOT) and scrutinizes potential in an attempt to teach the individual 
new ways of understanding self and world through integration with the 
collective. 
A ghostly image of the war memorial and allotments on the hill 
above the edge of Cowdenbeath High Street turning into Perth Road 
echoes with “Ports” taking Bishop’s “anthracite” (45) from “Roosters” 
(and echoes with Burnside’s early version of Dickinson).  Riddled 
with threads and traces, the poem forwards integration as 
transfiguration.  Not unlike the priest and the neighbour of the 
first section, the father is “transfigured by the work” (19) that he 
undertakes, and so, too, is the protagonist.  A Christian reference 
to more than simple outward appearance being altered, more a 
metamorphosis or spiritualizing i.e. body into white light (Matt. 
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17.2; Mark 9.2-3), informs Burnside’s funeral rite as labour that 
colours his thinking.  The collocation of neighbour, environmental 
crisis and the authority figure (imaginatively buried between traces 
of war and grounds of husbandry, threaded through the burden of the 
ecopoetic historical qualification to the phenomenological) suggests 
more than shifting relations betweens nodes of perception.  It is how 
Burnside writes personal and cultural history as one in his 
exploitation of the full potential that the contamination metaphor 
brings.  It is where the ‘I’ out-sounds the ecophenomenal. 
Ultimately, we find how nature and culture adapt to each other in 
this self-sustaining feature of consciousness.  The field as “lair” 
is a pagan or animal site, which runs into “gas” and “anthracite” as 
fundamentally elemental.  The three dimensions to the taste of water, 
plotted by the spatial unfolding of verse and thought, suggest 
richness and depth in an unusual final simile “like a struck match in 
the grass”.  Moreover, the confusion between bitterness evident in 
burning and the sweet crisp scent of meadow growth leans the poem 
towards the green in the dark rather than the reverse.  Fluidity and 
resistance within dread are amalgamated into qualified hope given a 
lasting position in the final reflection on insomnia: 
 
   for years I have sat up late 
and thought of something more 
         some half-seen thing 
the pull of the withheld 
        the foreign joy 
I tasted that one afternoon 
       and left behind 
when I made my way back down the hill 
with the known world about me.  (66-74) 
 
As with Bishop’s perceptive faculty, “foreign joy” or acceptance of 
alienation is internalized, in Burnside it is literalized as gravity 
pulling the figure down from any elevation.  The unknown and 
unquantifiable yet grounded energy in this precise instance of grief 
and newness pushes Burnside into the continuum of growth and decay, 
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memory and presence, fear and confirmation, relinquishment and a 
return home.  It has been a long journey and it requires a little 
historical reflection. 
The opencast ironstone mines and steel mills nationalised in 1967 
were the workplace for Burnside’s father and the reason for the 
family’s move south of the border to Northamptonshire in 1965, 
shortly before the closures and rise of unemployment to over 30 
percent of the district’s population.  The steel town was designated 
a new town in 1950 by the Corby Development Corporation’s expansion.  
It is vastly different now that the mines are closed and land has 
returned to agriculture.  It is yet another homestead that is a 
fading memory in Britain’s cultural psyche.  “Fields” is the 
reconnection of the personal, the consequences of our everyday life 
and our worldly circumstance, and an indication to the health issues 
of an environmental crisis: the fabric that connects us all (whether 
metaphysical or not) at the whim of (economic) power games wherein 
huge moments press upon the individual in extreme ways: 
 
   the blind calves laid in the earth 
a nightmare for weeks 
of gunshots 
      and buried flesh 
 
yet still (1: 121-125) 
 
The insomnia of the first section “Landfill” is an anxious disturbed 
state of mind that has to run the contrast between the medieval 
respect for land and the current use of pits and then on into the 
context of crisis.  These are problematized by semantic gaps and 
blurs, and by the poetic vision shifting from rite to right.60 
                         
60 The foot and mouth epidemic of 1967, which Burnside may be 
recalling through his father’s subsequent employment in the 
agricultural sector (although his dates suggest an earlier outbreak) 
was replayed in 2001, a year after the publication of TAD.  At the 
time of writing, the European Union was terminating the export ban on 
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One could read Garrard’s assertion of an intimate ecology, the 
geophilosophy of the local (not the international) where dwelling is 
attunement to Being via protection and cultivation.  Burnside’s 
betweeness, much like Heaney’s operates within a “mnemotechnical 
function”, the vertical excavation of the land resource enabling 
psychological and mythological aspects of cultural memory to come 
forth (Garrard “Heidegger” 170).  It is undoubtedly the political 
hinterland to the poetic consideration of how personal experience, 
the remnants of time that lay around us, and our inescapable 
interactions -- the footprint of human involvement -- constantly form 
our true navigation of place (much as Wordsworth’s Home).  It is a 
post-Romantic stillness, as in the last line, that views resources 
infused with personal and communal history, promoting the calibration 
of action to effects over time.  Both connect the macro to the micro, 
as with the panoramic sense following the image of the still church 
where the objective and detached view of the mourning family in 
isolation runs into the incredibly dynamic personal fragments of the 
deceased and then into the universal sense of world as “timesoiled” 
(105-17), a highly interesting expansive dynamic.  Whether this 
particular history is an intentional choice or all that is available 
to the poet is something that we can contest elsewhere; it has 
clearly shifted contemplation from poetry to history, technique to 
theme. 
                                                                      
British livestock, meat, and dairy products following another 
outbreak in August 2007.  The disease runs along animate and 
inanimate vectors that suggest precarious barriers in the natural 
world are at risk to mutating viruses that are parasites upon biotic 
displacements and flows: wind, movement of animals, contact between 
livestock, shared pasturage, networks of trade, and human contact are 
contributory factors to the spread of the disease.  See “Animal 
Health And Welfare: Foot and Mouth,” Department for Environment, 
Food, and Rural Affairs, 1 Oct. 2007 
<http://www.defra.gov.uk/footandmouth/>.  For the 2001 epidemic in 
Britain, see John Law’s “Disaster in Agriculture: Or Foot and Mouth 
Mobilities,” The Centre for Science Studies, Lancaster University 





The final poem makes a circular reference back to the opening poem 
“Ports” and Burnside’s use of the esoteric French poet and painter, 
Henri Michaux’s reflections upon travelling and the mystery of the 
duality of the harbour as terminus and departure point.  This time an 
epigraph from Octavio Paz provides escape and an emphasis on 
relations (which Burnside carries through into TLT).  The Labyrinth 
of Solitude (1950) Paz’s essay upon history, collective culture, and 
individual identity gives over to the notion of death and how it 
reflects the vanity of the living, how it defines life and shows its 
mutable forms.  In “Poetry and History” (1956), Paz reconsiders 
notions of repetition within a thesis on the occult revelation of 
otherness.  The recreation or ritual of the poem articulates and 
provides access to the “consecration of a concrete historical 
experience” (Bow 211), the kingdom of the fixed present where 
perpetual comradeship is re-established.  Paz’s thinking does not 
rewrite the law of entropy -- the passing of energy into different 
states -- in terms of (cultural) translation or (spiritual) 
transformation, but reads Hölderlin and Rilke to express the 
investment in humanized order that veils chaos -- something that 
needs to be rejected by the creature that is open to world.  This 
enables singularity to be “attenuated”: a form of redemption where 
time has meaning and purpose, the emphasis of the “now” (204).  I 
revisit this emphasizing Burnside’s desire to move. 
Burnside negotiates Paz’s notion of Mexican nihilism and solitude 
by focussing on change as disappearance, drawing from the poem “En 
tránsito [In Transit]”: “Transcurrir es suficiente, / Transcurrir es 
quedarse” (“To pass is sufficient, / To pass is to remain”) as 
epigraph.  The context of brotherhood with the non-human world brings 
sustenance and reduction simultaneously to the human, which clarifies 
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Burnside’s sense of annunciation in this poem while also suggesting 
the trace that we leave in places after departure.  As with all the 
images of infection and contamination in the first and fourth section 
of “Fields”, the metaphor works to resonate with the themes of 
history and tradition, and continuum and identity that begin to 
override the spiritual frame that the earlier Burnside secured to the 
human.  The poet must turn to the natural world for empirical not 
metaphorical evidence: the sense of prolonging and terminus as the 
presence of “oil slicks and fruit spills” (1: 13) and the presence:  
 
on back roads scabbed with weeds or veiled with sand 
running through chicken farms and unmapped towns 
or rising to the chill 
of native pine. (44-47) 
 
Poetic compression brings human land marked by nature’s resistance in 
proximity to worlds beyond the cartographic radar.  These contraries 
give a sense of vertigo and paralysis to the comparative “rising”, 
yet when “native” scans as indigenous -- inherent, innate, natural -- 
an intuitive feeling evidently suggests that the wood gives to the 
human securely.  The word is deployed economically to signal a lack 
of distinction between subject and object.  This direction (nature to 
human) is given further complex treatment in the assonance of the “s” 
sound notably absent in the last line, which would turn pine to 
“spine”, the mythical station of the soul in turn transforming world 
or fitting world into the indisputably human realm.  I argue that 
this sense cannot be reduced to simple models of appropriation. 
The tree reminds us of the pine that is the most widely 
distributed conifer in the world and the distinctly native keystone 
species to the boreal component of the Caledonian Forest.  Moreover, 
the poetic heritage resonates with Stevens’ desire for truth over 
anatomical thinking.  A purity derived from the postponement of “the 
physical pine, the metaphysical pine” (“Credences of Summer” 2: 1-2) 
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is the combined universal and particular in Stevens and Burnside that 
recalls Wordsworth’s “pine”.  This is poetic urge to long no more 
(Home 846) once the revealed universal condition can be brought to 
light, we read how the ecology of individual, place, and history 
offer intersubjective mapping of place.  However, Burnside’s “sudden 
/ untenable light” (1: 15) suggests an incapability of this being 
maintained; to be written into the present and materialized as 
“untenable” is a paradoxical signifier, both indefensible and not 
affording occupation.  This may represent distaste for the provincial 
or regional, but crucially this personal understanding of 
homelessness brings the poet to desire limbo as a state without the 
need to reduce world to names and events or extending cartography 
through historic sensibility: it is temporality as bedrock. 
Ultimately another phase of relinquishing finds selfhood within a 
“living caesura, less than the sum of my parts” (2 15).  The absence 
of a gestalt or even complete totality presents a vacuum that is not 
empty but energized, yet not finalized.  Moreover, in addition to 
latency and potential it draws from Paz’s artistic sensibility that 
inspired Elizabeth Bishop’s translations that attend to his 
articulation of between-ness.61  A sense of self that is different 
from the branded world is put forward in Paz; Burnside uses this to 
work against the sense that the world is designed for our taste and 
consumption.  It is an emphasis on the empirical in a raw state 
before envelopment.  It can be read as a platform for production 
rather than consumption.  The reader that is sensitive to Burnside’s 
Hallowtide liminal self and to the poetics of ecological 
consciousness is one alert to the significances here. 
Furthermore, this stance opens Burnside’s version of potential 
                         
61 Most especially in tune to Paz poetizing love and the infinity of 
stillness from which fabrications arise: “All is gain / if all is 
lost... We never arrive / Never reach where we are” (“Return” 165-166 
from “Ciudad de Mexico”, Vuelta, 1969-1975). 
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energy as an attunement to a sense of arrival without the knowledge 
of a journey or willed desire.  It is without pursuit and reminiscent 
of nature as “not yet”;62 moreover, it revisits his use of silence 
and transforms it into an aperture of possibility: 
 
those upland silences that last for days 
delectable mountains 
        hillsides clad with pines 
and cherries 
   the grey of nearness 
        soldiers 
standing in a clearing by a truck 
boys from the country in jackboots 
and threadbare shirts (37-45) 
 
The rough sounds of “jackboots” connotes ugly, military oppression 
and has been prepared by the palette’s use of “cl” sounds in “clad” 
and “clearing” noticeably widened and reversed in “delectable” with 
the semantic stress on taste and consumption heightened.  The latter 
is central to a sense of opening up new possibilities by allowing the 
resonance of that which comes forth, it is the animation of the 
mountains as striving towards consciousness contrasted to the 
appropriation of labour for territorial means, extending the poetics 
of “Fields”.  This takes on a local texture in this poem, yet to be 
“clad” is to be covered, what thus comes forth after the clearing 
that is particular to this site?  That which has come before: the 
nearness and resonance of “delectable” operating within the Puritan 
strain. 
Burnside’s allusion to John Bunyan may be missed if he were not to 
repeat the particular landscape in the same manner, later in section 
three, “Pilgrimage” viewing the “delectable mountains” (33) again.  
Burnside is speaking of illusory journeys without being pejorative; 
as Bunyan’s frontispiece to Pilgrim’s Progress (1684) stipulates, the 
text is the similitude of a dream as transport between this world and 
                         
62 Adorno (Aesthetic 107); ch. 1, p. 59. 
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one forthcoming.  We circle back to earlier thoughts of terminus and 
back to the thesis’ epigraph and the black-green dynamic: “Dark 
Clouds bring Waters, when the bright bring none” (Bunyan 2).  
Burnside’s appropriation of Bunyan has Eucharist consonance: it is of 
the host making an offering that is not taken but received; something 
that enters into one to satisfy a non-appropriative hunger.  The 
illusory journey, therefore, is one that is neither taken in desire 
nor fear but in respect of the other, weighted by the need to 
converse and share; it is how one takes communion. 
Section four, “Ida Y Vuelta” (“Going and Coming”) reconsiders that 
to dwell is to inhabit and that habitation incorporates time and 
history, for they involve place, fundamentally.63  These co-ordinates 
are of little use to the figure alone in the dark sanctuary of 
nothingness, attempting to communicate this to his partner and for 
her to witness the immensity of nature, and how it is irreducible and 
confusing.  Instancing domestic conversation shifts the poetry into 
the autobiographic and displaces the Heideggerian template. 
 
Yo atravesé los arcos y los puentes 
Yo estaba vivo, en busca de la vida  
(I crossed the arcs and the bridges 
I was alive, in search of the life) (34-35) 
 
To the phenomenologist the emphasis on the energy track of thought 
shaped by inquiry is central here; to the reader attuned to 
Burnside’s death-life-continuum inquiry via ethics, the eye propels 
itself to the phrase “moving without desire” (39) -- this entails 
bodily reduction to the material and the will to communicate in 
concert with the world outside anthropocentricism: 
 
Yo estaba vivo y vi muchos fantasmas, 
Todos de carne y hueso y todos ávidos 
                         
63 First published in Letras Libres 25 (2001). 
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(I was alive and saw many ghosts, 
All of meat and bone and all eager ones) (41-42) 
or how a life 
can never quite be seen 
in this measure of rain 
a bruise of kisses 
seeping to the bone 
and waiting there 
to flower as a word (43-49) 
 
The contradiction of phenomenological poetics stressed by “or” and by 
how it can “never” “quite” represent is particularly poignant.  The 
last line recalls Rilke’s ninth Duino elegy where the traveller 
brings a pure word, not flower, from the mountain: an instance of the 
archetypal phenomenon, concrete and empirical, and a world of the 
past brought into the present (Arendt 164, 206).  Yet this is given 
Burnside’s unique treatment and sensitivity to how the transcended or 
phenomenological world suspended in its own linguistic and mental 
realm dissolves into a crumbling enchantment beyond representation or 
communication protocols when brought to bear to another, or when 
momentary quickness is dispelled and the site of loss is pregnant 
only with recollection and impetus to replay the moment when it could 
see a new beginning (as continuation).  Burnside’s poetic is under 
the lens.  This vacancy elevates its fragility, contingency, and 
value.  Looking closer at the poem, “Bruise” is bodily and textual: 
to process the physical world into language is a version of Morley’s 
thematic concern within Heideggerian poeisis that Kerrigan outlines 
as disclosure “[of] the nature of things through flashes within a 
consciousness uncentred into language” (56).  I am reading this as a 
development of Burnside’s pre-dwelling epiphanic linguistic firework 
that leaves a trace of something magical as a resource for thinking.  
Now seen in terms of flora it is turned into a gesture not dissimilar 
to Wordsworth’s closure to the fifth book of The Prelude presenting a 
gap in logic that rings untrue yet dispenses a new singularity, 
uncentred yet communicated.  To bloom, attract, and expand “in a 
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word” would not suggest an adornment or veil through naming but it is 
the nominative (i.e. the foundational, original act in human relation 
to world) developed into an image of growth, that like blossom, is 
independent of the plant.  That is to say, to trigger spontaneously 
and attain the grammatical, intransitive verbal sense of “flower” (a 
limited relation that does not take an object, as naming might) to 
attain height and thrive (again afforded by the shift from noun to 
verb).  We remember Moore as epigraph and the abaxial within home. 
To emphasize the effect Burnside presents an array of singular 
objects united in their collocation within a field of potential 
relations; it echoes the “inclusive vitality of being multiform” 
(Kroeber Ecological 56) within poetics of interanimation: 
 
Tigre, novilla, pulpo, yedra en llamas 
(Tiger, heifer, squid, ivy in flames) (4: 50) 
 
whichever one you choose 
it’s all the same: 
arrival; end; hibiscus; carbon; stone. (51-53) 
 
To the craftsperson the predator, the domestic, the sea, and the 
earth are equated and given equal space to the poet as receiver-
transmitter.  While the first list ends with an allusion to Bergson’s 
blue flame of élan and Heraclitus’ fire, the latter array allows 
terminal and origin to open into a loose elemental threefold, which 
reflects Burnside’s textual point.  Respectively: the tropical Rose-
mallow signifies herb, shrub, or tree; the non-metallic organic 
compound incredibly abundant in nature (used for our electric lights) 
locates the cycle of plant and animal life, respiration and 
atmosphere (equally significant if charged by footprint, sink and 
tax, to an ecological listener); and “stone” relating to time, the 
inanimate and hard mineral signifying motionless, temporal 
perspectives.  The latter two elements are loose allusions to basic 
oxygen steelmaking and slagheap moulds, while the first refers to the 
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hardy plant that is renowned for self-reliance, a form of syncretic 
earth song.  This is not an organized array that blocks the shining-
forth of the world nor is it a disorganized array that has no 
meaning; it is but a subtlety highlighting self-contained connotation 
below the surface to the interdependence and separation of human and 
nature within one ecological semantic string.  
Wordsworth proposes that the poem presents objects in-themselves 
through language “a glory scarce their own” (The Prelude 5: 629) 
where the mind-power can be eased and volition diluted.  The 
dependency of world upon raised self-consciousness in Burnside does 
not relate to (instrumental) causality wherein one is indebted to an 
other.  The poetic entrance into the unconcealed and the process of 
bringing that forth to others (an attendance or ministration (5: 
620)) is a model of co-responsibility for the being and effecting of 
its other (Heidegger Question 10-11, 19).  I suggest this is not 
paradigmatically incoherent to Idealist thought, in respect to co-
creation.  As ethical as this agency may be, Burnside would 
reconfigure passivity towards harnessing life and dynamism from alien 
forms.  Inaction may not be appropriate in this new century of 
crisis, while power and force is unmistakably outlawed by his ethical 
code. 
  
IV. A Conclusion on Labour and “The Men’s Harbour” 
 
I have shown how Burnside’s ethics of relinquishment interface with 
labour in TAD.  Poirier reads manual labour in Frost in Emersonian 
terms of the penetration of matter outwards: “such penetration is the 
precondition for the discovery of an intermediate realm where 
something in the self and something in ‘things’ can meet in a ‘system 
of approximations’” (Knowing 279).  In contrasting the husbandman to 
the killer, Lawrence writes that the former “brings about the birth 
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and increase”; he continues: 
 
But even the husbandman strains in the dark mastery over the 
unwilling earth and beast; he struggles to win forth substance, 
he must master the oil and the strong cattle, he must have the 
heavy blood-knowledge, and the low, but deep, mastery.  There is 
no equality or selfless humility (37). 
 
Kroeber cannot think of Wordsworth’s homecoming in an analogy 
different from the wolf, a predator of “territorial familiarity” 
(“Home” 134).  Burnside, having contemplated the killer and “blood 
knowledge” together with Wordsworth’s “savage instinct” (Home 914) 
that charges his struggle (914-955), attempts to balance the 
ecological notion of approximation while also developing a non-
egotistical, humble self that is born of approximations but can 
wander freely.  His ecological voice, negotiating a plethora of 
forebears and impulses, suggests a stance in relation but not one 
easily given to relinquish solitude or self-reliance.  Again, it is 
the most alluring thematic. 
In “Blues” a variation of nostalgia and melancholy gives way to 
versions of departure and movement within notions of denial, the 
undiscovered and the half-light of knowing: “the not-pursued” resting 
“on the cusp / of touch / of loss” (3: 18-21).  In “Geese”, ego-free 
labour and attunement to nature are given in one move.  The migratory 
birds -- reminiscent of Leopold’s symbol of unity par excellence (A 
Sand Country Almanac) -- devolve “the homing instinct” (Burnside 21) 
via playful labour whose tenure is impossible to grasp by the human, 
yet is fathomable as “purer agency” (77).  In “Blues” Burnside calls 
this state “abandoned” (2: 2) and the particular exilic solitude or 
alien consciousness paradoxically fits mind and world via instinct.  
Moreover, the depiction of labourers in “Fisherfolk at New Haven” and 
in “Ports”, as untraceable, melding forms of the light that defines 
them is considered in “The Men’s Harbour” as “unaccountable” (12) to 
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both subject and object: it is a version of relationship between 
physics and technology that Burnside calls the “moment of self-
forgetting” (62).  It relates to Heidegger’s ethical term “ver-an-
lassen” (Question 9): liberty that occasions or sets things on their 
way, consonant with the Taoist letting be, and the ecological 
affordance of thing to its arrival.  Here, the phenomenological 
aspect of the poetry is under intense pressure and can be seen to be 
forcefully -- or deliberately and self-consciously -- embedded within 
historical context by Burnside’s transparent frames. 
The crafted language that is working within an elaborately 
conceived system of referencing (i.e. the intertext and the form of 
the dwelling triptych) is at once torn to suggest both skilled craft 
and labour, and to embrace intuitive energy, not to store or unlock 
energy via appropriation.  Here technique breaks-down and gives way 
to theme.  Thus self-reflection takes over as responsible agency, an 
occasion Burnside notes as “a knowledge they can’t quite voice though 
it has to do / with the grace that distinguishes strength / from 
power” (“The Men’s Harbour” 15-17).  The variation and redeployment 
of intertext (especially Moore), the decoding of theological lexis, 
and the resultant expression and image of labour that is not a model 
of technological domination but harnessing beyond simple harmony, all 
work towards this imperative.  For Heidegger, the significant 
definition of “harbour” is to “set [things] free...into [their] 
complete arrival” (Question 32): to abandon in the sense of enabling 
one’s freedom by bringing it forward while respecting its own life-
force.  It is volition within Moore’s “Paper Nautilus” which can be 
dangerous and must find the right balance that Burnside notices, not 
to be misinterpreted by others, self, or world, but knowing its own 
level of involvement. 
The fourth stanza that views the scene from a distanced point-of-
view has drawn the environment so that the men are set in place 
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fully.  As readers, we need to exercise another step in this level of 
abstraction to gain the full weight of the moment.  The camera zooms 
outward and widens its lens to pans across the Anstruther coastline 
westward to the caravan park where it finds a blackbird (30-37).  
This is a move into abstraction that finds the particular.  Moreover, 
while this reworks lines directly from Moore’s poem (“the white on 
white” 31) it also reintroduces the symbolic bird of mourning to 
rethread the notion of death or the loss of self and to lead onto a 
further appropriation of Stevens in TLT.  In this incredibly dense 
movement of poetry, Burnside contextualizes the men in their 
environment, draws from Heidegger, while also collocating American 
poetics to Scottish history to effect another sense of migration 
within his elaborating and extensive poetics.  Moreover, this is not 
a dislocated reference from post-modernist avant-garde melancholia, 
for it enfolds Kazmir Malevitch’s series “White on White” (1917-
1918), where the absence of colour affords the subtle emergence of 
outlines from backgrounds: this is the keynote to Burnside’s poetics 
of the unnameable arising through itself fabricated by an ecological 
emptiness (or poetic vortex). 
 
Finally, the phantom boat that arrives in the final stanza (67-70) to 
indicate the epiphanical connection to ecological worldliness has 
“snow on the deck” (68) and resonates with MacLean’s poem, “Nighean 
is Seann Orain”.  MacLean’s poignancy derives from unattainable 
dwelling written in the negative: “who sees a ship in the sea of 
Canna, / a ship that does not strive with white furrows, / that does 
not seek the harbour / that no one will never reach” (cited Herdman 
166).  Rather than follow MacLean into the dream of unattainable 
synthesis or the search for the absolute that cannot be reached, 
Burnside’s poem is charged by an internal array to promote individual 
ethics outside the negative.  First, this resonates on a textual 
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level to the silent harmonics of “a struck bell... singing in [the] 
blood” (“Sense Data”, 24-25), then the first light delivered by 
silence in “the ceasing of a bell” (“Ports” 2: 22) and lastly to the 
snow-like absence of a dissolving town into silence “where the 
blackbird vanishes” (“Fields” 2: 31).  This last reference depicts 
the sense of abandonment and surrender within a domestic scene 
pregnant with the past and with connections to other parts of the 
town.  It is the richest microcosm of Burnside’s ecological poeisis 
folding world, word, human, animal, presence and absence, silence, 
and snow into what he shows in “Adam and Eve” as the surrender to the 
“white-out” (64) the slow dissolve into the “sufficiency of names” 
(66).  I have indicated the problem resident within this microcosm, 
i.e. the level of involvement in phenomenological poetics, silent 
echoes of an implicit hinterland, and the breakdown of craft into 
thematic, technique often falling into reflection.  It is a poetic 
site that Burnside has yet to develop sufficiently well into a new 
disposition, although it is raised to a new level in TLT.  In its 
imagery it locates the peal of the bell, the wave that dissolves into 
nothingness that delimits a gap between sound and silence and 
highlights the attunement of the ear to the shifting soundscape of 
the environment; in a final ecology this reminds us of Heidegger’s 
conception of the poetic accumulative wave (“Language in the Poem”) 
and represented within material context by Bishop’s “Roosters”. 
Bishop’s sensitivity to the cry suggests modern attunement that 
knows that to answer nature’s call is to “penetrate the veil of 
Nature’s purity” (Bate Song 67), that a response would instil retreat 
yet to also acknowledge that we must supersede the notion that art is 
the perpetration of violence.  Our modern techne is a stillness that 
works behind the possibilities of language: to Heidegger it is the 
“peal of stillness” that as utterance is neither a relation that 
precedes vocalization nor a relationship established by 
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representation following the event, but a presence that can be 
sounded for mortal hearing (Poetry 188-208).  It is the danger in the 
saving of language (Heidegger Question).  Burnside’s interwoven 
fabric of intertext and geographic history is a web of difference 
that offers this to the reader that holds each poem closely to the 
ear and is open to the resonances that operate on each subtle 
frequency therein.  It is a question of judgement if one reads this 





A significant motif in this collection is an attention to hands and 
handiwork.  That Wordsworth’s ideal resource comes from the “Atlantic 
Main” (Home MS.D 801-802) suggests a body of strength and shorthand 
for place or mainland.  These are embodied principles, but the 
abbreviation “main” connotes the heraldic term for a hand, thus the 
marshalling of arms is given new inflection to emphasize work over 
prayer (as with Wordsworth’s faith in the labourers of the vale (469-
645)) as the source of deep dwelling.  Extending the final image of 
ANS’s clutching hand of insecurity and desire, Burnside places the 
clasped hand of prayer and the weather-torn labourers’ hands to 
foreground his unique sense of the built environment and the 
cultivation of nature that has been italicised by a post-Puritan, 
individualist pietism.  Hands take of the sacrament and disperse 
world amongst community but are absent in the act of receiving from 
the host: they represent the thin double edge to techne that poetry 
precariously rides across intuition and conception, experience and 
recollection.  Here we read Burnside’s conception of self-forgetting 
attending to a larger sacrificial obligation than technologies of 
control or force.  I have indicated this by attending to poetic 
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textures.  Burnside’s post-pastoral articulation of the crisis 
recognizes that survival will be possible only if nature becomes 
something knowingly maintained, manipulated, designed, and 
commoditized: “no longer different from other material products” 
(Kerridge “Small” 188).  It is thus that the poetry dispatched in 
loose and unskilled fragments could be read as a means to further 
continuum, thematic, and oeuvre rather than offer accomplished music 
but to promote careful techne.  Yet that sympathy towards emergence 
may be, however, in the final analysis, to overstate the historical 
as a means to guarantee the craft too far. 
The emphasis on death and graveyards in this collection is married 
to Burnside’s relinquishment of Wordsworth’s unambivalent unification 
with God in his desire to go out into the unfixed world.  This is not 
as contradictory as it appears.  Wordsworth’s unification leads to an 
“internal brightness” (Home 886), an immortality in a world yet to 
arrive.  Burnside evokes this in “8 a.m. Near Chilworth” and 
“Pleroma” (above), but Wordsworth’s version is significant, for it 
suggests not the silent company of death as union (906) but a vital 
life-force.  While Wordsworth has no ecological language to secure 
this, his mind presses “Inherent things from casual, what is fixed / 
From fleeting” (1031-2) in his address to God, which could suggest, 
in its constitution of an ecological voice of disparate unities, the 
promotion of a wide range of metaphysical interfaces over monotheism.  
Burnside, conversely, will accept the transitory nature of Being with 
the same metaphysical fervour derived from geological kinship and the 
creative will to sustain livelihood as cultural and evolutionary 
becoming and freedom. 
Fluidity and stability provide an ecological gloss to Burnside’s 
concern for identity and home.  The terminus to the collection in 
“Roads” emphasizes departure and signifies the ongoing process of 
world reflected in the mutability of self.  However, it has similar 
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undertones to Frost’s poem “The Pasture” (North of Boston).  The 
desire to go out into the world and the willingness to confess this 
despite the conflict it might entail -- a particular New England 
variation of what Heidegger meant by “passing by... the hidden 
site... of nearness” (Question 33), where both ordering and saving 
are irresistible and in restraint -– posits a model of self-reliant 
assertion and temperance.  In Burnside it is an abaxial move or 
turning away that has understood the need for the concept of the 
nature of human beings otherwise no sense can be made of them 
(sometimes) being alienated.  This is aspect by aspiration, which 
carries the sense of abandonment in dwelling (Harrison Forests 265).  
In Burnside’s craft it also indicates the problematic of operating 
within the phenomenological realm, or forwarding poetic temperance 
that may either frustrate a readership wishing to be moved along 
without jarring, or remain transcendent if not historicized.  That 
this has been clarified but not finalized suggests that Burnside can 




This chapter is divided into three sections representing three 
attempts at reading TLT, progressing to more radical criticism 
in the third move.  Respectively: three figures (Shepard, 
Benjamin, and Paz) qualify Burnside’s Rilkean lament; structure 
and intertext require a view of TLT as literary ecology; the 
enunciative shift within I/We politics suggests a 
heterophenomenological semiosphere of dispossession.  Here, 
materialist, holistic thinking negotiates the danger of how 
empiricism can slip into Idealism if unaware of the subject of 
perception or the poetics of ecological consciousness; TLT’s 
phenomenological forms, therefore, suggest that context and 
relation viewed as dynamic agency are integral to our 
understanding of being-in-the-world. 
 
I. Traditional Criticism and the Hinterland 
 
The interesting question regarding Burnside’s phenomenology might not 
be its role in his poetic development but his coming to view it as 
part of a dispossessed world.  What Burnside is able to imagine and 
construct is not necessarily co-terminus with his poetic achievement 
-- that which Crawford identifies as a “‘poetico-eco-philosophical’ 
perception” of a science of dwelling.  What is true is that Burnside 
remains clear sighted about the implications of his practice.  The 
deployment of world-to-mind agencies/dynamics does not suggest a 
paradigm of the subject and floating empirical phenomena, any more 
than the use of qualia makes his poems nature poems.  They suggest 
thought as action. 
Furthermore, a purely phenomenological approach to TLT could not 
involve authorial will to the degree that I choose to examine 
Burnside’s allusions and appropriations as determining factors to the 
reception of his poetry.  On an initial reading, these figures and my 
focus upon their thoughts de-centre Burnside’s work, but I stress 
that they are forwarded to see how his poetry is centred by these 
texts, and while constructed by the poet these paradoxically offer 
ecology of making that undermines a sense of individual authorial 
intention.  This craft represents neither a systematic theory nor 
counterintuitive configuration but a web that provides an alterative 
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sense to a ‘full’ ecopoetic in TLT. 
 
I begin my chapter here, with Burnside’s ecology of male thinkers 
from the twentieth century, offering me a base to reflect upon 
structure and thinking, how form and content reflect each other to an 
extensive degree.  This structuralist critical mode dissipates in 
this chapter’s second section as I shift to a position on intertext, 
yet it is reclaimed to a degree as I return to uncover aspects of 
form in TLT.  This tension bears the hallmarks of a response to an 
ecopoetic that is both in the moment and offering a point of 
reflection, a science of experience and a point of contact.  I see 
these as a singular, dynamic, creative agency of structure and 
decentering, conceiving and offering potential outside the conception 
(or originative act), and thus forward the idea of thinking as kan 
before moving into a realm of phenomenological criticism in the third 
section.  This dynamic, while underpinned by theoretical moves, is a 
concept or energy that is let free by the chapter’s structure as a 
means to evoke the phenomenological and to resonate with the main 
emphasis in this collection: binding and loosening, gravity and 
light.  It is given particular emphasis in the final two subsections 
that are presented as interchangeable units of the thesis to 
underline the possibility of combining acts of gathering and freedom, 
having otherness in relation.  I offer this as a means towards an 
understanding of Burnside’s poetics of relinquishment that is 
articulated by a Taoist inflection to Stevens’ “Thirteen Ways of 
Looking at a Blackbird” (Harmonium) throughout TLT.  The extension to 
the Pragmatist representation of “uncontainability and irreducible 
plurality” symbolized by the bird (Eeckhart 114) provides criticism 
with a perspective that reads the poet transforming Modernism by 
amplifying a two-dimensional representation of a process – the 
historical and imaginative interplay distilled by Burnside’s Marxist-
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Surrealist perspective -- into a hologram of a woven knot: modernized 
Romantic co-creation as human ecological outlook upon consciousness 
and world (Burnside Wild Reckoning 19).  I begin to clarify this 
through a perspective external to Burnside’s poetics. 
 
I.A. Shepard’s Mutual Interdependence 
 
Shepard’s Lacanian semiotics argues that language structures the 
unconscious.  His trilogy on animals, the human, and nature (Animals, 
Tender Carnivore And The Sacred Game, 1973, Nature) argues that 
culture traps humans in early adolescence, which reduces intimacy 
with the wild, offering life devoid of natural psychogenetic 
development that humans need.64  The Orwellian undertone implies that 
we are growing in our alienation from roots in nature -- that which 
made imagination and intelligence possible for the human -- as 
biodiversity (i.e. elements of our language, our biological creative 
vocabulary) is reduced (Animals).  It is stressed that we lack a 
vision where interdependence between language and culture is 
inclusive of animals and terrain.  Shepard’s notion of ‘minding’ 
clarifies this relationship: 
 
What is meant here is something more mutually and functionally 
interdependent between mind and terrain, an organic relationship 
between the environment and the unconscious, the visible space 
and the conscious, the ideas and the creatures (Animals 35). 
 
The negation to the fall into domestication is used as epigraph to 
the first section of TLT, and informs the central line “homesick for 
the other animals” (“History” (1); “The Light Trap”) -- that which is 
the volume’s conceptual core, (Funk interview 10) -- pregnant both 
with desire for equation with the other and the lament for the loss 
of the other.  The point of relation as written in “History” (1), 
                         
64 Also Shepard, The Others: How Animals Made Us Human (1996). 
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below, is crucially significant to an understanding of this volume 
and Burnside’s versions of Stevens. 
 
Since we have always shared all things with [the gods] and have 
always had a part of their strength and, certainly, all of their 
knowledge, we shared likewise in this experience of 
annihilation.  It was their annihilation, not ours, and yet it 
left us feeling... dispossessed and alone in a solitude (“Two Or 
Three Ideas”, Opus 206-207). 
 
While Burnside registers the loss of species, Stevens is speaking of 
the end of human belief in a particular style.  He is also speaking 
of art as a “social substitute” for the loss of Gods: the progression 
towards an ideal through harmony and cooperation (Carroll “Stevens” 
88-89).  Language as part of natural selection suggests that 
discrimination, differentiation, and memorialization are instruments 
of social adaptation to nature.  Modern poetry -- to Stevens, 
oscillating between the polarized cultures of print orientation and 
sound orientation as creations of the imagination -- can store the 
diversity of world into word images in its particular taxonomy.  This 
would relieve Stevens’ anxiety facing annihilation not by 
repopulating the deserted house but to recognize that the Gods “came 
to nothing” (206).  Burnside thinks of this within a phenomenological 
frame taking nothingness as the current state of new beginnings.  My 
thesis has been outlining the tenure of interreigns within and 
outwith emphases on the provisional.  I now situate this by reading 
Burnside’s signposts. 
Shepard embeds his conceptualization of taxonomy within a thesis 
that argues for children to participate empathetically with nature in 
order to fuel the right need for an objective schema for our 
relationship.  Taxonomy represents the shift from empirical 
particularity and diversity to conceptual generality and simplicity, 
the ordering of accumulated encounters of the non-human; its 
discovery of unity in diversity can mature the brain by operating 
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distinctions given through the operations of language, which can 
enable new and unknown, proper and mature encounters.  Therefore, 
named images are a means to our own behaviour, entering our 
consciousness as subject, what Shepard’s anthropology has called the 
element of mastery within the “inner-zoo” (Animals 14).  Burnside’s 
mastery comes from Rilkean poetics of nostalgia indebted to Benjamin. 
 
I.B. Benjamin: Language towards History and the Creaturely 
 
De Man’s reading of Benjamin in the posthumous “Conclusions: Walter 
Benjamin’s ‘The Task of the Translator’” (Resistance) while 
suspicious of intralingual equivalence of signifier and signified, 
emphasizes the need for the political stance that is resident in 
Wordsworth: to understand natural changes from the perspective of 
history rather than history from the perspective of natural changes.  
This is the Hegelian ripening of world through man’s actions.  
Burnside’s use of Benjamin in TLT takes the penultimate sentence from 
“On Language as Such and on the Language of Man” (1916), and places 
it as epigraph to his poem on world language, or earth song, “On 
Kvaloya”.  This links to Burnside’s contemplation of history in a 
wide sense that involves the creaturely, as such it conforms to 
Buell’s writerly ethics of not using nature as backdrop but manifests 
presence that suggests human history implicated in natural history 
(Environmental 7-8).  We have to translate Benjamin in TLT: 
 
The language of nature is to be compared to a secret password, 
which passes on each post the next in its own language, contents 
of the password (Selected 74). 
 
Benjamin is speaking of language as the expression of the aspect of 
mental life that is communicable.  He is drawing from language in the 
wide sense of a method of expression, not particularly a lexical 
field.  For Benjamin, man’s mental being communicates in his language 
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and it follows that in the naming process the essence of his being 
lies.  This does not enter negative post-structuralism (Rigby), for 
it makes two qualifications: (i) that world communicates to man first 
by stepping before him, by which he is able to name and go beyond 
himself; (ii) furthermore, that a use in language rather than by 
language is how the mental being communicates to God.  Naming is this 
manner for Benjamin, completing God’s creation as a creative power 
set free in man (68).  It is a form of Emersonian spirit and co-
creation come home. 
Benjamin makes a further distinction between revelation and 
poetry.  The former is a mental region that does not know 
inexpressibility but is wholly dependent on the language of man; the 
latter rests not in this spirit of language but on that part of 
things in which they communicate themselves.  This bears direct 
relation to Heidegger’s notion of unconcealment.  To Benjamin this, 
however, has not remained creative in man; it must be “fertilized” to 
forward the language of things themselves “from which in turn, 
soundlessly, in the mute magic of nature, the word of God shines 
forth” (69).  It is the site between invocation and soliloquy that 
must be recharged, the stillness and quietude of Coleridgean poetics: 
 
If silence is a re-drawing of speech, not its private 
withdrawal, absence can be commuted to an inflection of how 
others are present as one way of opening to an other (Larkin 
115). 
 
However, with Benjamin’s post-Romanticism in mind, to understand this 
in terms of a “password” shared between sentinels -- an idea of poet 
as guardian but also one figure in a web of bodies that must interact 
-- one must look to the fertilization process as a form of 
translation and means to interface with others.  This suggests the 
muteness in which things shine forth reconfigured as reverse echo of 
the nameless (nature) into the named (human realm) by promoting the 
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named (human) into the nameless (nature).  I have argued for nature 
coming to mind in earlier chapters and I see this as co-creative with 
dispossession poetics (often viewed as the opposite direction).  In 
Benjamin it is understood more simply in terms of that which is 
sustained and not reduced in the translation process in Being.  I 
shall forward the human translated into the nameless through Weilean 
poetics of dispossession in the third section of this chapter.  It is 
the signal central position that I wish to forward in my reading of 
TLT and I offer this initially in my reading of “On Kvaloya”, below. 
Benjamin views this translation-password process as “continua of 
transformation” (70), the development of “spontaneity” (69) or way of 
things becoming perfect.  It is this which carries the non-
communicable or non-referential element, the symbolic function which 
gives the language of man a “purified” essence; “the uninterrupted 
flow of this communication runs through the whole of nature”, the 
password and passage “imbued with a nameless, unspoken language, the 
residue of the creative word of God” (74).  This quality is something 
that Benjamin articulates as the expressionless and immediate in the 
essence of a translation, the poetic process of continuum and renewal 
in the life of an artwork (“The Task of the Translator”, 1923 – a 
timely meditation contemporaneous to Williams’ paean to spring, 
Rilke’s elegies, and Stevens’ Harmonium).  This should exist without 
being (or the need to be) channelled to a responsive agent, or 
consumer.  The work is to promote the history at work in the 
evolution of translation as energy in itself over psychologism or 
anticipatory determinism.  Romantic politics and craft reverberate in 
this post-Kantian realm of ethics that does not distil resources into 
standing reserve (objectness).  In Benjamin the promotion of life and 
sensationalism as the outline to difference in history between 
artwork or world and human, suggests the need for a consideration of 
time.  The promotion of history at work and the time in which human 
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action evolves and participates recalls Frost’s depiction of manual 
labour (North of Boston, “From Plane to Plane” An Afterword in 
Collected), and Wordsworth’s poetics of dwellers; crucially however, 
Benjamin’s eschatology is motivated by ethics where reductionism, 
Idealism or an absolute is inconsolably quashed. 
 
I.B.1. Mourning and Melancholia 
 
Hanssen reads Benjamin’s efforts to differentiate his writing from 
Heidegger’s as one crystallized in the concept of the kreatur, the 
de-limitation of the human subject within a thesis of natural history 
that incorporates transience and decay: a non-human history coloured 
by a critique of the philosophy of the subject (2).  It offers 
insight into the possibility of the named entering the nameless.  
Benjamin’s attentiveness injects contingency and alterity into the 
idea of nature (and transcendental philosophy) thus standing as one 
of many significant modifications to the Linnaean model of an 
infinite chain of being that rose during eighteenth century 
historiography before the advent of evolutionary theory.  
Furthermore, Benjamin’s humanistic subject is considered in terms of 
the present being salvaged by the incomplete potential of the past.  
This, although aimed against Fascism and being anchored in terms of 
anti-foundational human freedom, takes on morality located in the 
realm of action (“Fate and Character”, 1919) and the politics of 
destruction (“The Critique of Violence”, 1927) as the contact with 
nature’s forces that are violent and revolutionary. 
These counters are self-generational.  Their non-foundational 
origin purports a new ontology of vitalism not unlike hypotheses that 
dispute hereditary mechanisms.  Moreover, as state in-between 
identities, they can be read as an echo of the symbolic destructive 
angel of history, neither melancholic agent (as in late Benjamin) nor 
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hermeneut (as in traditional angelology).65  However, while Benjamin 
articulates voracity and the pursuit driven by desire, Burnside 
commutes love.  He now shares the attention toward his partner (TAD) 
with that of his newborn son in this collection, charging the poetics 
of husbandry with modalities of the domestic and authoritative 
dispositions.  It is thus that a model of decreation as openness not 
desire, derived from Stevens is more vital to this investigation than 
Benjamin’s revolutionary creationism (despite its emphasis on 
contingency and otherness).  Union, separation, and poetic 
consciousness, therefore, require further investigation. 
 
I.B.2. The Post-Rilkean Song of the Earth 
 
For Rilke, animals present back to humans the notion of submerged 
humanism in the recesses of the heart, the potential of which is to 
be gained via loss of self.  Heidegger argues that the human needs 
the animal’s face (Antlits) to see the open.  In “What Are Poets 
For?” (1946) the need for the non-rational is motioned less than the 
idea of being brought into relation with God via human distinction to 
creatures.  It is thus that “nature” in Heidegger’s Rilke is not 
divisional, as it “is not contrasted to history”, but it is life, not 
biological, but physis: “Being in the sense of all beings as a whole” 
(Poetry 101).  Thus minding the animals reflects back upon the human 
world and evokes a German-Jewish tradition of the creaturely to 
emphasize possibilities of relation.  In the fourth of the Duino 
elegies contemplating playfulness and harmony, Rilke asserts that: 
“our blood does not forewarn us / like migratory birds” (2-3).  The 
fact that the animals are world-poor suggests that man as world 
forming is not absorbed into the environment but can view it as a 
                         
65 The direct engagement: John Burnside, “Three Enquiries Concerning 
Angels (After Paul Klee),” Poetry London, 51 (2005): 4-5. 
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site of possibility: the project or mode of being more than the 
perspective or experience of one person -- I visit this in the 
heterophenomenology of I/We politics (sec. III.B.1.). 
The distinction between weltbildend and weltos to Heidegger is 
that an enormous sadness burdens the latter animal realm (Fundamental 
273).  In Rilke’s fourth elegy man is a latecomer to himself; in the 
eighth elegy the human is backward looking, his eyes like “traps” 
surrounding the world as it “emerge[s into] freedom” (4).  The 
metaphor of fleeing from the womb is the pain or “enormous sadness” 
(42) which, due to memory of the first and now distant home, provides 
the condition that “we live here, forever taking leave” (73).  This 
is an unmistakably Burnsidean sentiment.  Respite from this comes 
where there is no “World”, “that pure / unseparated elements which 
one breathes / without desire and endlessly knows” (16-19), it is 
nothingness as “unuberwachte” (18): free without burden of 
supervision and healed in “timeless / stillness” (17-18) that 
relinquishes the vision of the future but enters into the “boundless, 
/ unfathomable” (36-37).  Value in loss once more, but now it is the 
mysterious site of creation pregnant with possibility that can be 
viewed as a path or site for the progression of man’s actions.  
Symbolically this connects us to Stevens’ blackbird and Wordsworth’s 
streams.  Burnside reflects upon this version of homesickness in 
“History” (1) developed in “History” (2) and “A Theory of 
Everything”.  Before visiting these poems I read “On Kvaloya” to 
provide an insight into the richness of the ideas of the collection 
before distilling them into the Rilkean mode outlined. 
 
I.B.3. On Kvaloya 
 
“On Kvaloya” is a nexus of many motifs and themes of the collection: 
home to the blackbird –- the signified nominative act highly charged 
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by Burnside’s bird of mourning, and with Heaney in mind, “portent of 
death and loss” (“Underground” 18) -- the rim of sound, the naming 
process, perpetuation, and inattention.  These are set alongside 
‘stillness’ and ‘turning’ as attunement and praxis: time and body 
commingled.  Burnside hosts keynotes as a single scale meditating 
upon the concepts of the indeterminate and the prepared over the 
fixed.  This is an ecological statement of provisionalness (or 
incomplete evolution) that should encourage an ethics of freedom and 
release (or inaction as enowning).  It is positioned to negate 
enframing, exploitation, and derivative and impotent politics.  To 
the phenomenologist it is a beginning (newness) that is becoming 
(continua). 
The poem makes an explicit move from linguistic entrapment to 
Ancient Indian Dharmic religion (to the oldest literate community in 
India renowned for their fylfot, the holiest symbol or peaceful 
swastika of “well being” now eclipsed by twentieth century usage).  
The section titles read, “Learning to Talk”, “Metamorphosis”, “Tern” 
and “Jain”; they are attempts to transform the human into bird and 
make evitable self-control, spiritual independence, and equality.  
This is the human into the nameless as in the final movement’s 
presentation of the body and mind “attuned, / to gravity” (4: 31-32) 
offering Burnside’s version of moksha, the realization of the nature 
of the soul.  This should be viewed microscopically, too. 
The first section begins with nine sestets with each distinct unit 
written like a fencing volte that could stand on its own, again 
outplaying the form of the collection in each particular breath.  
These toy with “the rim of sound” (1: 6), “inattention” (18), and the 
“still[ness]” (19) of home in the final nine-line strophe, all 
working to complement the quantitative metre through their clarity.  
The first phrase relates to Heidegger’s notion of nearness given by 
the property of language “to sound and ring and vibrate, to hover and 
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tremble” (Language 98), the poetic saying of world as projection of 
energies.  The others suggest passivity (or the relinquished ‘I’) 
within attunement and the repetition of the provision of endurance in 
nature viewed as a momentary balance before fulfilment, respectively.  
I explicate these in respect to the collection as a whole while 
simultaneously wishing to indicate here how form and subject 
interrelate. 
The second section is a sonnet fragmented into two quatrains and 
sestet but is looser than its predecessor and crafted rhymelessly, 
suggesting an increase in “a foreign tongue” (7) and the “unsure” 
(12), yet also plugged into the “certainties” (11) of the meadows -- 
a version of foreignness as fact (Bishop) and extension to exilic 
consciousness of TAD.  The last sections, “Tern” and “Jain” are 
pinned into triplets and quatrains respectively, propagating 
expansive space that would complement the loosening of the first half 
of the poem.  “Tern” is composed of five triplets but only three 
semantic units.  The first short objective reportage of clipped lines 
moves into a subjective keyhole that sustains into the remainder of 
the poem, but I read more than trilogic form promoting the ‘I’: 
 
I’ve heard it said: 
we are 
what we imagine; 
 
but just now, 
turning for home, 
I caught the storm 
 
shaping a bird 
from the swerve 
of the not-yet-seen.  (3: 7-15) 
 
 
This is familiar short-breath poetics to the Burnside reader who 
has a pocketbook Husserl, but I suggest that it has a distinct charge 
resting in the word “turning” as a singular force, unremarkable and 
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distant.66  The use of migratory eider witnessed in the opening of 
TAD are at home here in “the fleeting rain” (3: 6), as with the tern, 
and blackbird, offering a confusion of sea-birds and land-birds 
eventually melding into the variegated, chequered magical flora in 
the final line of the poem.  The temporality is Rilkean (non-human) 
forewarning that Burnside encourages us to read in the non-Idealist 
self echoed in the democratically enchained birdlife.  I read 
“caught” in the sense of infection over entrapment, suggesting a mind 
of the elements.  I propose that the “swerve” is the worlding of 
nature, the movements that turn our sensibilities and root us in 
place.  These scaffold the “not-yet-seen” as three-way compound, an 
incredible compression of: (i) “not seen” -- for this is a multi-
sensual listening self we read of; (ii) “not yet” -- the world in 
process for the present participle is held in the “just now” (10) of 
the reporting process; and (iii) “yet-seen” -- invisible but minded, 
felt or registered in the turning of body, mind and world as one. 
The final movement represents the illumination of the other world, 
or epiphanical attunement held in the connection to nature.  It 
portends Burnside’s later prose versions of this epiphany as turning 
with the sway of the world -- i.e. the encounter of a flock of the 
incredibly seasonally camouflaged ptarmigan (“Learning To Fly” 113), 
and the non-transcendental heightening or stillness of the 
otherworld, symbolized by isolation and silence, threaded by the call 
of the red-winged blackbird (“Travelling into the Quotidian” 60, 70).  
We circle back to Stevens, Emerson and Coleridge, yet the enactive in 
TLT is threaded by morality and concern for animals, thus evoking 
Rilkean homesickness: 
 
I stopped dead: in a clump of buttercups 
                         
66 As emphasized in “Some More Thoughts on the Notion of a Soul” 
(“Poems”). 
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a creature stirred; then far out in the grass 
another wave, until I realised 
that everything was moving, one long tide 
 
of animals 
in flight from where I stood, 
and for that moment, I was powerless, 
afraid to move, inept, insensible. (4: 13-20) 
 
The death of the self leads to a new brotherhood “of animals” and 
rooting in place.  Burnside’s use of the “wave” represents a phase in 
personal history, the play of wind on the grass, and the global 
interlocked biosphere underlined by the grammatical movement inwards 
from colon to semi-colon to comma, intimately related to movement 
beyond the ‘I’ and the senses.  Breath, undulation, and mind are 
processes expanding as one.  This realization and attainment of 
powerlessness heals the homesick and while it offers the “insensible” 
it turns the (non-)transcended self to home as neutral, temporal 
unplanned and contingent gathering suggested by the verb/collective 
noun “clump”.  Furthermore, the significant line is given over to the 
seamless order “of animals” alone, indicative of the progression in 
form of the poem as a whole from the tight and military arrangements 
to the shaping of breath in the final section’s quatrains -- another 
stress underlining power (in terms of looseness and binding), 
solidarity, and attunement.  We have been witness to these before but 
they have not been wrapped by the creaturely in the same manner that 
TLT evokes the writings of Shepard and Benjamin. 
Rilke’s reconciling poeisis marks “the divinization of the 
immanent world” (Bate Song 263) and the potential for action or new 
ecological praxis.  However, one must read Burnside’s voice 
differentiated from the Romantic point of alienation, the position on 
the edge of experience.  His model of absence (from within 
homesickness) is neither a literature of the particular nor abstract 
idea but is the collapse of these in opposition to forward his model 
of the continuum across contingent and non-contingent realms.  For 
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Burnside, Rilkean sensitivity enables the ear to attune to how world 
enfolds the mental being.  It is a form of death discovered through 
creation. 
 
I.C. Paz: Relinquishment and Creation vs. Discovery 
 
Paz has brought Burnside to understand that the acceptance of death 
as a larger part of life in the critique of rectilinear time is one 
that finds the connection between heaven and earth represented in the 
continuum across present and past.  Paz’s reading of Michaux as 
entrance into “vortexes... interweavings of being” (Alternating 78) 
in the transport of language as medium “clearing a path” into unity, 
plurality, and chaos seems of use to Burnside’s ecological post-
Romantic ethic.67  Paz states that original disorder informs time and 
allows faceless intersection that is the continuation of being (79) 
and he mobilizes Heidegger to express the poetic revelation of 
simultaneity and non-contradiction of living and dying (Bow 121-139).  
These are made hybrid as a means to an insight into poetry’s ability 
to recreate time as an echo of the world’s movements; as such it 
relates to the notion of “objective chance” (155).  I find that this 
should not be considered outside the emphasis in TLT that promotes a 
sense of self as creature by finding the self before the creator.  
The faceless intersection is the Weilean poetic.  Objective chance 
relates to the backward compatibility of being thrown forward as a 
spirit which acts as feedback loop to any emphasis on essences. 
Paz clarifies the working of nature into mind as the Surrealist 
critique of subject-object relations where “on the one hand, the 
world evaporates and changes into an image of consciousness; on the 
other, consciousness is a reflection of world” (Bow 153).  
Inspiration -- a “poetic force” outside self and outside creator -- 
                         
67 See ch. 4, p. 253 for Burnside’s use of Michaux. 
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suppresses an antinomy between subject and object and any hierarchy 
between the two as a means to consecrate the alien other.  The 
reliance upon this to be incarnate forces a new beginning.  Paz’s 
version of Romantic wind and Modernist snow is attributed to an echo 
of St Augustine and Tertullian (Paz 246) and considered in terms of 
an invitation to support or oppose action, the song not to consecrate 
history but to be incarnated in history (212).  It is Burnside’s 
political position in TLT’s two “History” poems and it enables both 
directions (nature to mind, mind to nature) via nameless fusion that 
does not eradicate identity nor confuse intention/comportment.  Paz’s 
development of church fathers affords life viewed within a Surrealist 
exposition that leans heavily on André Breton and thinks of the end 
of history where man is master of his own consciousness as an 
evolutionary Marxism.  As the discovery of world “in that which 
emerges as fragment and dispersion” is to present and discover 
“otherness” (“Signs in Relation”, 1967, Bow 240-241): “being and not 
being the same as other animals” (246). 
To Breton the discovery and the inspirational force arise from an 
independent consciousness that is made whole by surprise, intimacy, 
and a return to that which has been witnessed before -- creation’s 
collective character that is an involuntary organization that fights 
censorship or doctrinism (Manifestos 153).  Burnside distilled this 
into the poem “Being and Time” as the dialectic of departure and 
return transformed by Surrealist intuition to go beyond the self: 
“something we knew without knowing, as we knew” (14).  Breton claimed 
this in Nadja (1928) as: “that taste for searching in the folds of 
material, in knots of wood, in the cracks of old walls, for outlines 
which are not there but can readily be imagined” (121-122).  It is 
the furthest stretch from the Puritan reading of signs; here the 
beyond is in this intuitive life, less as an enigma or pure source 
but the mental landscape and world dissolved without perspectival 
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horizons.  Phenomenology, therefore, has its role. 
It is one thing to claim that the real and imagined cease to be 
contradictions (Manifestos 123) but to forward the realization of 
spirit via particular automatic expression requires clarification: 
 
[The] manifestation-form of external necessity as it makes a way 
in the human unconscious.  It is moreover apt to be brought to 
the front rank of preoccupations by war, in which the strength 
of calculations appears to be continuously limited by that 
unknown, the oscillation of a certain chance (“Situation” 77). 
 
The present thesis could emphasize the new politicized spirit “in a 
state of grace with chance” replacing the Orpheus complex with the 
“geometric locus of coincidences” as a means to explaining necessity 
and freedom (Autobiography 106).  I have read this from another angle 
sensitive to the disposition that Breton states as attempting to 
trace the phenomena that the human mind perceives “as belonging to 
separate causal series [which come] so close together that they 
actually merge into one another”.  Burnside twists the possibility of 
encounters able to inspire non-conformism and irreverence into 
understanding the way of the outside world that answers an inner 
question, at the core of which is the desire to relate and care.  
This is enfolded, finally, into the Stevensian decreated unity, the 
Weilian poetic.  I have elected to present this last (sec. III.), to 
read it within yet after the tension between structure and thought. 
 
II. Structure and Thought 
 
A non-parasitical voice that has no inherent demands upon its laws of 
reception -- the time required for contemplation, evaluation, and 
internalization unencumbered by the technology used in its 
distribution processes -- can reconnect to the contours of its 
historical and material reality, the time and space of its unique 
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existence bearing upon its representational objectives.68  In Frost 
and Burnside, this begins with connection and an eye to the real: 
 
we trade so much to know the virtual 
we scarcely register the drift and tug 
of other bodies 
      scarcely apprehend 
the moment as it happens: shifts of light 
and weather 
      and the quiet local forms, 
of history (“History” (2): 43-50) 
 
The twisting shape of the verse spinning out trajectories of 
thought and pulling them in to sustain subject as with the light of 
setting suns being the dwelling to the world’s interfusion, posits a 
new version of the fragmented and seamless, or dispersion and unity 
and “how [gravity and light] loose and bind” (“A Theory of 
Everything” 2).  This is a vast and inclusive metaphor of the techne  
of anthropos: that animal that looks up imaginatively but is wedded 
to the earth.  “We inhabit what we have determined to be the 
necessary fiction”, an apprehension Burnside expresses as “the origin 
of both our sometimes tragic freedom and our immense responsibility” 
(Burnside in Stevens Selected xii).  The poet as maker structuring 
thought is echoed in the burdened poet as parent in “History” (2) 
resonating with the sense that marrying global to local –- the 
philosophical abstraction -– begins with the perspective of history 
(rather than of nature).  This poem represents the new historical 
mood of fear coupled to hope -- curiosity or Grundstimmung -- as 
matrix of life.  To Burnside, to reject the virtual is a political 
act not unlike stepping outside of the self that transforms the 
action of naming into singing.  This twin aspect can be heard in the 
                         
68 cf. Benjamin “Mechanical” (1167): an attempt to harness 
emancipative ‘aura’ or awe through creativity and external value -- 
concepts whose uncontrolled application “would lead to a processing 
of data in the Fascist sense”.  cf. Frost “From Plane to Plane”, 
Afterword (Collected). 
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expansive verse of TLT, given its highest inflection through an 
emphasis on certainty and spontaneity in the volume’s final line 
where the individual man, woman, and blackbird, resonate within a 
single array: the named singing themselves into existence.  It 
instances “a sense of the oneness [Hannah] Arendt [1906-1975] 
recognizes as predating the descriptive energies of language” 
(Burnside xii in Stevens Selected).  I shall return to these ideas 
and this poem at the chapter’s close.  Deconstructing or de-mixing 
manifest form in Burnside’s poetics can be fruitful, but I indicate 




Burnside’s most intricately conceptual collection decisively enforces 
themes of division and unity through twenty-seven poems divided into 
three sections of nine.  These are further split into three groups of 
triplets with each poem representing singularity and trilogy (as with 
the secular man, woman, and blackbird).  These divisions entitled 
“Habitat”, “Phusis”, and “World” relate to Burnside’s ecological 
appropriation of Heideggerian thought; the view of these at distance 
reads a progression from animals to perception to the fusion of the 
natural and the mental.  Furthermore, each triplet contains a single 
poem that stresses one of: (i) the relationship of mind and world; 
(ii) the condition of the human (homesickness and the possibility of 
Orphic resolution to exile in language); and (iii) the need for 
attunement.  These also represent the thematic watermark to sections 
one to three, respectively, when viewed at a distance, too.  The 
ordering of these within each triplet is shuffled, and in the manner 
of a scale that is widened by the gap between the notes thickening, 
these triplets are spirited from these initial concepts towards an 
emphasis on perception, process, and personhood interfacing with 
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division titles.  This expansive emphasis in its last phase 
(personhood) evokes inattentiveness (modern disinterest), the 
absolute and the local, and unity, respectively in the collection’s 
progression through sections.  Furthermore, unity, as the last 
counter is significant as it is housed in the final poems named 
“History” to the divisions “Habitat” and “Phusis” and at its widest 
(i.e. worldhood or ecohood not selfhood) in “A Theory of Everything” 
the last poem of the third section “World”.  I claim priority to 
these poems for an initial reading of the collection and I urge that 
these three emphases operate non-paradoxically and in non-opposition.  
The combinations and threads across poems locate a post-dialectical 
marriage where reading and then re-reading the collection works with 
this dynamic; altogether it is not dissimilar to yogic practice. 
 
II.B. Thought (and Kan) 
 
Burnside reads the contemporary scene in America as one of dissident 
poetics defined by insistence upon “the provisional, on the 
dialectic, on the bringing forth of the thought process, on the 
metaphorical” (“Mind” 69, my emphasis).  This in turn lays challenge 
to “the apparent consensus [which] is anti-intellectual, 
fundamentalist, literal-minded, self-righteous and xenophobic to a 
degree that has not been since the [19]50s” (67).  Burnside’s task is 
to marry ideal and real, to fuse the empirical to the imagination and 
make mind and world inhabit the same neural-material pathway to bring 
the heart and mind together as singular breathing in a new poetic.  
The introduction of a Surrealist indistinction between the 
unconscious and the visible attains this, and by an involvement in 
the way of thought of the Eastern kan -- the Chán (Zen) Buddhist 
statement inaccessible to rational thought -- cyclical nature evokes 
interdependency between mind and matter. 
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Firstly, it is important to note two distinct devices: (i) the 
‘imaginative-empirical’ and (ii) the description of mind via 
reference to the natural world.  The former places components of the 
experienced world into a new context or new array, which has not 
attained witness but is logical and can meet the imagination.  It is 
the noumenal realm.  The latter uses the natural world to describe 
the working of the mind; this is not necessarily metaphorical but is 
often given through analogy to suggest parallelism that can merge in 
non-Euclidean space.  This is the innately poetic realm.  There are 




is nothing like baize 
or polished jade; 
 
the gap between coltsfoot and mint 
no more or less 
specific than a kale field after rain (“Taxonomy” 19-24) 
 
As an example of the imaginative-empirical, a fragmented, provisional 
and temporal spectrum is indicated by the making (poeisis) being 
burdened upon the imaginative process of the reader, particularly 
onerous as one must imagine a reading of light.  This knowledge 
derived from a form of logical inference (the creation of new 
knowledge from existing knowledge, deductive reasoning derived from 
fact but not reducible to fact) is distinct from the use of the 
natural world to evoke our mental faculties of perception, storage, 
and recollection.  As here: 
 
As everything is given 
      and conceived 
imagined real 
    a stone’s throw in the mind 
 
it’s not the thing itself 
         but where it stands 
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-- the shadows fanned 
     or dripping from a leaf 
the gap between each named form and the next 
 
where frogs and dragonflies arrive 
from nowhere 
   and the kingdom is at hand 
in every shift of colour and degree 
 
bullfinch and squirrel 
      hawk-moth 
and antirrhinum. (“Koi” 30-45) 
 
“Where it stands” evokes known forms and relativity: in “Koi” the 
post-Kantian Wordsworthian concern for the relation between a priori 
and a posteriori paints a colourful picture of the mindscape and the 
movement of thought within an ecology of names and perception set 
within musical nominative acts.  Flora and fauna are given over to 
the sound of the word representing the rolling and turning of the 
mind -- “antirrhinum” a floral genus that extends to connote mythical 
fauna provides an inverse-onomatopoeia: rather than sound evoke 
thing, the formation of sound and thing as one imitates the mental 
station.  It is reminiscent of the phenomenological moment of 
Wordsworth’s representation of mind in the ascent of Snowdon (The 
Prelude book 14), where a blue chasm opens to deep streams, the 
metaphor of innumerable neural pathways given articulation as once 
roaring voice (43-59).  Rather than isolating an object, Burnside 
shifts “the thing” (“Koi” 34) into context and imagines an interior 
world -- the space and mechanics of mind -- alive with dynamic 
objects open to reinterpretation.  This constitutes progress from the 
reflective frame of the phenomenological in TAD.  This ecology of 
mind and matter, world, cognition and representation is interfused to 
the point of non-distinction and communality; it learns from flux, 
contradiction, reconciliations and the Rilkean dialectical where “all 
things are shown in terms of one another” (Cohn in Rilke Duino 16).  
This is resident in Burnside’s literary ecology but it is not the 
creation of an ecological voice, it is only a description of mind 
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(and of possible fictions), of which both the description and the 
state are constituted through the lexicon of nature.  This colours 
the perspective of history. 
  
The only laws of matter are those which our minds must 
fabricate, and the only laws of mind are fabricated for it by 
matter (TLT 21). 
 
Burnside’s quotation from the Edinburgh-born theoretical physicist, 
James Clerk Maxwell is located as epigraph to the second section 
“phusis” (Greek: kruptesthai) beside Heraclitus’ claim that nature 
loves to hide, a problem without a solution.  As an enlightenment 
perspective on the human investigation of the natural world partnered 
by early Greek thought, Burnside’s appropriation of a circular 
equation can  be seen as non-duality that outstrips pathetic fallacy 
via kan thinking.  The human ecological influence of Paul Shepard 
best explains this.  Shepard restates Maxwell: 
 
If the mind discovers structure in nature because its own 
structure is a produce of the order of nature, then such 
comparison is not a discovery or an original insight, but is 
inevitable (Animals 36). 
 
Burnside uses the scientific edge delivered from the idea of the 
defiance to logical unravelling (kan), given ecological and 
anthropological linguistic thesis by Shepard, to develop his poetics 
and inform his thoughts on history.  Here, intertextual gatherings 
play a role and offer an inner place turned outward: the paradoxical 
organically structured event of experience augmented by reflection of 
both memories and the need to communicate forwards in time.  
Intertext also brings into relief the poetics of experience located 
in the body and mind responding in the moment of (re-)telling.  By 
such transmissions and discoveries, the poetry urges, consciousness 
is woven. 
Bristow 291 
II.C. Intertext as Literary Ecology 
 
Following Rigby (Topologies 13), I stated that the poetics of ecology 
offer semantic webs.69  I am taking this a stage further by offering 
intertextual networks as poetic sites that marry de Man’s post-
Romanticism to Burnside’s metaphysical inflection of the material, 
“to understand natural changes from the perspective of history” (de 
Man Resistance 83).  I read a parallel and complementary initiative 
in the intertextual event, which Frow reads as having “instead of the 
social determination of the literary norm... the social text as 
content of the literary text” (Marxism 127).  My critical method 
prioritizes the imperative to exploit the emphasis on relations, 
offering representation in semiotic terms, immanent in structure 
(conceptual form and intertextual event) and as a historically 
specific system, a social text or fragmentary tradition that I chose 
over hub-spoke topologies (centralization).  Intertextuality draws 
links between signs separated in conceptual space whereby new ideas 
come into being; as an intersubjective space.  Moreover, as part of 
bringing forth the world collectively, it offers human semiosis as 
part of a wider cultural semiotic system.  It is a form of 
ecocritical modelling in itself where the movement among ideas is 
stressed more than the ideas themselves. I thus wish to consider this 
model as a field of consciousness operating in TLT. 
With respect to the decentred poem, or devolved ecology of 
intertextual site, I would like to make a distinction between two 
generic forms of intertextuality (each having multiple subsets 
therein).  The first, I should like to call ‘textual’, the later, 
‘integral’.  The first is constituted by grammatical and lexical 
manifestations of the intertextual event, micro-units of 
signification, texture, and music e.g. the use of triad, variation of 
                         
69 ch. 1, p. 70. 
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foot, end-line emphasis, vocabulary -- all parts of a larger matrix 
within an ever growing or emergent structure.  My readings of 
Burnside’s poetry under the influence of Bishop, Williams, and 
Dickinson (and to a much lesser degree certain elements of Stevens 
and Wordsworth) operate on this level; it is where Bloom locates 
ratios of poetic revision (Anxiety).70  For example, Burnside’s use 
of the word ‘depends’ in TLT’s “Of Gravity and Light” (1: 9), is not 
only poignant as line-ending, but Williamsesque in the manner that it 
forwards innocence, knowledge, and trickery shorn of metaphor yet 
with a subtext of play and risk, in language and in world, as with 
“The Red Wheelbarrow” (Spring and All 22, Imaginations 138).  The 
second form, the integral, is largely constituted by more explicit 
signposting to the eye, such as the peritext (i.e. epigraph, titling 
etc.), which are hypogrammatic events, linking texts relationally to 
already existent signifying words or texts of the past.  I have 
chosen to emphasis this form of intertextuality in TLT, especially 
the references to Stevens, Benjamin, and Shepard, for my thesis 
stipulates this collection as a highly conceived work of form, 
viewing the frame of sources over corpus but ultimately 
interdependent.  I borrow the distinction from John Frow’s semiotic 
split between the matrix (textual) and hypogram (integral) -- his 
extension to Micheal Riffaterre’s structuralist poetics –- viewing 
the matrix as “the elaboration of a text from a semantic core”, and 
the hypogram in relation to other texts (Marxism 152), the latter 
being the thematic field that I label integral.  I relate this to 
                         
70 Bloom’s map of misreading is primarily concerned with poetic 
intertexts emphasizing agon, or the conflict of power.  TLT promotes 
collusion, interfusion, and community.  Of the revisionary ratios 
offered by Bloom, clinamen and tessera enable a view on Burnside’s 
versions of predecessors, and kenosis and askesis offer further 
insight into the poetics of purgation and curtailment (vis-à-vis 
relinquishment).  I feel that daemonization -- promoting the power in 
the parent that does not belong to that site alone -- is the most 
useful in tackling the metaphysical aspect of this collection. 
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dynamics operating at the periphery of Lotman’s semiosphere. 
 
II.C.1. The Ecological Semiosphere as Intertext 
 
The Russian semiotician, Yuri Mikhailovich Lotman develops Vladimir 
Ivanovich Vernadsky’s understanding of Edward Suess’ concept of the 
biosphere: life as a geological force that shapes the earth.  
Lotman’s model of intertextuality, the semiosphere, argues for an 
ensemble of semiotic formations which precedes and becomes the 
condition for existence of an isolated language: without environment 
there is no particular manifestations -- a position that complements 
Shepard’s thesis deployed by Burnside in TLT.  Lotman’s model of core 
and periphery indicates a boundary between the semiosphere (the 
intertextual network, reaching outwards to established relations 
where participants are both part of the dialogue and the space of 
other dialogues) and the non or extra-semiotic space (that which is 
not yet encountered or interfaced with).  This is what Frow calls 
“both a part of the general discursive field and a particular mode of 
transformation of that field” (Marxism 127).  The border acts as 
filter translating levels of the macro semiosphere, for each 
semiosphere cannot be contiguous to extra-semiotic texts.  
Furthermore, Lotman’s model forwards atomistic complexity in signs, 
which he states “are immersed in a specific semiotic continuum” 
(206).  The notion of continuum in Lotman is called the semiosphere 
by explicit analogy with Verndasky’s use of the term biosphere, 
signifying the totality of living organisms.  This, distinct from the 
realm connected to human rational activity (the noosphere) has a 
structural role, it is the “cosmic mechanism” that affords “planetary 
unity” (207): a communication process that brings forth new 
information on diversity and integration.  My reading of TLT forwards 
primacy not in the individual sign, fragment, or allusion, but -- not 
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unlike Benjamin and Lotman -- in the unified mechanism, the totality 
of the greater semiosphere of isolated fragments as they relate to 
each other.  The ‘I’, no longer authorial but devolved by effect; 
originally offered solely by metaphysical rumination, now emerges as 
a self-consciously aware post-Kantian collective intersection of a 
dynamic field. 
 
We are sometimes 
haunted by the space 
we fill, or by the forms 
 
we might have known 
before the names (“Septugesima” 10-13, FD) 
 
And this was how he knew himself at last, 
the unvoiced presence shining in his eyes 
made flesh again, made whole, untouched by god (“History” (1) 
11-13, TLT) 
 
Rather than progress that is satisfied with new designs to re-
conceive old patterns, Burnside (like de Man’s on Benjamin and 
allegory) speaks of the historic materiality of thought; I see this 
in the mode of ecology driven by Shepard (language emphasis) but 
inflected through the stress on points of relation extended to self-
consciousness in “History” (1).  I view this effecting transparency, 
particularly acute in this collection at the conceptual level.  It is 
alive to the degree that TLT is a composite of intimately connected 
aggregates (individually and triadic elements) -- a highly 
interesting spatio-temporal concept enabling one to think of life 
constituted by and a function of the biosphere. 
 
II.C.1.a. The Light Trap, Particularly 
 
The quality of Burnside’s post-modernism, heightened in TLT’s 
eclectic aleatory poetics does suggest a critical relation to the 
possibility of complete relativism afforded by complicity to the 
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(negative?) extensions to Saussarian linguistics i.e. the inherent 
incoherence between signs, and the deferrals of meaning.  The aspect 
of Burnside’s verse that I am stressing in this reading forwards 
disseminations dependent on contingencies driven by the selections of 
the author.  It is supported by Burnside’s intertextual emphasis in 
TLT that acts as a form of heterophenomenology (Dennet).  This, 
distinct from the private, traditional ‘first person’ paradigm, is 
objective (or neutral) yet involves the self in the world through the 
subject’s self-reports and its interaction within a community (of 
texts and of world).  I speak of this as I/We politics in this 
chapter. 
Here, Burnside’s epiphanic stance becomes critical of the 
authority of the subject’s reports (unlike traditional phenomenology) 
and stresses the way things seem to the subject during and after 
experiential moment of immediacy, the resultant affect is to offer 
revelation as (and sometimes over) poeisis.  This leverages the 
reader to read the ‘I’, the intertext, and the fabric of the poem 
that combines the two, as a means to reach a conclusion from the 
total data set made available to them.  To Burnside, the poem and 
poetics cannot stand alone (or the epiphanic relation alone is not 
achieved in this poet’s hands).  The effect distils time and history 
as context for contemplating the movement of the poem and the 
movement of the mind in the poem: metaphors for our own actions once 
more.  For example, the Husserlian experience filtered into the 
object that is being studied, the poetics of the (pro-
heterophenomenological) semiosphere: 
 
Four days of wind; 




squabble and drowse 
in the fleeting rain. 
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I’ve heard it said: 
we are 
what we imagine; 
 
but just now, 
turning for home, 
I caught the storm 
 
shaping a bird 
from the swerve 
of the not-yet-seen. (“On Kvlaoya” 1-15) 
 
The third section to this poem, “Tern”, exploits Burnside’s reading 
of American poetics on the level of form, while also collating TAD 
images of the eider in Anstruther (“The Men’s Harbour”) to the sea-
bird of north Norway.  However, this indication of place is a weak 
veil to the poetics that I identify here: we are a long way from the 
locodescriptive poem and the vocative of apostrophe uniting mind to 
physical environment.  This section instances indissoluble union 
between mind and matter as fused elements of the same scene, what has 
been called active consciousness concerned with recalibrating itself, 
“the prized tension of awareness” as result of attempting an 
equilibrium with respect to “proximity to and distance from nature” 
(Slovic 353).71 
The section title operates as homophone to a Heideggerian stress 
(‘turning’ Question), which is coupled to an idea of the potential in 
world events (“the not yet seen”).  Another quick glance offers the 
reader three units of sense: (i) an expansive view of time and place; 
(ii) the momentary and particular object of study; and (iii) the 
third sense written over three triplets bringing the past and present 
‘I’ into context with the play of light and movement of mind as a 
means to reconsider the first two units within a new whole (or 
consideration of internal and external), typical of Burnside’s 
                         
71 See the site of meaning as “proprioception” (Ricou “Ecotopia” 55); 
cf. Noë, proprioception, “the ability to keep track of one’s relation 
to the world around one” (2) a form of perspectival self-
consciousness. 
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triadic sense in this collection.  This is particularly involved in 
the dual sense of agency in the line-ending “storm”, offering both 
subject and object as the (intentional) actor that shapes the bird, 
the subject and third term of the piece: all in turn and collectively 
forwarding imagination and experience within the pull for (an 
indistinct) home.  Furthermore, the enunciative shift and complex 
modality within the phenomenological account can be seen in the 
movement from the indicative mood, or actual state of affairs in the 
first two units, to the fusion of past and present as ambiguous 
disguised conditional (almost future perfect tense) of the present 
potential in the third unit, the tension and ambiguity between the 
double value of “shaping” (i.e. dual agency: man/wind confusion), 
following “caught”.  This, I argue, enriches the almost two-
dimensional flat-pack Husserlian phenomenological realm of the poem 
and represents a pronominal transformation shifting closer to nature 
speaking through the human than human speaking for nature.  I have 
moved on from structural criticism and have provided a critical model 
of phenomenological intertextuality. 
I now develop this to articulate TLT’s ecological ethic with 
respect to the tension between world and human agencies. 
 
III. (Post-)Phenomenological Poetics 
 
The flaw in correspondence between material reality and what is 
present to consciousness i.e. that which has no existence independent 
of mental faculties, that “‘refers’ to, or is ‘directed onto’” things 
(Scruton 264) positively instances the phenomenological frame, where 
meaning and reference is made essential to every mental act. I argue 
that this is not taken away but lowered in TLT as a means to enable 
greater letting be of the world and to challenge the pragmatic value 
of how categories (available for expansion, loosening and 
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phenomenalizing), although not explaining the world, endow the world 
with meaning for the human. 
How to achieve this is tricky.  How to sustain this across a 
collection is even more difficult.  It appears on a first reading 
that TLT phenomenalizes world but posits a gap in this conception.  
This primarily limits anthropocentric authority (or ownership) to 
indicate only the sense of being someone.  However, it also retains 
the possibilities of transcendence that a complete phenomenalizing of 
being would rule out.  Is the poet offering space for a subject-
independent reality prior to language or discourse? Furthermore, what 
are the possibilities of realism here, of the poetic act that can 
disclose the ‘two-in-one-ness’ of world (that we are apart from, and 
are a part of world)?  Stevens writes that “realism is a corruption 
of reality” (Opus 192); I suggest that this space in Burnside’s 
poetry subtracts epistemology and affords greater hermeneutic play.  
It does not suggest that the object of knowledge is the only reality 
but shows how human made centres of thought act as realities.  This 
intellectual domain is often conceived as an event, not a thing to 
itself but a site of bonding between the contingent reality and the 
non-contingent universal: the fact of world and the fact of our 
comportment to it: 
 
The trick is to create a world 
from nothing 
 
    - not the sound the blackbird makes 
in drifted leaves... 
 
but nothing 
   which is present in the flesh 
as ripeness is: a lifelong urgency. (“Koi” 1-4, 13-15) 
 
We return to the statement upon fiction, and the need for the private 
life “that allows us to catch the fleeting and tentative glimpses of 
the wider order that makes for actual poems” (Burnside in Stevens 
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Selected ix).  The declaration of the poem as an ecopoem undoes a 
pure ecopoeisis while also forwarding a mysterious discipline of “the 
individual state” which is “part alchemy, part conjuring trick” but 
ultimately a process that “begins and ends” in the lyrical ‘I’.  The 
positing of consciousness as phenomenological “nothing” in the 
opening lines to the collection neither offers a tabla rasa nor an 
‘I’ but brings the “lifelong urgency” into relief: the quest to enter 
into relation and the human inevitability of attempting metaphysical 
knowledge, which for Burnside are collapsed as one and the same.  
This urgency, or desperation, however, reverse engineers the ecopoem 
to a degree, threads polemic into any neutrality and undermines a 
sense of letting be and discovery.  However, “Making” (16) and 
process are forwarded by the given leaves and the intentional song 
resting in the human geography of the built environment where clouds 
are reflected in puddles of a space now absent of the human.  The 
persistence of natural forms instances unexpectedness and “ambiguity” 
(27) of world derived not by the random association of Surrealism but 
by the possibilities presented by free association of movement of 
mind and body.  All of these poetic energies effect the sense of 
human involvement variously. 
While one can read the indication of a made site movement is 
depicted in the poem by the human traversing through the world and 
noticing things move (or not) as they move themselves (clouds in 
puddles).  It is a declarative that claims no name for it is brokered 
by the poetics of the cast of mind over the poetics of verification.  
The consciousness of the poem is that of a wandering thinker and 
self-conscious phenomenological flâneur.  Thus, the loose line and 
the view outside to dilute the self-centred frame: 
 




 though it seems more ritual now 
than lifelike fear 
  as if they understood 
in principle 
   but couldn’t wholly grasp 
 
the vividness of loss 
 
and every time we gaze into this pool 
of bodies 
we will ask 
 
how much they know of us 
  and whether this 
is all illusion 
 
like the play of light (“Koi” 64-78) 
 
In “Koi” phenomenology can be seen to be pushed into hermeneutics 
seeking to understand actions by acts of rational self-projection 
rather than external causes.  This is how we view humans in a 
different manner to how we view nature -– reasons and decisions over 
causes and predictions.  Aims, emotions, and activity are terms in 
which the human sees the self, thus the hermeneutic dimension to 
phenomenology is self-conscious or a form of truth in art, not 
scientific but representative of “how men experience their conditions 
of life” (Eagleton 68).  This may appear as further penetration into 
inner sense or to contract world anthropogenically and quash the 
ecophenomenological impulse.  One response to this is to read how the 
poetry no longer asks questions of essence in abstraction from 
questions of existence: the complete phenomenological reduction 
(Husserl), it appears, is impossible.  That which is denoted by 
“this” (“Koi” 76) both world and poem, suggests that language is an 
event we encounter, to an itinerant agent (even if contained by a 
circuit and therefore repetition), it is not merely the fiction that 
contains and creates all.  Thus, Burnside offers, reality as an 
effect of language, a principle that is indicated but not pinned 
down.  Here the reduction from world to idea to consciousness is 
negated for the opposite direction, the shift from “we” as subject to 
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object with feedback loop where world is viewed within the event of 
language, conceived by mind evidentially afforded by world.  In the 
final analysis this ecological concept withdraws from ecological 
poeisis while representing the incredible difficulty of speaking for 
the world when neither speaking humanly nor phenomenologically. 
 
However, a position that reads a contradiction between non-
anthropocentric ecopoetics that is installed via an authorial ‘I’, is 
indebted, it appears, to too strict a focus on the authorial voice 
qualifying the signifying practice, a position that Burnside’s desire 
for ego-free politics urges against.  Moreover, this position has its 
blind-spot in not reading the ‘I’ as intersection, a point in a 
dynamic field (that which my opening chapters take particular care to 
foreground, especially heightened by my use of Ingold within the 
context of Romanticism), but wishing to posit the ‘I’ as a point, 
sometimes fixed, which misses the mediation of the literary system in 
a transparent and fresh mode.  This can be understood well by two 
elements. Firstly the notion of presence (above) within a thesis of 
action and inaction (coloured by Burnside’s hinterland threaded 
through the semantics of the triadic structure); secondly Frow’s 
“enunciative shift” (Marxism 128) resulting in complex modalities (as 
with my reading of “Tern” above). 
The second section to this chapter has prepared the reader for a 
loose critical method, both cautious and transparent in its 
application, to open the idea of the semiosphere to intertextual 
theory as a means to offer texts as organisms in relation to each 
other, without detracting from the subject of the poems under 
investigation.  Here the human ecological emphasis in TLT, conceived 
within triadic form and articulated via structuralist theory (sec. 
I.) combined with my critical method to show the possibilities of 
criticism keen to test the shift between traditional methods and 
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phenomenological criticism.  Not dissimilar to actor-network theory, 
it witnesses the recruitment and conversion of items and events as a 
means to build an assemblage.  Things are held in place by the 
conceptual form in this third section and I challenge the reader to 
make the final link between interchangeable sub-sections at the very 
end (sec. III.C. onwards), to become part of “the making of 
connections, with the linking of one thing with another in order to 
apprehend the greater whole” (Burnside Reckoning 15).  The promotion 
of the in-between state and the stilling of the ‘conversion’ process 
that I attempt to bring into relief evokes TLT’s final poem, where 
non-constituted fragmentation promotes the poem wandering errantly 
from poetic presence but made free within a dynamic array of 
reference and signification.  It is a site that the poet forwards for 
the reader to dwell in poetically; the relinquishing of his own craft 
brings forward a method that does not read thingness as an “effect of 
recognitions and uses performed within frames of understanding” (Frow 
“A Pebble” 279; my emphasis) but promotes world within modalities of 
acknowledgement and within spheres or realms of being attuned.  It is 
comportment poetics of the surround or ‘engirdlement’ -- an apparent 
outward spatial limit of earth, stressing commonality (concentricism) 
over enframing (limitation).  It is a new possibility of the poetic 
cast of mind. 
 
III.A. The Phenomenological Contract 
 
The phenomenological ‘I’ takes the mental act as its datum.  While 
the lyrical device in Burnside is not the symbolic psychology of 
introspection, how does it advance beyond the first-person case to 
the life-world, and while not taking the source of consciousness 
within this datum how does this evoke self-consciousness? 
Phenomenology has posited a distinction between the material 
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object and the intentional object of a mental state.  Stevens 
proposes that things are without human feeling and without human 
meaning.  That things merely are, is an inscrutable paradox stating 
both that things are beyond our imaginings but also that without the 
imagination no things can be i.e. it is in the imagination, our 
relationship to things, that we let things be or not.  Here, 
distinction or separation is always a relation.  Thus, the Stevensian 
imperative is to allow this relation its true and full fruition: “Let 
be be finale of seem”. (“The Emperor of Ice Cream” 7 Collected).  I 
read Burnside accepting this position by forwarding thinking in TLT 
not to state that ‘seeming’ cannot be reconciled to that which ‘is’, 
but that the ‘I’ is knowingly interdependently exchanging with the 
physical ecology.  Burnside thus embraces elements of the 
phenomenological -- especially the possibilities of the ‘I’ as non-
essentialist being located in only one place at one time -- but 
contextualizes his poetics to promote existence in relation to 
essences, the resultant materialist poems therefore vibrate with 
historical and collective dimensions.  Here, an incredible amount of 
pressure is placed upon the deployment and function of intertext to 
evoke the ontological. 
 
When they speak about angels in books, 
I think what they mean is this sudden 
 
arrival at somewhere else 
through a rift in the fabric, 
 
this glimpse of the absence that forms between two lives (“After 
Lucretius” 1: 25-30) 
 
Burnside’s self-indulgent recontextualizing of lines from “September 
Evening; Deer at Big Basin” (MOT 1-3) (“After Lucretius” 1:25-26/27) 
instances the mind’s capacity for care (Heideggerian sorge), the 
positing of world in a frame alive to the past and yet unintentional, 
“unanchored, blind” (1: 12).  It is, however, the universal 
Bristow 304 
intentionality (to relate) threaded with anxiety from the ultimate 
fact of our disconnection from world as time progresses -- both child 
to man and century to century.  The intertextual lines are therefore, 
indicative of human “apprehension for itself and for others, and the 
attempt to understand the world as an object of knowledge and 
activity” (Scruton 273). 
Moreover, the emphasis on being active in time forms and 
determines an outlook beyond the objective world or world of 
essences: “something will come from nowhere / and touch a man” 
(Burnside “After Lucretius” 1: 39-40).  Not wanting to transcend 
world, Burnside’s evokes the invisible flesh of world as something 
that provides a felt relation.  The source of consciousness does not 
appear to consciousness, thus phenomenology cannot postulate the 
transcendental ego, it can only posit consciousness as 
phenomenological nothingness (something that Burnside continually 
presents as “nothing”).  Here “something” and “nowhere” 
phenomenologically denote the transcendental ego, which is 
transcendental to the phenomenology.  It is at times, therefore, a 
limited linguistic realism, but it evokes intuition and emotion 
implicitly. 
 
III.B. Phenomenology Versus a Contracted Sense of Realism 
 
TLT uses the first person pronoun less than any other collection, 
which suggests that the need to install the Cartesian ground to 
phenomenological foundationalism is not a requirement.  Thus the 
indicative sense of the singular form does not report the contents of 
that foundation, but the stress on the ‘I’ in TLT -- always following 
the plural ‘we’, or framed by the ‘we’ -- proposes a different 
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foundation in the subjective case.72  As a replacement for a noun the 
pronoun shifts naming into relation, designating designation and 
summoning rather than fixing things in place.  In Burnside it is what 
is given to consciousness in the very act of conceiving itself as a 
related entity which is the experience of integration that precedes 
every attempt at description. 
 
I used to think old age would be like this: 
the afternoons more sudden than they are 
in childhood (“The Gravity Chair” 1-3) 
 
An indelicate, forced manipulation of the reader echoes Stevens’ 
position that the imaginatively transformed reality of poetry “is 
both preferable to an inhuman, contracted and oppressive sense of 
reality” while also offering “a truer picture of the relations humans 
entertain with the world” (Critchley 28).  I suggest that the effects 
in TLT require slow contemplation of the situated consciousness.  I 
shall expand. 
 
III.B.1. I/We and the World Paradigm of Situated Consciousness 
 
Wittgenstein’s private language argument proposes immediacy or 
privilege involved in knowledge of personal experiences where meaning 
is woven into the fabric of each individual’s life (Investigations).  
Burnside’s use of the plural pronoun suggests a publicly accessible 
condition with the contours of intimacy resting in-between the direct 
                         
72 Speaking generally of the three sections: (i) ‘Habitat’: 
emphasizes the singular pronoun being either framed by the plural 
pronoun or being setup as a means to address another individual 
subject; (ii) ‘Phusis’: the ‘I’ (with one exception, “The Gravity 
Chair”) is embedded in discourse with ‘you’ as second person pronoun 
indicating Sarah Burnside, as collective pronoun synonymous to ‘one’ 
(not individuation), and as relative link to other, most notably the 
most pronounced pronoun, the third person ‘he’, Burnside’s son; (iii) 
‘World’: both aspects of the former sections brings the three into 
relation (with the singular exception of “Birth Songs”) and uses 
these to promote place, ‘here’ is called to attention and discovered 
through these pronouns. 
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observation of a singular mental state on one hand, and the indirect 
observation of an other on the other hand (as with the section 
“Habitat” where the ‘I’ is framed by ‘we’).  It expands how things 
seem to how they are and how they are shared.  It pushes outward from 
pure phenomenology (and the Husserlian epoché) to suggest not only 
the possibility of thicker experience than the ‘I’ alone affords, but 
also the conviction of the existence of other minds, and an emphasis 
on shared experience where the world is seen under the aspect of 
meaning to communities and the forms of integrated experience.  This 
contextualizing of the phenomenological (to the degree that this is 
possible via frames) can return the self to an enriched and completed 
form, what Burnside has labelled “Pleroma” (FD). 
I have identified four moments in TLT that forward the ‘I’ more 
than its relational family as posited in all other poems.  I wish to 
look briefly at three of these here to loosely encompass themes and 
treatment in a manner that a phenomenological criticism might 
operate.  I see this necessarily tasked with accentuating the 
qualitative aspects that are spatially and temporally distributed 
through the collection which require a flitting and quick mind.  They 
are thus difficult to individuate and draw together with one thread; 
a temporary excuse for dextrous prose across the poems, I propose. 
The first two of these pronominal examples recall the poem’s 
persona in childhood and are embedded in the concept of gravity.  It 
is a force that reveals itself in “The Gravity Chair” and is viewed 
within the wake of the philosophical paradox of Zeno of Elea and the 
argument against motion, plurality and change.  In “Birth Songs” it 
is inseparable from Lucretius’ materialistic view of the nature of 
the universe where all things pass and change from one state to 
another.  The paradox of this combination is resolved through 
Burnside outrunning these theories in his offering of unity (the 
first poem dedicated to his wife) and mystery (the behaviour of world 
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beyond the phenomenological frame) within a single semantic site: 
 
I used to think old age would be like this: 
the afternoons more sudden then they are 
in childhood... 
 
yet sometimes, on a winter’s afternoon, 
I thought of someone skilled – a juggler, say - 
adapting to the pull of gravity 
 
by shifts and starts, till something in the flesh 
- a weightedness, a plumb-line to the earth -  
revealed itself, consenting to be still. (“The Gravity Chair” 1-
3, 10-15) 
 
The metaphysician reads “still” referring to the promotion of now: 
“the time it is inside the soul” (Priest 226, 237); the philosopher 
reads this as method where things are “temporaliz[ed]” (Deleuze 
Bergonism 35) and given relations in duration.  Why the need for 
“weightedness” one asks?  The condition of being something forwarded 
by the participial adjective brings forth the sense of gravity as our 
comportment to world; here the effect is to provide the sense of 
falling into death as part of the chord of the earth’s movements.  
This is highlighted by the frame of the poem that I have collapsed 
here, but it is wrapped within a thesis of adjustments as singular 
existence in the middle triplet’s articulation of change and oneness; 
motion, therefore can be conceived as stillness, temporality as 
infinite. 
This single movement is given further stress in the next poem that 
centres the ‘I’ more than other poems in TLT, but this, as with “The 
Gravity Chair”, is hardly singular centring at all.  Nature is 
threaded in paths and journeys of world in “Birth Songs”; it just 
cannot be conceived separately in the poem full of world.  The 
philosophical take is that of their being no rawness in world.  
Whether Burnside’s poetry shows an inconsistency with respect to the 
degree that this position can be extended into the notion of ‘ready-
to-hand’ (Heidegger), throwness and being ‘always-already’ situated 
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in time, and the quasi-Kantian argument that thought operates within 
perception, requires further investigation and may not be resolved by 
critical accounts of his poetry.  However, in TLT we can claim that 
Burnside offers the poetics of being neither alone nor out of 
process.73 
 
  I wonder what you dream 
 
and whether dreams 
are possible: what clouds of glory fade 
 
to sunlight, daybreak, 
hints of gorse and tar. (“Birth Songs” 1: 8-12) 
 
The mysterious world is soaked in the wired and connected realm of 
the parent’s intuition and love (1-4).  Is this a case of human 
behaviour viewed differently to nature; are reasons and decisions 
forwarded over causes and predictions?  The most telling aspect is 
the imagined child’s mind conceived through the man’s lexis of 
nature.  The shift from monochrome to gold widens a sense of binary 
between father and son, imagined and real, dark and light, human and 
nature.  The latter colour of gorse is not alone but collocated to 
the liquid of bituminous odour obtained by destruction of wood or 
coal, signifying the free and the organic made into technology as a 
qualification to potential sentimentality.  An environmentally acute 
fusion of the world and of human geography (tar) is also an ironic 
premise of the movement of mind upon surfaces to satisfy its need to 
conquer surfaces.  Is this heavy-handed treatment of the 
phenomenological?  By comparison, the loose navigation of “On 
Kvaloya” uncertainty and naming are considered once more within the 
quest and in comparison to stillness, but I’d like to think a little 
                         
73 Foucault names the institutionalized discipline of the body and 
the regulation of population biopolitics as 'biopower', which 
suggests to Agamben the politicization of bare life.  Michel 
Foucault, The History of Sexuality (1979), and Giorgio Agamben, Homo 
Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (1998). 
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more on “Birth Songs” first. 
 
I saw how lovingly the earth resumes 
possession, like a blizzard in reverse, 
retaining every blemish, every scratch 
 
and fingerprint, a history of touch 
and currency... 
 
as it became 
the echo of my ordinary self 
sounded-out and guessed-at in a chill 
descent (V: 3-7, 11-14) 
 
Poignant line-endings in these triplets, especially at “resumes” and 
“chill” suggest terminus and continuation in a fall from human 
ownership, complemented by the hyphenated and half-rhyme of past-
tense actions -- familiar ground to the advanced reader but a 
confusing array to the general reader unaware that the poet is 
writing out a “history” of his experience of “another presence” (17) 
folded within world, “like a descant, or a pulse” (18).  The quest 
and comportment beyond our contingent selves but one aware of self 
being embedded within this wider realm recalls MOT and it harnesses 
phenomenology to mark out consciousness in its wake: we pick at the 
scars and its footprint.  “On Kvaloya” restates this in more 
expedient poetics: 
 
I will have named 
all we can see, from here to the snow on Kvannfjellet, 
the yarrow in the grass, a passing swan, 
eider and black-backed gull at the rim of the sound. 
 
I gloss uncertainties – this lime-green weed 
that fetches up a yard above the tide; 
those seabirds in the channel, too far out 
to call for sure (3-10) 
 
The arc of mind from vision to the world concealed by nature 
(“snow”), and the herbs of white and yellow within the green, and the 
three species of birds that live at the edge of the horizon are 
enfolded into metre to stress parallels.  The end of speech and the 
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channel of water (“at the rim | of the sound”) are wrapped into 
three-syllable feet to elasticize their sense of connection.  A loose 
container for father and son, and the sense of the foreign and the 
domestic in the poem (“similar enough, / though different, to those 
we know at home”) are brought into singular music of delicate 
quietness.  I have already shown how this is significantly underlined 
by Burnside’s appropriation of Benjamin’s model of translation and I 
claim this phenomenological patch in each poem as being free yet also 
triggered by the ‘I’ at the beginning of the lines and dispersed in 
various temporal states: poetry created by operating outside the 
tiny, fractured phenomenological moment. 
I have taken these examples to indicate that Burnside’s use of the 
pronoun in TLT is significant in that even in its most singular 
moments it is infused in the world around.  Looking at these moments 
out of context of the collection has suggested the need to consider 
poetic devices and treatment on a larger scale.  I have suggested, 
too, the ways in which Burnside posits the mind, and I now wish to 
consider the decreative stance as an interface to these issues. 
 
III.C. Post-Weilean Poetics: Care as Comportment 
 
As identified above, the marrying of perception and world in this 
poetic, while troubled by human and technological frameworks locates 
a conception of livelihood as begreifen.  This is a mode of 
conceiving that works beyond representational thinking but also acts 
as the (less restrictive) representational comprehension of world in 
the immediateness of the living encounter (Heidegger Being).  Thus 
conceived through my phenomenological analysis, the Burnsidean 
epiphanical moment is one of arrest built from stillness and movement 
combined; in its most serene manifestation it assume the tone, though 
not the doctrinal implication, of a prayer. 
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The post-theological equilibrium of science and philosophy 
positions Jori Graham as one of this century’s finest poets of 
phenomenology and metaphysics.  "The Visible World" reads phenomena 
as "upthrown" (9, 40) from "the absolute" (1), deranged / and 
rippling" (10-11).  I have stated that Burnside and Oliver proffer 
the overlapping of instances carried and cradled by the non-
contingent soul, what Thomas has rightly understood as "an awareness 
of a universe only brielfy troubled by human presence", as with my 
reading of “Koi”.  For Graham, the challenge is to bring and make 
this "pellucid moment - here on this page now / as on this patch / of 
soil, my property".  As with Williams' treatise of ownership through 
disowning (ch. 3), Graham attempts to disentagle things yet retain 
supernatural dynamism in abstractions that are beyond the human frame 
and at the edge of poetics.  I choose to read Burnside’s concept of 
begriefen as grundstimmung, and thus emphasize history.  I forward 
this alongside a reading of Weilian poetics to imitate the 
collection’s simultaneous epistemology.  Thus, two subsections 
(III.C.1.a. and III.C.2.a) are interchangeable qualifications to the 
‘other’ parent section (‘Decreation’ and ‘History’) and can be read 
in one move as presented here or in two moves by swapping their order 
to widen each aspect of decreation and history, respectively.  This 
stylistic element is an avoidance of certainty but is primarily an 
affordance for the reader to bring into conception that which 
presents itself. 
 
III.C.1. Creation as Decreation 
 
Weil: “We must take the feeling of being at home into exile.  We must 
be rooted in the absence of a place” (34).  Chance, necessity, and 
evil have their place in Weil’s thought, which contemplates the world 
not as a debased creation but an expression of the love of the 
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Demiurge with which the human co-creates.  This creation is the act 
of decreation i.e. to pierce the screen of necessity between human 
and divine realms as a means to human ceasing.  Stevens sees a direct 
relation between this and the role of the artist. 
 
Decreation: to make something created pass into the uncreated.  
Destruction: to make something created pass into nothingness.  A 
blameworthy substitute for decreation (Weil 28; cited Stevens 
Necessary). 
 
This opening statement appears to make the distinction between the 
‘uncreated’ and ‘nothingness’, which suggests the potential and the 
rebirth of energy over the destroyed and destitute.  When read in the 
context of Weil’s thesis, “decreation” lying between sections 
entitled “The Self” and “Self-Effacement”, is not simply the 
renunciation of self, but as indicated in the final lines of the 
middle essay, it is the loss of being “‘myself’” or “‘ourselves’” 
which finds home in exile (Weil 34), resonating with Burnsidean 
dispossession. 
 
I have spoken of contextualized phenomenology as history.  I read 
Burnsidean negative poetics of naming turn towards immediacy and 
presence of earth (ekstasis) while the notion of repetition or the 
act of the human in response to world presents homology between mind 
and world.  This, as Harrison has found, comes from the view of 
possibility afforded by decreation: the new vision that understands 
the sin of denomination as possession (“Not Ideas” 662), that which 
charges abstraction with the need to “draw away”, abstrahere (663), 
i.e. loosen the phenomenon from the compounds of fiction while 
allowing fiction to take ownership or dispossess the human.  In 
American poetry it has been expressed as the spirit that passes and 
continues, celebrated as the lack of harbour in Whitman’s “Song of 
Myself” (1892): “without check with original energy” (Song 1: 13) 
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that is “not demented with the mania of owning things” (32: 6) and 
has bequeathed the self-will to “scattering” (14: 19).  I read its 
forbear in British Romanticism from an emphasis upon stillness that 
suggests attunement to world and to time, and I suggest it is coming 
to light once more in the post-Stevensian poetic.  I have prefigured 
this in terms of the techniques and themes of loosening and binding. 
In Weil, “the Self” posits that the ‘I’ is the only possession 
that we have, which can be destroyed from within as an offering and 
vehicle to the divine; this is the ceaseless renewal of being (27) 
recalling an Augustinian consent to unification.  “Self-Effacement” 
promotes humility and withdrawal that allows the light that is the 
union of God and earth (36).  Stevens has understood this in terms of 
artistry and reckoning that comes with post-human grace in 
relinquishing power of the single identity.  His text, “The Relations 
Between Poetry and Painting”, 1951, a Museum of Modern Art of New 
York pamphlet, mobilizes Weil’s conception of decreation as co-
creation (29).  Predating T.S. Eliot’s introduction to Weil in 1952 
following Routledge and Kegan Paul’s publication of The Need for 
Roots: Prelude to a Declaration of Duties Towards Mankind in 1949, 
Stevens stresses that possession via renouncing betokens not an 
identity as creator but one as spirit (“The Noble Rider and The Sound 
of Words” Necessary 33).  This is what Burnside attempts to trap or 
channel in this collection.  Unlike Weil’s extension into the passive 
acceptance of misery (Weil 30-31), to become “nothing” i.e. eternal 
(32), for Burnside it is to enter deeper into history and on into the 
nameless.  This can be read as further isolationism into the 
phenomenological realm as residence, but it should be read as 
intentional dwelling in thinking involved in action in the world. 
In the language of American deconstruction, decreated nothingness 
presences the invisible continuum and potential of earth.  This 
version of Heideggerian “sparing” to leave and let things dwell 
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(Question 308) is known to the unsympathetic modern reader as 
mystical, speculative imprecision.  To the phenomenologist it is the 
potential in world, often signified by ‘nothing’ the nominative act 
that cannot report the source of its consciousness.  For Burnside, it 
acknowledges that the human is not debarred from the scene: 
 
how every small erasure 
in the snow 
was dreamed to life 
as something you could hear: 
a thin song in the walls; a narrow purl 
of infant longing 
built into the stair. (“Animism” 15-21) 
 
Each erasure (not deletion) affords newness, separations posed as 
links.  There is an incredible weight placed upon the first foot of 
the last line here (“built”): a punchy monosyllable of human ecology 
which designates fiction and the power of metaphor.  Moreover, the 
complex “You” operating simultaneously/ambiguously as indicative 
second person pronoun and self-reflective, objective ‘I’, could be 
coined as ‘ego-free decreated self-hood’ but it has come from 
something made.  Here, the bridge between perception and memory 
modernizes Stevens’ appropriation of Weil further to interface 
empirical mind and imaginative flight.  I expand. 
“Purl” is the (textual) manifestation of thread and whirling 
movement of the imagination hardwired into the architectonics of home 
and body; the vehicle between planes (stair) is bridge and sanctuary, 
not means to elevation.  However, the “erasure” and “snow” betokening 
emptiness that could fuel negative “longing” is foremost the capacity 
to outlive impotent stillness and to resourcefully co-create within 
confined spaces and limited agency.  This is the Weilean ‘I’ 
dissolving into the nameless; it is the moment that disputes 
detachment where “at last we shall rush rapidly past objectiveness” 
(Graham “The Visible World” 88, Materialism in The Dream of the 
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Unified Field, 1996).74  It is a readable extension of the druidic 
ritual that “Animism” developed in the second stanza from the opening 
image of a bible “like a newly-gutted fish, / open forever / at 
Leviticus” (Burnside 5-7).  The final push (above) retains the move 
to conceive the third book of the Pentateuch not in terms of sanitary 
cleanliness but as the law of involvement -- another emphasis of rite 
over right debarred by unpoetic impasse.  Desire thus infuses the 
fish image (one of slaughter and offering) and enables it to run into 
the animism of names, which in the third stanza’s “narrow purl” 
negates confinement in law while suggesting possibility and 
plurality.  The verb as noun signifies both the song of rivulet and 
the East Anglian name for the tern, giving presence to the creatures 
over the scripture, building a sense of the hidden, local, contingent 
and empirical within the universal unfolding of the woven and fluid 
world.  It is a complex vacancy operating within the shift from the 
noun to verb.  To speak of its intrinsic quality would be to suggest 
that this is local history dependent upon the human for singing, or 
it is the poetic site of world and flight as human locus. 
 
III.C.1.a. History (the Lament as Base) 
 
Burnside’s Orphic allusions in TLT are to Rilke: to sing into 
existence not to name, codify or reflectively map. 
 
Then Adam forgot the names and one by one 
the creatures died. 
 
He seemed heroic then, a breed apart, 
and how he loved them more for being lost 
 
became his only myth, a tale he told 
of golden frogs and blood-red simians. 
 
                         
74 Graham’s line taken from Mikhail Vasilievich Matyushin follows 
direct citations of the Bergson influenced manifesto “Futurist 
Painting: Technical Manifesto”, Umberto Boccioni et al.  See Perloff 
Futurist. 
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Sometimes he wondered if they died en masse 
or if a single female had remained 
for months in the forest, 
lamenting the loss of her kind. 
 
And this was how he knew himself at last, 
the unvoiced presence shining in his eyes 
 
made flesh again, made whole, untouched by god 
and homesick for the other animals. (“History” (1)). 
 
Loss is the point of relationship and is the vehicle to finding 
oneself.  This has a particularly timbre in the poem’s endnote: “Miss 
Waldron’s Red colobus, 12th September 2000.”  Burnside references the 
old world primate, Piliocolobus badius waldronae, the critically 
endangered species of monkey discovered in 1933 and the first primate 
declared extinct in the twenty-first century, reported extinct by the 
Associated Press in September 2000 having not been sighted since 
1978.75  Burnside’s polemic can be heard in the line-endings “one”, 
“apart”, and “lost” that betoken the untimely meditation that “at 
last” signifies man’s destruction and irreversible alienation.  It 
appears that Stevens’ textual reconciliation has diminished.  The 
loss of animal ancestry and global biodiversity is Burnside’s 
challenge to thinking that views history as linear.  This is 
indicated by his use of Shepard who reads the central theme of linear 
history as “the rejection of habitat” (Nature 43), that New Testament 
“antiorganic and antisensuous masterpiece in abstract thinking” 
(“Puritans” Nature 5) -- to Burnside this indicates a requirement to 
rethink the condition of homesickness: to sense familiarity in the 
word oikos is to know it is a state of mind available in many places 
when one becomes unfixed.  This premise is echoed when mind is 
recalibrated to dispersion, thus reshuffled “apart” and “lost” lead 
                         
75 11,046 species were listed as threatened in “The International 
Union for Conservation and Natural Resources (IUCN) 2000” report; 
this rose to 16,118 in 2006.  IUCN, 1 Oct. 2007 
<http://www.iucnredlist.org/info/tables/table1>.  The extinction of 






Heidegger’s late metaphysics proposes responsible action as ver-an-
gassen (Question 9), which is to let loose and to start something on 
its way.  While it resonates well with Burnside’s deployment of Moore 
in TAD, it also suggests an occasion of freedom into presencing.  In 
terms of framing history, the challenge is positive destining, 
unlocking the energies of nature from the standing reserve (25).76  
It promotes poetic vision as ordaining, giving the world Romantic 
dispensation that allows an insight to the “yet veiled” as “waiting” 
(“The Turning”, Question 37): this is what Heidegger means by 
‘stillness’: endurance and unfulfilled potential.  It is also a new 
provision of history: 
 
We locate history in the realm of happening, instead of thinking 
history in accordance with its essential origin from out of 
destining (Question 38). 
 
Here, destining signifies the will, the “turning” within Being, 
Heidegger proposes, that can be realized through self-clearing 
(Question 41) -- a synonym for Weilean erasure. 
Burnside first writes of this in terms of a human response that 
promotes the context of human history within the earth’s evolution.  
It manifested into a monument poem regarding our relationship to 
creatures in “History” (1) and developed into a critique of middle-
eastern foreign policy in the uncollected poem “Base” with a middle 
ground of ethics and responsibility in “History” (2): 
 
but this is the problem: how to be alive 
in all this gazed-upon and cherished world 
                         
76 See Nietzsche’s third meditation (Untimely). 
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and do no harm 
 
      a toddler on a beach 
sifting wood and dried weed from the sand 
and puzzled by the pattern on a shell 
 
his parents on the dune slacks with a kite 
plugged into the sky 
       all nerve and line 
 
patient; afraid; but still, through everything 
attentive to the irredeemable. (“History” (2) 63-73) 
 
World-fear meets beach debris as the poet walks along the coastline 
at St Andrews with his wife and first son; it is a vision of the unit 
of three isolated yet “plugged” into a global context of letting be 
and universal authoritative response.77  The child, Lucas, echoes 
with the air-base Leuchars and expands the process of naming as 
enframing into the geo-political scale.78  Burnside starts with the 
“war planes” (10) over the golf course but allows them to fade out 
into “petrol blue” (35) and then focus on the kite; the dissolve to a 
colour suggestive of the imagination scaffolds the displacement of 
image by the kite as a symbol of communal interface across the three 
humans and between sky and earth.  This transition forwards the need 
to find context by thinking of “neither kinship nor our given states” 
(24) but our confinement “by property” (30).  The word resonates 
between the sense of intrinsic aspect and ownership.  The poet 
suggests it “has most to do with distance and the shapes / we find in 
water” (32-33), the homes of colour, light, oceanic patterns, and 
pollution that provide an affordance for life.  Relating this to fish 
trapped in ornamental ponds and the figure of his son on the beach 
brings the poet to the final lines of horror and the potential 
godless disorganization. 
I am reading this poem as a metaphor of craftwork, an instance of 
                         
77 See sec. II., pp. 284-286. 
78 cf. “Of Gravity and Light” and “Birth Songs” (TLT), “De Anima” 
(TGN), and “Responses to Augustine of Hippo” (GS). 
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human action.  Here the Romantic paradox outlined by Bate, to embrace 
sanctity of life without enframing it (“Eco laurels”), is a lens upon 
the landscape that provides the pictorial frame for the child 
navigating the terrain of the sea’s “driftwork” (20) and the locus of 
the parents’ stasis.  This is modelled as a stillness that is an 
indecision, “plugged” into earth’s elements, inactive but desperate 
for a composed response to the inescapable challenge to throw this 
child forth into the world.  Equally, “patient” and “afraid”, this 
balance of calm and fear is threaded as being “still” and is in 
“everything”.  Nevertheless, it is primarily “nerve and line”: taut 
“lines raised in the wind” (28).  Like the casting of poetic words 
out into the world, the fundamentally longitudinal connection between 
father and son (watermarked by universalism) is viewed as connection 
between earth and sky through playing and the desire to resist the 
gravity of the occasion, although knowledgeable of the fact that any 
spontaneity is lost in the reflective moment and the ethical stance.  
This knowledge is neighboured by paranoia.  Having traded so much for 
the virtual and having lost the other animals, the potential 
atonement for setting warplanes in the sky seems unlikely.  The poem 
is absent of resolution.  It forwards no manifesto but evokes 
enowning; an idea incredibly difficult to fit into English but 
connoted in the phrase “being-historical thinking” i.e. thinking that 
is governed by the historical unfolding of world/Being, viewed as 
leaping into truth or movement in the sway of the historical epoch of 
involvements guided by Being.79  I have read this poem in the wake of 
my emphasis on binding (gravity) and loosening (light); unfinishing 
and irresolvability in “History” (2) are revised in the final poem. 
 
 
                         





I remind readers of my statements on the breakdown of language as a 
means to uncreate self and to open up world (ch. 1).  Here, the 
unpoetic space is an unfinished semantic site where the work not the 
form of poetry comes into play; a site, Simic argues, that is best 
suited to prose (“The Spirit of Play” 29).  Brief disturbances of 
space with each sound enable the surrounding blank space to transform 
noun into question, without providing an answer.  It is a willed move 
to emptiness teasing with spiritual nostalgia confused with mental 
vacancy.  It is most centrally where the ordinariness of language 
admits the potential for revelation.  I urge the reader to recall the 
Coleridgean poetic of silence as absence identified by Larkin as “an 
inflection of how others are present as one way of opening to an 
other” (115).  In its modern form in the Weilean poetic, this urges 
the reader “to read the poem back from its fragmentary status” (Baker 
139), rather than reading the lines driving sense home. 
 
“A Theory of Everything” 
 
Until it deals with gravity and light 
and how they loose and bind 
all the ten thousand things 
 
I’ll settle for that reach of sunlit track 




the sound of water rushing through the pines 
towards us     and a scent 
 
unfolding from the earth, to draw us in 
 
-- a history of light 
and gravity   -- no more – 
 
for this is how the world 
occurs: not piecemeal 
        but entire 
and instantaneous 
the way we happen: 
 
woman         blackbird          man 
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I choose this poem for its location in this collection and as a final 
example of the phenomenological stance overriding poetic music.  This 
choice elevates the dual action of gravity and light as “loose[ning] 
and bind[ing]”, setting free and gathering where one can “settle” in 
the site of movement in time (the “reach”).  The poem is metaphor for 
an invocation of the imagination enfolding world inspirationally as 
an essence of world.  Heidegger speaks of things flashing (blitzen), 
as an entrance “into its own emitting of light” (Question 45). 
To Rilke this is reflected in the proper invisibility of world 
within human fleeting i.e. internalization where truth is one long 
internal season to the inner ear.  In this poem Burnside attempts the 
extensive time of the tenth elegy considered as “place and 
settlement, foundation and soil and home” (15).  The fourth and 
seventh lines echoed in “woman blackbird man” (17) suggests a form of 
disclosure where man, as much as his human other and creaturely 
other, is gazed upon and gathered in nearness.  The blackbird -- as 
transmigratory symbol of mourning that evolves into an Orphic 
messenger of relation and mutual belonging -- is one that postulates 
the unity of the ‘I’ rather than posits it as fixed grounding.  The 
effect is that the poem echoes the traces of prosperity from primal 
grief in Rilke’s principality of lament in the ninth -- the 
'protocosmic' thinking in daily relationships afforded by the witness 
to the naming of constellations.  As individual units spaced into 
singularity and emphasized by poetic breath, Burnside’s words flash 
outside of technological reckoning i.e. morphological, psychological, 
and the terms of decline, loss, fate, catastrophe, and destruction 
(Heidegger Question 48).  This song of the constellation of being is 
not a human utterance but suggestive “stillness”: the worlding of 
elements together into a gathering impregnated with potential and 
disclosure (49).  Here, the shallow artwork speaks of the occluded 
void as “the attempt to rebuild the shattered community of we” 
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(Graham “The Art of Poetry” 57).  Rather than mourning that considers 
death as terminus, Burnside’s bird recalls the “birdvoice of the 
deathlike one”, the soul not destined to death but “going under” into 
the realm of vespers, ghostliness, and the land of traces (Heidegger 
Language 197): it should be read as instigating a world of the third 
person in its presencing and occasional flight. 
Things that can gather “come to unite within the same” where they 
are “at rest within themselves” (“What Are Poets For?” Poetry 100).  
The poetic setting allows comparison of different things not to 
divorce into singularity, but giving the relation the same for each: 
to bring together earth (the gathering site) and human in earth (the 
song that names into existence and memory); as such, it is the 
vantage point of the total, historical process of nature. 
 
In the final analysis, a vacant modality is urged by the poem as 
primary ontology and means to secure the phenomenological experience 
as reference point to measure and map the self in relation to the 
unnamed fabric.  The presence of the ‘I’ is secured within this 
negative space of the reflexive pronoun “I’ll” indicating stance and 
futurity in one.  This is neither signification that indicates 
absence more than presence within the positing of sign, nor is it a 
transparent eyeball that alleviates language as mediator.  It is an 
involved and dispersed self across media and time.  It is what 
Poirier has noted as “compensatory emphasis” of the transitive, 
leading to substance (Poetry 136).  The fluxional emphasis within 
Burnside’s abstract vitality of qualia -- the way and how the world 
occurs -- reinstates the contradictory refraction and blurring of the 







Hannah Arendt speaks from an understanding of Benjamin’s poetic 
thought that conveys the spirit and its material manifestation as 
intimately connected.  Burnside borrows from Arendt to explicate his 
Stevens (Men in Dark Times, Stevens Selected).  The correspondence 
between the opposed concepts is paradigmatic of the metaphor for 
Arendt, which establishes a connection in immediacy that requires no 
interpretation: a material form given over to the invisible as 
linguistic transference that renders “it capable of being 
experienced” (Arendt 166).  The metaphysical acoustic space of 
language, therefore, is seen as part of the world essence (204-205), 
consonant with my Heideggerian explication of poetic language as an 
event (ch. 1).  This via Benjamin to Arendt, resituates our view on 
Burnside’s Stevens as poet of “intentionless” utterances of world 
essence.  Having posited eco-phenomenological poetics as intentional 
i.e. explicitly foregrounding mental state although often lowering 
the Kantian coordinative centre, the relinquished authority provides 
a particular ethical stance in the making/creating/writing process: 
 
Not to investigate the utilitarian or communicative faculties of 
linguistic creations, but to understand them in their 
crystallized and thus fragmentary forms (Arendt 205). 
 
Arendt’s concern for reading human experience with the “universe in 
its totality” is to convey not to explain “the experience of action” 
(Hammer 143), and I see this as a relevant context for approaching 
TLT’s final poem and the collection in totality.  Arendt’s concern 
understands humans as phenomenal beings who can regain a sense of 
play in and of the world outwith the modern life processes of 
production and consumption; it stresses that political thinking can 
come from the sensually perceived world, a site for Arendt where a 
corresponding “desire to care for and preserve the things of the 
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world” is to “instil a feel for what it means to cultivate the world” 
(144).  The larger emphasis in Burnside is to show his process of 
cultivation and to see these as natural changes developed by the 
human, especially heightened in his handling of phenomenology. 
 
In the final analysis, this last poem suggests certainty and 
spontaneity but primarily a disinterest where poet’s cultivation of 
nature extends to cultivation of spirit: the array of bird, woman, 
man, is an energia or actuality without goal and leaves no trace, a 
history that is regained in the activity of thinking.  The deployment 
of “I’ll” uncovers the subjunctive mood emoting possibility, 
necessity and judgement.  “I’ll settle” is a form of action or willed 
dwelling: the noethic act where the act of consciousness (noéisis) is 
driven by the content of consciousness (noéma).  But it is also a 
promotion of the phenomenological reduction of Husserl, the world as 
object of consciousness.  A final glance reads the third movement of 
the poem (12-17) as post-Husserlian being-in-the-world, the array of 
woman, blackbird, man for the ‘I’ and its thinking.  Therefore, it 
indicates both the provisional and the whole for it is tied to the 
noun/verb “settle” with an emphasis on comportment “for”.  This 
transitive sense operates throughout the poem and finds an 
“incremental process in which we are always beginning” (Hammer 130).  
Here fragments of the past, elements and a path (the array, and the 
“reach” driven out of memory and back into world action, stance) 
constitute grounds for the poet to re-enact founding.  Given over to 
the context of consciousness and the intentional stance this poem 
suggests that the Platonic separation of knowing and doing is 
negotiated by not offering the violence of origins but the ability to 
engineer the mind and construct an ethical comportment where the 
notion of founding falls to the sense of beginning, one that is a 
continuation of history. 
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The final lines to this collection suggest referentiality over 
originary experience.  It is the casting of words for the light to 
catch rather than as names to trap. 
 
Light in TLT, I argue, extends the German Idealist shift from 
interpretation of spiritual truth to the understanding of human 
action by promoting the way that meaning is communicated.  While 
Stevens has argued that “what we said of it became / A part of what 
it is... (“A Postcard from the Volcano” 15-16 Collected), Scigaj has 
restated the theory of poetry within the sense that ecopoetics 
requires, the larger sense of recreation.  Scigaj’s reading of A.R. 
Ammons: 
 
[an] outward movement from alienation and loneliness toward a 
more comfortable acceptance and celebration of the natural world 
parallels a deepening understanding of how the creative act of 
perception and its recreation in language is homologous to the 
operations of the energy-driven ecosystems of our planet (85). 
 
This complements Voros on process in Stevens (p. 34).  Man as one 
occurrence of physis alongside that of the plants and animals is the 
accomplishment of inaction that enables beings to exist in the 
“nameless” (“The Origin of the Work of Art”, Basic 199).  Although 
alone in his language world (205-206), by not determining how things 
appear (210), thinking can turn to the “recollection of [the] history 
that [primordially] unfolds itself” (211).  While Heidegger states 
that a dialogue with materialism is required before the holy region 
avails itself to thinking, Burnside enters the Surrealist provision 
of world.  Through Stevens and the influence of Simone Weil, he opens 
this into Eastern practice of meditation of proximity and 
involvement.80  Settlement upon the provisional in this manner 
                         
80 Burnside has indicated that this is driven by the Tao Te Ching, 
the “one significant factor in how [he] approach[es his] work” 
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suggests what Priest conceives as soul “what the unity of my 
consciousness consists in” (233), nature of experienced space 
thoroughly within things (234-35).  The poem, therefore, is a version 
of the temporal comportment of phenomenological intentionality 
(verhalten): capability embedded in living nature that holds us 
captive in our specific way and prior to subjective perspectivism. 
 
The last movement of the collection, as a model of parataxis 
shifting into an emphasis on prepositions without indication of 
relation is one that undermines poetic expectation and desire.  One 
wonders why this non-artistry is present at the culmination of such a 
conceptually wrought volume until one encounters the lack of period 
as a final grammatical relinquishment disordering Stevens’ line and 
promoting an “entirely provisional, achievement of order” (Burnside 
in Stevens Selected ix).  This is openness in the shift from 'nature' 
to 'life in the world', to view the process in which we can join 
offering the life of things not the agency of objects.  Furthermore, 
it appears to offer another version of the fact that “being there 
together is enough” (Stevens “Final Soliloquy of the Interior 
Paramour” Collected 18).  As with a grammarless and silent exit 
exhibited by the fragment par excellence and by evasion of simile, 
the trinity here crystallizes the presence of nature beside the 
intellect, the names as momentary passing and stillness that have 
come before and will return again.  These are events of poetic 
naming, not of a thing as being, but things in being (Heidegger 
Language 63), the operation of a single neighbourhood and inter-
subjective site or (non-)musical decreated structural harmony.  
Invisible and only available within the phenomenological domain 
unable to postulate its origin but always already thrown to a new 
                                                                      
(“Presiding Spirits” 12). 
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world where the ecological context transforms the ineffable into a 
material realm.  One can only turn to philosophical language in order 
to express a sense of enchainment, that is presence-absence 
underwritten by the unexpected and yet known, these are metaphors for 
a disclosed and fragile weakness that undermines the notion of power 






I. Closing Remarks 
 
The closing emphasis on freedom and departure in TAD is coupled to 
the availing freedom that terminates TLT.  Seen in unity they suggest 
movement as the source of life; as pre-figurations of TGN, they 
foresee that nature is no simple sanctuary: 
 
They should have guessed 
how earnestly the land conducts itself 
and how it longs for stories to contain: 
households and fiefdoms laid down in the dirt, 
the thumbprint on a harness or a knife, 
a cotton doll, a candy-coloured skirt, 
gas-stoves and ledgers falling through the earth 




Burnside’s collaboration with his contemporary, R.M.M. Crawford, the 
anthropologist and plant scientist of St Andrews, contemplates 
abandoned farms in Southeast Iceland as the symbolic frontier that is 
the history of buried landscapes, human settlements, and agriculture, 
in northern oceanic climates (“Science”; TGN).  The poem resists the 
polemic of settlement and negates territorial conceptions of 
belonging.  Its ground zero is the acknowledgement of the need for 
human and nature to evolve together within a consideration of human 
adaptability as a specialism in movement i.e. that belonging in 
particular habitats to which things are specially adapted can be 
viewed as the first step on the road to extinction.  This stoical 
escape from anthropocentricism also suggests the temporality of 
“stories to contain” world; that passing narratives as a formation 
within a continuum parallel Heideggerian presencing that allows 
things their ‘thingness’ without capture and exploitation.  The post-
Romantic principle that things without principle are the only true 
life, to Burnside, relates to the problem of the will (domination, 
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technology, epistemological frameworks) and the tendency to secure.  
When this is considered via transmutation of both destiny and 
responsibility, and within the relinquishing of goals and overseeing 
things that may promote anarchy, one must note that it is the self-
regulation of economies and ecologies that is being suggested by his 
ethos.  To read a fall “through light” that is self-extradition to 
the historical is to view this alive and in terms of involvement; it 
is an emphasis on separation as link, too (largely complementing 
Weil’s effacement into the nameless and Steven’s practice to 
elaborate and rework an oeuvre).  Harrison, through the territory of 
New England scholarship reminds us that “to dwell” is to “go astray”: 
 
The substantive disagreement with Heidegger, shared by Emerson 
and Thoreau, is that the achievement of the human requires not 
inhabitation and settlement but abandonment (Cavell 138; cited 
Harrison 265). 
 
As one may read in the closure to TAD, in leaving is the discovery 
that something has been settled: this something is the abandonment of 
self to world, the enthusiasm of Thoreauvian living deliberately, 
which as “craving for reality” (Harrison 222) is a move towards flux, 





My literary review of Burnside scholarship has suggested the need for 
an engagement with Emerson, James, and Santayana, to the degree that 
they bridge the Romantic and the phenomenological.  My readings of 
Burnside’s poetry suggests that the influence of Bergson, Deleuze, 
and Heidegger are not foreign to this American dimension, and by 
implication it proposes that deeper engagement with New England 
universities and theories of consciousness in the American 
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nineteenth-century parallels and is in tension with the European 
twentieth-century post-humanist models of thought that present 
themselves directly to Burnside. 
Heidegger’s critique of technology spells how the one-dimensional 
disclosure of earth as pure resource is a result not of human 
decision-making but of the developments of being within history.  
Burnside’s politics of dominion relinquishes this particular historic 
trajectory in its promotion of the human receiving and giving 
simultaneously.  The emphasis is upon dynamism and relation rather 
than control.  It can be viewed as co-creation.  As fluidity, it can 
be critiqued for its connotation of quietism in an age where human 
action appears crucial.  The emphasis on stillness suggests the 
impasse that humans face in approaching the ecological catastrophe 
while the poetry mediates between desire and asceticism.  A defence 
can be raised by the suggestion of metaphysical incompletion without 
the other, particularly poignant in TLT and its closing poem.  Love 
as the discovery of continuation across bodies, re-enactments of the 
world’s creations, and compassionate affirmation of the other, is 
represented by the fleeting blackbird.  This bird externalizes a 
mental process while its presence is given an inward occasion as an 
idea.  This is the ability to summon images, and for consciousness to 
attain itself via naming, but most crucially, it is mind as the 
habitat in which it moves, and it is nothing without inter-relation.  
In the final poem to TLT (“A Theory of Everything”) the closing line 
enables phenomenology to inform the false dichotomy between human and 
nature: we do not experience the human and the nature of sites in 
singularity, but we experience them holistically.  The dialectic is 
one of co-dependence between the human contribution and the natural 
process.  With this understanding of how the world figures for us we 
see no separating out and we better understand what makes human 
activities and the experience of phenomena possible.  We do not read 
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givens but context, setting and the backdrop in which all things 
reveal themselves: nature experienced in human practice. 
Finally, Burnside’s apocalyptic lens suggests the completion of 
metaphysics lies in proximity to the extreme oblivion of all life.  
His post-Romantic treatment of togetherness and separation, solipsism 
and community, the individual and community, learns from the 
constellation of the parsed and wider self, and poetics of inclusion 
over incorporation.  The contradiction between a non-anthropocentric 
ethic and authorial commitment in the lyric beyond the 
phenomenological (as a means to historically contextualize and 
promote the intention of the ‘I’) is perhaps less incoherent than a 
philosophy which advances subjective experience into the 
fundamental/sole basis of knowledge while demolishing the idea of the 
subject: the shift into the nameless is to enter into the larger ‘we’ 
where the I still resides, albeit heterophenomenologically.  Thus the 
metaphysical implications of ecology, no longer marginalized as an 
imaginative alterity set against social actuality but a discourse 
driven by it, delivers the possibilities of making sense of 
experience and confidently shaping a sense of home. 
 
II. New Directions 
 
As prolegomenon, this thesis has introduced important concepts and 
lines of thought that provide a framework for future advanced studies 
of Burnside and his contemporaries.  I have suggested that my 
counters assist the closing of the gap between Wordsworth and 
Burnside via American literature and ecocriticism.  The ecology of 
ideas that are present negates a final level of distillation.   
Furthermore, the poet’s exaltation of figures of exile -- Osip 
Mandelstam, Karl Marx, Benjamin, Dante, Guillén etc. -- seems to 
override the theological hinterland that derives from a Catholic 
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schooling and temporal terminus at St Andrews.  However, I argue that 
a first move to Burnside should read deep ecological psychology 
critically in terms of the degree that this offers compensatory 
transcendence, an understanding of exile, and the platform for right 
dwelling.  I have read this via ecocriticism’s view on human-nature 
relationships and I argue that Burnside’s mysticism is rescued by the 
political acuity of his ethics.  Moreover, “History” (2) forwards the 
unstable role of mental and geographical place/stance in the creative 
process.  The poem highlights how the maker shuttles between communal 
situation and personal conflict, and how this energy colours the 
quest for coherence and integrity of our actions in a disintegrated 
and fragile world. 
 
Kit Fan has read of the “pivot between necessity and obedience” (129) 
in the circulation of Simone Weil’s influence in contemporary 
American poetics, providing Jorie Graham a site to “articulate a 
lyrical ‘attempt’ at ‘praying’ [“Praying (Attempt of June 6 ’03)”, 
Overlord, 2005]” (133).  This Eliotian depersonalization, or 
extinction of personality in the nameless, finds a connection to 
Kantian disinterest and to Burnside’s call to dehumanize and be 
faceless (GS).  My reading of Burnside suggests that an additional 
imperative is to balance this against historical facticity, memory, 
and portent, leading to another version of doubt upon the stability 
of self and autonomy of experience. 
Furthermore, while consideration of masculinity and violence in 
relation to this as determinant for men “intrinsically involved and 
corrupted by power” (Burnside “Masculinity” 122), which requires 
“transcendence of any need for power or control”, it should not be 
considered in isolation.  I have offered the role of the father 
figure as character in the poems and the significant masculine symbol 
of power in terms other than gendered or psychological states, but as 
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a return to thoughts on difference and otherness in terms of 
consanguinity.  Over and above paternalistic faith, the promotion of 
interrelation, commonalities, and affinity in Burnside’s particular 
instance, show oneness bereft of origin (AL); his turn to life, which 
resists both looking inwards, and piety toward origin and locality, 
is one made via mourning.  To measure his depiction of power against 
his ethical stance would extend these symbols into a framework where 
aspiration ranks higher than desire.  This cannot decouple from the 
stoical stress on intelligibility, one that secures future desires 
and relishes present richness knowingly compromised by biotic 
impoverishment.  Here, a worthwhile life may evolve.  Burnside’s 
poetry reflects upon the fact that our ideals cannot be fought in 
sincerity without firm ground, that our values arise from the virtue 
of wisdom that sees meaningful relations above the packaged world.  
The interchange of animal worlds, the craft of husbandry, and the 
learning of diverse habitats are the agglomerate of death and life 
and instinct for confidence and skill (Bachelard 103-104) known to 
feed the soul. 
I have resisted extending these counters too far.  Burnside’s 
sensitivity to modes of power, the combined use of science and 
theology, his particular use of flora and fauna, the infusion of the 
natural with the urban and technological into one realm, all suggest 
further investigation.  In Burnside’s poetry, the sensorial meets the 
phenomenological as a means to sing that life has meaning beyond the 
immediate gratification of the senses, which as a stance in itself, 
bears upon the human predicament.  Rather than looking backwards, it 
is the predicament of being instilled in the future perfect tense in 
relation to material events, where worlds (past, present, and future) 
endure in one still moment.  Yet the problematic of the 
phenomenological lyric in Burnside’s hands, as indicated above, 
instils all poetry as continuum that knows no perfect tense, and 
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while it can act as an agent against the poetic it can also gesture 
toward a level of reality and pure energy without time and space.  It 
may relinquish music and poetic effect in attempt to forward the 
unmade and free; in Bergsonian terms it would be the one with number 
in potential, virtual coexistence of pure space.  This site can be 
claimed by historical materialism and it could further illuminate the 
phase of late capitalism that is the oeuvre’s context. 
 
III. Closing Reflections on Cultural Studies 
 
I have argued for TLT as a peak in Burnside’s metaphysics before GS 
and I have stated that it forwards revelation over verification.  
This has been borne out and influenced by my Heideggerian critical 
apparatus applied to Th onwards to outline Greek alethia -– 
unconcealedness, over Roman veritas -- correspondence of mind to 
thing.  It has also offered poetic correspondences across metaphor 
and ecology.  Spanos reminds us that veritas is an “end-oriented mode 
of inquiry” (152), a will to power of sorts of the naturalized 
spatial trope (163).  This he contrasts to post-modernist open-ended 
poeisis, and suggests that end-oriented literary forms, such as 
cultural studies, abandon the intellectual (and spiritual) quest and 
posit desire for the world picture and in-so-doing lose the 
revolutionary initiative to “rethink thinking/poeisis” (154).  Spanos 
is setting in opposition the decentred ontological centre and 
hyperrealism.  What levels of realism or errancy in Burnside, and 
what role ecocriticism here? 
One could argue for a lack of structure and instrumentalist 
language in Burnside’s poetry; one, too, could argue that a 
persuasive and manipulative phenomenological thread and urgency in 
the voice are part of the colonizing of thinking that the world 
picture achieves -- moreover, the ideology of ecological decline is 
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the ultimate world picture and conservative metanarrative.  However, 
ecocritical emphases that read sensitive, personal, and local 
pictures and history show care both for craft and its position within 
contemporary discourse.  Burnside’s inquiry, I argue, defines the 
interregnum that poetry can operate within and works to sustain the 
unhomed thinker, who, in Spanos’ frame, speaks an unsayable language 
unanswerable to the public and colonized realm (189).  This reminds 
Americanists of Emerson’s “thoughts and principles not marketable or 
perishable” (“The Transcendentalist” Collected 1: 216): poetry as a 
form of dissidence that survives “In the valley of its making where 
executives / Would never want to tamper” (Auden “In Memory of W.B. 
Yeats” Abrams et al. 2506-07, 2: 6-7; Burnside Polemic 7-8).  A 
cultural study of the poetics of ecological consciousness in the 
twenty-first century will inevitably meet case studies of this kind, 
its task is to illuminate their interfaces with a tradition and its 
particularly unique contours, textures, and philosophical 
perspectives that can be verified. 
 
Having outlined an approach to Burnside it is yet unclear whether a 
reformulation of the theoretical foundation should reflect merely 
ecocritical concerns.  However, it is indisputable if further work 
needs to deviate at all from a critical distaste for the technique of 
living that has surpassed the wild and artful game of life Burnside 
celebrates.  The theatre as embodiment of life over static and 
virtual politico-economical simulacrum is where a sustainable and 
evolutionary revisionist stance of internationalism, plurality, and 
diversity operates.  It may have to give sway to the local redress.  
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